Cases by Issue - Natural Resources

United States v. Georgia

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1203

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Georgia, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Goodman v. Georgia et al., No. 04-1236

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, May 16, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, November 9, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, January 10, 2006

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioner in No. 04-1203)

Gregory A. Castanias (argued the cause for Respondents)

Gregory Andrew Castanias (argued the cause for Respondents)

Samuel R. Bagenstos (argued the cause for Petitioner in No. 04-1236)

Gene C. Schaerr (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Goodman, a paraplegic held in a Georgia state prison, sued Georgia in federal court for maintaining prison conditions that allegedly discriminated against disabled people and violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Georgia claimed the 11th Amendment provided the state immunity from such suits. The district court ruled for Georgia, but the 11th Circuit reversed.

Before the 11th Circuit ruled in the case, the United States sued Georgia, arguing that the ADA's Title II abolished state sovereign immunity from monetary suits. Congress could do this, the U.S. argued, by exercising its 14th Amendment power to enforce equal protection.

Question

Did Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 validly abrogate state sovereign immunity for suits by prisoners with disabilities challenging discrimination by state prisons? Was Title II a proper exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to the administration of prison systems?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Yes and yes. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that Title II abrogates sovereign immunity in cases where violations of the 8th Amendment are alleged. The 14th Amendment incorporates the 8th Amendment (that is, applies it to the states). Congress can enforce the 14th Amendment against the states "by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations" of its provisions, which can involve abrogating state sovereign immunity. However, the Court did not address the question of whether Title II validly abrogates sovereign immunity when the 8th Amendment is not involved.

Central VA Comm. College v. Katz

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-885

Petitioner

Central Virginia Community College, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bernard Katz, Liquidating Supervisor for Wallace's Bookstores, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, April 4, 2005

Argued

Monday, October 31, 2005

Decided

Monday, January 23, 2006

Advocates

William E. Thro (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Kim Martin Lewis (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Katz, the supervisor of a bookstore that declared bankruptcy, filed a suit to collect debts owed to the bookstore by Central Virginia Community College and several other schools operated by the state of Virginia. Katz also petitioned to prevent the schools from filing claims to collect money from the bookstore because of its bankruptcy status. The colleges argued that they could not be sued by Katz because of state sovereign immunity (which holds that a state must consent in order to be sued). The bankruptcy court disagreed, however, finding that Congress's authority under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution (Article I Section 8) was sufficient to allow them to waive states' sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases.

Question

Does the Bankruptcy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article I Section 8), waive the states' sovereign immunity?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Katz, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 4: Bankruptcy Clause

Yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that states cannot invoke sovereign immunity as a defense in bankruptcy proceedings. Rather than ruling on the power of Congress under the Bankruptcy Clause to waive states' immunity, as the bankruptcy court did, the Court held that ratification of the Clause itself involved a subordination of state sovereign immunity. The Court relied on the history and intent of the Bankruptcy Clause, which indicated that "the power to enact bankruptcy legislation was understood to carry with it the power to subordinate state sovereignty, albeit within a limited sphere." Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy and Chief Justice John Roberts.

Sabri v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-44

Petitioner

Basim Omar Sabri

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 600 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, October 14, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, March 3, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 17, 2004

Advocates

Andrew Stuart Birrell (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Basim Omar Sabri, a Minneapolis landlord and developer, tried to bribe a Minneapolis City Council member who sat on the board of an organization that dispersed funding for economic revitalization of city neighborhoods. Some of the funds dispersed by the organization were federal funds.

Sabri was charged in federal court with bribery. He moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that the section of United States Code that he was charged under was unconstitutional. He claimed that Congress could only regulate the dispersal of federal funds; because the statute did not require the prosecutors to show that the bribery had affected any federal funds, only that it had affected an organization that received federal funds, he argued that it was outside of Congress's power to legislate. The district court sided with Sabri and dismissed the charges.

On appeal, an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed. It found that, because federal funds were often mixed with other funds by organizations that distributed them, it would be difficult for prosecutors to prove that the funds affected by an attempted bribe were federal funds. As a result, the government would have to regulate all bribes to organizations that dispersed federal funds in order to meaningfully protect federal funds. Because Congress had authority under the necessary and proper clause and the spending clause (both found in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution) to ensure that government funds were not misspent, the bribery statute was therefore constitutional.

Question

May Congress make it a federal crime to bribe officials of non-federal organizations that distribute some federal funds without requiring prosecutors to prove that the bribe actually affected federal funds?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 666

Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice David Souter, the Court held that Article I of the Constitution allows Congress to prohibit bribery of organizations that distribute federal funds. The Justices found that the Spending Clause authorizes Congress to spend money for the general welfare, and that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes it to take any reasonable steps to prevent such money from being misspent. These reasonable steps include prohibiting bribery. The Court rejected Sabri's argument that the law was unconstitutional because it applied to all bribes, not just those made in connection with actual federal funds. The Court held that to require proof of a connection between the bribes and federal funds would unreasonable and impractical; it was within Congress's power to prohibit all bribes to all federally-funded organizations. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which he questioned whether the Court had been correct to interpret the Necessary and Proper Clause so expansively.

Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v. Hood

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1606

Petitioner

Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pamela L. Hood

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 440 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, September 30, 2003

Argued

Monday, March 1, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 17, 2004

Advocates

Daryl J. Brand (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Leonard H. Gerson (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Pamela Hood had an outstanding debt to the Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation, a loan-granting institution established by the state, when she filed for bankruptcy. The state objected to her request that the debt be forgiven ("discharged" in the terms of bankruptcy law) by the federal bankruptcy court, arguing that to discharge the debt would violate the state's sovereign immunity (that is, its right not to be sued). Hood countered that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure allow student loan debts to be discharged if the bankruptcy filer can demonstrate that they will suffer "undue hardship" if the debt is not forgiven, and that this congressional permission is a constitutional waiver of state sovereign immunity because it falls under the power granted to Congress by the Bankruptcy Clause (Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution).

The bankruptcy court sided with Hood, finding that Congress had acted constitutionally in waiving the states' sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, as did a normal panel of the Sixth Circuit.

Question

Does the Bankruptcy Clause (Article I Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution) give Congress the power to waive a state's sovereign immunity in matters pertaining a federal bankruptcy court's forgiveness of debt owed to the state?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Hood, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court declined to reach the question of whether the Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress the power to waive a state's sovereign immunity. Instead, the Court ruled that discharging a debt owed to a state in a bankruptcy procedure is different from a suit and therefore not barred by sovereign immunity. "A bankruptcy court is able to provide the debtor a fresh start in this manner ... because the court's jurisdiction is premised on the debtor and his estate, and not on the creditors," wrote the Court. That is, the discharge of debt by a bankruptcy court is not a personal suit against a state (which would violate sovereign immunity) but instead merely a modification of a debtor's estate that incidentally affects a state. As such, it is permissible even without Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity.

Hibbs v. Winn

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1809

Petitioner

J. Elliott Hibbs, Director, Arizona Department of Revenue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kathleen M. Winn, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 88 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, September 30, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, January 20, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 14, 2004

Advocates

Marvin S. Cohen (argued the cause for Respondents)

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Samuel Goddard (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Several Arizona residents challenged in federal district court an Arizona statute that allows tax credits for money spent toward parochial schools. They alleged that the statute violates the religious establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment.

The district court dismissed the case and ruled that it lacked jurisdiction for two reasons: First, the federal Tax Injunction Act (TIA) prohibits federal district courts from ruling on the "assessment, levy or collection of any tax under state law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such state." And second, the court pointed to the comity doctrine - that is, the deference that federal courts should generally give to state tax laws. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that neither the TIA nor comity place the case outside federal jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the TIA was inapplicable because invalidating a tax credit would not harm Arizona's ability to raise revenue.

Question

Do the federal Tax Injunction Act and comity principles require federal district courts to dismiss (for lack of jurisdiction) constitutional challenges to state tax credits that directly affect a state's tax system?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Winn, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1341

No. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the intention of the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) was to prevent taxpayers from trying to avoid their state taxes through federal litigation. TIA was not intended, however, to prevent all federal interference with state taxation. Justice Ginsburg wrote, "Third-party suits not seeking to stop the collection of a tax imposed on plaintiffs were outside Congress' purview. ... Nowhere does the [legislative] history announce a sweeping congressional direction to prevent federal-court interference with all aspects of state tax administration." (emphasis original) Establishment clause challenges to state tax exemptions for religious eduction could therefore be challenged without violating TIA.

Tennessee v. Lane

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1667

Petitioner

Tennessee

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

George Lane, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 509 (2004)

Granted

Monday, June 23, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, January 13, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 17, 2004

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondent United States)

William J. Brown (argued the cause for Respondents Lane and Jones)

Michael E. Moore (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

George Lane and Beverly Jones were disabled and could not access upper floors in Tennessee state courthouses. Lane, Jones, and several others sued Tennessee in federal district court, alleging that by denying them public services based on their disabilities, Tennessee was in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990). According to Title II, no person may be denied access to "services, programs, or activities" on the basis of his disability. The act allows alleged victims of discrimination to sue states for damages.

Tennessee asked that the case be dismissed, claiming that it was barred by the 11th Amendment's prohibition of suits against states in federal courts (the sovereign immunity doctrine). The state cited Alabama v. Garrett (2001), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Congress had acted unconstitutionally in granting citizens the right to sue states for disability discrimination (such as the denial of employment) under the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause. In that case the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress did not have enough evidence of disability discrimination by states to justify the waiver of sovereign immunity.

The district court rejected the state's argument and denied the motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed. The courts reasoned that because Title II of the ADA dealt with the Due process Clause of the 14th Amendment, not the equal protection clause, the ruling in Garrett did not apply. The court found that while Congress may not have had enough evidence of disability discrimination to waive sovereign immunity for equal protection claims, it did have enough evidence of Due Process violations (such as non-handicap-accessible courthouses) to waive the sovereign immunity doctrine for Due Process claims.

Question

Did the Americans with Disabilities Act violate the sovereign immunity doctrine of the 11th Amendment when, based on Congress's 14th Amendment enforcement powers of the Due Process clause, it allowed individuals to sue states for denying them services based on their disabilities?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lane, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

No. In a 5-to-4 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that Congress had sufficiently demonstrated the problems faced by disabled persons who sought to exercise fundamental rights protected by the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment (such as access to a court). The Court also emphasized that the remedies required from the states were not unreasonable - they just had to make reasonable accommodations to allow disabled persons to exercise their fundamental rights. Because Title II was a "reasonable prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate end," and because Congress had the authority under the 14th Amendment to regulate the actions of the states to accomplish that end, the law was constitutional.

Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conserv. v. EPA

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:49 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-658

Petitioner

Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 461 (2004)

Granted

Monday, February 24, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 2004

Advocates

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Respondent)

Jonathan S. Franklin (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Under the Clean Air Act, state agencies must determine the best way to prevent air pollution in areas that have met national clean air standards. In part, they must require that polluting companies use the "best available control technology" to limit pollution whenever they construct new facilities. In 1998, Teck Cominco Alaska, a mining company, requested a permit to build an additional generator at one of its mines. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) issued the permit, which called for Cominco to use "Low NOx" technology on all its generators, not just the new one. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, stepped in, arguing that a better technology was available. ADEC appealed the EPA's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the EPA did not have the right to interfere with the state agency's decision. The Ninth Circuit sided with the EPA.

Question

Under the Clean Air Act, does the Environmental Protection Agency have the authority to overrule a state agency's decision that a company is using the "best available controlling technology" to prevent pollution?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for EPA, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Clean Air

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the Clean Air Act authorized the EPA to bar the construction of the polluting facility in Alaska. Though Alaska determined the facility's use of "Low NOx" met the act's requirement that facilities use "best available control technology," the EPA was reasonable to reject this claim. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered a dissent joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia and Chief Justice William Rehnquist.

Frew v. Hawkins

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-628

Petitioner

Linda Frew, on Behalf of Her Daughter, Carla Frew, et al.

Respondent

Albert Hawkins, Commissioner, Texas Health and Human Services Commission, et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 431 (2004)

Granted

Monday, March 10, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, October 7, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

Advocates

R. Ted Cruz (argued the cause for Respondents)

Susan Finkelstein Zinn (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1996, Linda Frew and other citizens settled a class-action lawsuit in federal district court against the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. Settlement was reached through a consent agree, in which the parties make an agreement that is subject to court supervision. As part of this consent decree, Texas was supposed to improve health care for poor children to comply with a federally mandated program called Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment. Two years later, Frew and others remained unsatisfied that Texas was complying with the federal requirements, and asked the court to force Texas to create a plan for how it would improve health care. Texas refused, however, claiming that it was immune from the court order under the 11th Amendment, which provides for state sovereignty. Texas argued that because no federal rights had been violated, suit could not be brought in federal court. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Texas.

Question

Do states forfeit 11th Amendment protection when they enter into a consent decree under federal law in federal court? And must states violate federal law, not just the consent agreement, in order to be subject to suit in federal court?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Frew, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that enforcement of the consent decree does not violate the 11th Amendment. The Court rejected the argument that a federal court cannot enforce a consent decree unless it finds a violation of federal law. "The decree here is a federal court order that springs from a federal dispute and furthers the objectives of federal law," Justice Kennedy wrote.

Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1368

Petitioner

Nevada Dept. of Human Resources

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hibbs

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 721 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, January 15, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 2003

Advocates

Paul G. Taggart (Carson City, Nevada, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Cornelia T. L. Pillard (Argued the cause for the respondent Hibbs)

Viet D. Dinh (Office of Legal Policy, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent United States)

Facts of the Case

William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a "serious health condition" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action "against any employer" that "interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

May an individual sue a State for money damages in federal court for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Hibbs, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that State employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the State's failure to comply with the FMLA's family-care provision. The Court reasoned that Congress both clearly stated its intention to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court under the FMLA and acted within its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting prophylactic, rather than substantively redefining, legislation. "In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic [section] 5 legislation," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy, who was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Scalia, filed dissents.

Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-298

Petitioner

Lapides

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Board of Regents of University System of Georgia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 613 (2002)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 2002

Decided

Monday, May 13, 2002

Advocates

David J. Bederman (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Julie C. Parsley (Austin, Texas, argued the cause for the Texas, e al., as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Devon Orland (Atlanta, Georgia, argued the cause for the respondents)

Irving L. Gornstein (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Paul Lapides, a professor employed by the Georgia state university system, filed a state-court lawsuit against the system?s board of regents and other university officials, alleging that the officials had violated state tort law and 42 USC section 1983 when they placed sexual harassment allegations in his personnel files. The defendants removed the case to Federal District Court and then sought a dismissal. Conceding that a state statute had waived Georgia's sovereign immunity from state-law suits in state court, the State claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal court. The District Court held that Georgia had waived such immunity when it removed the case to federal court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because state law was unclear as to whether the state attorney general had the legal authority to waive Georgia's Eleventh Amendment immunity, the State retained the legal right to assert immunity, even after the removal.

Question

Does a State's act of removing a lawsuit from state court to federal court waive the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of other States?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lapides, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a State waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it removes a case from state court to federal court. The Court concluded that that the university officials' voluntary removal of the action expressly invoked the jurisdiction of the federal courts and thus constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity with regard to state law claims for which immunity was waived in state court. Under the general principle that a State's voluntary appearance in federal court amounts to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court reasoned that Georgia was brought involuntarily into the case as a defendant in state court, but it then voluntarily removed the case to federal court, thus voluntarily invoking that court's jurisdiction.

Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

South Carolina State Ports Authority

176 Concord Street Charleston SC 29401

Charleston, SC 29401

United States

32° 47' 9.2256" N, 79° 55' 36.7788" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-46

Petitioner

Federal Maritime Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

South Carolina Ports Authority

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 743 (2002)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, May 28, 2002

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Argued the cause for the United States, supporting the petitioner)

Phillip C. Hughey (Argued the cause for the petitioner Federal Maritime Commission)

Warren L. Dean, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

South Carolina Maritime Services, Inc. (Maritime Services), asked the South Carolina State Ports Authority (SCSPA) five times for permission to berth a cruise ship, the M/V Tropic Sea, at the SCSPA's port facilities in Charleston, South Carolina. Some cruises offered by Maritime Services would allow passengers to participate in gambling activities while on board. The SCSPA repeatedly denied Maritime Services' requests, contending that it had an established policy of denying berths in the Port of Charleston to vessels whose primary purpose was gambling. Maritime Services file a complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), arguing that SCSPA violated the Shipping Act by its denials. The complaint was referred to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who found that the SCSPA, as an arm of the State of South Carolina, was entitled to sovereign immunity and thus dismissed the complaint. Reversing on its own motion, the FMC concluded that state sovereign immunity covers proceedings before judicial tribunals, not Executive Branch agencies. In reversing, Court of Appeals fund that the proceedings were an adjudication and thus subject to state sovereign immunity.

Question

Does a State's sovereign immunity preclude the Federal Maritime Commission from adjudicating a private party's complaint that a state-run port has violated the Shipping Act of 1984?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for South Carolina Ports Authority, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that state sovereign immunity bars the FMC from adjudicating a private party's complaint against a nonconsenting State. Historically, the Court noted, states were not subject to private suits in administrative adjudications when the Constitution was adopted, and states were thus presumptively immune from such actions. Moreover, the Court pointed to the similarities between the FMC's proceedings and civil litigation to conclude that there was no basis for distinguishing between the actions for purposes of sovereign immunity. "Although the Framers likely did not envision the intrusion on state sovereignty at issue in today's case, we are nonetheless confident that it is contrary to their constitutional design," wrote Justice Thomas.

Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:52 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1531

Petitioner

Verizon Maryland Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Public Service Commission of Maryland

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 00-1711

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 635 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, December 5, 2001

Decided

Monday, May 20, 2002

Advocates

Mark L. Evans (Argued the cause for the petitioner in No. 00-1531)

Barbara B. McDowell (Argued the cause for the petitioner United States)

Susan S. Miller (Public Service Commission, Baltimore, Maryland, argued the cause for the State Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that incumbent local-exchange carriers (LECs) provide interconnection with their existing networks; that the carriers then establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transporting and terminating the calls of each others' customers; and that their interconnection agreements be approved by a state utility commission. Verizon Maryland Inc., the incumbent LEC in Maryland, negotiated an interconnection agreement with MCI WorldCom, Inc. After the Maryland Public Service Commission approved the agreement, Verizon informed WorldCom that it would no longer pay reciprocal compensation for calls made by Verizon's customers to the local access numbers of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) because ISP traffic was not local traffic subject to the reciprocal compensation agreement. WorldCom filed a complaint with the Commission, which ordered Verizon to make the payments for past and future ISP-bound calls. Verizon then filed an action in federal district court, seeking an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, alleging that the determination that Verizon must pay reciprocal compensation for ISP traffic violated the Act. The District Court dismissed the action. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the Commission had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the Act did not provide a basis for jurisdiction over Verizon's claims.

Question

Do federal district courts have jurisdiction over a telecommunication carrier's claim that the order of a state utility commission requiring reciprocal compensation for telephone calls to Internet Service Providers violates the Telecommunications Act of 1996?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Verizon Maryland Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U.S.C. 251

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the district court had jurisdiction, so as to review the Commission's order for compliance with federal law, to entertain the suit because resolution of the LEC's claim turned on whether the Act, or an FCC ruling issued thereunder, precluded the state commission from ordering payment of reciprocal compensation. Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, the Court also reasoned that Verizon's request for injunctive relief to restrain state officials from enforcing an order allegedly in contravention of controlling federal law avoided an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.

Board of Trustees v. Garrett

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:31 +0000

Location

University of Alabama Tuscaloosa, AL 35487

United States

33° 12' 33.84" N, 87° 34' 10.2" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1240

Petitioner

Board of Trustees

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Garrett

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 356 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, October 11, 2000

Decided

Thursday, February 1, 2001

Advocates

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Michael H. Gottesman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

After Patricia Garrett, Director of Nursing for the University of Alabama, was diagnosed with breast cancer, her treatment forced her to take a substantial leave from work. Upon her return, her supervisor informed her she would have to give up her position. Milton Ash, a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services, who suffers from chronic asthma, requested that his employer modify his duties to accommodate him. Ultimately, none of Ash's requested relief was granted and his job performance evaluations fell. Both Garrett and Ash filed discrimination suits against their Alabama state employers, seeking money damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits the States and other employers from "discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of that disability... in regard to... terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." The District Court disposed of both cases by ruling that the ADA exceeds Congress' authority to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

May an individual sue a state for damages in federal court under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Board of Trustees, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages by reason of the state's failure to comply with Title I of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Chief Justice wrote for the majority that "in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation." Rehnquist added that none of these requirements had been met. Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Stephen G. Breyer's dissent.

United States v. Morrison

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:31 +0000

Location

US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

601 Market St Philadelphia PA 19106

Philadelphia, PA 19106

United States

39° 57' 2.7504" N, 75° 9' 1.3464" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Morrison

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 99-29

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 598 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2000

Advocates

Michael E. Rosman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Julie Goldscheid (Argued the cause for the petitioner in No. 99-29, Brzonkala v. Morrison)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States in No. 99-5)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, while enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), Christy Brzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both students and varsity football players at Virginia Tech, raped her. In 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. After a hearing, Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to immediate suspension for two semesters. Crawford was not punished. A second hearing again found Morrison guilty. After an appeal through the university's administrative system, Morrison's punishment was set aside, as it was found to be "excessive." Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university. Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does Congress have the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 under either the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Morrison, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1398

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment since the statute did not regulate an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce nor did it redress harm caused by the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that [i]f the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of...Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States." Dissenting, Justice Stephen G. Breyer argued that the majority opinion "illustrates the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone." Additionally, Justice David H. Souter, dissenting, noted that VAWA contained a "mountain of data assembled by Congress...showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce."

Reno v. Condon

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:30 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1464

Petitioner

Reno

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Condon

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 141 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, November 10, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2000

Advocates

Charles Condon (Columbia, South Carolina, argued the cause for respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for petitioners)

Facts of the Case

State departments of motor vehicles (DMVs) require drivers and automobile owners to provide personal information, which may include a person's name, address, telephone number, Social Security number, and photograph, as a condition of obtaining a driver's license or registering an automobile. Congress enacted the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA),which establishes a regulatory scheme that restricts the States' ability to disclose a driver's personal information without the driver's consent, after finding that many States sell such information. The DPPA conflicts with South Carolina law, under which information contained in the State's DMV records is available to any person or entity that fills out a form listing the requester's name and address and stating that the information will not be used for telephone solicitation. The Attorney General of South Carolina filed suit, alleging the DPPA violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. The District Court concluded that the DPPA was incompatible with the principles of federalism, granted summary judgement for the State, and permanently enjoined the DPPA's enforcement against the State. In affirming, the Court of Appeals also concluded that the DPPA violated the constitutional principles of federalism.

Question

Does the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 violate the constitutional principles of federalism?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Reno, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2721

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the DPPA is a proper exercise of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause and doesn't run afoul of federalism principles. The law "does not require the states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens," Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. "It does not require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals," the Chief Justice added.

Kimel v. Florida Bd. Of Regents

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:30 +0000

Location

Florida State University

600 W College Ave Tallahassee FL 32306

Tallahassee, FL 32306

United States

30° 26' 26.7324" N, 84° 17' 26.9592" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-791

Petitioner

Kimel

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida Bd. Of Regents

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 98-796

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 62 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, January 11, 2000

Advocates

Jeremiah A. Collins (Argued the cause for petitioners in No. 98-791 (Kimel, et al.), and respondents under the Court's Rule 12.6 in support of petitioner in No. 98-796)

Barbara D. Underwood (Argued for the United States, as petitioner in No. 98-796, and respondent in support of petitioners in No. 98-791)

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause for state respondents in both cases)

Facts of the Case

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) makes it unlawful for a private employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual...because of such individual's age." In 1974, Congress extended the ADEA's substantive requirements to the states. First, in 1994, employees of the University of Montevallo filed suit against the university, a branch of the State of Alabama, alleging that the university had discriminated against them on the basis of their age. The federal District Court dismissed the case based on the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court determined that, although the ADEA shows Congress' intent to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress did not enact or extend the ADEA under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. The court, therefore, held that the ADEA did not abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Second, in 1995, a group of faculty and librarians of Florida State University filed suit against the Board of Regents, alleging that the university's fiscal actions had violated the ADEA because the actions had a disparate impact on the pay of older employees. When the Florida Board of Regents moved to dismiss the suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the District Court denied the motion, holding that Congress expressed its intent to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity in the ADEA, and that the ADEA is a proper exercise of congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. Likewise, in 1996, a third case, involving an employee of the Florida Department of Corrections, was similarly decided. The Court of Appeals, in deciding all three cases, held that the ADEA does not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Question

Does the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Florida Bd. Of Regents, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

Split Vote

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the ADEA contains a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the states' immunity, but that the abrogation exceeds Congress' authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. "States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest," wrote Justice O'Connor for the Court. Justice O'Connor noted that, "[o]ld age also does not define a discrete and insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will experience it." Justice O'Connor concluded that "[i]n contrast, when a State discriminates on the basis of race or gender, we require a tighter fit between the discriminatory means and the legitimate ends they serve." Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer dissented.

College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-149

Petitioner

College Savings Bank

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida Prepaid

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 666 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, April 20, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, June 23, 1999

Advocates

William B. Mallin (on behalf of the Respondents Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, et al)

David C. Todd (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the United States as respondent)

Facts of the Case

This case is the second tier of a patent infringement action. College Savings Bank, a New Jersey chartered bank, markets and sells certificates of deposit designed to finance college costs. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity, administers a tuition prepayment program. In addition to its original patent infringement action, College Savings filed an action alleging that Florida Prepaid violated section 43 of the Lanham Act by making misstatements about its tuition savings plans in its brochures and annual reports. The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) subjects states to suits brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for false and misleading advertising. The District Court granted Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The court rejected arguments from College Savings and the United States that Florida Prepaid had waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in interstate marketing and administration of its program after the TRCA made clear that such activity would subject it to suit; and that Congress's abrogation of sovereign immunity in the TRCA was effective, since it was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) permit suits against states for alleged misrepresentations of their own products by providing a constitutionally permissible abrogation of state sovereign immunity? Does the TRCA permit suits against states for alleged misrepresentations of their own products by operating as a waiver of sovereign immunity when a state engages in activities regulated by the Lanham Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Florida Prepaid, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1125

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "the federal courts are without jurisdiction to entertain this suit against an arm of the State of Florida." Justice Scalia concluded that "the sovereign immunity of the State of Florida was neither validly abrogated by the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, nor voluntarily waived by the State's activities in interstate commerce." Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice Stephen G. Breyer expressed the view that Congress possesses the authority to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity where necessary and proper to the exercise of a congressional power under the Constitution's Article I. Justice John Paul Stevens filed his own dissenting opinion and joined that of Justice Breyer.

Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-531

Petitioner

Florida Prepaid

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

College Savings Bank

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 627 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, April 20, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, June 23, 1999

Advocates

Kevin J. Culligan (Argued the cause for College Savings Bank)

Jonathan A. Glogau (Tallahassee, Florida; argued the cause for the petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

Immediately after the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Act) changed patent laws to abrogate state's sovereign immunity, College Savings Bank (College) filed a patent infringement suit against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity. Florida Prepaid asked that College's suit be dismissed and that the Act be declared unconstitutional, based on Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (517 US 44) which upheld state sovereign immunity. The United States joined College looking to uphold the Act's constitutionality. After agreeing with College, the District Court denied Florida Prepaid's dismissal motion. When the Federal Circuit affirmed, Florida Prepaid appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Did nullification of state sovereign immunity, under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, constitute valid legislation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Florida Prepaid, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 35 U.S.C. 271

No. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court began by noting that there was no doubt that the Act intended to abrogate states' immunity from patent infringement. The Court then added that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Patent Clause give Congress the power to curtail state sovereign immunity from patent infringement claims. The Court reasoned that although the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to pass "appropriate legislation" to protect parties from being deprived of property without due process, this in itself does not permit the abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Only a showing of a consistent pattern of state patent violations, and a lack of adequate legal remedies to address such violations, would justify a limited effort to suspend a state's sovereign immunity. Since College made no such showing, and since the Act's language was overly broad in its scope, the Court dismissed College's suit and declared unconstitutional corresponding segments of the Act.

Alden v. Maine

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:30 +0000

Location

Alden's Workplace Cumberland County, ME

United States

43° 48' 47.8728" N, 70° 23' 13.4124" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-436

Petitioner

Alden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Maine

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 706 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, March 31, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, June 23, 1999

Advocates

Peter J. Brann (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Laurence E. Gold (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court)

Facts of the Case

A group of probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in 1992 alleging that the state had violated the overtime provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Following the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996)which held that States are immune from private suits in federal court and that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate that immunitythe probation officers' suit was dismissed in Federal district court. Alden and the other probation officers then sued Maine again for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time in state court. The state trial court and the state supreme court both held that Maine had sovereign immunity and could not be sued by private parties in their own court.

Question

May Congress use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from private suits in its own courts?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Maine, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

No. A sharply divided court held in a 5-4 decision that Congress may not use its Article I powers to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Both the terms and history of the eleventh amendment suggest that States are immune from suits in their own courts. And more generally, the original understanding of the Constitution's structure and the terms of the tenth amendment confirm that states retained much of their sovereignty despite their agreeing that the national government would be supreme when exercising its enumerated powers.

Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:06 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1536

Petitioner

Arizona Department of Revenue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Blaze Constr. Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 32 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, December 8, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, March 2, 1999

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Patrick Irvine (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Bruce C. Smith (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Over several years, the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs contracted with Blaze Construction Company to build, repair, and improve roads on several Indian reservations located in Arizona. When the various contracts expired, the Arizona Department of Revenue issued a tax deficiency assessment against Blaze for its failure to pay Arizona's transaction privilege tax, the tax levied on the gross receipts of companies doing business in the state, on the proceeds from its contracts with the Bureau. Blaze protested the assessment and prevailed in administrative proceedings. On review, the Arizona Tax Court granted summary judgment for the Department. In reversing, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that federal law pre-empted the tax's application to Blaze. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied review.

Question

May a state impose a nondiscriminatory tax upon a private company's proceeds from contracts with the Federal Government when the federal contractor renders its services on an Indian reservation?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Arizona Department of Revenue, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that a "State generally may impose a nondiscriminatory tax upon a private company's proceeds from contracts with the Federal Government, regardless of whether the federal contractor renders its services on an Indian reservation." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "[a]bsent a constitutional immunity or congressional exemption, federal law does not shield Blaze (a federal contractor) from Arizona's transaction privilege tax."

Printz v. United States

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:28 +0000

Location

Sheriff Printz's Office

205 Bedford Street Hamilton MT 59840

Hamilton, MT 59840

United States

46° 14' 41.6544" N, 114° 9' 24.75" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1478

Petitioner

Printz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 95-1503

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 898 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, December 3, 1996

Decided

Friday, June 27, 1997

Advocates

Stephen P. Halbrook (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

David Dellinger (Argued the cause for the United States)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required "local chief law enforcement officers" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal system for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, separately challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf of CLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively. In both cases District Courts found the background-checks unconstitutional, but ruled that since this requirement was severable from the rest of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system could remain. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the interim background-check provisions were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. United States.

Question

Using the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I as justification, can Congress temporarily require state CLEOs to regulate handgun purchases by performing those duties called for by the Brady Bill's handgun applicant background-checks?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Printz, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 922

No. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this case by performing background-checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it - even temporarily. The Court added that the Brady Bill could not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-application forms or notifying certain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since the Brady Bill reserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them.

Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-1474

Petitioner

Idaho

Respondent

Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 261 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 1996

Decided

Monday, June 23, 1997

Advocates

Clive J. Strong (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Raymond C. Givens (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Coeur d'Alene Tribe (the Tribe) of Idaho filed an action against the State of Idaho, various state agencies, and numerous state officials alleging ownership of the submerged lands and bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene and various navigable tributaries and effluents lying within the original boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. The Tribe sought a declaratory judgment establishing its entitlement to the exclusive use and occupancy and the right to quiet enjoyment of the submerged lands, a declaration of the invalidity of all Idaho laws, customs, or usages purporting to regulate those lands, and a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from taking any action in violation of the Tribe's rights in the lands. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed all the components of the complaint on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and on the merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the Eleventh Amendment barred all claims against the State and its agencies, as well as the title action against the officials. However, it allowed the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the state officials to proceed insofar as they sought to preclude continuing violations of federal law. The court reasoned that those claims were based on Idaho's ongoing interference with the Tribe's alleged ownership rights, and found it conceivable that the Tribe could prove facts entitling it to relief on the claims.

Question

May Indian Tribes proceed with suits against state officials in light of the sovereign immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Idaho, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

No. In an 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's suit against the state officials may not proceed in federal court because States enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits filed by Indian tribes. Justice Kennedy concluded, "the present suit is barred unless it falls within the exception this Court has recognized for certain suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officers in their individual capacities."

Seminole Tribe v. Florida

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:28 +0000

Location

Seminole Tribe

6300 Stirling Road Hollywood FL 33024

Hollywood, FL 33024

United States

26° 2' 43.908" N, 80° 13' 47.7084" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-12

Petitioner

Seminole Tribe

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

517 U.S. 44 (1996)

Argued

Wednesday, October 11, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, March 27, 1996

Advocates

Bruce S. Rogow (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Drew S. Days, III (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Jonathan A. Glogau (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Seminole Tribe brought suit against the State of Florida for violating the good faith negotiations requirement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Under the IGRA, the Tribe may engage in gaming (i.e., casino gambling) activities subject to Florida's good faith regulations. Florida moved to dismiss the Tribe's action, alleging that the lawsuit violated Florida's sovereign immunity. On appeal from the District Court's denial of Florida's motion to dismiss the lawsuit, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment shielded Florida from federal suit and that under Ex Parte Young, the Tribe may not enforce its right to good faith negotiations by naming Florida's governor as a party to the suit.

Question

Does the Eleventh Amendment provide Florida with immunity from the Tribe lawsuit?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Florida, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, The Court held that Congress did intend to abrogate states' sovereign immunity under the IGRA but that the Indian Commerce Clause (and by implication the Commerce Clause) did not give Congress that power. Under the Eleventh Amendment, all states are regarded as sovereign entities. Such sovereignty inherently implies that states may not be sued by parties without their consent, even if they are given authority to regulate those parties' activities through receipt of federal funds. Finally, Ex Parte Young's ruling does not justify the Tribe's suit against Florida's governor in light of certain IGRA provisions which specifically prohibit such an action.

United States v. Lopez

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:27 +0000

Location

Edison High School

701 Santa Monica San Antonio TX 78212

San Antonio, TX 78212

United States

29° 28' 22.3068" N, 98° 30' 20.7036" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1260

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lopez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 549 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, November 8, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, April 26, 1995

Advocates

John R. Carter (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Drew S. Days, III (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.

Question

Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lopez, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 922

Yes. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic activity.

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County Of Kent, Michigan

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-97

Petitioner

Northwest Airlines, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

County Of Kent, Michigan, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 355 (1994)

Argued

Monday, November 29, 1993

Decided

Monday, January 24, 1994

Advocates

Walter A. Smith, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioners)

William F. Hunting, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondents)

Edward C. DuMont (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for County Of Kent, Michigan, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 1513

None

New York v. United States

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:25 +0000

Location

Northern District Court of New York

445 Broadway Albany NY 12207

Albany, NY 12207

United States

42° 38' 58.3692" N, 73° 45' 0.5508" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-543

Petitioner

New York

Respondent

United States

Consolidation

No. 91-558

No. 91-563

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

505 U.S. 144 (1992)

Argued

Monday, March 30, 1992

Decided

Friday, June 19, 1992

Advocates

William B. Collins (Argued the cause for the state respondents)

Peter H. Schiff (Argued the cause for the petitioners in all cases)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the federal respondents in all cases)

Facts of the Case

The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. New York State and Allegany and Courtland counties were frustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New York filed suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management.

Question

Does the Low-Level Waste Act violate the Tenth Amendment and the "guarantee clause" of Article Four?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for New York, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld two of the three provisions of the Act under review, reasoning that Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to use financial rewards and access to disposal sites as incentives for state waste management. The third provision, the "take-title" qualification, stipulated that states must take legal ownership and liability for low-level waste or by the regulatory act. "Either type of federal action," wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments." This last provision violated the Tenth Amendment.

James M. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-680

Petitioner

James M. Beam Distilling Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Georgia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 529 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 1990

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 1991

Advocates

Amelia W. Baker (on behalf of the Respondents)

Morton Siegel (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for James M. Beam Distilling Co., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Howlett v. Rose

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-5383

Petitioner

Howlett

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rose

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

496 U.S. 356 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, March 20, 1990

Decided

Monday, June 11, 1990

Advocates

Gardner W. Beckett, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Charles A. Rothfeld (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Howlett, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 6, Section 2: Supremacy Clause

None

Davis v. Michigan Department of the Treasury

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:21 +0000

Location

Michigan Dept. of Treasury

430 W Allegan St Lansing MI 48922

Lansing, MI 48922

United States

42° 43' 57.666" N, 84° 33' 26.8884" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1020

Appellant

Paul Davis

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Michigan Department of the Treasury

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

489 U.S. 803 (1989)

Argued

Monday, January 9, 1989

Decided

Tuesday, March 28, 1989

Advocates

Paul S. Davis (argued the cause for the appellant, appearing pro se)

Michael K. Kellogg (argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Thomas L. Casey (argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

Paul Davis, a resident of Michigan, worked for the federal government and upon retirement received benefits. Michigan law exempts state retirement benefits from state taxes. Smith unsuccessfully petitioned for a refund on the state taxes he paid on his federal retirement benefits. He then filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims arguing that the state's tax policy violated 4 U.S.C. 111 by taxing benefits paid to federal employees but not to state employees. The court dismissed his suit and so did the Michigan Court of Appeals.

Question

Did Michigan violate federal law when it exempted state and local government pensions from taxation but levied taxes on federal government pensions?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Davis, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 4 U.S.C. 111

Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for an 8-1 court. The Court emphasized the principles of intergovernmental tax immunity, which work to keep one part of the government from hindering the operations of another part. Section 111 allows a state to tax income paid by the federal government "if the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source of the pay or compensation." Because the Court found no "significant differences between the two classes [federal and state employees]," it held that the Michigan tax distinguished between employees solely on "the source of the pay."

Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1346

Petitioner

Bonito Boats, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

489 U.S. 141 (1989)

Argued

Monday, December 5, 1988

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 1989

Advocates

Tomas Morgan Russell (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Charles E. Lipsey (Amicus Curiae in support of Judgment Below)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 6, Section 2: Supremacy Clause

None

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1241

Petitioner

Pennsylvania

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Union Gas Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

491 U.S. 1 (1989)

Argued

Monday, October 31, 1988

Decided

Thursday, June 15, 1989

Advocates

John George Knorr, III (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Robert A. Swift (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Union Gas Co., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 9601

None

Bennett v. Arkansas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-6124

Petitioner

Bennett

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arkansas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

485 U.S. 395 (1988)

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 1988

Decided

Tuesday, March 29, 1988

Advocates

Thomas M. Carpenter (on behalf of the Petitioner)

J. Steven Clark (on behalf of the Respondent)

Richard J. Lazarus (as amicus curiae, supporting Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bennett, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 6, Section 2: Supremacy Clause

None

Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-1172

Petitioner

Goodyear Atomic Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Miller

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

486 U.S. 174 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, January 19, 1988

Decided

Monday, May 23, 1988

Advocates

Thomas W. Merrill (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae in support of Appellant)

Robert E. Tait (on behalf of the Appellant)

Stewart W. Jaffy (on behalf of Appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Miller, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1257

None

South Dakota v. Dole

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:20 +0000

Location

South Dakota Legislature

500 E Capitol Ave Pierre SD 57501

Pierre, SD 57501

United States

44° 22' 1.5132" N, 100° 20' 46.8708" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-260

Petitioner

South Dakota

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dole

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

483 U.S. 203 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, April 28, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, June 23, 1987

Advocates

Louis R. Cohen (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Roger A. Tellinghuisen (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a state that permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol, challenged the law.

Question

Did Congress exceed its spending powers, or violate the Twenty-first Amendment, by passing legislation conditioning the award of federal highway funds on the states' adoption of a uniform minimum drinking age?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Dole, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 23 U.S.C. 158

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Congress, acting indirectly to encourage uniformity in states' drinking ages, was within constitutional bounds. The Court found that the legislation was in pursuit of "the general welfare," and that the means chosen to do so were reasonable. The Court also held that the Twenty-first Amendment's limitations on spending power were not prohibitions on congressional attempts to achieve federal objectives indirectly. The five percent loss of highway funds was not unduly coercive.

Wardair Canada v. Florida Dept. Of Revenue

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:06 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-902

Appellee

Florida Dept. Of Revenue

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Wardair Canada

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

477 U.S. 1 (1986)

Argued

Monday, March 31, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, June 18, 1986

Advocates

Joseph C. Mellichamp, III (on behalf of the Appellee)

Walter D. Hansen (on behalf of the Appellant)

Albert G. Lauber, Jr. ()

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Florida Dept. Of Revenue, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 1301

None

Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-351

Petitioner

Atascadero State Hospital

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scanlon

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

473 U.S. 234 (1985)

Argued

Monday, March 25, 1985

Decided

Friday, June 28, 1985

Advocates

James E. Ryan (on behalf of the petitioners)

Marilyn Holle (on behalf of the respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Atascadero State Hospital, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

None

Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-240

Appellee

Lead-Deadwood School Dist.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Lawrence County

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

469 U.S. 256 (1985)

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 1984

Decided

Wednesday, January 9, 1985

Advocates

Louis F. Claiborne (on behalf of United States as amicus curiae)

Alan Raywid (on behalf of Appellants)

A. P. Fuller (on behalf of Appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Lawrence County, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 6, Section 2: Supremacy Clause

None

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:17 +0000

Location

San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority San Antonio, TX

United States

29° 25' 26.8392" N, 98° 29' 37.0608" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-1913

Appellee

San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Garcia

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, No. 82-1951

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

469 U.S. 528 (1985)

Argued

Monday, March 19, 1984

Reargued:

Monday, October 1, 1984

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 1985

Advocates

William T. Coleman, Jr. (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Laurence E. Gold (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Rex E. Lee (Reargued the cause for appellant, Donovan, in No. 82-1951)

Facts of the Case

The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. SAMTA argued that it was providing a "traditional" governmental function, which exempted it from federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act.

Question

Did principles of federalism make the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority immune from the Fair Labor Standards Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Garcia, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the guiding principles of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery were unworkable and that SAMTA was subject to Congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause. The Court found that rules based on the subjective determination of "integral" or "traditional" governmental functions provided little or no guidance in determining the boundaries of federal and state power. The Court argued that the structure of the federal system itself, rather than any "discrete limitations" on federal authority, protected state sovereignty.

South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-1608

Petitioner

South-Central Timber Dev.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wunnicke

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

467 U.S. 82 (1984)

Argued

Wednesday, February 29, 1984

Decided

Tuesday, May 22, 1984

Advocates

Kathryn A. Obery (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae)

LeRoy Eugene DeVeaux (on behalf of Petitioner)

Ronald W. Lorensen (on behalf of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for South-Central Timber Dev., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-2101

Petitioner

Pennhurst State School & Hosp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Halderman

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

465 U.S. 89 (1984)

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 1983

Reargued:

Monday, October 3, 1983

Decided

Monday, January 23, 1984

Advocates

H. Bartow Farr, III (on behalf of the Petitioners)

David Ferleger (on behalf of the Respondents)

Thomas K. Gilhool (on behalf of the Respondents)

Allen C. Warshaw (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

None

Arkansas Elec. Coop. v. Ark. Public Ser v. Comm'n

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-731

Appellee

Comm'n

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Arkansas Elec. Coop. v. Ark. Public Ser

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

461 U.S. 375 (1983)

Argued

Monday, January 17, 1983

Decided

Monday, May 16, 1983

Advocates

Robert D. Cabe (on behalf of the Appellant)

Jeff Broadwater (on behalf of the Appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Comm'n, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Power

None

Washington v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-969

Appellee

United States

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Washington

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

460 U.S. 536 (1983)

Argued

Monday, January 10, 1983

Decided

Tuesday, March 29, 1983

Advocates

Kenneth O. Eikenberry (on behalf of the Appellants)

Stuart A. Smith (on behalf of the United States)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Washington, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 6, Section 2: Supremacy Clause

None

Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-1613

Appellee

Garner

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Memphis Bank & Trust Co.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

459 U.S. 392 (1983)

Argued

Monday, November 29, 1982

Decided

Monday, January 24, 1983

Advocates

Jimmy C. Creecy (on behalf of appellee, William M. Leech, Jr)

J. Minor Tait, Jr. (on behalf of appellees Garner and Foster)

K. Martin Worthy (on behalf of the Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Memphis Bank & Trust Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Sporhase v. Nebraska Ex Rel. Douglas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-613

Appellee

Nebraska Ex Rel. Douglas

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Sporhase

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

458 U.S. 941 (1982)

Argued

Tuesday, March 30, 1982

Decided

Friday, July 2, 1982

Advocates

Richard A. Dudden (on behalf of the Appellants)

George Roderic Anderson (on behalf of the Appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Sporhase, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Ferc v. Mississippi

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:33 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-1749

Appellee

Mississippi

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Ferc

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

456 U.S. 742 (1982)

Argued

Tuesday, January 19, 1982

Decided

Tuesday, June 1, 1982

Advocates

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of the Appellants)

Alex A. Alston, Jr. (on behalf of the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Ferc, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 10: Tenth Amendment

None

Maryland v. Louisiana

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83 ORIG

Plaintiff

Maryland

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

Louisiana

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

451 U.S. 725 (1981)

Argued

Monday, January 19, 1981

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 1981

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Maryland, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:52 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-1810

Appellee

Snead

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Arizona Public Service Co.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

441 U.S. 141 (1979)

Argued

Monday, February 26, 1979

Decided

Wednesday, April 18, 1979

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Arizona Public Service Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Hughes v. Oklahoma

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-1439

Appellee

Oklahoma

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Hughes

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

441 U.S. 322 (1979)

Argued

Tuesday, January 9, 1979

Decided

Tuesday, April 24, 1979

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Hughes, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:33:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

76-930

Appellee

Atlantic Richfield Co.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Ray

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

435 U.S. 151 (1978)

Argued

Monday, October 31, 1977

Decided

Monday, March 6, 1978

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Ray, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 46 U.S.C. 215

None

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:34:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

76-635

Appellee

Multistate Tax Comm.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

U.S. Steel Corp.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

434 U.S. 452 (1978)

Argued

Tuesday, October 11, 1977

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 1978

Advocates

William D. Dexter (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Erwin N. Griswold (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

In 1972, twenty one states were members of the Multistate Tax Compact, a body formed by states to assist them in formulating and administering tax law relating to multistate businesses. The Compact had not received congressional approval.

Question

Did the formation of this group violate the the Compact Clause of Article I?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Multistate Tax Comm., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10, Paragraph 3: Compact Clause

The Court found no constitutional violation. The Compact did not enhance state political power at the expense of the United States; it not confer to states powers which they did not already possess; it did not involve any delegation of state power to the Commission. Furthermore, argued Justice Powell, each state was free to withdraw from the group at any time.