Cases by Issue - Assault

United States v. Lanier

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1717

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lanier

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 259 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, January 7, 1997

Decided

Monday, March 31, 1997

Advocates

Alfred H. Knight (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

David W. Lanier was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 242 of criminally violating the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them sexually while he served as a state judge. The jury had been instructed that the Government had to prove, as an element of the offense, that Lanier had deprived the victims of their Fourteenth Amendment due process right to liberty, which included the right to be free from sexually motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual battery. The District Court denied Lanier's motion, which sought to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the law is void for vagueness. The en banc Court of Appeals vacated Lanier's convictions for "lack of any notice to the public that this ambiguous criminal statute includes simple or sexual assault crimes within its coverage." The Court of Appeals held that the law may be imposed only if the constitutional right, said to have been violated, is first identified in a decision of the U.S Supreme Court, and only when the right has been held to apply in a factual situation "fundamentally similar." The court regarded these combined requirements as substantially higher than the "clearly established" standard used to judge qualified immunity in civil cases.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals use a too demanding standard when it ruled that freedom from sexual assault, as included under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process right to liberty, has never been recognized as a federally protected constitutional right and therefore cannot be the basis for a federal prosecution?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 242

es. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that the standard of notice that the Court of Appeals employed was higher than the Constitution requires and too demanding. Justice Souter wrote that the Court of Appeals mistakenly concluded that it takes a Supreme Court decision in a "fundamentally similar" case to make a constitutional right specific enough that its violation can be prosecuted. Law makes it a crime to deprive anyone of rights "secured . . . by the Constitution."

McLaughlin v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-5189

Petitioner

McLaughlin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

476 U.S. 16 (1986)

Argued

Monday, March 31, 1986

Decided

Tuesday, April 29, 1986

Advocates

Stephen J. Cribari (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Christopher J. Wright (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In the morning of July 26, 1984, Lamont McLaughlin and a companion, both wearing stocking masks, entered a bank in Baltimore. McLaughlin displayed a handgun and ordered everyone in the bank to put his hands up and not to move. While McLaughlin remained in the lobby area holding the gun, his companion placed about $3,400 in a brown paper bag. A police officer apprehended the two as they left the bank. The police then found that McLaughlin's gun was not loaded. Ultimately, McLaughlin pleaded guilty to charges of bank robbery and bank larceny and was found guilty of assault during a bank robbery "by the use of a dangerous weapon." The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is an unloaded handgun a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of the federal bank robbery statute?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2113

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that an unloaded handgun is a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of the federal bank robbery statute, 18 USC section 2113(d). The Court articulated three reasons supporting the conclusion that such a gun is a dangerous weapon: First, a gun is an article that is typically and characteristically dangerous. Second, the display of a gun instills fear in the average citizen. Finally, a gun can cause harm when used as a bludgeon.

Garcia v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-6061

Petitioner

Garcia

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

469 U.S. 70 (1984)

Argued

Wednesday, October 10, 1984

Decided

Monday, December 10, 1984

Advocates

Jerrold J. Ganzfried (on behalf of the Respondent)

Charles G. White (on behalf of the Petitioners (pro hac vice))

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2114

None

United States v. Feola

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:33:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

73-1123

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Feola

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

420 U.S. 671 (1975)

Argued

Tuesday, November 19, 1974

Decided

Wednesday, March 19, 1975

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 371

None

Ladner v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:30:06 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Ladner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Warren Court (1957-1958)

Decided By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Opinion

358 U.S. 169 (1958)

Argued

Tuesday, November 19, 1957

Reargued:

Wednesday, October 22, 1958

Decided

Monday, December 15, 1958

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Ladner, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 254

None