Cases by Issue - Affirmative Action

Gratz v. Bollinger

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

1220 Student Activities Building - Undergraduate Admissions

515 E. Jefferson Ann Arbor MI 48109

Ann Arbor, MI 48109

United States

42° 16' 55.1172" N, 83° 43' 28.4268" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-516

Petitioner

Gratz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bollinger

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 244 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, April 1, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 23, 2003

Advocates

Kirk O. Kolbo (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

John A. Payton (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Jennifer Gratz applied to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science and the Arts with an adjusted GPA of 3.8 and ACT score of 25. In 1997, Patrick Hamacher applied to the University with an adjusted GPA of 3.0, and an ACT score of 28. Both were denied admission and attended other schools. The University admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." In addition, the University has a policy to admit virtually all qualified applicants who are members of one of three select racial minority groups - African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans - that are considered to be "underrepresented" on the campus. Concluding that diversity was a compelling interest, the District Court held that the admissions policies for years 1995-1998 were not narrowly tailored, but that the policies in effect in 1999 and 2000 were narrowly tailored. After the decision in Grutter, Gratz and Hamacher petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 for a writ of certiorari before judgment, which was granted.

Question

Does the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Gratz, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violates both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI. While rejecting the argument that diversity cannot constitute a compelling state interest, the Court reasoned that the automatic distribution of 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single "underrepresented minority" applicant solely because of race was not narrowly tailored and did not provide the individualized consideration Justice Powell contemplated in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause."

Grutter v. Bollinger

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

The University of Michigan Law School Graduate Admissions

726 Oakland Avenue Ann Arbor MI 48104

Ann Arbor, MI 48104

United States

42° 16' 22.6524" N, 83° 44' 22.1352" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-241

Petitioner

Grutter

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bollinger

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 306 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, April 1, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 23, 2003

Advocates

Kirk O. Kolbo (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Maureen E. Mahoney (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (as amicus curiae, supporting Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's "critical mass" was the functional equivalent of a quota.

Question

Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bollinger, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. Justice O'Connor wrote, "in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race- conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants."

Adarand Constructors v. Pena

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:27 +0000

Location

U.S. Department of Transportation

"1200 New Jersey Ave**** SE" Washington DC 20590

Washington, DC 20590

United States

38° 54' 19.5228" N, 77° 0' 53.3592" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1841

Petitioner

Adarand Constructors

Respondent

Pena

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 200 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, January 17, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 12, 1995

Advocates

William Perry Pendley (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Drew S. Days, III (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...." Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales.

Question

Is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, and consequent allocation of favored treatment, a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection principle embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Adarand Constructors, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547), the Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review. In other words, they "must serve a compelling government interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." The Court added that compensation programs which are truly based on disadvantage, rather than race, would be evaluated under lower equal protection standards. However, since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and the award of favored treatment, all race-based classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, even proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the Transportation Department's program satisfied strict scrutiny.

Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-453

Petitioner

Metro Broadcasting Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

FCC

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Astroline Communications Company Limited Partnership v. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc., et al, No. 89-700

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

497 U.S. 547 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, March 28, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, June 27, 1990

Advocates

Harry F. Cole (on behalf of Respondent)

Margaret Polivy (on behalf of the Private Respondent)

Margot Polivy (Argued the cause for respondent Rainbow Broadcasting Company)

Gregory H. Guillot (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

J. Roger Wollenberg (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Daniel M. Armstrong (Argued the cause for the federal respondent)

Facts of the Case

This case challenged the constitutionality of two minority preference policies of the Federal Communications Commission. Under the first policy challenged by Metro Broadcasting, Inc., minority applicants for broadcast licenses were given preference if all other relevant factors were roughly equal. The second policy, known as the "distress sale," was challenged by Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford Inc. This policy allowed broadcasters in danger of losing their licenses to sell their stations to minority buyers before the FCC formally ruled on the viability of the troubled stations. This case was decided together with Astroline Communications Co. v. Shurberg Broadcasting, in which Faith Center Inc. made a "distress sale" of its television license to a minority outfit owned by Astroline. Shurberg, a non-minority applicant for a similar license, challenged the FCC's approval of Faith Center's sale to Astroline.

Question

Did the FCC's minority preference policies violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for FCC, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that the FCC's minority preference policies were constitutional because they provided appropriate remedies for discrimination victims and were aimed at the advancement of legitimate congressional objectives for program diversity. The FCC's minority preference policies were closely related to, and substantially advanced, Congress's legitimate interest in affording the public a diverse array of programming options. The availability of program diversity serves the entire viewing and listening public, not just minorities, and is therefore consistent with First Amendment values. Finally, the Court noted that the FCC's minority preference policy did not unduly burden nonminorities. The FCC did not predetermine the number of distress sales, and could only invoke them in a small number of cases, when no competing bids were filed and the licensee elected to sell at a lower price rather than risk an FCC investigation (see also Adarand Constructors v. Pena).

Astroline Communications v. Shurberg Broadcasting

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-700

Petitioner

Astroline Communications

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shurberg Broadcasting

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Metro Broadcasting Inc. v FCC, No. 89-453

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

497 U.S. 547 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, March 28, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, June 27, 1990

Advocates

Harry F. Cole (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Roger Wollengerg (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In an effort to comply by its duty to promote programming diversity, under the Communications Act of 1934, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted two minority preference policies. The first policy awarded preferences to minority ownership bids for licenses for new radio or television broadcasting stations. The second policy allowed radio or television broadcasters with questionable license qualifications, to avoid an FCC investigation of their actions by making a "distress sale" of their licenses to a legitimate minority outfit. Upon FCC approval, Faith Center Inc. "distress sold" its television license to Astroline's minority-owned outfit. Shurberg, a nonminority applicant for a similar license, sought appellate review of Astroline's award. The appellate court agreed, and invalidated the distress sale policy as unconstitutional. Astroline appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Does the FCC's minority preference policy, giving preference to minority ownership bids for new radio or television broadcasting licenses and permitting "distress sales" to minority owned enterprises only, violate a nonminority bidder's' Fifth Amendment equal protection rights?

Conclusion

No. The Court, in the last opinion authorer by Justice William J. Brennan,Jr., held that the FCC's minority preference policies are constitutional because they provide appropriate remedies for discrimination victims and are aimed at the advancement of the legitimate congressional objective of program diversity. The FCC's minority preference policies were closely related to, and substantially advanced, Congress's legitimate interest in affording the public a diverse array of programming options. The availability of program diversity serves the entire viewing and listening public, not just minorities, and is therefore consistent with First Amendment values. Finally, the Court noted that the FCC's minority preference policy did not unduly burden nonminorities. The FCC did not predetermine the number of distress sales, and could only invoke them in a small number of cases, when no competing bids are filed and the licensee elects to sell at a lower price rather than risk an FCC investigation.

Martin v. Wilks

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1614

Petitioner

Martin

Respondent

Wilks

Consolidation

No. 87-1639

No. 87-1668

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

490 U.S. 755 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, January 18, 1989

Decided

Monday, June 12, 1989

Advocates

Thomas W. Merrill (Argued the cause for the United States)

Robert D. Joffe (Argued the cause for the petitioners in the Martin case)

Raymond P. Fitzpatrick, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents Wilks et al)

James P. Alexander (Argued the cause for the petitioners in the Personnel Board and Arrington cases)

Facts of the Case

As a result of a lawsuit in 1974, the Jefferson County Personnel Board in Birmingham, Alabama, entered into consent decrees that included hiring blacks as firefighters and for promoting them. The decrees were approved by a federal district court. Years later, Robert K. Wilks, a white firefighter, challenged the decrees and alleged that whites were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks. Wilks argued that such practices violated Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The personnel board agreed that it was making race-conscious decisions but argued it was doing so pursuant to the original decrees. The Court combined arguments in two companion cases: Personnel Board v. Wilks and Arrington v. Wilks.

Question

Did Wilks and other white firefighters have a constitutional right to challenge the previously established decrees?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Wilks, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that because "a person cannot be deprived of his legal rights in a proceeding to which he is not a party," the white firefighters were not precluded from challenging employment decisions taken pursuant to the consent decrees. The Court argued that "[t]he parties to a lawsuit presumably know better than anyone else the nature and scope of relief sought in the action" and that they were better suited to intervene when their rights were immediately threatened. Conversely, the Court noted that "[n]o one can seriously contend that an employer might successfully defend against a Title VII claim by one group of employees on the ground that its actions were required by an earlier decree entered in a suit brought against it by another, if the later group did not have adequate notice or knowledge of the earlier suit."

Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:21 +0000

Location

City Council of Richmond

900 East Broad Street Richmond VA 23219

Richmond, VA 23219

United States

37° 32' 27.4884" N, 77° 25' 58.7244" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-998

Appellee

J.A. Croson Co.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Richmond

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

488 U.S. 469 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, October 5, 1988

Decided

Monday, January 23, 1989

Advocates

Walter H. Ryland (Argued the cause for the appellee)

John A. Payton (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Facts of the Case

In 1983, the City Council of Richmond, Virginia adopted regulations that required companies awarded city construction contracts to subcontract 30 percent of their business to minority business enterprises. The J.A. Croson Company, which lost its contract because of the 30 percent set-aside, brought suit against the city.

Question

Did the Richmond law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for J.A. Croson Co., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that "generalized assertions" of past racial discrimination could not justify "rigid" racial quotas for the awarding of public contracts. Justice O'Connor's opinion noted that the 30 percent quota could not be tied to "any injury suffered by anyone," and was an impermissible employment of a suspect classification. O'Connor further held that allowing claims of past discrimination to serve as the basis for racial quotas would actually subvert constitutional values: "The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs."

Johnson v. Transportation Agency

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:19 +0000

Location

The Transportation Agency

331 North First Street San Jose CA 95134

San Jose, CA 95134

United States

37° 20' 27.4164" N, 121° 53' 39.3" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1129

Petitioner

Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Transportation Agency

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

480 U.S. 616 (1987)

Argued

Wednesday, November 12, 1986

Decided

Tuesday, March 24, 1987

Advocates

Constance E. Brooks (on behalf of Petitioner)

Steven Woodside (on behalf of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Transportation Agency, Santa Clara, California promoted Diane Joyce to road dispatcher over Paul Johnson. Both candidates were qualified for the job. As an affirmative action employer, the Agency took into account the sex of the applicants in making the promotion decision.

Question

Did the Agency impermissibly take into account the sex of the applicants in the promotion process and violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Transportation Agency, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

The Court affirmed the promotion procedures of the Agency. Justice Brennan argued that it was not unreasonable to consider sex as one factor among many in making promotion decisions, and that the Agency's actions did not create an absolute barrier to the advancement of men (a quota system did not exist).

United States v. Paradise

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-999

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Paradise

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

480 U.S. 149 (1987)

Argued

Wednesday, November 12, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 1987

Advocates

J. Richard Cohen (on behalf of the respondent)

Charles Fried (on behalf of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In response to a series of NAACP-initiated lawsuits in the 1970s, the Alabama Department of Public Safety was required to implement a promotion scheme in which half of the department's promotions to certain ranks would go to black officers if enough qualified blacks were available.

Question

Did the one-black-for-one-white promotion scheme violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Paradise, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

In a plurality opinion, the Court upheld the promotion plan. The scheme did not impose an "absolute bar" to white advancement, was narrowly drawn to include only specific ranks in the department, and, according to the four justices who voted to affirm it, was "required in light of the Department's long and shameful record of delay and resistance" in complying with past judicial decisions. It is important to remember that courts had first found the Department's practices unconstitutional in 1972.

California Federal S. & L. Assn. v. Guerra

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-494

Petitioner

California Federal S. & L. Assn.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Guerra

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

479 U.S. 272 (1987)

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 1986

Decided

Tuesday, January 13, 1987

Advocates

Marian M. Johnston (on behalf of the Respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Guerra, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

None

Local 28 v. EEOC

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1656

Petitioner

Local 28

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

478 U.S. 421 (1986)

Argued

Tuesday, February 25, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, July 2, 1986

Advocates

O. Peter Sherwood (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Martin R. Gold (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1975, a federal district court found the Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Union guilty of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court established a 29 percent minority membership goal and ordered the union to implement procedures to meet the goal. In 1982 and 1983, the union was found guilty of civil contempt for disobeying the court orders. The court then established a 29.23 percent nonwhite membership goal to be met by August 1987.

Question

Did provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 empower courts to order race-conscious membership quotas?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for EEOC, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

The Court held that Title VII did not prohibit courts from ordering, in appropriate circumstances, affirmative race-conscious relief as a remedy for past discrimination. Specifically, the Court held that such relief was appropriate where employers or labor unions had engaged in "persistent or egregious discrimination, or where necessary to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination." The Court noted that injunctions simply reiterating Title VII's prohibition against discrimination were useless in cases of chronically discriminatory employers or unions.

Firefighters v. Cleveland

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1999

Petitioner

Firefighters

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cleveland

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

478 U.S. 501 (1986)

Argued

Tuesday, February 25, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, July 2, 1986

Advocates

John D. Maddox (on behalf of respondent City of Cleveland, et al)

William Bradford Reynolds (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae in support of the petitioner)

Edward R. Stege, Jr. (on behalf of respondent Vanguards of Cleveland)

William L. Summers (on behalf of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Cleveland, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

None

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1340

Petitioner

Wygant

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jackson Board of Education

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

476 U.S. 267 (1986)

Argued

Wednesday, November 6, 1985

Decided

Monday, May 19, 1986

Advocates

Jerome A. Susskind (Argued the cause for the respondents)

K. Preston Oade, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Under the collective bargaining agreement between the Jackson Board of Education (Board) and a teachers' union, teachers with the most seniority would not be laid off. It was also agreed not to lay off a percentage of minority personnel that exceeded the percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of a layoff. When the schools laid off some nonminority teachers, while retaining other minority teachers with less seniority, Wendy Wygant, a displaced nonminority teacher, challenged the layoff in district court. Holding that the Board could grant racial preferences without grounding them on prior discrimination findings and that the preferences did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, since they remedied discrimination by providing "role models" for minority students, the District Court upheld the layoff provision's constitutionality. When the appeals court affirmed, the Supreme Court granted Wygant certiorari.

Question

Did the collective bargaining agreement provision for race-based layoffs violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Wygant, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court argued that Wygant's layoff stemmed from race and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court noted that the government, when embarking on affirmative action, had two duties: first, to justify racial classification with a compelling state interest and second, to demonstrate that its chosen means were narrowly tailored to its purpose. Regarding the first, the Court rejected the lower court's argument that racial preferences were justified because the percentage of minority students exceeded the percentage of minority teachers. At best, this argument implied a separate but equal system, which the Court rejected in Brown v. Board of Education. Instead, racial preferences had to be based on prior discrimination. Second, the Court rejected the school's discrimination remedy: layoff preferences incorrectly addressed injurious prior discriminatory hiring practices since "denial of a future employment opportunity [was] not as intrusive as loss of an existing job."

Firefighters v. Stotts

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:43 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-206

Petitioner

Firefighters

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Stotts

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 82-229

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

467 U.S. 561 (1984)

Argued

Tuesday, December 6, 1983

Decided

Tuesday, June 12, 1984

Advocates

Allen S. Blair (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Richard B. Fields (on behalf of the Respondents)

Rex E. Lee (amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Firefighters, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

None

Weinberger v. Rossi

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-1924

Petitioner

Weinberger

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rossi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

456 U.S. 25 (1982)

Argued

Monday, February 22, 1982

Decided

Wednesday, March 31, 1982

Advocates

Barbara E. Etkind (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Randy M. Mott (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Weinberger, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 7151

None

Minnick v. California Dept. Of Corrections

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-1213

Petitioner

Minnick

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California Dept. Of Corrections

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

452 U.S. 105 (1981)

Argued

Tuesday, December 2, 1980

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1981

Advocates

Stuart R. Pollak (on behalf of the Respondents)

Ronald Yank (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for California Dept. Of Corrections, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Fullilove v. Klutznick

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:13 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

78-1007

Petitioner

Fullilove

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Klutznick

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

448 U.S. 448 (1980)

Argued

Tuesday, November 27, 1979

Decided

Wednesday, July 2, 1980

Advocates

Robert G. Benisch (Argued the cause for Fullilove et al)

Robert J. Hickey (Argued the cause for General Building Contractors of New York State, Inc)

Drew S. Days, III (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1977, Congress enacted legislation requiring that at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for local public works programs had to be used to obtain services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members. H. Earl Fullilove and other contractors filed suit, claiming they had been economically harmed by the enforcement of the statute. The defendant was Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce.

Question

Did the provision of the statute for minority business enterprises violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Klutznick, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 91 Stat. 116

No. The Court held that the minority set-aside program was a legitimate exercise of congressional power. The Court found that Congress could pursue the objectives of the minority business enterprise program under the Spending Power. The plurality opinion noted that Congress could have regulated the practices of contractors on federally funded projects under the Commerce Clause as well. The Court further held that in the remedial context, Congress did not have to act "in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion."

Southeastern Community College v. Davis

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:13 +0000

Location

Southeastern Community College

4564 Chadbourn Highway Whiteville NC 28472

Whiteville, NC 28472

United States

34° 19' 40.6632" N, 78° 47' 19.1904" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

78-711

Petitioner

Southeastern Community College

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Frances Davis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

442 U.S. 397 (1979)

Argued

Monday, April 23, 1979

Decided

Monday, June 11, 1979

Advocates

Eugene Gressman (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Marc P. Charmatz (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Frances Davis sought admission to the nursing program at Southeastern Community College, which received federal funds. Davis also suffered from a hearing disability, and was unable to understand speech without lip-reading. Davis' application was denied. She asked for reconsideration, and her application was again denied. Davis filed suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which ruled against her. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned that decision.

Question

Did Southeastern Community College violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in denying Davis admission to its nursing program?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Southeastern Community College, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Rehabilitation

No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote for a unanimous court that an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" specified by the Act meant one who meets all the program's requirements "in spite of his handicap" as opposed to "in every respect except as to limitations imposed by their handicap." Even with an improved hearing aid, Davis still required lip-reading to understand speech, and therefore was not "otherwise qualified." Since Davis could not be admitted to Southeastern's program without substantial changes to admission requirements, Davis' rejection did not constitute unlawful discrimination.

United Steelworkers of America v. Weber

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:31 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

78-432

Petitioner

United Steelworkers of America

Respondent

Weber

Consolidation

Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Weber, No. 78-435

United States v. Weber, No. 78-436

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

443 U.S. 193 (1979)

Argued

Wednesday, March 28, 1979

Decided

Wednesday, June 27, 1979

Advocates

Thompson Powers (Argued the cause for the petitioner, Kaiser Aluminum)

Michael R. Fontham (Argued the cause for respondent Weber in all cases)

Michael H. Gottesman (Argued the cause for the petitioner, Steelworkers Union)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the United States et al., petitioners in No. 78-436)

Facts of the Case

The United Steelworkers of America and the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation implemented an affirmative action-based training program to increase the number of the company's black skilled craft workers. Half of the eligible positions in the training program were reserved for blacks. Weber, who was white, was passed over for the program. Weber claimed that he was the victim of reverse discrimination. These cases (United Steelworkers v. Weber and Kaiser Aluminum v. Weber) were also decided together with United States v. Weber.

Question

Did United and Kaiser Aluminum's training scheme violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United Steelworkers of America, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

No. The Court held that the training scheme was legitimate because the 1964 Act "did not intend to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps" to implement the goals of Title VII. Since the program sought to eliminate archaic patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy while not prohibiting white employees from advancing in the company, it was consistent with the intent of the law.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:11 +0000

Location

University of California Medical School at Davis

4610 X Street Sacramento CA 95817

Sacramento, CA 95817

United States

38° 33' 10.7784" N, 121° 27' 8.7696" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

76-811

Petitioner

Regents of the University of California

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bakke

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

438 U.S. 265 (1978)

Argued

Wednesday, October 12, 1977

Decided

Monday, June 26, 1978

Advocates

Reynold H. Colvin (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Archibald Cox (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Wade H. McCree (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.

Question

Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's application for admission to its medical school?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bakke, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Split Vote

No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action.

Morton v. Mancari

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:07 +0000

Location

Bureau of Indian Affairs

1849 C St NW Washington DC 20240

Washington, DC 20240

United States

38° 53' 36.6612" N, 77° 2' 39.7428" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

73-362

Appellee

Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

C. R. Mancari et al.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 73-364, Amerind v. Mancari et al.

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

417 U.S. 535 (1974)

Argued

Wednesday, April 24, 1974

Decided

Monday, June 17, 1974

Advocates

Harry R. Sachse (argued the cause for appellants in No. 73-362)

Harris D. Sherman (argued the cause for appellant in No. 73-364)

Gene E. Franchini (argued the cause for the appellees in both cases)

Facts of the Case

Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934. The Act included a provision in 25 U.S.C. Section 472 that gave hiring preference Native Americans for positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Congress then passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which prohibited racial discrimination in federal employment. In June 1972, the BIA extended Indian preference to both hiring and promotion decisions. C.R. Mancari was a non- Indian employee of the BIA. He and other non-Indian employees of the BIA filed a class action in United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. They claimed that Section 472 was repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. They also claimed that Section 472 violated the Fifth Amendment and their right to property without due process. The District Court ruled in their favor. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question

(1) Did the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 repeal Section 472 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934?

(2) Did Section 472 violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Morton, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No and no. The Court reversed the District Court. The 1972 Act did not explicitly repeal Section 472. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, cited the long history of Indian employment preference as exceptions to prohibitions against employment discrimination. Congress had also passed two Indian preference statutes after the 1972 Act, showing that Congress did not intend implicitly to repeal Section 472. In addition, the Court held that Section 472 did not constitute discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Again, Justice Blackmun cited the history of "special treatment" granted to Indians. The preference for Indians in Section 472 was not "a 'racial' preference", but rather "an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government." Section 472 went towards the "fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation towards the Indians," and was therefore not in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

Texas v. Lesage

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1111

Petitioner

Texas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lesage

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 18 (1999)

Decided

Monday, November 29, 1999

Facts of the Case

Francois Daniel Lesage, an African immigrant of Caucasian descent, was denied admission to the University of Texas Ph.D. program in counseling psychology for the 1996-1997 academic year. Subsequently, Lesage filed suit, alleging that by establishing and maintaining a race-conscious admissions process the university had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and various federal civil rights statutes. The university did not dispute that it considered the race of its applicants at some stage during the review process. The university argued that Lesage was unqualified for admission. Granting the university summary judgment, the District Court concluded that considerations of race had no effect on the Lesage's rejection. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that summary judgment was inappropriate because there remained a factual dispute as to whether the stage of review during which Lesage's application was eliminated was in some way race conscious.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the University of Texas was not entitled to summary judgment for its rejection of an African immigrant Ph.D. applicant of Caucasian descent even if he would have been rejected under a race-neutral policy?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lesage, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court held that "[i]nsofar as the Court of Appeals held that [the University of Texas was] not entitled to summary judgment on Lesage's section 1983 claim for damages relating to the rejection of his application for the 1996-1997 academic year even if he would have been denied admission under a race-neutral policy, its decision contradicts our holding in Mt. Healthy." "Under Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, even if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration," stated the opinion.