Cases by Issue - Natural Resources

S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1527

Petitioner

S.D. Warren Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Maine Board of Environmental Protection, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, October 11, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, February 21, 2006

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2006

Advocates

William J. Kayatta, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Jeffrey P. Minear (argued the cause for Respondent)

G. Steven Rowe (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

S.D. Warren Company (Warren) operates several hydroelectric dams in Maine. Under Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act, companies must obtain state approval of "any activity" "which may result in any discharge into the [Nation's] navigable waters." When Warren sought to renew the federal licenses for its dams, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) required that it first get approval from the Maine Board of Environmental Protection because, FERC ruled, the dams resulted in a "discharge." Warren disagreed, arguing that the water which moved through the hydroelectric dams was not actually a "discharge" because it was water from the same river which had just been temporarily re-routed. After Warren's administrative appeals and state court suit (which went to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court) failed, it appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Question

Do hydroelectric dams result in "discharge" under the meaning of Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Maine Board of Environmental Protection, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the term "discharge" in section 401 had historically been given a broad meaning by FERC, the Environmental Protection Agency, and even the Supreme Court. Justice David Souter, in the Opinion of the Court, wrote that "[w]hen it applies to water, 'discharge' commonly means a 'flowing or issuing out.' ... In fact, this understanding of the word was accepted by all Members of the Court sitting in our only other case focused on Section 401 of the Clean Water Act." The discharge from hydroelectric dams fit this definition perfectly, and Section 401 therefore mandated state approval.

Rapanos v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1034

Petitioner

John A. Rapanos, et ux., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States Army Corps of Engineers, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Carabell v. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 04-1384

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, October 11, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, February 21, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 19, 2006

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondents)

Timothy A. Stoepker (argued the cause for Petitioners in No. 04-1384)

M. Reed Hopper (argued the cause for Petitioners in No. 04-1034)

Facts of the Case

John Rapanos sought to fill in three wetland areas on his property in order to build a shopping center. Rapanos ignored warnings from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality that the area was protected wetlands under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA allows the government to regulate the discharge of any pollutant (including dirt or sand) into "navigable waters," which the Act defines as "the waters of the United States." Under regulations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), wetlands are covered by the CWA as long as they are adjacent to traditionally navigable waters or tributaries of such waters. After Rapanos also ignored cease-and-desist orders from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the government brought a civil suit against him. Rapanos argued before the District Court that the CWA gives the government jurisdiction to regulate only traditionally navigable waters. The government countered that Rapanos's lands were covered by the CWA as "adjacent wetlands" under the Corps's interpretation of the Act; the sites drained into man-made drains which eventually emptied into navigable rivers and lakes. The District Court rejected Rapanos's argument and upheld the Corps's regulations including the wetlands as "waters of the United States." The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the "hydrological connection" of the wetlands to the navigable waters qualifies them as "waters of the United States" under the Act.

The Carabells sought to fill in a wetland on their property in order to build a condominium, but were denied a permit because the wetland was protected under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA allows the government to regulate the discharge of any pollutant (including dirt or sand) into "navigable waters," which the Act defines as "the waters of the United States." Under regulations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), wetlands are covered by the CWA as long as they are adjacent to traditionally navigable waters or tributaries of such waters. Carabell's site is separated from a nearby ditch by a 4-foot- wide berm (earthen barrier), but the Corps's regulations specify that the wetland is nevertheless adjacent to the waterway. The ditch empties into another ditch, which in turn empties into a creek and ultimately into Lake St. Clair, a navigable water. After exhausting administrative appeals, Carabell sued in District Court. Carabell argued that the government lacked jurisdiction under the CWA to regulate the relatively isolated wetland as part of the "waters of the United States." The District Court disagreed, and upheld the Corps's expansive interpretation of the CWA. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also ruled for the Corps, holding that as long as wetlands are "adjacent" to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters and share a "significant nexus" with such waters, the wetlands qualify as "waters of the United States" for purposes of the CWA.

Question

Does the phrase "waters of the United States" in the Clean Water Act include a wetland that at least occasionally empties into a tributary of a traditionally navigable water?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Rapanos, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

Unanswered. The closely-divided Court split 4-1-4, with Justice Anthony Kennedy providing the crucial fifth vote to reject the Sixth Circuit's decision.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the plurality opinion, which was joined by three other Justices. The plurality rejected the argument that only actually- navigable waters can be regulated by the Clean Water Act, but also held that the word "navigable" in the Act cannot be divested of all meaning. The plurality held that the definitional term "waters of the United States" can only refer to "relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water," not "occasional," "intermittent," or "ephemeral" flows. Furthermore, A mere "hydrological connection" is not sufficient to qualify a wetland as covered by the CWA; it must have a "continuous surface connection" with a "water of the United States" that makes it "difficult to determine where the 'water' ends and the 'wetland' begins."

Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, which disagreed with much of the plurality's reasoning. In Justice Kennedy's view, wetlands need not have a continuous surface connection to a continuously flowing body of water to be covered under the CWA, but mere adjacency to a tributary of a navigable water is not sufficient. Instead, Wetlands that are not adjacent to a traditionally navigable water must have a "significant nexus" with a one. This requirement is satisfied if the wetland has a significant effect on the water quality of navigable waters. Justice Kennedy suggested that Rapanos's wetlands may be covered under the CWA if more evidence of a significant nexus were presented.

Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The dissent argued that the Corps's regulations should be upheld as a reasonable interpretation of the Act. The inclusion of all wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters was most consistent with the CWA's purpose of eliminating pollution in the nation's waters.

Though the Court failed to obtain a majority on most of the legal issues presented by the case, the plurality and Justice Kennedy agreed to send the case back to the Sixth Circuit for a new decision based on a different analysis.

Orff v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1566

Petitioner

Francis A. Orff, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (argued the cause for Respondent United States)

Stuart L. Somach (argued the cause for Respondent Westlands Water District)

William M. Smiland (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Westlands Water District received water from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation under a 1963 contract. In 1993 Westlands sued the district for reducing their water supply. California farmers who had bought water from Westlands also sued the bureau, intervening as plaintiffs. After negotiations Westlands agreed to dismiss their suit. But the farmers refused to drop theirs, accusing the bureau of breach of contract. The farmers claimed that as third-party beneficiaries they could enforce the contract and that the United States had waived its sovereing immunity from such suits in the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. That act allowed parties "to join the United States as a necessary party defendant in any suit" over rights under a federal reclamation contract. The district court held that the farmers were not contracting parties or third-party beneficiaries and thus could not invoke the waiver. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision.

Question

Did the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 waive the United States' sovereign immunity from breach of contract suits?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 43 U.S.C. 390

In this case, no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the act merely permitted parties to join the United States in an action between other parties when the action required interpretation of a contract and joining the U.S. was necessary. The farmers suit was not an attempt to join the U.S. as a necessary party defendant.

Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1192

Petitioner

Cooper Industries, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Aviall Services, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 157 (2004)

Granted

Friday, January 9, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, October 6, 2004

Decided

Monday, December 13, 2004

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

William Bradford Reynolds (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Richard O. Faulk (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Texas prodded Aviall Services to clean up contaminated property bought from Cooper Industries. Aviall sued in federal district court to force Cooper to pay some of the clean up costs. Aviall claimed it could sue Cooper under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Cooper admitted to being a potentially responsible party (PRP), but claimed it was not liable because Aviall was never sued to clean up the land and had no federal requirement to do so. The district court and a panel for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Aviall. The entire appellate court reversed and ruled CERCLA does not require a PRP to first be sued before seeking clean up funds from other PRPs.

Question

Does the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) require that a party liable for pollution be sued under CERCLA before seeking clean up funds from other liable parties?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Cooper Industries, Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 9613

In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that a private party, who, like Aviall, had not been sued under CERCLA could not obtain cleanup contributions from other liable parties. The Court reasoned that CERCLA's language made clear that parties could seek cleanup contribution only during or following a civil action.

Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:52 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-358

Petitioner

Department of Transportation, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Public Citizen, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 752 (2004)

Granted

Monday, December 15, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, April 21, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 7, 2004

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Jonathan Weissglass (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 2001, President Bush announced that he planned to lift a temporary ban on Mexican trucking companies in the United States once new regulations were prepared by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to regulate safety inspections and applications to transport materials. Congress specified certain standards that those regulations would have to meet before it would appropriate money to register the new carriers.

When the FMCSA formulated its regulations, it performed an Environmental Assessment (EA) to examine their effects on the environment. Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), federal agencies must perform an Environmental Impact Study (EIS) of policies that are likely to have significant environmental effects. If an agency feels that its policies will not have significant effects, however, it may perform a more limited Environmental Assessment (EA) - which is what FMCSA chose to do. Public Citizen, a watchdog group that monitors government actions, challenged this decision in federal court. It argued that, because FMCSA knew that a large number of Mexican trucks would be admitted into the United States once it issued its regulations, it should have considered the environmental impact of the increased number of trucks in addition to the more limited impact of the safety inspections. The impact of the trucks would have been significant enough to warrant an EIS, so Public Citizen argued that FMCSA had violated NEPA by not conducting the more stringent study. The district court side with the FMCSA, holding that, while the passage of the regulations was necessary before the trucks could be admitted, the FMCSA nevertheless did not have control of those trucks and therefore did not have to account for them in its Environmental Assessment; a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.

Question

Should the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, knowing that its passage of certain regulations would cause Congress and the President to lift a ban on Mexican motor carriers, have considered the environmental impact of the motor carriers when determining whether to perform an Environmental Impact Study of its regulations?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Department of Transportation, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Environmental Policy

No. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the FMCSA had no control of the trucks once the regulations were passed, and would therefore be unable to act on the findings of an EIS even if it did conduct one. Further, the Court found that the passage of the regulations was not sufficiently responsible for the increased pollution caused by the trucks to warrant an EIS.

Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-101

Petitioner

Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 55 (2004)

Granted

Monday, November 3, 2003

Argued

Monday, March 29, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 14, 2004

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Paul M. Smith (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) designated 2.5 million acres of land in Utah as "Wilderness Study Areas" under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). Under the Act, the BLM is required to manage this land "so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness."

The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) and several other environmentalist groups brought suit in federal district court under section 706 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which allows federal courts to compel government action when an agency has failed to meet its legal duties. SUWA claimed that the BLM had failed to take a "hard look," as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, at the effects of off-road vehicles on the Wilderness Study Areas. It also claimed that the permitted off-road vehicle use was in fact damaging the study areas in violation of the agency's FLPMA obligations.

The district court dismissed the case, holding that SUWA's charge that the bureau had failed to adequately protect the study areas was not specific enough for the court to hear under the Administrative Procedure Act. On appeal, a divided panel of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held that the bureau's discretion was limited to deciding how to implement the act, not if to implement it, and that SUWA could therefore bring suit to force it at least to take a "hard look" at the effects of the off-road vehicle policy.

Question

Does section 706 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act authorize federal courts to review the management of public lands under statutory standards and the land use plans of the Bureau of Land Management?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Norton, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Administrative Procedure, or Administrative Orders Review

Yes, but only to a limited extent. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the APA only allows courts to examine government agencies' failures to meet specific statutory requirements. A general complaint based on policy differences - like SUWA's view that the off- road vehicles made the Wilderness Study Areas unsuitable for preservation as wilderness - could not be heard under the APA. Justice Scalia wrote, "If courts were empowered to enter general orders compelling compliance with broad statutory mandates ... it would ultimately become the task of the supervising court, rather than the agency, to work out compliance with the broad statutory mandate, injecting the judge into day-to-day agency management."

Bedroc Limited v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1593

Petitioner

BedRoc Limited, LLC, and Western Elite, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 176 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, September 30, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, January 20, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, March 31, 2004

Advocates

R. Timothy McCrum (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Thomas L. Sansonetti (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

BedRoc Ltd. and Western Elite, Inc., own property in Nevada patented under the federal Pittman Act (1919). (The act was repealed in 1964.) The act authorized the issuance of patents to desert lands in Nevada to individuals who successfully developed underground water resources. However, the act specified that patents reserve to the United States "all the coal and other valuable minerals" in the patented lands. When the previous owner of BedRoc and Western Elite's land extracted and sold commercially valuable sand and gravel from the lands without a federal mineral contract, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) gave notification that the mining was illegal under federal law. The owner lost an appeal to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). Once BedRoc and Western Elite owned the land, they filed suit in U.S. district court, arguing that the Pittman Act's "valuable minerals" provision did not include valuable sand and gravel. The district court rejected the companies' argument and sided with the United States. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the reservation to the United States of all "coal and other valuable minerals" in patents issued under the Pittman Act (1919) include commercially valuable sand and gravel?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Bedroc Limited, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 43 U.S.C. 351

No. In an plurality opinion written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and joined by three other Justices, the Court ruled that because sand and gravel were not commercially valuable in 1919 when the Pittman Act was passed, they were not "valuable minerals" covered under the Act. Although the Court had interpreted "minerals" expansively in the past, the Court held that the adjective "valuable" limited the term sufficiently to exclude sand and gravel. The Court emphasized that since the plain text of the statute was clear, there was no need to delve into the legislative history of the Act. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he agreed that sand and gravel were not "valuable minerals" under the Act, but disputed the plurality's reliance on the word "valuable." Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented. The dissent argued that the legislative history of the Pittman Act indicated that "valuable minerals" should be interpreted broadly to include sand and gravel.

South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-626

Petitioner

South Florida Water Management District

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 95 (2004)

Granted

Friday, June 27, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 23, 2004

Advocates

Timothy S. Bishop (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Jeffrey P. Minear (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Dexter W. Lehtinen (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and the Friends of the Everglades sued the South Florida Water Management District under the Clean Water Act (CWA) in federal district court. The suit alleged that the water district violated the Clean Water Act by releasing pollutants from a pump system without a discharge elimination system permit. The Clean Water Act prohibits the "addition of any pollutant... from any point source" without a specific permit. The water district defended its action by claiming that it was not actually adding pollutants to the water, but merely transporting polluted water from one body of water to another, less polluted, body.

The district court ruled against the water district and found that it had violated the CWA by using the pump. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on this point, "conclud[ing] that the release of water caused by the... pump station's operation constitutes an addition of pollutants from a point source."

Question

Does pumping water into a water conservation area - where the water being pumped contains a pollutant but the pumping station itself adds no pollutants to the water - violate the Clean Water Act's prohibition of adding pollutants from a point source?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for South Florida Water Management District, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court sent the case back to the district court to consider whether the water conservation area and the canal used to transport the water are distinct. If the district court decides the two are not distinct, then the water district will not need a permit under the Clean Water Act. The Court rejected the water district's argument that the act covers a point source only when pollutants originate from that source, not when pollutants originating elsewhere pass through the point source. A point source need only convey the pollutant to navigable waters. The Court was unanimous in sending the case back to district court. Justice Antonin Scalia dissented from part of the Court's reasoning.

Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conserv. v. EPA

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:49 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-658

Petitioner

Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 461 (2004)

Granted

Monday, February 24, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 2004

Advocates

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Respondent)

Jonathan S. Franklin (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Under the Clean Air Act, state agencies must determine the best way to prevent air pollution in areas that have met national clean air standards. In part, they must require that polluting companies use the "best available control technology" to limit pollution whenever they construct new facilities. In 1998, Teck Cominco Alaska, a mining company, requested a permit to build an additional generator at one of its mines. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) issued the permit, which called for Cominco to use "Low NOx" technology on all its generators, not just the new one. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, stepped in, arguing that a better technology was available. ADEC appealed the EPA's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the EPA did not have the right to interfere with the state agency's decision. The Ninth Circuit sided with the EPA.

Question

Under the Clean Air Act, does the Environmental Protection Agency have the authority to overrule a state agency's decision that a company is using the "best available controlling technology" to prevent pollution?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for EPA, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Clean Air

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the Clean Air Act authorized the EPA to bar the construction of the polluting facility in Alaska. Though Alaska determined the facility's use of "Low NOx" met the act's requirement that facilities use "best available control technology," the EPA was reasonable to reject this claim. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered a dissent joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia and Chief Justice William Rehnquist.

Borden Ranch v. United States Army Corps of Engineers

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1243

Petitioner

Borden Ranch

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States Army Corps of Engineers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 99 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, December 10, 2002

Decided

Monday, December 16, 2002

Advocates

Timothy S. Bishop (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Jeffrey P. Minear (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, Angelo Tsakopoulos purchased the Borden Ranch, an 8348-acre ranch in California. Tsakopoulos planned to subdivide the land into parcels for cultivation as vineyards and orchards. Because a dense layer of material prevented water from reaching the depths necessary to cultivate vineyards or orchards, Tsakopoulos intended to "deep rip" the soil. Deep ripping has a dramatic effect on the character of a wetland area. The Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency informed Tsakopoulos that he was not to deep rip protected waters without a permit. Ultimately, the District Court found that Tsakopoulos had violated the Clean Water Act multiple times and imposed a substantial fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part.

Question

Does deep plowing ranchland to plant deep-rooted crops constitute the "addition" of a "pollutant" from a "point source" so as to fall within the regulation of the Clean Water Act? Is deep plowing ranchland which is farmable in its natural state to plant deep-rooted crops statutorily exempt from regulation under the Act's exemption for any discharge from "normal farming...activities such as plowing?" Does the Act's civil penalty section authorize assessing the maximum daily penalty for each time a plow crosses a seasonal drainage feature, without regard to the number of days when such activity occurred?

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for United States Army Corps of Engineers, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

In a per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed the judgment of the appeals court by an equally divided vote. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Whitman v. American Trucking Associations

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

Environmental Protection Agency

"1200 Pennsylvania Avenue**** N.W." Washington DC 20460

Washington, DC 20460

United States

38° 53' 41.154" N, 77° 1' 43.9968" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1257

Petitioner

Whitman

Respondent

American Trucking Associations

Consolidation

No. 99-1426

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 457 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, November 7, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, February 27, 2001

Advocates

Judith L. French (Columbus, Ohio, argued the case for the respondents)

Edward W. Warren (Argued the cause for the respondents, on behalf of the Respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (on behalf of the Petitioners, on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Section 109(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator to promulgate national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for each air pollutant for which "air quality criteria" have been issued under section 108. In 1997, Carol Browner, the Administrator of the EPA, revised the ozone and particulate matter NAAQS. Afterwards, her revised NAAQS were challenged in court. The District of Columbia Circuit found that section 109(b)(1), which instructs the EPA to set standards, delegated legislative power to the Administrator in contravention of the Federal Constitution because the court found that the EPA had interpreted the statute to provide no "intelligible principle" to guide the agency's exercise of authority. The court remanded the NAAQS to the EPA. The courts also held to its rule that the EPA could not consider implementation costs in setting the NAAQS. Additionally, the court rejected the EPA's position that the implementation provisions for ozone found in Part D, Subpart 2, of Title I of the CAA, were so tied to the existing ozone standard that the EPA lacked the power to revise the standard.

Question

Does section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency? May the Administrator of the EPA consider the costs of implementation in setting national ambient air quality standards under section 109(b)(1)? Does the Court of Appeals have the jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA, with respect to implementing the revised ozone NAAQS?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Whitman, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Clean Air

No, no, and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the CAA properly delegated legislative power to the EPA, but that the EPA could not consider implementation costs in setting primary and secondary NAAQS. Moreover, the Court held that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the EPA's interpretation of Part D of Title I of the CAA related to the implementation of the revised ozone NAAQS; however, the EPA's interpretation of Part D was unreasonable.

Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Engineers

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1178

Petitioner

Solid Waste Agency

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Army Corps of Engineers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 159 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, October 31, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, January 9, 2001

Advocates

Timothy S. Bishop (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) selected an abandoned sand and gravel pit as a solid waste disposal site. Excavation trenches on the site had previously become ponds for migrating birds. Because some trenches would have to be filled in, the SWANCC contacted the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to determine if a landfill permit was required under the Clean Water Act (CWA), which authorizes the Corps to issue permits allowing the discharge of dredged or fill material into "navigable waters." Under the CWA, "navigable waters" are defined as "the waters of the United States" and the Corps regulations define such waters to include intrastate waters, of which damage could affect interstate commerce. Subsequently, the Corps denied the SWANCC a permit. The District Court ruled in SWANCC's favor. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate waters.

Question

May the provisions of the Clean Water Act be extended to intrastate waters? Does Congress have the authority under the Commerce Clause to exercise such power?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Solid Waste Agency, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 33 U.S.C. 1334

No and unanswered. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the provision of the CWA, which requires those discharging fill material into navigable waters to obtain a permit from the Corps, does not extend to isolated, abandoned sand and gravel pits with seasonal ponds, which provide migratory bird habitats. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that "[t]he term 'navigable' has...the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made." In answering the first question no, the Court did not reach the second question. Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent was joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.

Public Lands Council v. Babbitt

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1991

Petitioner

Public Lands Council

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Babbitt

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 728 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, March 1, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2000

Advocates

Timothy S. Bishop (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Taylor Grazing Act grants the Secretary of the Interior authority to divide the public rangelands into grazing districts, to specify the amount of grazing permitted in each district, and to issue grazing leases or permits to "settlers, residents, and other stock owners." When Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt announced new regulations governing the administration of livestock on 170 million acres of public range, the Public Lands Council (Council), a group of nonprofit ranching-related organizations, objected. The Council's members who held grazing permits brought an action against Secretary Babbitt challenging 10 of the new federal grazing regulations issued by the Secretary in 1995. The Council claimed that the Secretary acted beyond his power in regulating the grazing patterns. The District Court found 4 of the 10 regulations unlawful. Reversing in part, the Court of Appeals upheld three previously overturned regulations, which changed the definition of "grazing preference," permitted those who were not "engaged in the livestock business" to qualify for grazing permits; and granted the United States title to all future range improvements.

Question

Do the Secretary of the Interior's amendments governing grazing preferences, permit issuance, and ownership of range improvements to the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 exceed the authority that this statute grants the Secretary and violate the Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Babbitt, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 43 U.S.C. 315

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "[t]he regulatory changes do not exceed the Secretary's Taylor Grazing Act authority." "Congress itself has directed development of land-use plans, and their use in the allocation process in order to preserve, improve and develop the public rangelands," wrote Justice Stephen G. Breyer. "And the secretary [of the Interior] has always had the statutory authority...to reclassify and withdraw range land from grazing use."

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-822

Petitioner

Friends of the Earth

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Laidlaw Environmental Services

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 167 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2000

Advocates

Donald A. Cockrill (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioners)

Bruce J. Terris (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

After Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. bought a wastewater treatment plant, it was granted a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The permit authorized Laidlaw to discharge treated water and limited pollutants. Laidlaw's discharge of mercury into the North Tyger River repeatedly exceeded the limits set by the permit. Ultimately, Friends of the Earth and others (FOE) filed a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Laidlaw, alleging noncompliance with the NPDES permit, seeking injunctive relief and an award of civil penalties. Laidlaw moved for summary judgement on the ground that FOE lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. The District Court denied the motion. Ultimately, the District Court found that Laidlaw violated the mercury discharge limitation. In issuing its judgment, the District Court concluded that a civil penalty of $405,800 would be adequate to forestall future violations, given that Laidlaw would have to reimburse the plaintiffs for a significant amount of legal fees and had itself incurred significant legal expenses. The court declined to order injunctive relief because Laidlaw, after the lawsuit began, had achieved substantial compliance with the terms of its permit. FOE appealed to the amount of the District Court's civil penalty judgment, but did not appeal the denial of declaratory or injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals ordered the case to be dismissed. The appellate court held that the case had become moot once Laidlaw complied with the terms of its permit. The court reasoned that the only remedy currently available to FOE, civil penalties payable to the Government, would not redress any injury FOE had suffered.

Question

Does an environmental group's citizen suit for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act become moot when the defendant, after commencement of the litigation, has come into compliance with its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Friends of the Earth, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a citizen suitor's claim for civil penalties need not be dismissed as moot when the defendant, after commencement of the litigation, has come into compliance with its NPDES permit. "A defendant's voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily does not suffice to moot a case," Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court. "Congress has found that civil penalties in the Clean Water Act cases do more than promote immediate compliance... they also deter future violations," concluded Justice Ginsburg. The Court also ruled that FOE had standing to bring the suit on behalf on its members.

Amoco Production Company v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-830

Petitioner

Amoco Production Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Southern Ute Indian Tribe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 865 (1999)

Argued

Monday, April 19, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 7, 1999

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the United States)

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Thomas H. Shipps (Argued the cause for the Souther Ute Indian Tribe)

Thomas J. Davidson (Argued the cause for the amici States)

Facts of the Case

Land patents issued pursuant to the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 (the Acts) reserve all rights to the coal contained in the subject properties to the United States. The Southern Ute Indian Tribe has equitable title to coal within its reservation lands. These lands contain large quantities of coalbed methane gas (CBM gas), now considered a valuable energy source, within the coal formations. In 1981, the Department of the Interior issued an opinion that concluded that the reservation of coal under the Acts did not encompass CBM gas. Energy companies then entered into leases with landowners holding title under the Acts to produce CBM gas. The Tribe field suit against the Amoco Production Company and others, royalty owners and producers under the oil and gas leases covering that land, and various federal entities, seeking a declaration stating CBM gas to be coal reserved by the Acts and therefore belonging to the Tribe. The District Court disagreed and concluded that the plain meaning of the term "coal" was limited to the solid rock substance and did not include the CBM gas. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Acts' use of the term "coal" was ambiguous, and ambiguities in land grants must be resolved in favor of the sovereign. Therefore, the Acts' reservation of coal included the CBM gas.

Question

Does the reservation of coal under the land patents issued pursuant to the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 include the coal-bed methane gas found within the coal formation?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Amoco Production Company, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 30 U.S.C. 81

No. In a 7-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that, "[t]he term 'coal' as used in the 1909 and 1910 Acts does not encompass CBM gas;" therefore, CBM gas is not included in the reserved coal rights. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "[t]he common understanding of coal in 1909 and 1910 would not have encompassed CBM gas, both because it is a gas rather than a solid mineral and because it was understood as a distinct substance that escaped from coal as the coal was mined, rather than as part of the coal itself." Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed the view that Congress, at the time the Acts were passed, would have assumed that the coal owner had dominion over and responsibility for the CBM gas. Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the case.

United States v. Bestfoods

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-454

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bestfoods

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 51 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, March 24, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Lois J. Schiffer (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kenneth S. Geller (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The site of a chemical manufacturing plant was polluted over many years. During much of the time, the companies running the plant were wholly owned subsidiaries of, first, CPC International Inc. (CPC), and later Aerojet- General Corp (Aerojet). By 1981, the federal Environmental Protection Agency had undertaken to have the site cleaned up. To recover some of the money spent, the U.S. filed an action under Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. Section 9607(a)(2). Section 107 allows the U.S. to seek reimbursement for cleanup costs from, among others, "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility." The first phase of the trial concerned only liability, and focused on whether CPC and Aerojet had "owned or operated" the facility.

Question

May a parent corporation that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of a subsidiary, without more, be held liable under CERCLA Section 107(a)(2) as an operator of a polluting facility owned or operated by the subsidiary?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 9607

No, unless the corporate veil may be pierced. But a corporate parent that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of the facility itself may be held directly liable in its own right as an operator of the facility.

Babbitt, Secretary Of Interior v. Sweet Home Chapter Of Communities For A Great Oregon

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-859

Petitioner

Babbitt, Secretary Of Interior, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sweet Home Chapter Of Communities For A Great Oregon et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 687 (1995)

Argued

Monday, April 17, 1995

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 1995

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Petitioners)

John A. Macleod (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Endangered Species Act requires that no person "take" an endangered or threatened species. The Act defines take as "harass, harm, pursue," "wound," or "kill." The Secretary of the Interior further characterizes "harm" as including "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife." Several persons within forestry industries sued the Secretary, asserting that Congress did not intend for the regulation to include changes in habitat. The District Court found for the Secretary of the Interior.

The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of noscitur a sociis, which means that the meaning of words is determined by the words around it. Thus, "harm" could only include actions applying direct force to the animal.

Question

Does the definition of "harm" as an expansion of the word "take" in the Endangered Species Act include habitat modification that kills or injures wildlife?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Babbitt, Secretary Of Interior, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 16 U.S.C. 1531

Yes. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court held that habitat modification is a legitimate application of the word "harm." First, the Court found that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in assuming that the words in the definition of "take" only apply to actions involving direct contact with endangered animals. Then, based on the Act itself, the Court determined that the ordinary meaning of harm would in fact include changes in habitat that hurt the endangered animals. Also, the Court held that the intent of the Act to give broad protection to endangered species must include even actions that may have minimal or unforeseeable effects.

Key Tronic Corp. v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-376

Petitioner

Key Tronic Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 809 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 6, 1994

Advocates

Mark David Schneider (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 9601

None

PUD No. 1 Of Jefferson County v. Washington Department Of Ecology

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1911

Petitioner

PUD No. 1 Of Jefferson County et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Washington Department Of Ecology et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 700 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 1994

Advocates

Howard E. Shapiro (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Christine O. Gregoire (on behalf of the Respondents)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Washington Department Of Ecology, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

None

City Of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1639

Petitioner

City Of Chicago et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Environmental Defense Fund et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 328 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 1994

Decided

Monday, May 2, 1994

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Lawrence Rosenthal (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Richard J. Lazarus (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Environmental Defense Fund, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 6921

None

Gade, Director, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency v. National Solid Wastes Management Association

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1676

Petitioner

Gade, Director, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Solid Wastes Management Association

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

505 U.S. 88 (1992)

Argued

Monday, March 23, 1992

Decided

Thursday, June 18, 1992

Advocates

Donald T. Bliss (on behalf of the Respondent)

William K. Kelley (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

John W. Simon (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for National Solid Wastes Management Association, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Occupational Safety and Health

None

Arkansas v. Oklahoma

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1262

Petitioner

Arkansas et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oklahoma et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 90-1266

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

503 U.S. 91 (1992)

Argued

Wednesday, December 11, 1991

Decided

Wednesday, February 26, 1992

Advocates

Robert A. Butkin (on behalf of the Respondent)

Edward W. Warren (on behalf of the Petitioners Arkansas, et al)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the Petitioner EPA)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Arkansas, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

None

Robertson, Chief, United States Forest Service v. Seattle Audubon Society

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1596

Petitioner

Robertson, Chief, United States Forest Service, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Seattle Audubon Society et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

503 U.S. 429 (1992)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 1991

Decided

Wednesday, March 25, 1992

Advocates

Todd D. True (on behalf of the Respondents)

Kenneth W. Starr (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Robertson, Chief, United States Forest Service, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 1, Paragraph 1: Judicial Power

None

General Motors Corp. v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-369

Petitioner

General Motors Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

496 U.S. 530 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, March 21, 1990

Decided

Thursday, June 14, 1990

Advocates

Theodore L. Garrett (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Clean Air

None

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:13 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-42

Petitioner

Hallstrom

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tillamook County

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

493 U.S. 20 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, October 4, 1989

Decided

Tuesday, November 7, 1989

Advocates

Kim T. Buckley (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Brian J. Martin (as amicus curiae supporting the Respondent)

I. Franklin Hunsaker (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Tillamook County, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 6972

None

Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1704

Petitioner

Marsh

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oregon Natural Resources Council

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

490 U.S. 360 (1989)

Argued

Monday, January 9, 1989

Decided

Monday, May 1, 1989

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Marsh, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Environmental Policy

None

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1703

Petitioner

Robertson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Methow Valley Citizens Council

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

490 U.S. 332 (1989)

Argued

Monday, January 9, 1989

Decided

Monday, May 1, 1989

Advocates

David A. Bricklin (on behalf of the Respondents)

Charles Fried (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Robertson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Environmental Policy

None

Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-473

Petitioner

Gwaltney

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chesapeake Bay Foundation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Opinion

484 U.S. 49 (1987)

Argued

Monday, October 5, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, December 1, 1987

Advocates

Louis F. Claiborne (on behalf of the Respondent)

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Gwaltney, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

None

Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1239

Petitioner

Amoco Production Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gambell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 85-1406

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

480 U.S. 531 (1987)

Argued

Monday, January 12, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, March 24, 1987

Advocates

Donald S. Cooper (on behalf of the respondents)

E. Edward Bruce (on behalf of the petitioners in No. 85-1239)

F. Henry Habicht, II (on behalf of the petitioners in No. 85-1406)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Amoco Production Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 16 U.S.C. 3120

None

California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:43 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1200

Appellee

Granite Rock Co.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

California Coastal Comm'n

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

480 U.S. 572 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, December 2, 1986

Decided

Tuesday, March 24, 1987

Advocates

Barbara R. Banke (on behalf of Appellee)

Jeffrey P. Minear (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, supporting Appellee)

Linus Masouredis (on behalf of Appellants)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for California Coastal Comm'n, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1254

None

Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-954

Petitioner

Japan Whaling Assn.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Cetacean Soc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 85-955

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

478 U.S. 221 (1986)

Argued

Wednesday, April 30, 1986

Decided

Monday, June 30, 1986

Advocates

Arnold I. Burns (on behalf of Petitioners in No. 85-955)

William P. Rogers (on behalf of Respondents)

Scott C. Whitney (on behalf of Petitioners in No. 85-954)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Japan Whaling Assn., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 16 U.S.C. 1821

None

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-701

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

474 U.S. 121 (1985)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 1985

Decided

Wednesday, December 4, 1985

Advocates

Kathryn A. Oberly (on behalf of the petitioner)

Edgar B. Washburn (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

None

Midlantic Nat. Bank v. N. J. Dept. Of E. P.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-801

Petitioner

Midlantic Nat. Bank

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

N. J. Dept. Of E. P.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 84-805

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

474 U.S. 494 (1986)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 1985

Decided

Monday, January 27, 1986

Advocates

William F. Mc Enroe (on behalf of the petitioner in No. 84-805)

A. Dennis Terrell (on behalf of the petitioner in No. 84-801)

Robert Hermann (on behalf of the respondents in No. 84-805)

Mary Carol Jacobson (on behalf of the respondent in No. 84-801)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for N. J. Dept. Of E. P., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Act or Rules, or Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

None

Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-679

Petitioner

Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Berner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

472 U.S. 299 (1985)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 1985

Decided

Tuesday, June 11, 1985

Advocates

Bruce M. Kuhlik (on behalf of Securities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae in support of Respondents)

Geoffrey P. Knudsen (on behalf of Respondents)

Robert S. Warren (on behalf of Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Berner, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

None

Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-2129

Petitioner

Schreiber

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Burlington Northern, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

472 U.S. 1 (1985)

Argued

Wednesday, January 9, 1985

Decided

Tuesday, June 4, 1985

Advocates

Marc P. Cherno (on behalf of the respondent)

Irving Bizar (on behalf of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Burlington Northern, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

None

Lowe v. SEC

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:07 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1911

Petitioner

Lowe

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Securities and Exchange Commission

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

472 U.S. 181 (1985)

Argued

Monday, January 7, 1985

Decided

Monday, June 10, 1985

Advocates

Michael E. Schoeman (on behalf of Petitioners)

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Lowe, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 80

None

Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. NRDC

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:06 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1013

Petitioner

Chemical Manufacturers Assn.

Respondent

NRDC

Consolidation

No. 83-1373

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

470 U.S. 116 (1985)

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 1984

Decided

Wednesday, February 27, 1985

Advocates

Samuel A. Alito, Jr. (on behalf of Petitioner)

Frances Dubrowski (on behalf of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Chemical Manufacturers Assn., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

None

Chevron U.S. A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-1005

Petitioner

Chevron U.S. A.

Respondent

Natural Res. Def. Council

Consolidation

No. 82-1247

No. 82-1591

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

467 U.S. 837 (1984)

Argued

Wednesday, February 29, 1984

Decided

Monday, June 25, 1984

Advocates

Paul M. Bator (on behalf of petitioner)

David D. Doniger (on behalf of respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Chevron U.S. A., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Clean Air

None

Secretary Of Interior v. California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-1326

Petitioner

Secretary Of Interior

Respondent

California

Consolidation

No. 82-1327

No. 82-1511

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

464 U.S. 312 (1984)

Argued

Tuesday, November 1, 1983

Decided

Wednesday, January 11, 1984

Advocates

E. Edward Bruce (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Theodora Berger (on behalf of the Respondents)

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Secretary Of Interior, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 16 U.S.C. 307

None

Nevada v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-2245

Petitioner

Nevada

Respondent

United States

Consolidation

No. 81-2276

No. 82-38

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

463 U.S. 110 (1983)

Argued

Wednesday, April 27, 1983

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1983

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the United States)

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr (on behalf of Nevada)

Robert S. Pelcyger (on behalf of Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians)

Frederick G. Girard (on behalf of Truckee-Carson Irrigation District)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Nevada, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: res judicata

None

Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Nrdc

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-524

Petitioner

Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.

Respondent

Nrdc

Consolidation

No. 82-545

No. 82-551

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

462 U.S. 87 (1983)

Argued

Tuesday, April 19, 1983

Decided

Monday, June 6, 1983

Advocates

David A. Strauss (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Timothy B. Atkeson (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Environmental Policy

None

Metropolitan Edison v. People Vs. Nuclear Energy

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-2399

Petitioner

Metropolitan Edison

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

People Vs. Nuclear Energy

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 82-358

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

460 U.S. 766 (1983)

Argued

Tuesday, March 1, 1983

Decided

Tuesday, April 19, 1983

Advocates

Paul M. Bator (on behalf of the Petitioners)

William S. Jordan, III (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Metropolitan Edison, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Environmental Policy

None

Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-1686

Petitioner

Watt

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Western Nuclear, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

462 U.S. 36 (1983)

Argued

Monday, January 17, 1983

Decided

Monday, June 6, 1983

Advocates

Harley W. Shaver, III (on behalf of the Respondents)

John H. Garvey (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Watt, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 43 U.S.C. 299

None

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-1990

Petitioner

Weinberger

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Romero-Barcelo

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

456 U.S. 305 (1982)

Argued

Tuesday, February 23, 1982

Decided

Tuesday, April 27, 1982

Advocates

Elinor Hadley Stillman (on behalf of Petitioners)

John A. Hodges (on behalf of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Weinberger, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

None

Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-1711

Petitioner

Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth.

Respondent

Sea Clammers

Consolidation

No. 79-1754

No. 79-1760

No. 80-12

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

453 U.S. 1 (1981)

Argued

Tuesday, February 24, 1981

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 1981

Advocates

Milton B. Conford (on behalf of the non-federal Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754 & 79-1760)

Robert P. Corbin (on behalf of the Respondents other than federal)

Alan I. Horowitz (on behalf of the federal parties as Petitioners in No. 80-12 and as Respondents in Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754 & 79-1760)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

None

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-1538

Appellee

Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Hodel

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 79-1596

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

452 U.S. 264 (1981)

Argued

Monday, February 23, 1981

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1981

Advocates

J. Marshall Coleman (on behalf of Appellees (No. 79-1538) and of Appellants (No. 79-1596))

Peter Buscemi (on behalf of Appellant (No. 79-1538) and of Appellees (No. 79-1596))

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hodel, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 30 U.S.C. 1201

None

Hodel v. Indiana

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-231

Appellee

Indiana

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Hodel

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

452 U.S. 314 (1981)

Argued

Monday, February 23, 1981

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1981

Advocates

Peter Buscemi (on behalf of the Appellants)

G. Daniel Kelly, Jr. (on behalf of the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hodel, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 30 U.S.C. 1201

None

Milwaukee v. Illinois

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-408

Petitioner

Milwaukee

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

451 U.S. 304 (1981)

Argued

Tuesday, December 2, 1980

Decided

Tuesday, April 28, 1981

Advocates

Elwin J. Zarwell (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Joseph V. Karaganis (on behalf of the Respondents)

Andrew J. Levander (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Milwaukee, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Epa v. National Crushed Stone Assn.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-770

Petitioner

Epa

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Crushed Stone Assn.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

449 U.S. 64 (1980)

Argued

Tuesday, October 7, 1980

Decided

Tuesday, December 2, 1980

Advocates

George C. Freeman, Jr. (on behalf of Consolidation Coal Company et al., Respondents)

Theodore L. Garrett (on behalf of National Crushed Stone Association et al., Respondents)

Andrew J. Levander (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Epa, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

None

Bryant v. Yellen

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-421

Petitioner

Bryant

Respondent

Yellen

Consolidation

No. 79-425

No. 79-435

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

447 U.S. 352 (1980)

Argued

Tuesday, March 25, 1980

Decided

Monday, June 16, 1980

Advocates

Northcutt Ely (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Charles W. Bender (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Arthur Brunwasser (on behalf of the Respondents)

Wade H. McCree (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bryant, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 43 U.S.C. 617

None