Cases by Issue - Direct Injury

FEC v. Akins

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1590

Petitioner

FEC

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Akins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 11 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, January 14, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1998

Advocates

Daniel M. Schember (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) imposes recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon political committees which receive more than $1,000 in "contributions" or which make more than $1,000 in "expenditures" in a year "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." Certain assistance does not count toward the expenditure cap if it takes the form of a "communication" by a "membership organization or corporation" "to its members" as long as the organization is not "organized primarily for the purpose of influencing [any individual's] nomination... or election." A complaint filed by a group of voters asked the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to order the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to make public the information that FECA demands of political committees. Ultimately, the FEC found that AIPAC was not a political committee because its major purpose was not the nomination or election of candidates. The en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the FEC's major purpose test improperly interpreted FECA's definition of a political committee.

Question

Do voters have the proper legal standing to challenge the Federal Election Commission's decisions regarding political committees?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for FEC, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 2 U.S.C. 431

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that voters seeking information, to which they believe FECA entitles them, have standing to challenge the FEC's decision not to bring an enforcement action. Because FECA seeks to address the voters' injury, the failure to obtain relevant information, Justice Breyer concluded that the voters had prudential standing. Furthermore, because the voters' inability to obtain information constitutes an "injury in fact," continued Justice Breyer, the voters had standing under Article III. The Court did not address the FEC's major purpose test, allowing the FEC to address the issue under newly proposed rules. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas joined.

Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-643

Petitioner

Steel Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Citizens for a Better Environment

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 83 (1998)

Argued

Monday, October 6, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Advocates

Sanford M. Stein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David A. Strauss (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Citizens For A Better Environment, a environmental protection organization, filed an enforcement action for relief under the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986's (EPCRA) Citizen-Suit Provision. Citizens alleged that the Chicago Steel And Pickling Company had violated the EPCRA by failing to file timely toxic- and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports since 1988. Ultimately, Chicago Steel filed all of the overdue forms with the relevant agencies by the time the complaint was acted on. Arguing this fact and that the EPCRA does not allow suit for purely historical violations, Chicago Steel filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Citizens' allegation of untimeliness in filing was not a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court agreed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EPCRA authorizes citizen suits for purely past violations.

Question

Does an environmental organization have standing to bring suit against companies that fail to meet the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act Of 1986's deadlines for filing toxic- and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports? Does the EPCRA authorize suits for purely past violations?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Steel Company, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No and the Court did not answer the question. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held, because none of the relief sought would likely remedy its alleged injury in fact, that Citizens For A Better Environment lacked standing to maintain suit and that the Court and lower federal courts lack the jurisdiction to entertain it. While all nine Justices agreed that the organization lacked standing, they disagreed on the reasons. Lacking jurisdiction, the Court declined to answer whether the EPCRA authorizes suits for purely past violations. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Stephen G. Breyer, John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote concurring opinions.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:25 +0000

Location

Defenders of Wildlife

1130 17th Street NW Washington DC 20036

Washington, DC 20036

United States

38° 54' 17.8488" N, 77° 2' 19.3128" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1424

Petitioner

Lujan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Defenders of Wildlife

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

504 U.S. 555 (1992)

Argued

Tuesday, December 3, 1991

Decided

Friday, June 12, 1992

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Brian B. O'Neill (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (S7(a)(2)) required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that any authorized actions did not jeopardize endangered or threatened species or critically destroy natural habitats. A 1986 amendment to the act limited it scope to actions in the United States or on the high seas. Defenders of Wildlife and other organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the new amendment erred by providing for a geographic limit on the original law.

Question

Do the respondents have standing to sue?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Lujan, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. Even if the Court were to assume that the agency-funded projects at issue threatened listed species, there was no proof that these actions would produce "actual or imminent" injuries to particular respondents who might some day wish to visit the foreign countries in question. The Court disregarded the proposed theory of "ecosystem nexus" which claimed that any person who used any part of of a "contiguous ecosystem" adversed affected by a funded activity had standing to sue.

Public Citizen v. Department Of Justice

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-429

Appellee

Department Of Justice

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Public Citizen

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 88-494

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

491 U.S. 440 (1989)

Argued

Monday, April 17, 1989

Decided

Wednesday, June 21, 1989

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Department Of Justice, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 1

None

Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-1034

Appellee

American Booksellers Assn.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Virginia

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Opinion

484 U.S. 383 (1988)

Argued

Wednesday, November 4, 1987

Decided

Monday, January 25, 1988

Advocates

Paul M. Bator (on behalf of the appellees)

Richard W. Smith (on behalf of the appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Virginia, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:18:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-1124

Petitioner

Simon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 74-1110

Heard By

Burger Court (1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

426 U.S. 26 (1976)

Argued

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

Decided

Tuesday, June 1, 1976

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Simon, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Warth v. Seldin

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:33:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

73-2024

Petitioner

Warth

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Seldin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

422 U.S. 490 (1975)

Argued

Monday, March 17, 1975

Decided

Wednesday, June 25, 1975

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Seldin, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Cramp v. Bd. Of Public Instruction

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:41:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellee

Bd. Of Public Instruction

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Cramp

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Decided By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Opinion

368 U.S. 278 (1961)

Argued

Monday, October 16, 1961

Decided

Monday, December 11, 1961

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cramp, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None