Cases by Issue - State Regulation of Business

American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1230

Petitioner

American Trucking Associations, Inc. and USF Holland, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan Public Service Commission, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 03-1234

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 14, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, April 26, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Henry J. Boynton (argued the cause for Respondents)

Malcolm L. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondents)

James H. Hanson (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1234)

Robert Digges, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1230)

Facts of the Case

Michigan law required every truck engaged in intrastate commercial hauling to pay a flat $100 annual fee. Interstate trucking companies asked Michigan courts to invalidate the fee, claiming the flat fee discriminated against interstate carriers and imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate trade (in violation of the "dormant" commerce clause). They pointed to the fact that trucks carrying both interstate and intrastate loads engaged in intrastate business less than trucks that only haul within Michigan. State courts refused to invalidate the fee.

Question

Did a Michigan law requiring every truck engaged in intrastate commercial hauling to pay a fee violate burden interstate trade in violation of the dormant commerce clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that Michigan's fee did not violate the dormant commerce clause because the fee was imposed only on intrastate transactions and did not facially discriminate against interstate or out-of-state activities or enterprises. The dormant commerce clause did not, Breyer wrote, ban such a "neutral" and "locally focused fee."

Granholm v. Heald

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1116

Petitioner

Jennifer M. Granholm, Governor of Michigan, et al.

Respondent

Edward D. Kelly, Chairman, New York Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, State Liquor Authority, et al.

Consolidation

Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Association v. Eleanor Heald et al., No. 03-1120

Juanita Swedenburg, et al. v. Edward D. Kelly, Chairman, New York Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, State Liquor Authority, et al., No. 03-1274

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 460 (2005)

Granted

Monday, May 24, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, December 7, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 16, 2005

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1116 & 03-1120)

Clint Bolick (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1274)

Kathleen M. Sullivan (argued the cause for Respondents in 03-1116 & 03-1120)

Caitlin J. Halligan (argued the cause for Respondents in 03-1274)

Facts of the Case

Michigan and New York laws allowed in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers but restricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so. In separate cases groups sued the states and argued the laws violated the U.S. Constitution's "dormant" commerce clause. The dormant commerce clause prohibited states from passing laws affecting interstate commerce, particularly laws favoring in-state business over out-of-state business. The states argued the laws were valid exercises of state power under the 21st Amendment, which ended federal Prohibition and allowed states to regulate alcohol importation. A federal district court ruled for Michigan. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Michigan law violated the dormant commerce clause and did not advance the core concerns of the 21st Amendment (such as temperance). A separate federal district court ruled against New York. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the 21st Amendment allowed New York's law.

Question

Does a state law that allows in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers, but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so, violate the dormant commerce clause in light of the 21st Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Heald, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that both states' laws violated the commerce clause by favoring in-state wineries at the expense of out-of-state wineries and did so without the authorization of the 21st Amendment. State authority to engage in such economic discrimination was not the purpose the 21st Amendment. Moreover, in modern cases, that amendment did not save state laws violating other provisions of the Constitution.

Fitzgerald v. Racing Association of Central Iowa

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-695

Petitioner

Fitzgerald

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Racing Association of Central Iowa

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 103 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, April 29, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 9, 2003

Advocates

Mark McCormick (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Thomas J. Miller (Iowa, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kent L. Jones (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A group of racetracks that earn revenue from gambling sued the state of Iowa, claiming that the state's practice of taxing racetrack gambling at a higher rate than riverboat gambling violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The group asserted that gambling at racetracks and riverboat casinos is is not substantially different, and that the state should therefore charge the same tax rate for both activities. A state district court sided with the state, ruling that important differences did exist between riverboat and racetrack gambling; the Iowa Supreme Court reversed in a 4-3 decision.

Question

Do different tax rates levied against racetrack and casino gambling violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fitzgerald, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Iowa's differential tax rate, which distinguishes between adjusted revenues from slot machines at racetracks and revenues from riverboat slot machines, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the facts did not preclude an inference that the reason for the different tax rates was to help the riverboat industry or the river communities. Thus, the Court reasoned there was a rational basis for the law.

Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:54:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-950

Petitioner

Hillside Dairy Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lyons

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 01-1018

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 59 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, April 22, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 9, 2003

Advocates

Roy T. Englert, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Barbara B. McDowell (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Mark J. Urban (Sacramento, California, argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

California regulates the minimum price paid to dairy farmers producing raw milk by establishing price minimums and requiring contributions to a price equalization pool. After it became profitable for some California processors to buy raw milk from out-of-state producers, the California Department of Food and Agriculture amended its regulations to require contributions to the price equalization pool on some out-of-state purchases. Four dairy farms in Nevada filed suit, alleging that the amendment unconstitutionally discriminated against them. Without reaching the merits, the District Court dismissed both cases. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 immunized California's milk pricing and pooling laws from Commerce Clause challenge. The appellate court also held that the individual petitioners' Privileges and Immunities Clause claims failed because the amendment did not create classifications based on any individual's residency or citizenship.

Question

Does the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 exempt California's milk pricing and pooling regulations from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause? Are individual claims under the Privileges and Immunities Clause against California's required contributions to the price equalization pool on some out-of-state purchases foreclosed because those regulations do not discriminate on their face on the basis of state citizenship or state residence?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Hillside Dairy Inc., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 7 U.S.C. 7254

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held, 8-1, that, because the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 did not clearly express an intent to insulate California's pricing and pooling laws from a Commerce Clause challenge, the Court of Appeals erred in relying on it to dismiss the case. The Court also held, 9-0, that the appellate court erred in rejecting the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim on the ground that the California laws did not, on their face, create classifications based on any individual's residency or citizenship. The Court reasoned that the absence of an express statement identifying out-of-state citizenship as a basis for disparate treatment was not a sufficient basis for rejecting the claim. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part.

Pharmaceutical Research v. Walsh

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-188

Petitioner

Pharmaceutical Research

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Walsh

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 644 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, January 22, 2003

Decided

Monday, May 19, 2003

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Andrew S. Hagler (Augusta, Maine, argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In order to achieve savings on Medicaid purchases above federal cost-saving measures, the "Maine Rx" Program reduces prescription drug prices for state residents. Under the program, Maine attempts negotiate rebates with drug manufacturers. If a company does not enter into a rebate agreement, its Medicaid sales are subjected to a prior authorization procedure that requires state agency approval to qualify a doctor's prescription for reimbursement. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of nonresident drug manufacturers, challenged the program, claiming that it is pre-empted by the Medicaid Act and violates the Commerce Clause. Without resolving any factual issues, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction preventing the statute's implementation, concluding that any obstacle to the federal program's administration is sufficient to establish pre-emption. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Is a Maine statute providing for affordable prescription drugs pre-empted by the Supremacy Clause? Does the statute violate the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Walsh, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held, 9-0, that the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America had not carried its burden of showing a probability of success on the merits of its Commerce Clause claims and, 6-3, that their showing was insufficient to support a finding that the Medicaid Act pre-empts Maine's Rx Program insofar as it threatens to coerce manufacturers into reducing their prices on non- Medicaid sales. The Court's decision upheld the Court of Appeal's reversal of the District Court's injunction. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, dissented from the plurality's opinion. "By imposing prior authorization on Maine's Medicaid population to achieve wholly non-Medicaid related goals, Maine Rx 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives' of the federal Medicaid Act," argued Justice O'Connor.

Yellow Transportation, Inc. v. Michigan

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-270

Petitioner

Yellow Transportation, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 36 (2002)

Argued

Monday, October 7, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, November 5, 2002

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (On behalf of the respondents)

Charles A. Rothfeld (On behalf of the petitioner)

Austin C. Schlick (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Before 1994, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) allowed States to charge interstate motor carriers annual registration fees of up to $10 per vehicle. Under this system, some States discounted or waived registration fees for carriers from other States in exchange for reciprocal treatment. Under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), the ICC implemented a new registration system. ISTEA also capped state registration fees by establishing a fee system that "will result in a fee for each participating State that is equal to the fee?that such State collected or charged as of?1991." In 1991, the Michigan Public Service Commission did not levy a fee for Yellow Transportation, Inc.'s trucks pursuant to a reciprocal agreement. However, in 1992, the commission changed how it computed fees and, ultimately, levied a fee of $10 per vehicle on Yellow Transportation's entire fleet. Yellow Transportation sued, alleging that, because Michigan had not collected or charged a 1991 registration fee for those trucks, ISTEA's fee-cap provision prohibits Michigan from levying a fee for them. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that reciprocity agreements are not relevant in determining what fee a State charged or collected as of 1991. The court reasoned that the new fee system is not based on the fees collected from one company, but at the generic fee Michigan charged or collected from carriers as of 1991.

Question

Did the Michigan Supreme Court err in holding that, under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, only a State's generic fee is relevant to determining the fee that was collected or charged as of November 15, 1991?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Yellow Transportation, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 14504

Yes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that, because the ICC's interpretation of ISTEA's fee-cap provision that States may not renounce or modify a reciprocity agreement so as to alter any fee charged or collected as of that date was permissible reading, the Michigan Supreme Court erred in declining to enforce it. "Under the ICC's rule, where a State waives its registration fee, its 'fee?collected or charged' is zero and must remain zero," wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice O'Connor concluded," to allow States to disavow their reciprocity agreements so as to alter any fee charged or collected as of November 15, 1991, would potentially permit States to increase their revenues substantially under the new system, a result that the ICC quite reasonably believed Congress did not intend." Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment.

C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town Of Clarkstown, New York

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:26 +0000

Location

C & A Carbone Inc.

183 Western Highway West Nyack NY 10994

West Nyack, NY 10994

United States

41° 5' 2.526" N, 73° 57' 41.9148" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1402

Petitioner

C & A Carbone, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Town Of Clarkstown, New York

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 383 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, December 7, 1993

Decided

Monday, May 16, 1994

Advocates

Betty Jo Christian (on behalf of the Petitioners)

William C. Brashares (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A New York town, Clarkstown, allowed a contractor to construct and operate a waste processing plant within town limits. The revenue from the plant would help compensate the contractor. Clarkstown promised that the plant would receive 120,000 tons of solid waste each year, and permitted the contractor to charge an $81 "tipping fee" for each ton received. To meet the 120,000 ton quota, Clarkstown adopted a "flow control ordinance." The ordinance required that all solid waste flowing into and out of the town pass through the new plant. C & A Carbone, Inc. operated a similar plant within the town. To avoid paying the $81 fee, Carbone trucked processed waste directly to an Indiana landfill. In 1991, a Carbone truck carrying illegal waste crashed and police discovered that Carbone was violating the ordinance. Clarkstown sued Carbone in a New York Supreme Court. Carbone responded by suing Clarkstown in a federal District Court, claiming that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause by disrupting interstate commerce. The District Court agreed but dissolved its injunction against Clarkstown when the New York Supreme Court ruled in favor of Clarkstown.

Question

Does a town's "flow control ordinance," which requires that all waste pass through a certain waste processing plant, violate the interstate Commerce Clause by disrupting commerce for waste processing plants in other states?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for C & A Carbone, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. Tthe Court held 6-3 that the Commerce Clause invalidates local laws that discriminate against interstate commerce, disrupt the flow of articles of commerce, and grant municipalities disproportionate market gains. In an opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court found that "the article of commerce...is the service of processing and disposing of [waste]." The Court held that the flow ordinance was discriminatory because "[i]t hoards solid waste...for the benefit of the preferred processing facility." For the ordinance to be constitutional, the municipality would have had to prove that its effects on commerce are nondiscriminatory and justified by a "legitimate local interest."

Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department Of Natural Resources

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-636

Petitioner

Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan Department Of Natural Resources et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

504 U.S. 353 (1992)

Argued

Monday, March 30, 1992

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1992

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (on behalf of the Respondents)

Harold B. Finn, III (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

General Motors Corp. v. Romein

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1390

Petitioner

General Motors Corp. et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Romein et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

503 U.S. 181 (1992)

Argued

Tuesday, December 10, 1991

Decided

Monday, March 9, 1992

Advocates

Theodore Sachs (on behalf of the Respondents)

Kenneth S. Geller (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Romein, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10, Paragraph 1: Contract Clause

None

Healy v. The Beer Institute

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:06 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-449

Appellee

The Beer Institute

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Healy

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 88-513

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

491 U.S. 324 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, March 28, 1989

Decided

Monday, June 19, 1989

Advocates

Robert F. Vacchelli (on behalf of the Appellants)

Jeffrey Ives Glekel (on behalf of the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for The Beer Institute, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Northwest Cent. Pipeline v. Kan. Corp. Comm'n

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-1856

Appellee

Kan. Corp. Comm'n

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Northwest Cent. Pipeline

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

489 U.S. 493 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, November 29, 1988

Decided

Monday, March 6, 1989

Advocates

Frank A. Caro, Jr. (on behalf of the Appellees)

Harold L. Talisman (on behalf of the Appellant)

Michael R. Lazerwitz (as Amici Curiae supporting Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Kan. Corp. Comm'n, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 6, Section 2: Supremacy Clause

None

Cts Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. Of America

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-71

Appellee

Dynamics Corp. Of America

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Cts Corp.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 86-97

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

481 U.S. 69 (1987)

Argued

Monday, March 2, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, April 21, 1987

Advocates

John F. Pritchard (on behalf of Appellant Indiana)

James A. Strain (on behalf of Appellant CTS Corporation)

Lowell E. Sachnoff (on behalf of Appellee Dynamics Corporation of America, et al)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Cts Corp., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Brown-Forman Distillers v. N. Y. Liquor Auth.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-2030

Appellee

N. Y. Liquor Auth.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Brown-Forman Distillers

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

476 U.S. 573 (1986)

Argued

Monday, March 3, 1986

Decided

Tuesday, June 3, 1986

Advocates

Lloyd E. Constantine (on behalf of the appellee)

Macdonald Flinn (on behalf of the appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Brown-Forman Distillers, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:16 +0000

Location

Kansas State Legislature

300 SW 10th Ave Topeka KS 66612

Topeka, KS 66612

United States

39° 2' 48.12" N, 95° 40' 43.1544" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-1370

Appellee

Energy Reserves Group

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Kansas Power & Light

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

459 U.S. 400 (1983)

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 1982

Decided

Monday, January 24, 1983

Advocates

Gary W. Davis (on behalf of the Appellant)

Basil W. Kelsey (on behalf of the Appellee)

Facts of the Case

The Kansas Power & Light Company (KPL) entered long-term contracts in 1977 governing its purchase of natural gas from the Energy Reserves Group (ERG), a Kansas-based oil company. The contracts contained "price escalator" clauses which provided for gas prices to rise to the levels set by governmental authorities. In 1978, the federal government established a new system for regulating natural gas prices under the Natural Gas Policy Act. The Act set maximum lawful prices that could be charged for different types of natural gas and applied these price levels to intrastate gas markets. The Act allowed states to set maximum price levels below federal levels, which Kansas did under the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act (Kansas Act). When ERG tried to raise its prices to the higher federal levels using the "price escalator" clause, KPL insisted that it was only legally obligated to buy gas at the lower prices set by the Kansas Act. ERG claimed that KPL violated the contract by refusing to pay federal prices. In response, KPL argued that the Kansas Act clearly prohibited the use of federal price levels to trigger "price escalator" clauses. After a state trial court ruled in favor of KPL, ERG claimed that the Kansas Act violated the Contract Clause by preventing federal price changes from affecting state contracts. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the Kansas Act did not violate the Contract Clause since it was a legitimate effort by the state of Kansas to protect its economy from rapid price changes.

Question

Did the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act violate the Contract Clause by preventing federal price controls on natural gas from affecting price adjustments made under intrastate contracts?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Kansas Power & Light, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10, Paragraph 1: Contract Clause

No. Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court determined that ERG did not have its contractual rights "substantially impaired" and found that the state of Kansas had "significant and legitimate public purpose[s]" for passing the Kansas Act. The contract between ERG and KPL facilitated changes in prices according to governmental price controls, and the new state price controls adhered to federal guidelines. In passing the Kansas Act, the state "exercised its police powers to protect consumers from the escalation of natural gas prices." The Natural Gas Policy Act set maximum price levels for natural gas but explicitly permitted states to lower these levels. Therefore "price escalator" clauses included in intrastate contracts would adhere to lawfully enacted state price levels.

White v. Mass. Council Of Constr. Employers

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-1003

Petitioner

White

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mass. Council Of Constr. Employers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

460 U.S. 204 (1983)

Argued

Monday, November 1, 1982

Decided

Monday, February 28, 1983

Advocates

Paul J. Kingston (on behalf of the Respondents)

Laurence H. Tribe (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for White, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Rice v. Norman Williams Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-1012

Petitioner

Rice

Respondent

Norman Williams Co.

Consolidation

No. 80-1030

No. 80-1052

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

458 U.S. 654 (1982)

Argued

Wednesday, April 21, 1982

Decided

Thursday, July 1, 1982

Advocates

John R. McDonough (on behalf of Petitioners in 80-1030 and 80-1052)

George J. Roth (on behalf of the Petitioner in 80-1012)

George G. Weickhardt (on behalf of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Rice, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Sherman

None

New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-1208

Petitioner

New Hampshire

Respondent

New England Power Co.

Consolidation

No. 80-1471

No. 80-1610

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

455 U.S. 331 (1982)

Argued

Monday, December 7, 1981

Decided

Wednesday, February 24, 1982

Advocates

Donald K. Stern (on behalf of the Appellants in No. 80-1471 and No. 80-1610)

Gregory H. Smith (Attorney General of New Hampshire, on behalf of the Appellees)

Samuel Huntington (on behalf of the Appellant in No. 80-1208)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for New England Power Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

G. D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-644

Petitioner

G. D. Searle & Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cohn

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

455 U.S. 404 (1982)

Argued

Monday, December 7, 1981

Decided

Wednesday, February 24, 1982

Advocates

Walter R. Cohn (on behalf of the Respondents)

William P. Richmond (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for G. D. Searle & Co., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

None

Edgar v. Mite Corporation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-1188

Appellee

Mite Corporation

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Edgar

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

457 U.S. 624 (1982)

Argued

Monday, November 30, 1981

Decided

Wednesday, June 23, 1982

Advocates

Eugene D. Berman (Argued the cause for the State of New York as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Stephen M. Shapiro (Argued the cause for the Securities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae urging affirmance)

Richard W. Hulbert (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Russell C. Grimes, Jr. (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Facts of the Case

The MITE Corp, organized under Delaware laws with its principal office in Connecticut, initiated a tender offer for all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., an Illinois corporation. The Illinois Business Take-Over Act requires a tender offeror to notify the Secretary of State and the target company of its intent to make a tender offer and the terms of the offer 20 days before the offer becomes effective. During that time, the target company, but not the offeror, is free to disseminate information about the offer to the target company's shareholders. In addition, the Secretary of State could call a hearing, and the offer could not proceed until the hearing was completed. Finally, the Secretary of State could deny registration of a takeover offer he or she found inequitable. MITE Corp. sought and won a declaratory judgment holding that the Illinois Act was pre-empted by the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f), and that it violated the Commerce Clause.

Question

Is the Illinois Business Take-Over Act unconstitutional under the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Mite Corporation, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes, with regard to the Commerce Clause. The Illinois Act imposes burdens on interstate commerce that are excessive in light of the local interests the Act purports to further. Among the ways a corporation can be covered by the Act is if 10% of the class of equity securities subject to the offer is owned by shareholders located in Illinois. Thus Illinois would have the power to determine whether a tender offer may proceed even if made for a corporation incorporated and having a principal place of business outside of Illinois, with up to 90% of the shareholders residing outside of Illinois. Illinois's asserted interest in protecting resident security holders is insufficient to outweigh the burdens Illinois would impose on interstate commerce. In addition, Illinois's asserted interest in regulating the internal affairs of a corporation incorporated under its laws not only fails to justify the Act's coverage of foreign corporations, but transfers of stock to a third party do not implicate the internal affairs of a corporation.

Kassell v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of DL

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-1320

Appellee

Consolidated Freightways Corp. of DL

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Kassell

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

450 U.S. 662 (1981)

Argued

Tuesday, November 4, 1980

Decided

Tuesday, March 24, 1981

Advocates

Mark E. Schantz (on behalf of the Appellants)

John H. Lederer (on behalf of the Appellee)

Facts of the Case

An Iowa law restricted the length of vehicles traveling on its highways. Iowa justified the law as a reasonable use of its police power to assure safety on the state's roads.

Question

Did the law pose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Consolidated Freightways Corp. of DL, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

The Court held that the law violated the Commerce Clause for two reasons. First, Iowa could not prove that the vehicles it targeted posed potential danger to highway travelers. The safety interest was "illusory." Second, the law was "out of step with the laws of all other Midwestern and Western States" which did not have similar regulations. This placed significant burdens on the flow of interstate commerce

Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:14 +0000

Location

Minnesota State Legislature

100 Constitution Ave St. Paul MN 55103

St. Paul, MN 55103

United States

44° 57' 16.2288" N, 93° 6' 13.6224" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-1171

Petitioner

Minnesota

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Clover Leaf Creamery Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

449 U.S. 456 (1981)

Argued

Monday, November 3, 1980

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 1981

Advocates

Leonard J. Keyes (on behalf of the Respondents)

Kenneth E. Raschke, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Harlon L. Dalton (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Facts of the Case

Minnesota enacted a statute prohibiting the sale of milk and milk products in non-refillable, non-returnable plastic containers. Clover Leaf Creamery sued to overturn the law. A Minnesota District Court found that the statute did not fulfill the legislature's purpose. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision.

Question

Did the Minnesota statute violate the Commerce clause of Article I or the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Minnesota, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No and no. Writing for the majority in a 7-1 decision, Justice William J. Brennan Jr. maintained that Minnesota's statute was not unconstitutional, acknowledging that the legislature had an interest in promoting resource conservation and resolving solid waste disposal issues. The difference between non-reusable plastic containers and paper or reusable plastic containers was "rationally related" to the legislature's purpose, and therefore not unconstitutional under the rational basis test set forth in New Orleans v. Dukes. The statute banned sale of all milk in the specified containers and did not distinguish by seller, and therefore did not violate the commerce clause. Justice Powell wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Reeves Inc. v. Stake

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-677

Petitioner

Reeves Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Stake

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

447 U.S. 429 (1980)

Argued

Wednesday, April 16, 1980

Decided

Thursday, June 19, 1980

Advocates

Dennis M. Kirven (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

William J. Janklow (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The state of South Dakota operated a cement plant. A substantial percentage of the plant's production was sold to buyers outside the state. One such customer was Reeves, Inc., a concrete distributor in Wyoming that obtained over 90 percent of its cement from the state-run plant. In 1978, for economic reasons, the South Dakota plant began supplying in-state customers before honoring other commitments. Reeves, Inc. challenged South Dakota's "hoarding" of resources.

Question

Did South Dakota's preferential system violate the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Stake, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. and found that "'[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.'" The Court found that South Dakota was acting as a "market participant" rather than a "market regulator," and was capable of withdrawing from the interstate market if an in-state shortage arose. The Court rejected arguments that cement was a "natural resource" to which South Dakota had sought to limit outside access.

Lewis v. Bt Investment Managers, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-45

Appellee

Bt Investment Managers, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Lewis

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

447 U.S. 27 (1980)

Argued

Tuesday, January 15, 1980

Decided

Monday, June 9, 1980

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lewis, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Marquette Nat. Bank v. First Of Omaha Corp.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-1265

Petitioner

Marquette Nat. Bank

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

First Of Omaha Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 77-1258

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

439 U.S. 299 (1978)

Argued

Tuesday, October 31, 1978

Decided

Monday, December 18, 1978

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for First Of Omaha Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 12 U.S.C. 85

None

Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:12 +0000

Location

Allied Structural Steel Company: Industrial Construction Division

9216 Grand Avenue South Minneapolis MN 54420

Minneapolis, MN 54420

United States

44° 50' 10.6692" N, 93° 17' 10.0356" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-747

Appellee

Spannaus

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Allied Structural Steel Co.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

438 U.S. 234 (1978)

Argued

Tuesday, April 25, 1978

Decided

Monday, June 26, 1978

Advocates

George B. Christensen (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Byron E. Starns (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

In 1974, Minnesota adopted legislation which required private employers to pay a fee if they terminated employee pension plans or if they moved their offices from the state, leaving insufficient funds to cover pensions for ten-year employees. This law affected Allied Structural Steel as the company began closing offices in Minnesota. Even though the employees affected by the closing were not entitled to pensions under the terms of their employment with the company, according to the Minnesota law, they were. The company was ordered to pay approximately $185,000 to comply with the statute's provisions.

Question

Did Minnesota's Private Pension Benefits Protection Act violate the Contract Clause of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Allied Structural Steel Co., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10, Paragraph 1: Contract Clause

The Court found that the Minnesota law did violate the Constitution as it "substantially altered" the provisions of pension agreements which Allied Steel had with its employees. Citing the importance that the Framers placed on private contracts in the conduct of business, Justice Stewart found that the act's effect was "severe" as it nullified terms of t he company's obligations to its employees and imposed an "unexpected liability in potentially disabling amounts." Furthermore, the law was narrowly targeted at employers who had decided to establish employee pension plans, and it did not seek to deal with broad economic and social problems.

Philadelphia v. New Jersey

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:11 +0000

Location

New Jersey State Legislature

25 W State St Trenton NJ 08608

Trenton, NJ 08608

United States

40° 13' 13.5192" N, 74° 46' 1.3224" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-404

Petitioner

New Jersey

Respondent

Philadelphia

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

437 U.S. 617 (1978)

Argued

Monday, March 27, 1978

Decided

Friday, June 23, 1978

Advocates

Herbert F. Moore (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Stephen Skillman (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

A New Jersey law prohibited the importation of most "solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State."

Question

Did New Jersey's waste importation law violate the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Philadelphia, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. The Court held that the law violated the principle of nondiscrimination as it treated out-of-state waste differently than waste produced within the state. Since New Jersey could not demonstrate a legitimate reason for distinguishing between foreign and domestically produced waste, it was clear to the Court that the state had "overtly moved to slow or freeze the flow of commerce for protectionist reasons."

Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:11 +0000

Location

Exxon Headquarters

5959 Las Colinas Boulevard Irving TX 75039

Irving, TX 75039

United States

32° 53' 27.186" N, 96° 56' 50.8488" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-10

Appellant

Exxon Corporation et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Respondent

Governor of Maryland et al.

Consolidation

No. 77-11, Shell Oil Co. v. Governor of Maryland et al.

No. 77-12, Continental Oil Co. et al. v. Governor of Maryland et al.

No. 77-47, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Governor of Maryland et al.

No. 77-64, Ashland Oil, Inc., et al. v. Governor of Maryland et al.

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

437 U.S. 117 (1978)

Argued

Tuesday, February 28, 1978

Decided

Wednesday, June 14, 1978

Advocates

William Simon (argued the cause for the appellants)

Francis B. Burch (Maryland Attorney General, argued the cause for the appellees)

Thomas M. Wilson III (argued the cause for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

Maryland observed oil producer-operated stations receiving favorable rates from producers and refiners. In response, Maryland passed a statute prohibiting oil producers or refiners from operating gasoline stations within the state and requiring producers and refiners extend temporary price cuts to the stations they supplied. Exxon challenged the statute in Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, which ruled the statute invalid. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the ruling.

Question

(1) Does Maryland's statute violate the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution?

(2) Does Maryland's statute conflict with the Robinson-Patman Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Governor Of Maryland, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No and no. In a 7-1 decision, the Court affirmed the Maryland Court of Appeals. Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens cited Ferguson v. Skrupa establishing that the purpose of the judiciary is not to "weigh the wisdom of legislation," and therefore did not concern due process. Additionally, since all gasoline sold in Maryland came from out-of-state refineries, Maryland's statute did not discriminate against interstate commerce. The court acknowledged that while the price-cut provision conflicted with the purposes of the Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts, the hypothetical situations of price discrimination presented were "speculative" and insufficient to invalidate the act. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not take part in consideration or decision of this case.

Carter v. Miller

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:34:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

76-1171

Petitioner

Carter

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Miller

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

434 U.S. 356 (1978)

Argued

November 29-30, 1977

Decided

Tuesday, January 17, 1978

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Miller, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:33:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

76-558

Appellee

Rice

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

434 U.S. 429 (1978)

Argued

November 8-9, 1977

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 1978

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Ad. Comm.

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:10 +0000

Location

North Carolina Board of Agriculture

2 West Edenton Street Raleigh NC 27601

Raleigh, NC 27601

United States

35° 46' 53.8644" N, 78° 38' 22.3512" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

76-63

Appellee

Wash. State Apple Ad. Comm.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Hunt

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

432 U.S. 333 (1977)

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 1977

Decided

Monday, June 20, 1977

Advocates

John R. Jordan, Jr. (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Slade Gorton (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

In 1972, the North Carolina Board of Agriculture adopted a regulation that required all apples shipped into the state in closed containers to display the USDA grade or nothing at all. Washington State growers(whose standards are higher than the USDA) challenged the regulation as an unreasonable burden to interstate commerce. North Carolina stated it was a valid exercise of its police powers to create "uniformity" to protect its citizenry from "fraud and deception."

Question

Did the North Carolina regulation violate the Commerce Clause by placing an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Wash. State Apple Ad. Comm., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

The Court voted unanimously that the North Carolina regulation was an unconstitutional exercise of the state's power over interstate commerce. Although the regulation was facially neutral, it had a discriminatory impact on the Washington growers while shielding the local growers from the same burden. The regulation removed the competitive advantage gained by the Washington apples from stricter inspection standards. The regulation produced a leveling effect that works to the local advantage by "downgrading" apples from other states unjustly. Therefore, the regulation places an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.

United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jersey

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:10 +0000

Location

United States Trust Co. of New York

45 Wall Street New York NY 10005

New York, NY 10005

United States

40° 42' 22.6728" N, 74° 0' 35.4384" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

75-1687

Appellee

New Jersey

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States Trust Co. of NY

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

431 U.S. 1 (1977)

Argued

Wednesday, November 10, 1976

Decided

Wednesday, April 27, 1977

Facts of the Case

New York and New Jersey had established a Port Authority to enhance water- bound business between the two states. In 1974, the states repealed a 1962 bond agreement which limited the Authority to administer commercial and passenger railroad subsidies.

Question

In repealing the 1962 agreement, did the states violate the Contract Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for United States Trust Co. of NY, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10, Paragraph 1: Contract Clause

The repeal violated the Constitution. Justice Blackmun argued that the states could have implemented a less drastic solution to encourage people to use commuter train services in lieu of driving their cars. (State leaders thought the increase in bridge fares that would occur with the agreement's repeal would cause this to occur.) Furthermore, since the need to facilitate mass transportation in the New York metropolitan area had been a concern long before 1962, the states could not justify their action as a response to unforeseen circumstances.

Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:18:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-1607

Appellee

Alexandria Scrap Corp.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Hughes

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

426 U.S. 794 (1976)

Argued

Wednesday, January 21, 1976

Decided

Thursday, June 24, 1976

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Hughes, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:12:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-1148

Appellee

Cottrell

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

A & P Tea Co.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

424 U.S. 366 (1976)

Argued

Monday, December 1, 1975

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 1976

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for A & P Tea Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

New Orleans v. Dukes

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:18:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-775

Appellee

Dukes

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

New Orleans

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

427 U.S. 297 (1976)

Argued

Tuesday, November 11, 1975

Decided

Friday, June 25, 1976

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for New Orleans, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

None

North Dakota Pharmacy Bd. v. Snyder's Stores

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:09:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

72-1176

Petitioner

North Dakota Pharmacy Bd.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Snyder's Stores

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

414 U.S. 156 (1973)

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 1973

Decided

Wednesday, December 5, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for North Dakota Pharmacy Bd., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:06 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

545

Appellee

Hostetter

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Seagram & Sons

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Warren Court (1965-1967)

Decided By

Warren Court (1965-1967)

Opinion

384 U.S. 35 (1966)

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 1966

Decided

Tuesday, April 19, 1966

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hostetter, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Hudson Distributors v. Eli Lilly

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:37:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

490

Petitioner

Eli Lilly

Respondent

Hudson Distributors

Consolidation

No. 489

Heard By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Decided By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Opinion

377 U.S. 386 (1964)

Argued

April 29-30, 1964

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1964

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Eli Lilly, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 45

None

Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:37:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

470

Petitioner

Clay

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Decided By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Opinion

377 U.S. 179 (1964)

Argued

Tuesday, April 28, 1964

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1964

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Clay, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 4, Section 1: Full Faith and Credit Clause

None

Polar Co. v. Andrews

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:34:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellee

Andrews

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Polar Co.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Decided By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Opinion

375 U.S. 361 (1964)

Argued

Wednesday, November 20, 1963

Decided

Monday, January 6, 1964

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Polar Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Ferguson v. Skrupa

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:05:59 +0000

Location

Skrupa's business

1818 S. 72nd St. Omaha NE 68124

Omaha, NE 68124

United States

41° 14' 31.0524" N, 96° 1' 29.3304" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

111

Appellee

Skrupa

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Ferguson

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Decided By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Opinion

372 U.S. 726 (1963)

Argued

Wednesday, March 20, 1963

Decided

Monday, April 22, 1963

Facts of the Case

A Kansas statute made it a misdemeanor to enter into contracts for "debt adjusting" (a practice in which a debtor agrees to pay a monthly fee to an adjustor who then makes payments to the debtor's creditor). Skrupa was in business as a "Credit Advisor" and engaged in this practice. A lower court held that the Kansas statute was an "unreasonable regulation of a lawful business" and struck it down.

Question

Did the Kansas regulation of debt adjusting violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ferguson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. The Court reversed the decision of the lower court and affirmed Kansas's right to regulate debt adjusting. The unanimous decision held that the question of whether the law was wise or reasonable was a legislative and not a judicial one. Justice Black argued that the lower court's ruling relied on old law; the Court had moved out of the business of using the "vague contours" of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down laws which it had deemed economically unwise. Those were issues for state and national legislatures to address and not the courts. As long as state regulations do not offend a "specific federal constitutional prohibition" or a "valid federal law," they are legitimate.

Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:38:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellee

Paul

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Florida Avocado Growers

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 49

Heard By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Decided By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Opinion

373 U.S. 132 (1963)

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 1963

Decided

Monday, May 13, 1963

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Florida Avocado Growers, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 6, Section 2: Supremacy Clause

None

Martin v. Walton

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:41:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellee

Walton

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Martin

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Decided By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Opinion

368 U.S. 25 (1961)

Argued

Tuesday, October 17, 1961

Decided

Monday, November 6, 1961

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Walton, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

None

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:37:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

203

Petitioner

Sav-On-Drugs

Respondent

Eli Lilly & Co.

Heard By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Decided By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Opinion

366 U.S. 276 (1961)

Argued

March 20-21, 1961

Decided

Monday, May 22, 1961

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Sav-On-Drugs, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Safeway Stores v. Oklahoma Grocers

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:29:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

252

Appellee

Oklahoma Grocers

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Safeway Stores

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Decided By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Opinion

360 U.S. 334 (1959)

Argued

Tuesday, May 19, 1959

Decided

Monday, June 22, 1959

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Oklahoma Grocers, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Service Transfer Co. v. Virginia

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:29:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Service Transfer Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Virginia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Decided By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Opinion

359 U.S. 171 (1959)

Argued

Thursday, February 26, 1959

Decided

Monday, March 30, 1959

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Service Transfer Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Interstate Commerce, as amended

None

Gordon v. Texas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:30:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellee

Texas

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Gordon

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Warren Court (1957-1958)

Decided By

Warren Court (1957-1958)

Opinion

355 U.S. 369 (1958)

Argued

Thursday, January 9, 1958

Decided

Monday, January 13, 1958

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Texas, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 21: Twenty-First Amendment

None

Morey v. Doud

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:28:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

475

Appellee

Doud

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Morey

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Warren Court (1957-1958)

Decided By

Warren Court (1957-1958)

Opinion

354 U.S. 457 (1957)

Argued

Wednesday, April 24, 1957

Decided

Monday, June 24, 1957

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Doud, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

None

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:05:57 +0000

Location

Lee Optical Co.

N Robinson Ave & W Main St. Oklahoma City OK 73102

Oklahoma City, OK 73102

United States

35° 28' 3.7128" N, 97° 30' 58.6548" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

184

Appellee

Lee Optical of Oklahoma

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Williamson

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 185

Heard By

Warren Court (1954-1955)

Decided By

Warren Court (1955-1956)

Opinion

348 U.S. 483 (1955)

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 1955

Decided

Monday, March 28, 1955

Facts of the Case

An Oklahoma law prohibited persons who were not licensed optometrists or ophthalmologists to fit lenses for eyeglasses. Non-licensed individuals were also prohibited from duplicating optical instruments without written prescriptions from licensed ophthalmologists. The Lee Optical Company challenged the law, bringing a suit against the state Attorney General, Mac Q. Williamson.

Question

Did the Oklahoma law violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Williamson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that while the law may have been "needless" and "wasteful," it was the duty of the legislature, not the courts, "to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement." The Court emphasized that "[t]he day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."