Cases by Issue - Miscellaneous

Dept of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-404

Appellee

U.S. House of Representatives

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Dept of Commerce

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

Clinton, President of the United States, et al. v. Glavin et al., No. 98-564

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 316 (1999)

Argued

Monday, November 30, 1998

Decided

Monday, January 25, 1999

Advocates

Michael A. Carvin (Argued the cause for the appellees in No. 98-564)

Maureen E. Mahoney (Argued the cause for the appellees in No. 98-404)

Seth P. Waxman (on behalf of the Appellees in No. 98-404)

Facts of the Case

Under the Census Clause (Art. I, Sect. 2, Cl. 3), Congress is authorized to conduct a census of the American public every 10 years. Among other purposes, the census provides a basis for apportionment of congressional districts. Under the Census Act, Congress delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary). When the Census Bureau (Bureau) announced plans to use two new forms of discretionary statistical sampling in the 2000 census, various United States residents, counties, and the House of Representatives challenged the constitutionality of the new sampling methods in two separate suits. On direct appeals from three-judge district courts enjoining the use of the new sampling methods, the Supreme Court consolidated the cases and granted certiorari.

Question

Is the use of statistical sampling in the execution of the census inconsistent with provisions of the Census Act or in conflict with the Census Clause of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for U.S. House of Representatives, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 13 U.S.C. 1

Yes with regard to the Census Act. The Court began by noting that the plaintiffs in the joined cases had good standing to bring their challenges because they stood to suffer a decrease in the number of their congressional representatives and a corresponding dilution of voting strength. The Court then added that the disputed Amendment to the Census Act, authorizing the discretionary use of statistical sampling, did not alter the Act's older statutory prohibition against the use of sampling. Consequently, the Court struck down the sampling provision on statutory grounds and avoided the constitutional question.

Clinton v. City of New York

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:29 +0000

Location

The White House

1600 Pennsylvania Ave Washington DC 20500

Washington, DC 20500

United States

38° 53' 51.7056" N, 77° 2' 11.4684" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1374

Appellee

City of New York

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Clinton

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 417 (1998)

Argued

Monday, April 27, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 1998

Advocates

Charles J. Cooper (Argued the cause for the appellee City of New York)

Louis R. Cohen (Argued the cause for the appellee Snake River Potato Growers)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

This case consolidates two separate challenges to the constitutionality of two cancellations, made by President William J. Clinton, under the Line Item Veto Act ("Act"). In the first, the City of New York, two hospital associations, a hospital, and two health care unions, challenged the President's cancellation of a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 which relinquished the Federal Government's ability to recoup nearly $2.6 billion in taxes levied against Medicaid providers by the State of New York. In the second, the Snake River farmer's cooperative and one of its individual members challenged the President's cancellation of a provision of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The provision permitted some food refiners and processors to defer recognition of their capital gains in exchange for selling their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. After a district court held the Act unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on expedited appeal.

Question

Did the President's ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills, under the Line Item Veto Act, violate the Presentment Clause of Article I?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for City of New York, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 7, Paragraph 2: Separation of Powers

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court first established that both the City of New York, and its affiliates, and the farmers' cooperative suffered sufficiently immediate and concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the President's actions. The Court then explained that under the Presentment Clause, legislation that passes both Houses of Congress must either be entirely approved (i.e. signed) or rejected (i.e. vetoed) by the President. The Court held that by canceling only selected portions of the bills at issue, under authority granted him by the Act, the President in effect "amended" the laws before him. Such discretion, the Court concluded, violated the "finely wrought" legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers.

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:27 +0000

Location

Spendthrift Farm

884 Iron Works Pike Lexington KY 40511

Lexington, KY 40511

United States

38° 6' 47.88" N, 84° 25' 49.44" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1121

Petitioner

Ed Plaut et al.

Respondent

Spendthrift Farm, Inc., et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 211 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, November 30, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, April 18, 1995

Advocates

William H. Allen (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the Federal Respondent supporting the Petitioners)

Theodore B. Olson (on behalf of the Private Respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1987, several Spendthrift Farm shareholders, including Ed Plaut, brought suit against the corporation claiming stock sales in 1983 and 1984 had violated the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The Supreme Court's ruling in Lampf v Gilbertson (1991) set a universal time limit of three years after an alleged violation for suits stemming from the relevant portion the Securities and Exchange Act. Based on this ruling, a district court judge dismissed the shareholders' case on August 13, 1991. On December 19, 1991, Congress enacted the FDIC Improvement Act, which required courts to reinstate cases dismissed under the Supreme Court's limitation in Lampf. The shareholders filed a motion to reinstate. A district court judge agreed the act required the case be reinstated, but denied the request on the ground that Congress had violated separation of powers in requiring the courts to reopen settled matters. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's conclusion on the same ground.

Question

Did Congress violate separation of powers by requiring federal courts reopen settled cases as part of the FDIC Improvement Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court concluded that Congress had usurped power assigned to the judiciary by Article III and thus had violated the separation of powers principle. Justice Scalia notes that Article III assigns to the courts the "judicial power of the United States" and the power to "say what the law is." According to the Court, this clearly includes "the power to render final judgments," and by enacting what Justice Scalia describes as "retroactive legislation, that is, legislation that prescribes what the law was at an earlier time," Congress intruded upon the power of the courts to issue "the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy." Thus, Congress had violated separation of powers.

Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-762

Petitioner

Freytag

Respondent

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 868 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, April 23, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 1991

Advocates

Kathleen M. Sullivan (Argued the case for the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the case for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Under 26 U.S.C. 7443A(b), the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court (an Article I Court established by Congress) may appoint special trial judges to certain specified proceedings explicitly laid out in the statute, in which the special trial judges may issue decisions. He may also appoint them to "any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate," but in those unspecified cases the special trial judge may not issue a final decision, only draft an opinion which must be reviewed by a regular judge of the Tax Court.

Freytag and several other defendants were charged with using a tax shelter to avoid paying roughly $1.5 billion in taxes. They consented to have their case heard by a special trial judge. The trial judge eventually drafted an opinion unfavorable to their position, which was reviewed and adopted by the Chief Judge. They then appealed the case, arguing that their case was too complex to assign to a special trial judge under section 7443A. Congress's decision to allow the Chief Judge to make such an assignment, they argued, violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution (Article II Section 2), which provides that Congress may "vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Freytag asserted that the "Courts of Law" referred to there were only Article III courts (Federal District Courts, Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, all of which have judges with lifetime tenure), and that the Chief Judge was part of an Article I court, meaning that Congress could not assign him the power of appointment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, affirming the Tax Court's decisions.

Question

Does 26 U.S.C. 7443A(a) permit the assignment of particularly complex cases dealing with large amounts of money to "special trial judges" appointed by the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court, provided that the special trial judges do not enter the decision but simply prepare an opinion for review and adoption by a regular Tax Court judge? Under the Appointments Clause of Article II Section 2, may Congress permit the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court to appoint "special trial judges" to "any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate"?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 2, Section 2, Paragraph 2: Appointments Clause

Yes and yes. On the question of whether 7443A permitted the assignment of complex cases to special trial judges, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the statute unambiguously did allow such appointments. Justice Harry Blackmun, in the majority opinion, wrote, "The plain language of 7443A(b)(4) surely authorizes the Chief Judge's assignment of petitioners' cases to a special trial judge. When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry should be complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances."

On the Appointments Clause question, however, the Court was divided 5-to-4. Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority that Article I Courts, like Article III Courts, exercised the judicial power of the United States and were therefore "Courts of Law" for purposes of Article II Section 2. While they may have been more dependent on Congress than the other branches, they were nevertheless independent, and it therefore did not violate the separation of powers to allow them to make appointments.

Airports Auth. v. Citizens For Noise Abatement

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-906

Petitioner

Airports Auth.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Citizens For Noise Abatement

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 252 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, April 16, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 17, 1991

Advocates

William T. Coleman, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioners)

David L. Shapiro (on behalf of Respondent United States, supporting the Petitioners)

Patti Goldman (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Citizens For Noise Abatement, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

United States v. Stuart

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1064

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Stuart

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

489 U.S. 353 (1989)

Argued

Monday, December 5, 1988

Decided

Tuesday, February 28, 1989

Advocates

Charles E. Peery (on behalf of the Respondents)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Treaty

None

Mistretta v. United States

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:21 +0000

Location

Residence of John Mistretta Greenville, SC

United States

34° 51' 9.4248" N, 82° 23' 38.436" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-7028

Petitioner

John Mistretta

Respondent

United States

Consolidation

United States v. Mistretta, No. 87-1904

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

488 U.S. 361 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, October 5, 1988

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 1989

Advocates

Paul M. Bator (Argued the cause for the United States Sentencing Commission as amicus curiae urging affirmance)

Alan B. Morrison (Argued the cause for the petitioner in No. 87-7028 and the respondent in No. 87-1904)

Charles Fried (Argued the cause for the United States in both cases)

Facts of the Case

Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. This Commission was to attack the wide discrepancies in sentencing by federal court judges by creating sentencing guidelines for all federal offenses. It was to be part of the judicial branch, with members appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. John Mistretta (convicted of three counts of selling cocaine) claimed that the Act violated the delegation-of-powers principle by giving the Commission "excessive legislative powers." This case was decided together with United States v. Mistretta.

Question

Did the Act violate the nondelegation doctrine of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3551

The Court found the Act to be valid because although Congress cannot generally delegate its legislative power to another Branch, the nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from obtaining assistance from coordinate Branches. The test of validity is that an "intelligible principle" must be established by the legislature where the agency of the delegated authority must adhere to specific directives that govern its authority. The delegation to the Commission was sufficiently detailed and specific to meet these requirements. The Commission was given substantial authority and discretion in setting the guidelines; however, Congress established a classification hierarchy for federal crimes that the Commission was to use as an outline for its work.

Morrison v. Olson

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:20 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1279

Appellee

Olson

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Morrison

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

487 U.S. 654 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, April 26, 1988

Decided

Monday, June 27, 1988

Advocates

Thomas S. Martin (on behalf of Appellees)

Alexia Morrison (on behalf of the Appellant)

Charles Fried (as amicus curiae, supporting Appellees)

Michael Davidson (as amicus curiae, supporting Appellant)

Facts of the Case

The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 created a special court and empowered the Attorney General to recommend to that court the appointment of an "independent counsel" to investigate, and, if necessary, prosecute government officials for certain violations of federal criminal laws.

Question

Did the Act violate the constitutional principal of separation of powers?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Morrison, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 49

The Court addressed a number of constitutional issues in this case and upheld the law. The near-unanimous Court held that the means of selecting the independent counsel did not violate the Appointments Clause; the powers allocated to the special court did not violate Article III; and the Act was not offensive to the separation of powers doctrine since it did not impermissibly interfere with the functions of the Executive Branch.

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-870

Petitioner

Phillips Petroleum Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mississippi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

484 U.S. 469 (1988)

Argued

Monday, November 9, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, February 23, 1988

Advocates

Kathy D. Jones (on behalf of the Respondent)

Eugene Gressman (on behalf of Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Mississippi, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-920

Petitioner

Alaska Airlines, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brock

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

480 U.S. 678 (1987)

Argued

Monday, December 1, 1986

Decided

Tuesday, March 24, 1987

Advocates

Louis R. Cohen (on behalf of the Respondents)

William T. Coleman, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Brock, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 1552

None

Bowsher v. Synar

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:19 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1377

Petitioner

Mike Synar

Respondent

Charles Arthur Bowsher

Consolidation

No. 85-1378

No. 85-1379

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

478 U.S. 714 (1986)

Argued

Wednesday, April 23, 1986

Decided

Monday, July 7, 1986

Advocates

Lloyd N. Cutler (Argued the cause for the appellant in No. 85-1377)

Alan B. Morrison (Argued the cause for appellees Synar et al)

Steven R. Ross (Argued the cause for the appellants in No. 85-1379)

Charles Fried (Argued the cause for the United States)

Michael Davidson (Argued the cause for the appellant in No. 85-1378)

Lois G. Williams (Argued the cause for appellees National Treasury Employees Union et al)

Facts of the Case

Due to rising government budget deficits during the first term of the Reagan Administration, Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985. The act was designed to eliminate the federal budget deficit by restricting spending during fiscal years 1986 through 1991. Under the law, if maximum allowable deficit amounts were exceeded, automatic cuts, as requested by the Comptroller General, would go into effect. This case was decided together with O'Neill v. Synar and United States Senate v. Synar.

Question

Did the functions assigned by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985 violate the doctrine of separation of powers?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Synar, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 7, Paragraph 2: Separation of Powers

The Court found that the duties which the Congress delegated to the Comptroller General did violate the doctrine of separation of powers and were unconstitutional. A two step process led Chief Justice Burger to arrive at this conclusion. First, in exploring the statute defining the provisions of the Comptroller General's office relating to the Congress's power of removal, it was clear to Burger that this officer was subservient to the legislative branch. Second, in examining the functions that this officer would carry out under the Deficit Control Act, Burger concluded that the Comptroller General was being asked to execute the laws and, thus, was intruding on the prerogatives of the executive branch.

First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-984

Petitioner

First Nat. City Bank

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Banco Para El Comercio

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

462 U.S. 611 (1983)

Argued

Monday, March 28, 1983

Decided

Friday, June 17, 1983

Advocates

Michael Krinsky (on behalf of the Respondent)

Henry Harfield (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Richard G. Wilkins (for U.S. as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for First Nat. City Bank, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

INS v. Chadha

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:15 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-1832

Petitioner

Chadha

Respondent

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

Consolidation

United States House of Representatives v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), No. 80-2170

United States Senate v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), No. 80-2171

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

462 U.S. 919 (1983)

Argued

Monday, February 22, 1982

Reargued:

Tuesday, December 7, 1982

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 1983

Advocates

Alan B. Morrison (Reargued the cause for Jagdish Rai Chadha in all cases)

Michael Davidson (Reargued the cause for the petitioner in No. 80-2171)

Eugene Gressman (Reargued the cause for the petitioner in No. 80-2170)

Rex E. Lee (Reargued the cause for the Immigration and Naturalization Service in all cases)

Facts of the Case

In one section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress authorized either House of Congress to invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the United States Attorney General. Chadha had stayed in the U.S. past his visa deadline. Though Chadha conceded that he was deportable, an immigration judge suspended his deportation. The House of Representatives voted without debate or recorded vote to deport Chadha. This case was decided together with United States House of Representatives v. Chadha and United States Senate v. Chadha.

Question

Did the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed a one-House veto of executive actions, violate the separation of powers doctrine?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Chadha, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

The Court held that the particular section of the Act in question did violate the Constitution. Recounting the debates of the Constitutional Convention over issues of bicameralism and separation of powers, Chief Justice Burger concluded that even though the Act would have enhanced governmental efficiency, it violated the "explicit constitutional standards" regarding lawmaking and congressional authority.

United States v. Will

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-983

Appellee

Will

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 79-1689

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

449 U.S. 200 (1980)

Argued

Tuesday, October 14, 1980

Decided

Monday, December 15, 1980

Advocates

Kevin M. Forde (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Kenneth S. Geller (Argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

Congress enacted legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970s to adjust the compensation of federal employees, including judges, which provided automatic annual pay raises. However, from 1976 to 1979 Congress intervened and blocked cost-of-living increases which were scheduled to occur.

Question

Did the congressional acts between 1976 and 1979 violate the Constitution's Compensation Clause of Article III?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 455

In two of the years in question, Congress effectively revoked automatic pay increases after the statutes guaranteeing those increases had already taken effect. This amounted to a reduction in salaries for judges and violated the Compensation Clause.

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:34:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

76-635

Appellee

Multistate Tax Comm.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

U.S. Steel Corp.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

434 U.S. 452 (1978)

Argued

Tuesday, October 11, 1977

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 1978

Advocates

William D. Dexter (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Erwin N. Griswold (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

In 1972, twenty one states were members of the Multistate Tax Compact, a body formed by states to assist them in formulating and administering tax law relating to multistate businesses. The Compact had not received congressional approval.

Question

Did the formation of this group violate the the Compact Clause of Article I?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Multistate Tax Comm., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10, Paragraph 3: Compact Clause

The Court found no constitutional violation. The Compact did not enhance state political power at the expense of the United States; it not confer to states powers which they did not already possess; it did not involve any delegation of state power to the Commission. Furthermore, argued Justice Powell, each state was free to withdraw from the group at any time.