Cases by Issue - Untimely Filing

Woodford v. Ngo

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-416

Petitioner

Jeanne S. Woodford, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Viet Mike Ngo

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, November 14, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, March 22, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 22, 2006

Advocates

Jennifer G. Perkell (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Meir Feder (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), prisoners must exhaust any available administrative remedies for resolving disputes within the prison system before they can bring suit in federal court. Viet Mike Ngo filed a grievance with the California prison system, but it was dismissed because he had waited too long to file it. He then brought suit in federal district court. California objected, arguing that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies, and that the fact those remedies were no longer available to him because of his delay in filing was immaterial. The district court agreed, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that all of Ngo's administrative remedies were "exhausted" because they were no longer available to him.

Question

Does a prisoner satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995's requirement that he exhaust all administrative remedies available to him before bringing suit in federal court by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance which is rejected?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Woodford, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1997

No. In a 6-to-3 decision authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner must properly exhaust any available administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court. This understanding of the PLRA's exhaustion provision mirrors that of the traditional exhaustion provision in administrative law and is "substantively similar" to that of habeas corpus law. An alternative ruling, Justice Alito wrote, would allow prisoners to circumvent the obvious purpose of the act (channeling initial appeals through the administrative system rather than the courts) by simply waiting until their administrative appeals were no longer timely.

Lockhart v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:31 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-881

Petitioner

James Lockhart

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, April 25, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, November 2, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, December 7, 2005

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (argued the cause for Respondents)

Brian Wolfman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 2002 the U.S. began withholding a portion of Lockhart's Social Security payments to offset his debt on federally reinsured student loans that were more than 10 years overdue. Lockhart sued, arguing the offset was barred by the 10-year statute of limitations of the Debt Collection Act (1982). The district court dismissed Lockhart's suit, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Could the United States offset Social Security benefits to collect a student loan debt that had been outstanding for over 10 years?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 31 U.S.C. 3716

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Debt Collection Improvement Act made Social Security benefits subject to offset and that the Higher Education Technical Amendments removed the 10-year limit that would otherwise bar the offset.

Graham County Water District v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-169

Petitioner

Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States, ex rel. Karen T. Wilson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, April 20, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Christopher G. Browning, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Mark T. Hurt (argued the cause for Respondent)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The False Claims Act (FCA) allows the government or an individual on the government's behalf to sue any person for "making false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States." A 1986 amendment to the FCA allows individuas to sue their employer if the employer retaliates against them in any way for assisting in an investigation of such false claims. In 2001, Karen Wilson, a secretary for Graham County Water District, sued her employer for various false claims it allegedly made concerning a federal disaster relief program. She also brought a retaliation suit against her employer, alleging that after she had provided information on the false claims to federal officials in December 1995, she had been repeatedly harassed by Graham County District officials until she resigned in March 1997. The District Court dismissed Wilson's suit as untimely. The court accepted Graham County District's argument that the six-year statute of limitations in the 1986 amendment to the FCA was not intended to apply to retaliation suits. Therefore, the court held, the most closely analogous state limitation applies instead. The north Carolina limit for retaliation suits was three years, so Wilson's suit was brought too late. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court and applied the six-year limitation to all retaliation suits under the FCA.

Question

Does the six-year statute of limitations in the False Claims Act apply to suits brought by individuals who were retaliated against by their employers for assisting an investigation of false or fraudulent claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Graham County Water District, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal False Claims

No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that the six-year statute of limitations did not apply to suits for retaliation. The majority opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas found the statute of limitations "ambiguous." The ambiguity arose from the fact that the six-year limitation in the FCA starts from the time the false claim was made. Yet in a retaliation suit, no actual false claim needs to be alleged. The plaintiff only has to allege that her employer retaliated against her in connection with a federal investigation. The Court found that the ambiguity could be resolved by interpreting the statute of limitations to apply only to suits for false claims, not to retaliation suits. The Court left to the lower courts the question of which state statute of limitations should apply in place of the six-year limitation. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. The dissent characterized the statute of limitations as "unusual" but "reasonably clear," and argued that it should be read to apply to retaliation actions.

Dodd v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-5286

Petitioner

Michael Donald Dodd

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, November 29, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Janice L. Bergmann (argued the cause for Petitioner)

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, Dodd was convicted under federal law for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. On April 4, 2001 he filed a motion that the conviction should be set aside because it was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1999 in Richardson v. U.S. In that case, the Court held that a jury must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific violations that constitute the continuing criminal enterprise. The district court rejected Dodd's motion, because it was filed more than a year after the Court decided Richardson. Under federal law, the one-year limitation period in which a prisoner may file a motion to change his sentence, begins "on the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." The 11th Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is the start date for a federal prisoner's one-year limitation period the date on which the Court "initially recongized" the right asserted in an applicant's motion, or the date on which the right is "made retroactive?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the text of the federal law "unequivocally" stated that the one-year limitation period begins to run on the date on which the Court "initially recongized" the right, not the date on which that right was made retroactive. O'Connor wrote that Dodd's reliance on the statute's second clause was misplaced, because that clause merely limited the subsection's applicability to cases where applicants assert rights both "newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made applicable to cases on collateral reviiew." Thus, the date the right was asserted does not apply at all unless the second clause's conditions are met. The Court noted that this would make it difficult for applicants filing second or successive motions to obtain relief, since the Court rarely announces a new rule and makes it retroactive within a year.

Pace v. DiGuglielmo

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9627

Petitioner

John A. Pace

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

David DiGuglielmo, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 408 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, February 28, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, April 27, 2005

Advocates

Ronald Eisenberg (argued the cause for Respondents)

David Wycoff (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1986 John Pace was convicted for murder in a Pennsylvania court. His post- conviction appeal was rejected by the state courts as untimely. In 1999 he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. While federal law provides a one-year statute of limitations on filing habeas petitions, that period is tolled while "a properly filed" state appeal is pending. The district court found Pace entitled to both statutory and equitable tolling, effectively discounting the period of time when Pace pursued appeals in state courts. Pennsylvania appealed and argued the court had no basis for the extension. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and ruled Pace could not file a federal habeas petition.

Question

If a state court rejected Pace's post-conviction appeal as untimely, could his federal habeas petition still be "properly filed" within the context of the federal law establishing a one-year statute of limitations for such petitions?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for DiGuglielmo, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the federal statute of limitations barred Pace's petition, as it was filed beyond the deadline. Pace was not entitled to statutory tolling because a petition filed after a time limit, which does meet any exceptions to that limit, was no more "properly filed" than a petition filed after a time limit permitting no exception. Moreover, because Pace did not pursue claims in a "diligent" and timely fashion, he was not entitled equitable tolling for any of the time period during which he pursued his state appeals.

Johnson v. U.S.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9685

Petitioner

Robert Johnson, Jr.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 295 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 2005

Decided

Monday, April 4, 2005

Advocates

Courtland L. Reichman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1998 a Georgia court reversed all of Johnson's seven prior convictions. One of these had been the basis for the enhanced federal sentence Johnson had received in 1994. In light of the reversals, Johnson filed a motion to vacate his enhanced federal sentence. Federal law, however, set out a one-year statute of limitations on motions by prisoners seeking to modify their sentences. That one-year period ran from the latest of four dates, the last of which was "the date on which the facts supporting the claim...could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." Johnson argued his motion was timely because the reversals constituted previously undiscoverable "facts supporting the claim" and thus triggered a renewed limitation period. The district court and the 11th Circuit denied Johnson's motion as untimely.

Question

Is the vacating of a state conviction a "fact" as that term is used in the federal law setting out a statute of limitations on federal sentence modification motions, thus commencing the statute's 1-year limitations period?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for U.S., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court that the vacating of a state sentence that underlay a federal sentence enhancement was a "fact" within the meaning of the law, but that fact had to have been discovered with due diligence: that is, the prisoner must have promptly sought to have the state judgment vacated. The Court held that by waiting until more than three years after his federal sentence, Johnson failed to show due diligence in seeking to have his original state convictions vacated.

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley and Sons Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1205

Petitioner

Edith Jones, et al., on Behalf of Herself and a Class of Others Similarly Situated

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 369 (2004)

Granted

Monday, May 19, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, February 24, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 3, 2004

Advocates

Kevin C. Newsom (argued the cause for Respondent)

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Respondent)

H. Candace Gorman (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Petitioners, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

In November of 1996, Edith Jones and several other African Americans filed a class action lawsuit in federal district court against R.R. Donnelley and Sons, a commercial printing company. They claimed they had suffered racial discrimination in violation of section 1981 of United States Code (U.S.C.), which had no specified statute of limitations. Donnelley and Sons, however, argued that the section was bound by a two-year statute of limitations established by Illinois for all personal injury claims. The suit fell outside that statute of limitations, and the company argued that it should therefore be dismissed.

Jones, however, argued that a separate section of U.S.C. extended the statute of limitations to four years for any civil suit brought under an act of Congress passed after 1990. Because the 1991 Civil Rights Act had broadened the definition of section 1981, she argued, the four-year statute of limitations should apply to that section and the suit should therefore not be thrown out. Donnelley and Sons countered that the 1991 Civil Rights Act had merely amended the section, not created a new law, and that the four-year statute of limitations therefore did not apply.

A federal district court sided with Jones. A Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed.

Question

Does the United States Code's four-year statute of limitations for suits brought under acts of Congress passed after 1990 apply only to new laws, or does it also apply to amendments of previously existing laws?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jones, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 26 U.S.C. 1658

It also applies to amendments of previously existing laws. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice John Paul Stevens stated "[a]n amendment to an existing statute is no less an 'Act of Congress' than a new, stand-alone statute." The four-year statute of limitations therefore applies to any act or amendment to an act passed by Congress after 1990.

Rotella v. Wood

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-896

Petitioner

Rotella

Respondent

Wood

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 549 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, November 3, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 2000

Advocates

Richard P. Hogan, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Charles T. Frazier, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Mark Rotella was admitted to a Brookhaven Psychiatric Pavilion in 1985 and discharged in 1986 after Brookhaven allegedly coerced him to stay longer than he intended. In 1994, the facility's parent company pleaded guilty to charges of fraud, conspiracy and violations of RICO, for giving physicians monetary incentives to needlessly admit, treat and retain patients at their hospitals. Rotella learned of the plea that same year, and in 1997 he filed a civil damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), claiming that the Brookhaven doctors and related business entities, had conspired to keep him hospitalized to maximize their profits. RICO makes it criminal "to conduct" an "enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." A "pattern" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, the last of which occurred within 10 years after the commission of a prior act. Brookhaven countered that the statute of limitations under RICO had run on the charge. The District Court granted Brookhaven summary judgment on the ground that the 4-year limitation period for civil RICO claims had expired in 1990, four years after Rotella admitted discovering his injury. In affirming, the Court of Appeals rejected Rotella's argument that the limitations period does not begin to run until a plaintiff discovers (or should have discovered) both the injury and the pattern of racketeering activity.

Question

Does the four year statute of limitations on claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act begin to run before a claimant actually discovers that a defendant's racketeering activity caused the harm?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wood, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Rotella's action was not timely, because the start of the 4-year limitations period applicable to a civil RICO action was not governed by an "injury and pattern discovery" accrual rule under which such a civil claim would accrue only when the claimant discovered, or should have discovered, both an injury and a pattern of racketeering activity. In a footnote, Justice Souter noted that "[w]e do not...settle upon a final rule."

Irwin v. Veterans Administration

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-5867

Petitioner

Irwin

Respondent

Veterans Administration

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 89 (1990)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 1990

Decided

Monday, December 3, 1990

Advocates

Jon T. Ker (Argued the case for the petitioner)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Shirley Irwin filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that he had been unlawfully fired by the federal Veterans Administration on the basis of his race and disability. In order to sue the federal government for unlawful discrimination, one must obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC (which is a waiver of the government's sovereign immunity from private suits). The EEOC mailed right-to-sue letters to both Irwin and his attorney. His attorney was out of the country, however, so while the letter arrived at his office on March 23, the attorney did not receive it until April 10. Irwin receive his copy of the letter on April 7. Less than a month from when Irwin received the letter, but more than a month from when the letter arrived at his attorney's office, Irwin filed suit in federal District Court. The court dismissed the suit, however, because it was filed more than a month after the attorney's office received the letter. Under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c), suits against the government must be filed within 30 days "of receipt of notice of final action taken" by the EEOC. The court ruled that the 30-day window began when the attorney's office received the letter. On appeal, Irwin argued that the window should have started when he or his attorney - not just the attorney's office - actually received the letter. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, however, upholding the District Court's decision.

Question

Does the 30-day window after "receipt of notice of final action taken" by the EEOC within which a suit against the federal government must be filed begin when an attorney's office receives notification, or when the attorney or client himself receives notification?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Veterans Administration, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

The 30-day window begins as soon as either the attorney's office, the attorney, or the client receives notification - whichever comes first. In an opinion written by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that lower courts have consistently held that notice to an attorney's office qualifies as notice to the client. "The practical effect of a contrary rule would be to encourage factual disputes about when actual notice was received, and thereby create uncertainty in an area of the law where certainty is much to be desired," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.

Board Of Regents v. Tomanio

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:52 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-424

Petitioner

Board Of Regents

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tomanio

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

446 U.S. 478 (1980)

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 1980

Decided

Monday, May 19, 1980

Advocates

Vincent J. Mutari (on behalf of the Respondent)

Donald O. Meserve (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Board Of Regents, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Hadley v. Junior College District

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:38:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellee

Junior College District

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Hadley

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1969-1970)

Decided By

Burger Court (1969-1970)

Opinion

397 U.S. 50 (1970)

Argued

Monday, November 10, 1969

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 1970

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Hadley, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

None

Scofield v. NLRB

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:40:43 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

273

Petitioner

Scofield

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Warren Court (1967-1969)

Decided By

Warren Court (1967-1969)

Opinion

394 U.S. 423 (1969)

Argued

Tuesday, January 14, 1969

Decided

Tuesday, April 1, 1969

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for NLRB, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

None

Crown Coat Front Co. v. U.S.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:42:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

371

Petitioner

Crown Coat Front Co.

Respondent

U.S.

Heard By

Warren Court (1965-1967)

Decided By

Warren Court (1965-1967)

Opinion

386 U.S. 503 (1967)

Argued

February 13-14, 1967

Decided

Monday, April 10, 1967

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Crown Coat Front Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 2401

None

Burnett v. New York Central R. Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:34:33 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

437

Petitioner

Burnett

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

New York Central R. Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Decided By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Opinion

380 U.S. 424 (1965)

Argued

Thursday, March 11, 1965

Decided

Monday, April 5, 1965

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Burnett, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Employers' Liability

None

Fallen v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:37:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

210

Petitioner

Fallen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Decided By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Opinion

378 U.S. 139 (1964)

Argued

Thursday, April 30, 1964

Decided

Monday, June 22, 1964

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fallen, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

United States v. Healy

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:37:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellee

Healy

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Decided By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Opinion

376 U.S. 75 (1964)

Argued

Monday, January 6, 1964

Decided

Monday, February 17, 1964

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Supreme Court Rules

None

Soriano v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Soriano

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Warren Court (1956-1957)

Decided By

Warren Court (1956-1957)

Opinion

352 U.S. 270 (1957)

Argued

Wednesday, December 5, 1956

Decided

Monday, January 14, 1957

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 2501

None