Cases by Issue - Hearing

LaChance v. Erickson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1395

Petitioner

LaChance

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Erickson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 262 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, December 2, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 1998

Advocates

Paul E. Marth (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Federal employees subject to adverse actions by their respective agencies, each made false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action. Separately, each employee appealed the actions taken against him or her to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld the portion of each penalty that was based on the underlying charge. The Board overturned each false statement charge. The Board held that an employee's false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employee's credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employee's underlying misconduct. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board and held that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim.

Question

Does either the Due Process Clause or the Civil Service Reform Act preclude a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding alleged employment-related misconduct on the part of the employee?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for LaChance, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In an unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that neither the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause nor the Civil Service Reform Act precludes a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding his alleged employment-related misconduct. "The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. "But we reject, on the basis of both precedent and principle," continued Chief Justice Rehnquist, "the view expressed by the Court of Appeals in this case that a 'meaningful opportunity to be heard' includes a right to make false statements with respect to the charged conduct."

Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University v. Homar

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-651

Petitioner

Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hamar

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 924 (1997)

Argued

Monday, March 24, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 9, 1997

Advocates

Gwendolyn T. Mosley (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Ann Hubbard (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

James V. Fareri (on behalf of the Respondents)

Gregory O'Duden (on behalf of the National Treasury Employees Union, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Richard J. Homar, a tenured policeman for East Stroudsburg University (ESU), was arrested for possession of illegal drugs. ESU, a Pennsylvania state institution, immediately suspended him without pay until his culpability could be determined. State police dropped the charges but the suspension continued. At a later hearing ESU demoted Homar to groundskeeper, relying on his confession to police. Homar argued that ESU president James Gilbert had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the suspension. A district court granted summary judgment to ESU. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the decision, holding that it was illegal to withhold pay without first providing a hearing.

Question

Does a state institution violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by suspending a tenured employee without pay before holding a hearing in which the employee can voice objections?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. The Court ruled unanimously that a pre-suspension hearing is not necessary to protect the rights of a tenured employee who is suspended without pay. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia balanced three factors relevant to constitutional due process: 1) the weight of the private interest of the accused; 2) the chance of wrongfully depriving the private interest; and 3) the weight of the government's interest. The Court held that "[s]o long as the suspended employee receives a sufficiently prompt post suspension hearing, the lost income is relatively insubstantial."

Ncaa v. Tarkanian

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1061

Petitioner

Ncaa

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tarkanian

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

488 U.S. 179 (1988)

Argued

Wednesday, October 5, 1988

Decided

Monday, December 12, 1988

Advocates

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Samuel S. Lionel (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Ncaa, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Cornelius v. Nutt

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:13 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1673

Petitioner

Cornelius

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nutt

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

472 U.S. 648 (1985)

Argued

Monday, January 7, 1985

Decided

Monday, June 24, 1985

Advocates

Charles A. Rothfeld (pro hac vice)

Charles A. Hobbie (on behalf of the respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Cornelius, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 7701

None

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:18 +0000

Location

Cleveland Metropolitan School District

1380 East 6th St Cleveland OH 44114

Cleveland, OH 44114

United States

41° 30' 8.2944" N, 81° 41' 30.4728" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1362

Petitioner

Cleveland Board of Education

Respondent

James Loudermill

Consolidation

No. 83-1363

No. 83-6392

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

470 U.S. 532 (1985)

Argued

Monday, December 3, 1984

Decided

Tuesday, March 19, 1985

Advocates

Robert M. Fertel (on behalf of the respondents in Nos. 83-1362 and 83-1363 and the petitioner in No. 83-6392)

James G. Wyman (on behalf of the petitioners in Nos. 83-1362 and 83-1363 and respondents in No. 83-6392)

Facts of the Case

James Loudermill stated on his application for employment with the Cleveland Board of Education that he had never been convicted for a felony. After hiring him as a security guard, the board discovered that he had been convicted for grand larceny and without further consideration fired him for providing false information on his application. Since Loudermill qualified as a "classified civil servant" under Ohio law, he obtained a property right to his employment. This meant he could only be dismissed for cause and could obtain an administrative review of the causes for his termination. The Cleveland Civil Service Commission granted him an administrative review after his termination and found it valid. Loudermill filed suit in District Court alleging that the review system was unconstitutional because it only allowed him to respond to the charges against him after his termination. He argued that the board removed his property without giving him a chance to defend himself in violation of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court agreed that the Ohio statute gave Loudermill a property right to his job, but ruled that the board did not violate his due process rights because it followed the procedures specified by the same statute for removing the property right. In a similar case, Richard Donnelly alleged that post- dismissal hearings violated his due process rights. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard both cases together and ruled that the board violated both defendants' due process rights by removing their property rights to employment before providing an opportunity for them to respond to charges against them.

Question

Can a state remove a civil servant's property rights to employment before providing an opportunity for that worker to respond to the charges offered for his termination?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Loudermill, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. Justice Byron White authored the opinion for an 8-1 court. The Ohio statute clearly grants civil servants property rights to their employment. In order to lawfully remove this property, the Due Process Clause requires a procedure that carefully weighs the interests of the government in removing the property against the interests of the private party in retaining the property. This procedure must incorporate the "essential requirements of due process," which "are notice and an opportunity to respond." There was no strong reason to delay the opportunity to respond until after termination. The Court found that "affording the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination would impose neither a significant administrative burden nor intolerable delays." Accordingly, the significant interests of the employees to retain their jobs outweighed the interests of the state to remove employees quickly.

Codd v. Velger

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

75-812

Petitioner

Codd

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Velger

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

429 U.S. 624 (1977)

Argued

Wednesday, December 1, 1976

Decided

Tuesday, February 22, 1977

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Codd, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Bishop v. Wood

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:18:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-1303

Petitioner

Bishop

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wood

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

426 U.S. 341 (1976)

Argued

Monday, March 1, 1976

Decided

Thursday, June 10, 1976

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Wood, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Christian v. New York Department Of Labor

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:34:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

72-5704

Appellee

New York Department Of Labor

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Christian

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

414 U.S. 614 (1974)

Argued

Tuesday, November 13, 1973

Decided

Monday, January 21, 1974

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Christian, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Arnett v. Kennedy

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:34:52 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

72-1118

Appellee

Wayne Kennedy

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Arnett

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

416 U.S. 134 (1974)

Argued

Wednesday, November 7, 1973

Decided

Tuesday, April 16, 1974

Facts of the Case

Wayne Kennedy was a nonprobationary employee of the federal Office of Economic Opportunity. He was dismissed from his position after allegedly making recklessly false and defamatory statements about other OEO employees. Though he had the right under federal regulations to reply to the charges, he chose instead to sue the agency for interfering with his freedom of expression and denying him due process. A three-judge District Court agreed with Kennedy on the due process claim.

Question

May the federal government dismiss a nonprobationary employee without a trial- type preremoval hearing? Must the federal government provide sufficiently precise guidelines as to what kind of speech might be made the basis for a removal action?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Arnett, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

In a plurality opinion written by Justice William H. Rehnquist, the court held that the procedures established for the purpose of determining whether there is "cause" for Kennedy's dismissal satisfied the requirements of procedural due process. The court also held that standard of employment protection imposed by was not impermissibly vague or overbroad in its regulation of the speech of federal employees. The statute in question was not unconstitutional on its face.

Board of Regents v. Roth

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:06 +0000

Location

University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh

800 Algoma Blvd Oshkosh WI 54901

Oshkosh, WI 54901

United States

44° 1' 26.8068" N, 88° 33' 6.0948" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

71-162

Petitioner

Board of Regents of State Colleges

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

David Roth

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

408 U.S. 564 (1972)

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 1972

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 1972

Facts of the Case

David Roth was hired under a one-year contract to teach political science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh. He was informed that he would not be rehired at the end of his contract. No reasons were given for this decision. Roth brought suit against the university claiming that (1) the real reason for his non-retention was his criticism of the university administration violating his right to free speech protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the university's failure to advise him of the reason for its decision violated his right to procedural due process. Roth won on the second claim. It was upheld on appeal.

Question

Does the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require that a state university provide a one-year contract employee a hearing and reasons when he is not retained after the termination of his contract?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Board of Regents, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

In an opinion by Justice Potter Stewart, the court held 5-3 that Roth had no protected interest in continued employment, as he had completed his contracted term, and therefore was no Fourteenth Amendment protection.

Perry v. Sindermann

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:06 +0000

Location

Odessa Junior College

201 W University Blvd Odessa TX 79764

Odessa, TX 79764

United States

31° 52' 5.3112" N, 102° 22' 52.7592" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

70-36

Petitioner

Charles R. Perry et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robert P. Sindermann

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

408 U.S. 593 (1972)

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 1972

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 1972

Advocates

W. O. Shafer (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Michael H. Gottesman (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Robert Sindermann had been a professor at Odessa Junior College for four years, working under one-year contracts. After his election as president of the Texas Junior College Teachers Association, he had several public disagreements with the Odessa Junior College Board of Regents. In May 1969, after the expiration of his teaching contract, Sindermann was not offered a new contract and terminated by the college's Board of Regents. While the Board of Regents did issue a press release accusing him of insubordination, they did not provide official reasons for his termination or the option of a hearing for him to challenge his termination. Sindermann filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. He alleged that his termination was due to his disagreements with the Board of Regents, a violation of his First Amendment right to free speech, and that the lack of a hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court ruled for the Board of Regents without a full trial. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held that his termination would have been unconstitutional if it was based on his exercise of free speech or if he had a reasonable expectation of continued employment. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court.

Question

(1) Was Sindermann entitled to a full trial in District Court?

(2) Was Sindermann entitled to a hearing before the Board of Regents?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Sindermann, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes and yes. In a 5-3 decision, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit and held that Sindermann was entitled to a full trial in federal District Court and a hearing before the Board of Regents. The Court acknowledged that Sindermann did not have a contractual or tenure-based right to continued employment by Odessa Junior College. However, this lack was "immaterial to [Sindermann's] free speech claim." Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart relied on Shelton v. Tucker and Keyishian v. Board of Regents in emphasizing that nonrenewal of a one-year teaching contract "may not be predicated on [a teacher's] exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights." However, the Court stopped short of invalidating Sindermann's termination, as the Board of Regents' reasoning had not been established. While Sindermann had yet to "show that he has been deprived of an interest that could invoke procedural due process," the Court stated that his claim did "raise a genuine issue." While Odessa College did not have a formal tenure system, the Court recognized the possibility of a college having an "unwritten 'common law'" "in practice" that would grant "the equivalent of tenure." Given the policies of Odessa College, Sindermann was entitled to a hearing before the Board of Regents as well.

Williams v. Zuckert

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:38:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

133

Petitioner

Williams

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Zuckert

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Decided By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Opinion

371 U.S. 531 (1963)

Argued

Thursday, December 13, 1962

Decided

Monday, January 14, 1963

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Zuckert, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Writ Improvidently Granted

None