Cases by Issue - Takings Clause

San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-340

Petitioner

San Remo Hotel, L.P., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2004

Argued

Monday, March 28, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Paul F. Utrecht (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The owners and operators of a hotel in San Francisco sued the city in state court, arguing a $567,000 conversion fee they had to pay in 1996 was an unconstitutional taking of private property. After California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued in federal district court that the fee violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that had been resolved in their state-court suit. The federal full faith and credit statute, however, barred litigants from suing in federal court when that suit was based on issues that had been resolved in state court (the rule of "issue preclusion"). The hoteliers asked the district court to exempt from the statute claims brought under the takings clause.

Question

Should federal courts make an exception to the full faith and credit statute for Fifth Amendment takings clause claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for San Francisco, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. In a 9-0 judgment delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court refused to create an exception to the full faith and credit statute in order to provide a federal forum for litigants seeking to advance federal takings claims. The Court rejected the argument that whenever plaintiffs reserved their federal takings claims in state court, federal courts should review the reserved federal claims, regardless of the issues decided by the state court. Moreover, federal courts were not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute simply to guarantee that all takings plaintiffs can sue in federal court.

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-163

Petitioner

Linda Lingle, Governor of Hawaii, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 528 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

Mark J. Bennett (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Craig E. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Hawaii enacted a limit on the rent oil companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service stations. The rent cap was a response to concerns about the effects of market concentration on gasoline prices. Chevron, one of the state's largest oil companies, argued in federal district court that the the cap was an unconstitutional taking of its property. The district court held that the cap amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it did not substantially advance Hawaii's asserted interest in controlling gas prices. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980), where the Court declared that government regulation of private property is "a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests." The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does a regulation amount to an unconstitutional taking "if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests?"

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lingle, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the Court's unanimous opinion that the Court needed to "correct course" and make clear that the "substantially advances" formula put forth in Agins was inappropriate for determining whether a regulation amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking. Takings clause challenges to regulations had to be based on the severity of the burden that the regulation imposed upon property rights, not the effectivness of the regulation in furthering the governmental interest. The Court insisted that its ruling did not "disturb any of its prior holdings."

Kelo v. City of New London

Fri, 29 Oct 2010 18:40:17 +0000

Location

City of New London Town Hall

181 State Street

New London, CT 06320

United States

41° 21' 14.4" N, 72° 5' 45.6" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-108

Petitioner

Susette Kelo, et al.

Respondent

City of New London, Connecticut, et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. 469 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

Scott G. Bullock (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Wesley W. Horton (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

New London, a city in Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The city said developing the land would create jobs and increase tax revenues. Kelo Susette and others whose property was seized sued New London in state court. The property owners argued the city violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which guaranteed the government will not take private property for public use without just compensation. Specifically the property owners argued taking private property to sell to private developers was not public use. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled for New London.

Question

Does a city violate the Fifth Amendment's takings clause if the city takes private property and sells it for private development, with the hopes the development will help the city's bad economy?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for City of New London, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the majority held that the city's taking of private property to sell for private development qualified as a "public use" within the meaning of the takings clause. The city was not taking the land simply to benefit a certain group of private individuals, but was following an economic development plan. Such justifications for land takings, the majority argued, should be given deference. The takings here qualified as "public use" despite the fact that the land was not going to be used by the public. The Fifth Amendment did not require "literal" public use, the majority said, but the "broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose.'"

Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1325

Petitioner

Brown

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Legal Foundation of Washington

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 216 (2003)

Argued

Monday, December 9, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, March 26, 2003

Advocates

David J. Burman (Argued the cause for the respondent Legal Foundation of Washington)

Charles Fried (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the respondents, Justices of the Supreme Court of Washington)

Facts of the Case

Every state uses interest on lawyers' trust accounts (IOLTA) to pay for legal services for the needy. Among it rules, Washington's program requires that funds that cannot earn net interest for the client be deposited in an IOLTA account. The Supreme Court of Washington extended its IOLTA rules to cover Limited Practice Officers (LPOs), nonlawyers who are licensed to act as escrowees in real estate closings. Allen Brown and Greg Hayes alleged that they regularly purchase and sell real estate, in the course of such transactions they deliver funds to LPOs who are required to deposit them in IOLTA accounts, and the taking of the interest earned on their funds in IOLTA accounts violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court found, among other things, that Brown and Hayes had lost nothing. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals reasoned that there was no taking because Brown and Hayes had suffered neither an actual loss nor an interference with any investment-backed expectations.

Question

Does the use of interest on lawyers' trust accounts to pay for legal services provided to the needy constitute a state taking in violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Legal Foundation of Washington, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that state law that requires client funds that could not otherwise generate net earnings for the client to be deposited in an IOLTA account is not a regulatory taking. Moreover, the Court reasoned that, because compensation is measured by the owner's pecuniary loss, which is zero whenever the Washington law is obeyed, there is no violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Court's decision created an exception to its general rule that the just compensation owed to former owners of confiscated property is the fair market value of the property taken. Justice Kennedy also filed a separate dissent.

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

Lake Tahoe Basin

United States

38° 58' 40.6668" N, 119° 51' 43.6464" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1167

Petitioner

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council

Respondent

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 302 (2002)

Argued

Monday, January 7, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, April 23, 2002

Advocates

Michael M. Berger (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) imposed two moratoria from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983 and from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984, totaling 32 months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the area. Real estate owners affected by the moratoria and an association representing such owners, including the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., filed suits, claiming that TRPA's actions constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. The District Court found that TRPA had not effected a partial taking; however, it concluded that the moratoria did constitute a categorical taking because TRPA temporarily deprived real estate owners of all economically viable use of their land. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that because the regulations had only a temporary impact, no categorical taking had occurred.

Question

Does a moratorium on development imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that that the mere enactment of the regulations implementing the moratoria did not constitute a per se taking of the landowners' property. The Court reasoned that whether a taking occurred depended upon the considerations of landowners' expectations, actual impact, public interest, and reasons for the moratoria. Moreover, the Court concluded that the adoption of a categorical rule that any deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief, constituted a compensable taking would impose unreasonable financial obligations upon governments for the normal delays involved in processing land use applications. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas also filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia.

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

Rhode Island General Assembly

82 Smith St Providence RI 02903

Providence, RI 02903

United States

41° 49' 53.6448" N, 71° 24' 53.3664" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-2047

Petitioner

Palazzolo

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rhode Island

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 606 (2001)

Argued

Monday, February 26, 2001

Decided

Thursday, June 28, 2001

Advocates

James S. Burling (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Sheldon Whitehouse (State of Rhode Island, argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Anthony Palazzolo owns a waterfront parcel of land in Rhode Island. Most of the property is salt marsh, subject to tidal flooding. The Rhode Island Resources Management Council's Coastal Resources Management Program regulations designate salt marshes as protected "coastal wetlands," on which development is greatly limited. After multiple development proposals of his were denied, Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior Court. Palazzolo asserted that the State's wetlands regulations had taken his property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the Council's action had deprived him of "all economically beneficial use" of his property. Ruling against Palazzolo, the court held that his takings claim was not ripe, that he had no right to challenge the regulations predating his acquisition of the property's title, and that he could not assert a takings claim based on the denial of all economic use of his property in light of undisputed evidence that he had $200,000 in development value remaining on an upland parcel of the property.

Question

May a property owner who acquired title to the property after is was subject to wetlands regulations still bring a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Palazzolo, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "the State Supreme Court erred in finding [Palazzolo's] claims were unripe and in ruling that acquisition of title after the effective date of the regulations barred the takings claims. The court did not err in finding that [Palazzolo] failed to establish a deprivation of all economic value, for it is undisputed that the parcel retains significant worth for construction of a residence." Discussing the post-regulation acquisition of title, Justice Kennedy wrote, "[w]ere we to accept the State's rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land."

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-42

Petitioner

Eastern Enterprises

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Apfel

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 498 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 1998

Advocates

Peter Buscemi (on behalf of the Respondents UMWA)

Edwin S. Kneedler (supporting the Federal Respondents)

John T. Montgomery (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Currently unknown.

Question

Currently unknown.

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Eastern Enterprises, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

Currently unknown.

Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1578

Petitioner

Phillips

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Washington Legal Foundation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 156 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, January 13, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1998

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Richard A. Samp (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Darrell E. Jordan (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Under Texas' Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) program, lawyers must deposit their client's funds into a special interest-bearing "NOW" account upon determination that the funds could not earn the client interest or compensate for other financial and accounting fees. Interest federally funded interest accrued on IOLTA accounts is then paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation (TEAJF) which supports legal services for low-income persons. Acting on behalf of others opposed to IOLTA, the Washington Legal Foundation (the "Foundation") challenged TEAJF's receipt and use of the IOLTA funds. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a favorable district court decision, the Supreme Court granted the Foundation certiorari.

Question

Does Texas' public use of interest accrued on principal client funds, deposited by mandate into federally funded accounts, violate the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Washington Legal Foundation, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that TEAJF's used of IOLTA interest funds violated the Takings Clause which prohibits the taking of "private property for public use, without just compensation." The Court noted that since the principal client fees deposited into the IOLTA account are private property, any accrued interest on such fees attaches as a property right incident to ownership of the underlying principal. Thus, since they may not redistribute the principal deposits, TEAJF is also prohibited from assigning any interest accumulated thereon.

Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-243

Petitioner

Suitum

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 725 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, February 26, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 1997

Advocates

R. S. Radford (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Richard J. Lazarus (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Bernadine Suitum owned an undeveloped lot near Lake Tahoe. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency determined that the lot was ineligible for development under agency regulations. However, the agency determined that Suitum was entitled to "Transferable Development Rights" (TDRs) that she could sell to other landowners with the agency's approval. Rather than sell her TDRs, Suitum filed suit claiming that the agency's determination amounted to a regulatory taking of her property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court held that Suitum's claim was unjusticible because she had not attempted to sell her TDRs. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that an agency action on a TDR transfer application would be the requisite "final decision" regarding Suitum's lot in order for her claim to be ripe for adjudication.

Question

Must property owners attempt to sell their developmental rights before claiming the regulatory taking of property without just compensation, in accordance with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Suitum, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Suitum's regulatory taking claim was ripe for adjudication. Justice Souter reasoned that, by determining that Suitum's property was ineligible for development, the agency had had made final determination, even though she had not attempted to sell the TDRs which she had received, or was eligible to receive, under the agency plan. "While the pleadings raise issues about the significance of the TDRs both to the claim that a taking has occurred and to the constitutional requirement of just compensation, we have no occasion to decide, and we do not decide, whether or not these TDRs may be considered in deciding the issue of whether there has been a taking in this case, as opposed to the issue of whether just compensation has been afforded for such a taking," wrote Justice Souter.

Babbitt v. Youpee

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:06 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1595

Petitioner

Babbitt

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Youpee

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 234 (1997)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, January 21, 1997

Advocates

Rene A. Martell (Montana, argued the cause for the respondents)

James A. Feldman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

A late nineteenth century congressional Indian land program resulted in the extreme fractionation of Indian lands as allottees passed their undivided interests on to multiple heirs. In 1983, Congress adopted the Indian Land Consolidation Act to reduce the fractionated ownership of allotted lands. Section 207 of the Act--the "escheat" provision--prohibited the descent of fractional interests that constituted 2 percent or less of the total acreage in an allotted tract and earned less than $100 in the preceding year. The interests described in Section 207 would escheat to the tribe, thereby consolidating the ownership of Indian lands. Section 207 made no provision for the payment of compensation to those who held such fractional interests. The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the original version of Section 207 on the ground that it was a taking of private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Congress then amended Section 207. which looks back five years instead of one year to determine the income produced from a small interest. The will of William Youpee, an enrolled member of the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes, devised to the respondents, all of them enrolled tribal members, his several undivided interests in allotted lands on reservations. An administrative law judge found that interests devised to each of the respondents fell within amended Section 207 and should therefore escheat to the relevant tribal governments. The respondents, asserting the unconstitutionality of amended Section 207, appealed the order to the Board of Indian Appeals, which dismissed the appeal. The respondents then filed a suit against the Secretary of the Interior, alleging that amended Section 207 violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court agreed with respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does amended Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act violate the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Youpee, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 2206

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Court ruled that the amended Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act does not cure the constitutional deficiency The Court identified in the original version of Section 207, which amounted to a taking of private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Ginsburg wrote Section 207 is unconstitutional because it "severely restricts the right of an individual to direct the descent of his property."

Bennis v. Michigan

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-8729

Petitioner

Bennis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

516 U.S. 442 (1996)

Argued

Wednesday, November 29, 1995

Decided

Monday, March 4, 1996

Advocates

Larry L. Roberts (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Richard H. Seamon (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance)

Stefan B. Herpel (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Bennis's husband was convicted of gross indecency following his sexual activity with a prostitute in the couple's jointly-owned car. The local county prosecutor filed a complaint alleging the car was a public nuisance subject to abatement (i.e., to eliminate or confiscate the car). The Circuit Court entered the abatement order, but the Appeals Court reversed. After granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the appellate court's decision and re-entered the abatement order. Bennis appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question

Does the abatement order entered against Bennis's car constitute a taking of private property for public use in violation of the property clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Michigan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Writing for a 5-to-4 majority, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist held that the abatement order against Bennis's car did not violate the takings clause. Her innocence and lack of knowledge concerning her husband's illegal and indecent activity, in the couple's jointly owned car, could not serve as a defense against her vehicle's forfeiture. Furthermore, under the present circumstances, the vehicle's forfeiture did not violate Bennis's property rights without due process. Michigan's abatement policy, aimed at deterring criminal uses of property, lawfully transferred her's vehicle to the state. As such, Michigan is not required to compensate Bennis for the vehicle's forfeiture.

Dolan v. City of Tigard

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:27 +0000

Location

City of Tigard

13125 SW Hall Blvd Tigard OR 97223

Tigard, OR 97223

United States

45° 25' 31.836" N, 122° 45' 56.7792" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-518

Petitioner

Dolan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of Tigard

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 374 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, March 23, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1994

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (For the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Timothy V. Ramis (Argued the cause for the respondent)

David B. Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Florence Dolan wanted a permit from the City of Tigard to expand her store and pave her parking lot. The city agreed to grant her permit on the condition that she dedicate part of her land for (1) a greenway along a nearby creek to help alleviate runoff from the pavement, and (2) a pedestrian/bicycle path to relieve traffic congestion from the city's growing business district.

Question

Did the city's conditions for the permit violate the 5th Amendment's "takings" clause as absorbed by the 14th Amendment's due process clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Dolan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

Yes. The Court ruled that the city did not present conclusive evidence that the walkway/bicycle path would reduce traffic congestion, and so could not require Dolan to give up her property as a condition of the permit. In addition, the city did not explain why a public greenway was necessary, as opposed to a private one. There must be an "essential nexus" between a legitimate state interest and the permit requirements (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission), and the city failed to demonstrate that the benefits would justify the requirements.

Lucas v. South Carolina Coast Council

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:25 +0000

Location

Charleston County Court of Common Pleas

2144 Melbourne Avenue North Charleston SC 29418

North Charleston, SC 29418

United States

32° 52' 1.7292" N, 79° 59' 33.8748" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-453

Petitioner

Lucas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

South Carolina Coast Council

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

505 U.S. 1003 (1992)

Argued

Monday, March 2, 1992

Decided

Monday, June 29, 1992

Advocates

C. C. Harness, III (on behalf of the Respondent)

A. Camden Lewis (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1986, Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island. He intended to build single-family homes as on the adjacent lots. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting permanent habitable structures on his land. The law aimed to protect erosion and destruction of barrier islands. Lucas sued and won a large monetary judgment. The state appealed.

Question

Does the construction ban depriving Lucas of all economically viable use of his property amount to a "taking" calling for "just compensation" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Lucas, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

Yes. In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court relied on the trial court's finding that Lucas's lots had been rendered valueless by the state law. "[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good...he has suffered a taking."

Yee v. City Of Escondido, California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:13 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1947

Petitioner

Yee et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City Of Escondido, California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

503 U.S. 519 (1992)

Argued

Wednesday, January 22, 1992

Decided

Wednesday, April 1, 1992

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (on behalf of the Respondent)

Robert J. Jagiello (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for City Of Escondido, California, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Preseault v. ICC

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1076

Petitioner

Preseault

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

ICC

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

494 U.S. 1 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, November 1, 1989

Decided

Wednesday, February 21, 1990

Advocates

Michael M. Berger (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Brian J. Martin (on behalf of the federal Respondent)

John K. Dunleavy (on behalf of the state Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for ICC, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

United States v. Sperry Corp.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-952

Appellee

Sperry Corp.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

493 U.S. 52 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, October 10, 1989

Decided

Tuesday, November 28, 1989

Advocates

John D. Seiver (on behalf of the Appellees)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1160

Appellee

Barasch

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Duquesne Light Co.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

488 U.S. 299 (1989)

Argued

Monday, November 7, 1988

Decided

Wednesday, January 11, 1989

Advocates

Peter Buscemi (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Irwin A. Popowsky (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Barasch, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1257

None

Pennell v. San Jose

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-753

Appellee

San Jose

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Pennell

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

485 U.S. 1 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, November 10, 1987

Decided

Wednesday, February 24, 1988

Advocates

Harry D. Miller (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Joan Gallo (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

The City of San Jose enacted a rent-control ordinance in 1979 in an attempt to alleviate the problem of skyrocketing rent prices due to the growing shortage of and the increasing demand for housing. Part of the ordinance allowed a Mediating Hearing Officer to consider as one factor "hardship to a tenant" when evaluating rent increases imposed by landlords.

Question

Did the ordinance violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for San Jose, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. The Court held that the ordinance was rationally crafted to protect the financial investments of landlords while simultaneously preventing tenants from becoming victims of burdensome rent increases. The City argued the ordinance satisfied a need. This view was uncontested and, according to Justice Rehnquist, represented a "legitimate and rational" means to protect "consumer welfare."

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:19 +0000

Location

Faria Beach Ventura County, CA

United States

34° 19' 5.9484" N, 119° 23' 16.1376" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-133

Petitioner

California Coastal Commission

Respondent

Nollan

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

483 U.S. 825 (1987)

Argued

Monday, March 30, 1987

Decided

Friday, June 26, 1987

Advocates

Robert K. Best (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Andrea Sheridan Ordin (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

The California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property wishing to obtain a building permit to maintain a pathway on their property open to the public.

Question

Did the requirement constitute a property taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Nollan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

Yes. The Court agreed that a legitimate interest may be served by maintaining a "continuous strip of publicly accessible beach along the coast." However, reasoned Justice Scalia, if California wished to use its power of eminent domain to do so, it must provide just compensation to the Nollans and other beachfront property owners for the public use of their land.

United States v. Cherokee Nation Of Okla.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1940

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cherokee Nation Of Okla.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

480 U.S. 700 (1987)

Argued

Monday, February 23, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, March 31, 1987

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (on behalf of the petitioner)

James Wilcoxen (on behalf of the respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

First Eng. Evan. Luth. Church v. Los Angeles

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:34:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1199

Appellee

Los Angeles

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

First Eng. Evan. Luth. Church

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

482 U.S. 304 (1987)

Argued

Wednesday, January 14, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, June 9, 1987

Advocates

Michael M. Berger (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Jack R. White (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

In 1979, the County of Los Angeles passed an ordinance which prohibited construction or reconstruction on land which had been devastated by a flood one year earlier. The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church owned a campground which was affected by this ordinance and it was not allowed to reconstruct buildings on this land which the flood had destroyed.

Question

Did the ordinance violate the Fifth Amendment (as applied to the states through the Fourteenth) which prevents government from taking private property for public use without providing just compensation to the owner of the property?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for First Eng. Evan. Luth. Church, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

The Court held that the ordinance violated the Constitution. Noting that the fate of the Church's property had been in limbo for over six years (the suit which it had filed in 1979 had been denied a hearing as late as October of 1985), Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that, because the church was unable to use its property during this time, a "taking" of the property had occurred. Thus, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment required the government to exercise one of a number of "options" such as amending the regulation or fair payment for the use of the property in order to protect the Church's constitutional rights.

FCC v. Florida Power Corp.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1658

Appellee

Florida Power Corp.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Federal Communications Commission

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

Group W Cable, Inc., et al. v. Florida Power Corp. et al., No. 85-1660

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

480 U.S. 245 (1987)

Argued

Wednesday, December 3, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 1987

Advocates

Jay E. Ricks (on behalf of the appellants)

Allan J. Topoi (on behalf of the appellees)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the appellants)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for FCC, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Keystone Bituminous Coal Association. v. DeBenedictis

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:19 +0000

Location

Pennsylvania General Assembly

225 N Capitol Building Harrisburg PA 17101

Harrisburg, PA 17101

United States

40° 15' 52.8156" N, 76° 53' 6.1296" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1092

Petitioner

Keystone Bituminous Coal Association et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Debenedictis et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

480 U.S. 470 (1987)

Argued

Monday, November 10, 1986

Decided

Monday, March 9, 1987

Advocates

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Andrew S. Gordon (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

By passing the the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Act), the Pennsylvania Legislature empowered the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) to regulate underground coal mining that damaged structures on the surface. When implementing the Act, DER prevented coal miners from removing more than 50% of coal from mines located beneath buildings. Historically, coal miners acquired rights to "mining estates" separate from the property owned on the above "surface estates." The Keystone Bituminous Coal Association, a group of miners, complained that the Act created a "support estate" that effectively took away its property without compensation. Keystone relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon to allege that this state action violated the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court rejected both allegations and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the decision.

Question

Does a state violate the Takings Clause by forcing coal mining companies to keep certain amounts of coal in underground mines in order to support structures on the surface? Does this restriction violate the Contract Clause by canceling agreements miners have made to secure their rights to underground coal?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Debenedictis, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No and No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of a 5-4 court. Like in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court's decision depended upon the "particular facts" of the mining regulation in question. Unlike in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court found a valid public purpose behind the present Act and determined the Act would not make it impossible for the miners to profitably conduct business. Therefore the decision in Pennsylvania Coal did not apply. To refute alleged Takings Clause violations, the Court established that "the support estate has value only insofar as it is used to exploit another estate." Then the Court conducted a factual review of the effects of the new regulation. It concluded that "[b]ecause petitioners retain the right to mine virtually all the coal in their mineral estates, the burden the Act places on the support estate does not constitute a taking." The Court also dismissed alleged Contract Clause violations because the state acquired no property for itself, but rather used its police power to implement regulation which served valid public interests.

Hodel v. Irving

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-637

Appellee

Irving

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Hodel

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

481 U.S. 704 (1987)

Argued

Monday, October 6, 1986

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1987

Advocates

Yvette Hall War Bonnett (on behalf of the appellees)

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Irving, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Bowen v. Agencies Opposed To Soc. Sec. Entrap.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-521

Appellee

Agencies Opposed To Soc. Sec. Entrap.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Bowen

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

477 U.S. 41 (1986)

Argued

Monday, April 28, 1986

Decided

Thursday, June 19, 1986

Advocates

Andrew D. Hurwitz (on behalf of Appellees)

Richard K. Willard (on behalf of Appellants)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bowen, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Social Security, as amended, including Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act, but excluding Medicare, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children

None

Macdonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-2015

Appellee

Yolo County

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Macdonald, Sommer & Frates

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

477 U.S. 340 (1986)

Argued

Wednesday, March 26, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, June 25, 1986

Advocates

Howard N. Ellman (on behalf of the appellant)

William L. Owen (on behalf of the appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Yolo County, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Lyng v. Payne

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1948

Petitioner

Lyng

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Payne

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

476 U.S. 926 (1986)

Argued

Monday, March 24, 1986

Decided

Monday, June 16, 1986

Advocates

Bruce M. Kuhlik (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Theodore L. Tripp, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Lyng, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1555

Appellee

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Connolly

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 84-1567

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

475 U.S. 211 (1986)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 1985

Decided

Wednesday, February 26, 1986

Advocates

Wayne Jett (on behalf of Appellants in No. 84-1555)

Baruch A. Fellner (on behalf of Appellees)

Richard M. Freeman (on behalf of Appellants in No. 84-1567)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Employee Retirement Income Security

None

Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:14 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-4

Petitioner

Williamson Planning Comm'n

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hamilton Bank

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

473 U.S. 172 (1985)

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 1985

Decided

Friday, June 28, 1985

Advocates

Robert L. Estes (on behalf of the petitioners)

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioners)

G. T. Nebel (on behalf of the respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Williamson Planning Comm'n, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

United States v. Locke

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1394

Appellee

Locke

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

471 U.S. 84 (1985)

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 1984

Decided

Monday, April 1, 1985

Advocates

Carolyn F. Corwin (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Harold A. Swafford (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 43 U.S.C. 1744

None

United States v. 50 Acres Of Land

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:14 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1170

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

50 Acres Of Land

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

469 U.S. 24 (1984)

Argued

Tuesday, October 2, 1984

Decided

Tuesday, December 4, 1984

Advocates

H. Louis Nichols (on behalf of Respondent)

Joshua I. Schwartz (on behalf of Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Summa Corp. v. California Ex Rel. Lands Comm'n

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-708

Petitioner

Summa Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California Ex Rel. Lands Comm'n

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

466 U.S. 198 (1984)

Argued

Wednesday, February 29, 1984

Decided

Tuesday, April 17, 1984

Advocates

Louis F. Claiborne (on behalf of the U.S. as amicus curiae)

Warren M. Christopher (on behalf of the petitioner)

Nancy Alvarado Saggese (on behalf of the respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Summa Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:14 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-196

Appellee

Monsanto Co.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Ruckelshaus

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

467 U.S. 986 (1984)

Argued

Monday, February 27, 1984

Decided

Tuesday, June 26, 1984

Advocates

A. Raymond Randolph (on behalf of Appellee)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Ruckelshaus, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-1994

Petitioner

Kirby Forest Industries, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

467 U.S. 1 (1984)

Argued

Wednesday, February 22, 1984

Decided

Monday, May 21, 1984

Advocates

Joe G. Roady (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Harriet S. Shapiro (on behalf of the respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Kirby Forest Industries, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan Catv Corp.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:33 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-244

Appellee

Teleprompter Manhattan Catv Corp.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Loretto

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

458 U.S. 419 (1982)

Argued

Tuesday, March 30, 1982

Decided

Wednesday, June 30, 1982

Advocates

Erwin N. Griswold (on behalf of Appellee)

Michael S. Gruen (on behalf of Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Loretto, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Texaco, Inc. v. Short

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-965

Appellee

Short

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Texaco, Inc.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 80-1018

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

454 U.S. 516 (1982)

Argued

Tuesday, October 6, 1981

Decided

Tuesday, January 12, 1982

Advocates

John L. Carroll (on behalf of Appellants)

Verner P. Partenheimer, Jr. (on behalf of Appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Short, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Dames & Moore v. Regan

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:15 +0000

Location

Dames & Moore

911 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles CA 90017

Los Angeles, CA 90017

United States

34° 3' 1.9764" N, 118° 15' 35.91" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-2078

Petitioner

Dames & Moore

Respondent

Regan

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

453 U.S. 654 (1981)

Argued

Wednesday, June 24, 1981

Decided

Thursday, July 2, 1981

Advocates

Thomas G. Shack, Jr. (Argued the cause for intervenor-respondent Islamic Republic of Iran)

C. Stephen Howard (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Eric M. Lieberman (Argued the cause for intervenor-respondent Bank Markazi Iran)

Rex E. Lee (Argued the cause for the the federal respondents)

Facts of the Case

In reaction to the seizure of the U.S. embassy and American nationals in Iran, President Jimmy Carter invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and froze Iranian assets in the United States. When the hostages were released in 1981, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan affirmed the agreements made the Carter administration that terminated all legal proceedings against the Iranian government and created an independent Claims Tribunal. Dames & Moore attempted to recover over $3 million owed to it by the Iranian government and claimed the executive orders were beyond the scope of presidential power.

Question

Did the president have the authority to transfer Iranian funds and to nullify legal claims against Iran?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Regan, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 50 U.S.C. 1702

The Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act constituted a specific congressional authorization for the President to order the transfer of Iranian assets. The Court further held that although the IEEPA itself did not authorize the presidential suspension of legal claims, previous acts of Congress had "implicitly approved" of executive control of claim settlement. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its ruling, limiting the decision to the facts of the case.

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-678

Appellee

San Diego

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

San Diego Gas & Electric Co.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

450 U.S. 621 (1981)

Argued

Monday, December 1, 1980

Decided

Tuesday, March 24, 1981

Advocates

C. Alan Sumption (on behalf of the Appellees)

Louis E. Goebel (on behalf of the Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for San Diego, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1257

None

Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies Inc. v. Beckwith

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:43 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-1033

Appellee

Beckwith

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies Inc.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

449 U.S. 155 (1980)

Argued

October 14-15, 1980

Decided

Tuesday, December 9, 1980

Advocates

Harry A. Stewart (on behalf of the Appellees)

Harvey M. Alper (on behalf of the Appellants)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Agins v. Tiburon

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-602

Appellee

Tiburon

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Agins

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

447 U.S. 255 (1980)

Argued

Tuesday, April 15, 1980

Decided

Tuesday, June 10, 1980

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Tiburon, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:14 +0000

Location

The Pruneyard

1875 South Bascom Avenue Campbell CA 95008

Campbell, CA 95008

United States

37° 17' 19.0212" N, 121° 55' 59.6136" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-289

Appellee

Robins

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

PruneYard Shopping Center

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

447 U.S. 74 (1980)

Argued

Tuesday, March 18, 1980

Decided

Monday, June 9, 1980

Advocates

Elinor Hadley Stillman (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance)

Philip L. Hammer (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Max L. Gillam (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

High school students seeking support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism set up a table in PruneYard to distribute literature and solicit signatures for a petition. A security guard told them to leave since their actions violated the shopping center's regulations against "publicly expressive" activities.

Question

Did PruneYard's regulations violate the students' free speech rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Robins, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

Yes. Since the California Constitution protected "speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the shopping centers are privately owned," PruneYard could not prevent the students from soliciting on its property. The Court argued that it was within California's power to guarantee this expansive free speech right since it did not unreasonably intrude on the rights of private property owners.

Andrus v. Allard

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

78-740

Appellee

Allard

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Andrus

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

444 U.S. 51 (1979)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 1979

Decided

Tuesday, November 27, 1979

Advocates

Harriet S. Shapiro (For the Appellants)

John P. Akolt, III (For the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Andrus, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-1819

Petitioner

Vaughn

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Vermilion Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

444 U.S. 206 (1979)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 1979

Decided

Tuesday, December 4, 1979

Advocates

Harry McCall, Jr. (on behalf of the respondent)

John K. Hill, Jr. (on behalf of the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Vaughn, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Kaiser Aetna v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:43 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

78-738

Petitioner

Kaiser Aetna

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

444 U.S. 164 (1979)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 1979

Decided

Tuesday, December 4, 1979

Advocates

Richard Charles Bocken (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Kathryn A. Oberly (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kaiser Aetna, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

United States v. 564.54 Acres Of Land

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

78-488

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

564.54 Acres Of Land

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

441 U.S. 506 (1979)

Argued

Tuesday, March 27, 1979

Decided

Monday, May 14, 1979

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Leo Sheep Co. v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:33 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-1686

Petitioner

Leo Sheep Co.

Respondent

United States

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

440 U.S. 668 (1979)

Argued

January 15-16, 1979

Decided

Tuesday, March 27, 1979

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Leo Sheep Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 12 Stat. 489

None

Penn Central Transport Co. v. New York

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:12 +0000

Location

Grand Central Terminal

42nd Street and Park Avenue. New York NY 10017

New York, NY 10017

United States

40° 45' 7.4484" N, 73° 58' 39.1836" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-444

Appellee

New York

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Penn Central Transport Co.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

438 U.S. 104 (1978)

Argued

Monday, April 17, 1978

Decided

Monday, June 26, 1978

Advocates

Leonard J. Koerner (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Daniel M. Gribbon (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Patricia Wald (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance)

Facts of the Case

The New York City Landmarks Preservation Law of 1965 empowered the city to designate certain structures and neighborhoods as "landmarks" or "landmark sites." Penn Central, which owned the Grand Central Terminal (opened in 1913), was not allowed to construct a multistory office building above it.

Question

Did the restriction against Penn Central constitute a "taking" in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for New York, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. The Court held that the restrictions imposed did not prevent Penn Central from ever constructing above the terminal in the future. New York's objection was to the nature of the proposed construction and not to construction in general implemented to "enhance" the Terminal. Preventing the construction of a 50-plus story addition above the station was a reasonable restriction substantially related to the general welfare of the city.

Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:18:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-125

Petitioner

Alamo Land & Cattle Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arizona

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

424 U.S. 295 (1976)

Argued

October 14-15, 1975

Decided

Tuesday, February 24, 1976

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Alamo Land & Cattle Co., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:33:07 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-165

Respondent

Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases

Consolidation

No. 74-166

No. 74-167

No. 74-168

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

419 U.S. 102 (1974)

Argued

Wednesday, October 23, 1974

Decided

Monday, December 16, 1974

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None

Almota Farmers Elevator & Whse. Co. v. U.S.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

71-951

Petitioner

Almota Farmers Elevator & Whse. Co.

Respondent

U.S.

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

409 U.S. 470 (1973)

Argued

Wednesday, October 18, 1972

Decided

Tuesday, January 16, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Almota Farmers Elevator & Whse. Co., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None