Cases by Issue - Establishment of Religion

Cutter v. Wilkinson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9877

Petitioner

Jon B. Cutter, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reginald Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 709 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Monday, March 21, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondent United States, supporting petitioners)

Douglas R. Cole (argued the cause for Respondent Wilkinson)

David A. Goldberger (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA) prohibited government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a "compelling government interest." Prisoners in Ohio alleged in federal district court that prison officials violated RLUIPA by failing to accomodate the inmates' exercise of their "nonmainstream" religions. The prison officials argued that the act improperly advanced religion and thus violated the First Amendment's establishment clause (which prohibited government from making laws "respecting an establishment of religion"). The district court rejected that argument and ruled for the inmates. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Did a federal law prohibiting government from burdening prisoners' religious exercise violate the First Amendment's establishment clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cutter, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 2000

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, on its face, RLUIPA made an accommodation allowed by the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the law was an effort to alleviate the "government-created burden" on religious exercise that prisoners faced. Nor did section three discriminate between mainstream and non-mainstream religions. The Court did point out that constitutional problems could arise if RLUIPA were enforced improperly and religious prisoners received favored treatment, or if religious exercise and security concerns were not properly balanced.

Van Orden v. Perry

Fri, 29 Oct 2010 18:40:17 +0000

Location

Texas State Capitol

1100 Congress Avenue Austin TX 78701

Austin, TX 78701

United States

30° 16' 21.882" N, 97° 44' 28.0752" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1500

Petitioner

Thomas Van Orden

Respondent

Rick Perry, in his Official Capacity as Governor of Texas and Chairman, State Preservation Board, et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. 677 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Erwin Chemerinsky (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondents, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting respondents)

Greg Abbott (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion.

Question

Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Perry, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

No. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause."

McCreary County v. ACLU

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1693

Petitioner

McCreary County, Kentucky, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Mathew D. Staver (argued the cause for Petitioners)

David A. Friedman (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause.

Question

Do Ten Commandments displays in public schools and in courthouses violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" 2. Was a determination that the displays' purpose had been to advance religion sufficient for the displays' invalidation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for ACLU, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance religion. In the case of each of the displays, the Court held, an observer would have concluded that the government was endorsing religion. The first display for presenting the Ten Commandments in isolation; the second for showing the Commandments along with other religious passages; the third for presenting the Commandments in a presentation of the "Foundations of American Law," an exhibit in which the county reached "for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses."

Good News Club v. Milford Central School

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

Milford Central School

42 West Main Street Milford NY 13807

Milford, NY 13807

United States

42° 35' 27.3948" N, 74° 56' 54.816" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-2036

Petitioner

Good News Club

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Milford Central School

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 98 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, February 28, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 11, 2001

Advocates

Thomas Marcelle (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Frank W. Miller (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under New York law, Milford Central School policy authorizes district residents to use its building after school for certain activities. Stephen and Darleen Fournier were district residents eligible to use the school's facilities. They sought approval of their proposed use and sponsorship of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children. The Fourniers submitted a request to hold the Club's weekly afterschool meetings at the school. Milford denied the request reasoning that the proposed use, including singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture, and praying, was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. The Club filed suit alleging that the denial violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the District Court granted Milford summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the subject matter of the Club's was "quintessentially religious", and the activities "fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character development,'" Milford's policy of excluding the Club's meetings was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.

Question

Did Milford Central School violate the First Amendment free speech rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the Club from meeting after hours at the school? If a violation occurred, was it justified by Milford's concern that permitting the Club's activities would violate the Establishment Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Good News Club, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "Milford's restriction violates the Club's free speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation." "When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment," wrote Justice Thomas.

Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:31 +0000

Location

Santa Fe Independent School District

13310 Hwy 6 Santa Fe TX 77510

Santa Fe, TX 77510

United States

29° 22' 40.656" N, 95° 6' 16.38" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-62

Petitioner

Santa Fe Independent School Dist.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 290 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, March 29, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 19, 2000

Advocates

John Cornyn (Argued the cause for Texas, et al., as amici curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Jay A. Sekulow (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Anthony P. Griffin (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a prayer, described as overtly Christian, over the public address system before each home varsity football game. One Mormon and one Catholic family filed suit challenging this practice and others under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court enjoined the public Santa Fe Independent School District (the District) from implementing its policy as it stood. While the suit was pending, the District adopted a new policy, which permitted, but did not require, student-initiated and student- led prayer at all the home games and which authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether "invocations" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students authorized such prayers and selected a spokesperson, the District Court entered an order modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer. The Court of Appeals held that, even as modified by the District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid. The District petitioned for a writ of certiorari, claiming its policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because the football game messages were private student speech, not public speech.

Question

Does the Santa Fe Independent School District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Doe, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded that the football game prayers were public speech authorized by a government policy and taking place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events and that the District's policy involved both perceived and actual government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important school events. Such speech is not properly characterized as "private," wrote Justice Stevens for the majority. In dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, noted the "disturbing" tone of the Court's opinion that "bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life."

Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-780

Petitioner

Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pinette

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 753 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, April 26, 1995

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 1995

Advocates

Michael J. Renner (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Benson A. Wolman (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, the Ku Klux Klan organization attempted to place an unattended cross on Capitol Square, the state-house plaza in Columbus, Ohio, during the 1993 Christmas season. Ohio law makes Capitol Square a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gives the Advisory Board responsibility for regulating access to the square. The Board denied the application of the Ku Klux Klan to erect the cross on Establishment Clause grounds.

Question

Did the Board's denial of a permit to the Ku Klux Klan violate free speech under the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Pinette, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes. The display was private religious speech that "is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression." Because Capitol Square is designated as a traditional public forum, any group may express their views there, and the Board may regulate the content of the Klan's expression on the plaza only if a restriction is necessary and narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.

Rosenberger v. University of Virginia

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:27 +0000

Location

University of Virginia Charlottesville, VA 22904

United States

38° 2' 0.4272" N, 78° 30' 51.3324" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-329

Petitioner

Rosenberger

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

University of Virginia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 819 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, March 1, 1995

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 1995

Advocates

Michael W. McConnell (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

John C. Jeffries, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a diety or an ultimate reality," as prohibited by University guidelines.

Question

Did the University of Virginia violate the First Amendment rights of its Christian magazine staff by denying them the same funding resources that it made available to secular student-run magazines?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Rosenberger, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes. The Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion, held that the University's denial of funding to Rosenberger, due to the content of his message, imposed a financial burden on his speech and amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The Court noted that no matter how scarce University publication funding may be, if it chooses to promote speech at all, it must promote all forms of it equally. Furtheremore, because it promoted past publications regardless of their religious content, the Court found the University's publication policy to be neutral toward religion and, therefore, not in violation of the establishment clause. The Court concluded by stating that the University could not stop all funding of religious speech while continuing to fund an atheistic perspective. The exclusion of several views is as offensive to free speech as the exclusion of only one. The University must provide a financial subsidy to a student religious publication on the same basis as other student publications.

Lee v. Weisman

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:24 +0000

Location

Nathan Bishop Middle School

101 Sessions Street Providence RI 02906

Providence, RI 02906

United States

41° 50' 28.5612" N, 71° 23' 35.6604" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1014

Petitioner

Lee

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Weisman

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

505 U.S. 577 (1992)

Argued

Wednesday, November 6, 1991

Decided

Wednesday, June 24, 1992

Advocates

Charles J. Cooper (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Sandra A. Blanding (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Kenneth W. Starr (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In keeping with the practice of several other public middle and high school principals in Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the graduates. Hoping to stop the rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought a temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the ceremony, where prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent injunction barring Lee and other Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their schools' ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling against the schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.

Question

Does the inclusion of clergy who offer prayers at official public school ceremonies violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Weisman, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government involvement in this case creates "a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school." Such conduct conflicts with settled rules proscribing prayer for students. The school's rule creates subtle and indirect coercion (students must stand respectfully and silently), forcing students to act in ways which establish a state religion. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause is that government may not compose official prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.

Allegheny v. ACLU

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:21 +0000

Location

Allegheny County Courthouse

436 Grant Street Pittsburgh PA 15239

Pittsburgh, PA 15239

United States

40° 26' 19.6584" N, 79° 59' 47.058" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-2050

Petitioner

Allegheny

Respondent

ACLU

Consolidation

Chabad v. American Civil Liberties Union et al., No. 88-90

City of Pittsburgh v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, et al., No. 88-96

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

492 U.S. 573 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, February 22, 1989

Decided

Monday, July 3, 1989

Advocates

Peter Buscemi (Argued the cause for the petitioners in Nos. 87-2050 and 88-96)

Roslyn M. Litman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Nathan Lewin (Argued the cause for the petitioner in No. 88-90)

Facts of the Case

Two public-sponsored holiday displays in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union. The first display involved a Christian nativity scene inside the Allegheny County Courthouse. The second display was a large Chanukah menorah, erected each year by the Chabad Jewish organization, outside the City-County building. The ACLU claimed the displays constituted state endorsement of religion. This case was decided together with Chabad v. ACLU and City of Pittsburgh v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh.

Question

Did the public displays violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for ACLU, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the creche inside the courthouse unmistakably endorsed Christianity in violation of the Establishment Clause. By prominently displaying the words "Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ," the county sent a clear message that it supported and promoted Christian orthodoxy. The Court also held, however, that not all religious celebrations on government property violated the Establishment Clause. Six of the justices concluded that the display involving the menorah was constitutionally legitimate given its "particular physical setting."

Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:21 +0000

Location

Texas State Comptroller

111 E 17th St Austin TX 78711

Austin, TX 78711

United States

30° 16' 42.42" N, 97° 44' 17.8476" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1245

Appellant

Texas Monthly, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Bob Bullock, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas et al.

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

489 U.S. 1 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, November 1, 1988

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 1989

Advocates

Roger J. George, Jr. (argued the cause for the appellant)

Harriet D. Burke (Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for appellees)

Facts of the Case

The state of Texas offered a tax exemption to religious publications during a 3-year period. Texas Monthly, Inc, a nonreligious publisher, claimed that this promoted religion in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Texas Monthly filed suit in a state court seeking to recover the taxes it had paid in 1985. The court ruled that the exemption violated the Establishment Clause by advancing religion and the Free Press Clause by discriminating based on the content of publications. Since the court did not have the authority to rewrite tax statutes, it instead invalidated taxes levied on nonreligious publications and ordered the state to refund Texas Monthly's tax payments. A state appeals court reversed the decision.

Question

Does a state violate the Establishment Clause and the Free Press Clause by exempting religious publications from paying taxes that all nonreligious publications must pay?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Texas Monthly, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the judgment for 6-3 court a wrote a plurality opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Thurgood Marshall. In the Brennan's view, the Texas government "directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations" by providing the exemption. The Court referred to its decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which required legislation affecting religion to have a secular purpose. In this case, the exemption did not have a secular purpose since it could not "reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion." Since taxing religious publications did not inhibit the exercise of religion, a state could not singularly remove taxes for religious publications while still taxing nonreligious publications. This would use state mechanisms to give religious publishers an advantage over nonreligious publishers in violation of the Establishment Clause.

Bowen v. Kendrick

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-253

Petitioner

Kendrick

Respondent

Bowen

Consolidation

No. 87-431

No. 87-462

No. 87-775

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

487 U.S. 589 (1988)

Argued

Wednesday, March 30, 1988

Decided

Monday, June 27, 1988

Advocates

Janet Benshoof (Argued the cause for the appellees in Nos. 87-253, 87-431, and 87-775 and the appellants in No. 87-462)

Michael W. McConnell (Argued the cause for the appellant in No. 87-775)

Charles Fried (Argued the cause for the appellant in Nos. 87-253 and 87-431, and for the federal appellee in No. 87-462)

Facts of the Case

The Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA") provided federal funding for organizational services and research in the area of premarital teenage sexuality. Among other requirements, AFLA beneficiaries had to involve religious and governmental agencies in dealing with the problems they faced. Over time, AFLA benefited several organizations with institutional ties to religious denominations. Chan Kendrick, on behalf of several federal taxpayers, clergymen, and the American Jewish Congress, challenged AFLA's constitutionality. On appeal from a ruling favoring Kendrick, the Supreme Court granted Bowen certiorari.

Question

Do AFLA's provisions, requiring its beneficiaries to involve both religious and governmental organizations in addressing the problems of teenage sexual relations, violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bowen, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 300

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the "advancement of religion" was not AFLA's primary effect. Although it funded religious and other institutions without expressly prohibiting the use of such funds for religious purposes, AFLA required potential recipients to reveal what services they intended to provide and how they would provide them. Thus, the government could protect against the misuse of its funds. At the same time, however, such oversight did not create an "excessive entanglement" between church and state because AFLA merely authorized funding of religiously affiliated, rather than pervasively sectarian, organizations. Finally, the Court remanded the matter to the district court for further determination of whether AFLA violated the establishment clause "as applied."

Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:19 +0000

Location

Deseret Gymnasium

150 Salt Lake City UT 84111

Salt Lake City, UT 84111

United States

40° 46' 5.6496" N, 111° 53' 12.2208" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-179

Appellee

Amos

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Corporation of Presiding Bishop

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 86-401, United States v. Amos et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

483 U.S. 327 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, March 31, 1987

Decided

Wednesday, June 24, 1987

Advocates

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of appellants in No. 86-179)

William Bradford Reynolds (Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States in No. 86-401)

David B. Watkiss (on behalf of the appellees in both cases)

Facts of the Case

Two affiliate organizations of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints operated Deseret Gymnasium, a non-profit facility in Salt Lake City, Utah. These affiliates were the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (CPB) and the Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (COP). Arthur Frank Mayson worked for the Gymnasium for sixteen years as an engineer, but CPB and COP fired him when he failed to obtain a certificate authorizing him to attend the Church's religious temples. He filed a class-action lawsuit in District Court alleging that CPB and COP violated Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by dismissing him from nonreligious employment because he did not satisfy certain religious conditions. In response, CPB and COP claimed that Section 702 of the Act, as amended in 1972, exempts religious organizations from the Act's ban in Section 703 on religious discrimination. Mayson then claimed that Section 702 violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by allowing religious organizations to practice discriminatory hiring for nonreligious jobs. The District Court agreed that Mayson's job was nonreligious. It also held that Section 702 violated the Establishment Clause because it allowed religious adherents exclusive participation in nonreligious activities.

Question

Does Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 violate the Establishment Clause by allowing religious employers to choose employees for nonreligious jobs based on their religion?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Corporation Of Presiding Bishop, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Establishment Clause forbids the government from using state mechanisms to advance a religion. Section 702 passed a three-part test the Court established in Lemon v. Kurtzman for determining whether a state action violates the Establishment Clause. To be valid, the state action must first promote a "secular legislative purpose." The Court found that Section 702 satisfied this criterion, since it ensured that the government would not determine for religious organizations what they could count as religious activities. Second, the state action can neither "advance nor inhibit religion." The Court held that for a violation of this standard to occur, the "Government itself must have advanced religion through its own activities and influence." In this case, the government allowed for a church to advance its religion but did not directly intervene. Third, the state action must not "entangle" church and state. By allowing religious organizations to employ whom they pleased, they state became less entangled in religion.

Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-773

Petitioner

Bender

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Williamsport Area School Dist.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

475 U.S. 534 (1986)

Argued

Tuesday, October 15, 1985

Decided

Tuesday, March 25, 1986

Advocates

John C. Youngman, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondents)

James M. Smart, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Charles Fried (as amicus curiae in support of Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Williamsport Area School Dist., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

None

Board Of Trustees Of Scarsdale v. Mccreary

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-277

Petitioner

Board Of Trustees Of Scarsdale

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mccreary

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

471 U.S. 83 (1985)

Argued

Wednesday, February 20, 1985

Decided

Wednesday, March 27, 1985

Advocates

Marvin Schwartz (on behalf of the Respondents)

Marvin E. Frankel (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Mccreary, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Estate of Thornton v. Caldor

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1158

Petitioner

Estate of Thornton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Caldor

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

472 U.S. 703 (1985)

Argued

Wednesday, November 7, 1984

Decided

Wednesday, June 26, 1985

Advocates

Paul Gerwitz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Nathan Lewin (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Joseph I. Lieberman (Argued the cause for the State of Connecticut)

Facts of the Case

Donald E. Thornton worked as a supervisor in the Caldor department store chain. A devout Presbyterian, Thornton asked to be excused from working Sundays at the company's store in Torrington, Connecticut. The store required its managers to work one of every four Sundays, although rank-and-file employees were exempt under their union contract from Sunday work. In 1979, the company refused to allow Thornton to take off Sundays but offered him a transfer to another store, an hour away in Massachusetts, that was closed on Sundays. When he turned that down, the company said it would demote him from his manager's job and cut his hourly pay from $6.46 to $3.50. Thornton had worked Sundays for nearly eight months before he became aware the store was violating Connecticut law giving employees an absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath. He filed a grievance against Caldor with the state board of mediation. The board ruled in his favor. The state supreme court reversed. Thornton's estate (Thornton died in 1982) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.

Question

Does the Connecticut statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Caldor, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court held 8-to-1 that the Connecticut Sabbath observance statute was void, saying its "unyielding weighing in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests" results in an unconstitutional mingling of church and state. In his opinion, Burger wrote that the Connecticut law "provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath." Burger said the state law "thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath."

Lynch v. Donnelly

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:17 +0000

Location

Shopping District Pawtucket, RI

United States

41° 52' 43.3596" N, 71° 22' 57.2016" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-1256

Petitioner

Lynch

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Donnelly

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

465 U.S. 668 (1984)

Argued

Tuesday, October 4, 1983

Decided

Monday, March 5, 1984

Advocates

William F. Mc Mahon (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Amato A. De Luca (on behalf of the Respondents)

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading "Seasons Greetings," and a nativity scene. The creche had been included in the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket.

Question

Did the inclusion of a nativity scene in the city's display violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lynch, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, the city had not violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the display, viewed in the context of the holiday season, was not a purposeful or surreptitious effort to advocate a particular religious message. The Court found that the display merely depicted the historical origins of the Holiday and had "legitimate secular purposes." The Court held that the symbols posed no danger of establishing a state church and that it was "far too late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country."

Marsh v. Chambers

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:16 +0000

Location

Residence of Senator Ernie Chambers Omaha, NE

United States

41° 15' 14.4216" N, 95° 59' 57.3288" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-23

Petitioner

Marsh

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chambers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

463 U.S. 783 (1983)

Argued

Wednesday, April 20, 1983

Decided

Tuesday, July 5, 1983

Advocates

Shanler D. Cronk (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Herbert J. Friedman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Ernest Chambers, a member of the Nebraska legislature, challenged the legislature's chaplaincy practice in federal court. This practice involves the offering of a prayer at the beginning of each legislative session by a chaplain chosen by the state and paid out of public funds. The district court supported Chambers on the use of public funds. The appeals court supported Chambers on the prayer practice. Both parties appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Question

Does the chaplaincy practice of the Nebraska legislature violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Marsh, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court upheld the chaplaincy practice. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger abandoned the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, which had been the touchstone for cases involving the Establishment Clause. In its place, Burger rested the Court's opinion on historical custom. Prayers by tax-supported legislative chaplains could be traced to the First Continental Congress and to the First Congress that framed the Bill of Rights. As a consequence, the chaplaincy practice had become "part of the fabric of our society." In such circumstances, an invocation for Divine guidance is not an establishment of religion. "It is," wrote Burger, "simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country."

Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-878

Appellee

Grendel's Den, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Larkin

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

459 U.S. 116 (1982)

Argued

Monday, October 4, 1982

Decided

Monday, December 13, 1982

Advocates

Gerald J. Caruso (on behalf of the Appellants)

Laurence H. Tribe (on behalf of the Appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Grendel's Den, Inc., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

None

Larson v. Valente

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-1666

Appellee

Valente

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Larson

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

456 U.S. 228 (1982)

Argued

Wednesday, December 9, 1981

Decided

Wednesday, April 21, 1982

Advocates

Larry Salustro (on behalf of the Appellants)

Barry A. Fisher (on behalf of the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Valente, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

None

Widmar v. Vincent

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-689

Petitioner

Widmar

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Vincent

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

454 U.S. 263 (1981)

Argued

Tuesday, October 6, 1981

Decided

Tuesday, December 8, 1981

Advocates

James M. Smart, Jr. (on behalf of Respondent)

Ted D. Ayres (on behalf of Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Vincent, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

None

Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:04 +0000

Location

New York City Tax Commission

1 Centre Street New York NY 10007

New York, NY 10007

United States

40° 42' 46.6164" N, 74° 0' 13.0176" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

135

Appellee

Tax Commission of the City of New York

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Walz

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1969-1970)

Decided By

Burger Court (1969-1970)

Opinion

397 U.S. 664 (1970)

Argued

Wednesday, November 19, 1969

Decided

Monday, May 4, 1970

Advocates

Edward J. Ennis (Argued the cause for the appellant)

J. Lee Rankin (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

Frederick Walz, the owner of real estate in Richmond County, New York, brought suit against the New York City Tax Commission, challenging property tax exemptions for churches. Walz alleged that the exemptions forced him, as a taxpayer, to indirectly contribute to those churches.

Question

Did the property tax exemptions violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Tax Commission of the City of New York, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the exemptions did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court held that the purpose of the exemptions was to neither advance nor inhibit religion; no one particular church or religious group had been singled out to receive tax exempt status. Unlike direct subsidies, which would have unduly entangled the state with religion, tax exemptions created only "minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of churches." The Court noted that "benevolent neutrality" toward churches and religions was "deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life."

Epperson v. Arkansas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:40:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellee

Arkansas

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Epperson

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Warren Court (1967-1969)

Decided By

Warren Court (1967-1969)

Opinion

393 U.S. 97 (1968)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 1968

Decided

Tuesday, November 12, 1968

Advocates

Don Langston (Argued the cause for appellee)

Eugene R. Warren (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

The Arkansas legislature passed a law prohibiting teachers in public or state- supported schools from teaching, or using textbooks that teach, human evolution. Epperson, a public school teacher, sued, claiming the law violated her First Amendment right to free speech as well as the Establishment Clause. The State Chancery Court ruled that it violated his free speech rights; the State Supreme Court reversed.

Question

Does a law forbidding the teaching of evolution violate either the free speech rights of teachers or the Establishment clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Epperson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes. Seven members of the Court held that the statute violated the Establishment clause. Writing for the Court, Justice Abe Fortas stated that the law had been based solely on the beliefs of fundamentalist Christians, who felt that evolutionary theories directly contradicted the biblical account of Creation. This use of state power to prohibit the teaching of material objectionable to a particular sect ammounted to an unconstitutional Establishment of religion. Justice Fortas wrote, "The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment." The two other members of the Court concurred in the result, writing that it violated either the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment (because it was unconstitutionally vague) or the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment.

Abington School District v. Schempp

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:05:59 +0000

Location

Abington High School

900 Highland Avenue Abington PA

Abington, PA

United States

40° 6' 52.596" N, 75° 7' 35.0004" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

142

Appellee

Schempp

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania, et al.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

Murray v. Curlett, No. 119

Heard By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Decided By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Opinion

374 U.S. 203 (1963)

Argued

February 27-28, 1963

Decided

Monday, June 17, 1963

Advocates

John D. Killian, III (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Henry W. Sawyer, III (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Philip H. Ward, III (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

The Abington case concerns Bible-reading in Pennsylvania public schools. At the beginning of the school day, students who attended public schools in the state of Pennsylvania were required to read at least ten verses from the Bible. After completing these readings, school authorities required all Abington Township students to recite the Lord's Prayer. Students could be excluded from these exercises by a written note from their parents to the school. In a related case -- Murray v. Curlett -- a Baltimore statute required Bible-reading or the recitation of the Lord's Prayer at open exercises in public schools. Murray and his mother, professed atheists -- challenged the prayer requirement.

Question

Did the Pennsylvania law and Abington's policy, requiring public school students to participate in classroom religious exercises, violate the religious freedom of students as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Schempp, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

The Court found such a violation. The required activities encroached on both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment since the readings and recitations were essentially religious ceremonies and were "intended by the State to be so." Furthermore, argued Justice Clark, the ability of a parent to excuse a child from these ceremonies by a written note was irrelevant since it did not prevent the school's actions from violating the Establishment Clause.

Engel v. Vitale

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:05:59 +0000

Location

New Hyde Park-Garden City Park School District

1950 Hillside Avenue New Hyde Park NY 11040

New Hyde Park, NY 11040

United States

40° 44' 58.4988" N, 73° 40' 50.9196" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

468

Petitioner

Engel

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Vitale

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Warren Court (1962)

Decided By

Warren Court (1962)

Opinion

370 U.S. 421 (1962)

Argued

Tuesday, April 3, 1962

Decided

Monday, June 25, 1962

Advocates

Porter R. Chandler (Argued the cause for the intervenors-respondents)

William J. Butler (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Bertram B. Daiker (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Board of Regents for the State of New York authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. This was an attempt to defuse the politically potent issue by taking it out of the hands of local communities. The blandest of invocations read as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and beg Thy blessings upon us, our teachers, and our country."

Question

Does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day violate the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Engel, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes. Neither the prayer's nondenominational character nor its voluntary character saves it from unconstitutionality. By providing the prayer, New York officially approved religion. This was the first in a series of cases in which the Court used the establishment clause to eliminate religious activities of all sorts, which had traditionally been a part of public ceremonies. Despite the passage of time, the decision is still unpopular with a majority of Americans.

Two Guys v. Mcginley

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:37:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellee

Mcginley

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Two Guys

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Decided By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Opinion

366 U.S. 582 (1961)

Argued

Thursday, December 8, 1960

Decided

Monday, May 29, 1961

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Mcginley, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

None

McGowan v. Maryland

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:38:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellee

Maryland

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

McGowan

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Decided By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Opinion

366 U.S. 420 (1961)

Argued

Thursday, December 8, 1960

Decided

Monday, May 29, 1961

Advocates

Harry Silbert (Argued the cause for the appellants)

John M. Jones, Jr. (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

Several employes of a discount department store sold a few items, such as floor wax and loose-leaf notebooks, to customers on a Sunday. By doing so, they violated Maryland's blue laws which only allow certain items, such as drugs, tobacco, newspapers and some foodstuffs, to be sold on Sundays.

Question

Do Maryland's blue laws violate the Free Exercise and Religious Establishment clauses of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Maryland, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. The Court found that the blue laws did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the employees allege only economic injury and not infringement on their own religious practices. The Court also found that the blue laws did not violate the division between church and state. Sunday closing laws started out to facilitate church attendance in colonial America; however, the present Maryland laws are based on secular rather than religious state interests. The laws are to improve the "health, safety, recreation, and general well-being" of citizens. The present purpose of the laws is to provide a uniform day of rest for all. The fact that this day is of particular significance for various Christian sects does not bar the State from achieving its secular goals.

Arlan's Dept. Store v. Kentucky

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:38:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

503

Appellee

Kentucky

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Arlan's Dept. Store

Respondent Type

Appellant

Decided By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Opinion

371 U.S. 218 (1962)

Decided

Monday, December 17, 1962

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Kentucky, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Chamberlin v. Public Instruction Bd.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:37:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

939

Appellee

Public Instruction Bd.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Chamberlin

Respondent Type

Appellant

Decided By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Opinion

377 U.S. 402 (1964)

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1964

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Chamberlin, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

None

Stone v. Graham

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-321

Petitioner

Stone

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Graham

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

449 U.S. 39 (1980)

Decided

Monday, November 17, 1980

Facts of the Case

Sydell Stone and a number of other parents challenged a Kentucky state law that required the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in each public school classroom. They filed a claim against James Graham, the superintendent of public schools in Kentucky.

Question

Did the Kentucky statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Stone, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

In a 5-to-4 per curiam decision, the Court ruled that the Kentucky law violated the first part of the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, and thus violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. The Court found that the requirement that the Ten Commandments be posted "had no secular legislative purpose" and was "plainly religious in nature." The Court noted that the Commandments did not confine themselves to arguably secular matters (such as murder, stealing, etc.), but rather concerned matters such as the worship of God and the observance of the Sabbath Day.