Cases by Issue - Abortion

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1144

Petitioner

Kelly A. Ayotte, Attorney General of New Hampshire

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, May 23, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, November 30, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 2006

Advocates

Jennifer E. Dalven (argued the cause for Respondents)

Kelly A. Ayotte (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After New Hampshire's state legislature approved the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act but before the act went into effect, Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenged the law in federal district court. They claimed that the law, which requires that parents be notified before their minor daughter has an abortion, violated the "undue burden" test laid out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a 1992 Supreme Court decision that reformulated the constitutional protections given to abortion in Roe v. Wade. Specifically, they argued that an exemption in the law for abortions necessary to prevent the death of the mother, but not for those abortions necessary to protect merely her health, was unconstitutionally narrow.

The federal district court agreed, rejecting the argument of New Hampshire's Attorney General that the judicial bypass procedure included in the law, in which a judge could approve an abortion without parental notification for a minor who showed she was mature enough to make the decision on her own, could be used to permit abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother. The judge also rejected New Hampshire's argument that the law could not be challenged until it had actually been implemented. A First Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously affirmed the decision.

Question

May Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenge the constitutionality of the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act in federal court before it is put into effect? Does the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act, through the judicial bypass procedure or other safeguards, adequately protect the health of minors seeking abortions?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ayotte, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a rare unanimous decision regarding abortion, the Supreme Court sidestepped the most contentious questions of the case and focused instead on the proper remedy when a portion of a statute is found unconstitutional. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that the statute would be unconstitutional when applied to the very small percentage of minors for whom an emergency abortion would be necessary to avert serious damage to their health. The lower court's decision to invalidate the entire statute based on its unconstitutional results in this small percentage of cases, however, was unnecessary. Instead, O'Connor wrote, "in this case the lower courts can issue a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting [only] the statute's unconstitutional application."

O'Connor warned, however, that a court should be wary of upholding an act while strike down some of its applications when it was obvious that a legislature would prefer the entire act be declared unconstitutional. Because of some disagreement about which course the legislature would have preferred - wholesale nullification or narrower individual rulings - the Court remanded the case to lower court to determine legislative intent.

Scheidler v. National Organization for Women (NOW)

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1244

Petitioner

Joseph Scheidler, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Organization for Women, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women, Inc., et al., No. 04-1352

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, June 28, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, November 30, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, February 28, 2006

Advocates

Erwin Chemerinsky (argued the cause for Respondents)

Lisa S. Blatt (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Alan Edward Untereiner (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that abortion protesters do not commit extortion in violation the Hobbs Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when they blockade abortion clinics, because they do not "obtain" property, as required by the Act. The Court concluded that "Without an underlying RICO violation, the injunction [on the protesters] issued by the District Court must necessarily be vacated." The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to vacate the injunction, however, finding that the Court had only ruled on the 117 counts of extortion, and not on four additional counts of violence unrelated to extortion. The National Organization for Women (NOW) argued that acts of physical violence are sufficient to establish a violation of the Hobbs Act. Scheidler countered that the four counts of "violence-only" were irrelevant to the Hobbs Act, which he said requires that violence be used for robbery or extortion. Scheidler petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the Circuit Court had acted properly, and the Court granted certiorari. (Consolidated with No. 04-1352, Operation Rescue v. NOW.)

Question

Does the Hobbs Act prohibit violence unrelated to extortion or robbery?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Scheidler, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1951

No. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court ruled that "physical violence unrelated to robbery or extortion falls outside the scope of the Hobbs Act." Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Stephen Breyer cited statutory language, legislative history, and case law in support of the decision. He wrote, "The language of the statute makes the more restrictive reading the more natural one." Although Congress had revised the Act in 1948, making it less clear, the Court ruled that Congress did not intend for the revisions to "create a freestanding physical violence offense in the Hobbs Act."

Scheidler v. National Organization for Women (NOW)

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:54:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1118

Petitioner

Scheidler

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Organization for Women (NOW)

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women (NOW), No. 01-1119

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 393 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, December 4, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, February 26, 2003

Advocates

Roy T. Englert, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Fay Clayton (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

The National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW) filed a class action alleging that certain individuals and organizations that oppose legal abortion violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through "a pattern of racketeering activity" that included acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent nationwide injunction against the abortion opponents. Upholding the injunction, the Court of Appeals held, in part, that the things abortion supporters claimed were extorted from them, such as women's right to seek medical services from the clinics and the clinic doctors' rights to perform their jobs, constituted "property" that was "obtained" for purposes of the Hobbs Act. (Together with No. 01-1119, Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women.)

Question

Do abortion opponents, who protest at abortion clinics, commit extortion within the meaning of the Hobbs Act? May abortion supporters obtain injunctive relief in a civil action pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Scheidler, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1951

In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that abortion opponents did not commit extortion because they did not "obtain" property from the abortion supporters as required by the Hobbs Act. The Court further held that is first holding renders insufficient the other bases or predicate acts of racketeering supporting the jury's conclusion that the abortion opponents violated RICO. While the opponents' conduct constituted the separate offense of coercion, reasoned Chief Justice Rehnquist, the opponents neither pursued nor received something of value from the supporters that the opponents could exercise, transfer, or sell, and thus did not commit extortion. Without an underlying RICO violation, the Court vacated the District Court's injunction and did not reach the second question. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Stenberg v. Carhart

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:31 +0000

Location

Nebraska General Assembly

2115 State Capitol Lincoln NE 68509

Lincoln, NE 68509

United States

40° 48' 32.5872" N, 96° 41' 21.0012" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-830

Petitioner

Stenberg

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Carhart

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 914 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, April 25, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2000

Advocates

Donald B. Stenberg (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Simon Heller (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Nebraska law prohibited any "partial birth abortion" unless that procedure was necessary to save the mother's life. It defined "partial birth abortion" as a procedure in which the doctor "partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the... child," and defined the latter phrase to mean "intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the [abortionist] knows will kill the... child and does kill the... child." Violation of the law is a felony, and it provides for the automatic revocation of a convicted doctor's state license to practice medicine. Leroy Carhart, a Nebraska physician who performs abortions in a clinical setting, brought suit seeking a declaration that the statute violates the U.S. Constitution, claiming the law was unconstitutionally vague and placed an undue burden on himself and female patients seeking abortions. The District Court held the statute unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Nebraska statute, which makes the performance of a "partial birth abortions" a crime, violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Carhart, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a complicated 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "Nebraska's statute criminalizing the performance of "partial birth abortion[s]" violates the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted in Casey and Roe." The sharply divided Court struck down the statute because it placed an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion and did not allow for exception in cases of threatened health. "All those who perform abortion procedures using that method must fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment," that results in "an undue burden upon a woman's right to make an abortion decision," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent concluded that "[t]he notion that the Constitution of the United States... prohibits the States from simply banning this visibly brutal means of eliminating our half-born posterity is quite simply absurd."

Hill v. Colorado

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:30 +0000

Location

Colorado State Legislature

200 E Colfax Ave Denver CO 80203

Denver, CO 80203

United States

39° 44' 24.1332" N, 104° 59' 3.9048" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1856

Petitioner

Hill

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Colorado

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 703 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2000

Advocates

Michael E. McLachlan (Denver, Colorado, argued the cause for the respondents)

Barbara D. Underwood (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondents)

Jay A. Sekulow (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

A Colorado statute makes it unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance to "knowingly approach" within 8 feet of another person, without that person's consent, in order to pass "a leaflet or handbill to, display a sign to, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person...." Leila Hill and others, sidewalk counselors who offer abortion alternatives to women entering abortion clinics, sought to enjoin the statute's enforcement in state court, claiming violations of their First Amendment free speech rights and right to a free press. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the statute imposed content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative channels of communication. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment after holding that a provision creating a speech-free floating buffer zone with a 15-foot radius violated the First Amendment. On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment. In affirming, the Colorado Supreme Court reiterated the lower court's conclusions. The court concluded that the statute struck a proper balance between a person's right to protest and a person's right to medical treatment.

Question

Does Colorado's statutory requirement that speakers obtain consent from people within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance before speaking, displaying signs, or distributing leaflets to such people violate the First Amendment rights of the speaker?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Colorado, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Colorado statute's restrictions on speech-related conduct are constitutional. The Court concluded that the statute "is not a regulation of speech. Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur." "Although the statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from anyone passing by. Nor does it place any restriction on the content of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone else, either inside or outside the regulated areas. It does, however, make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical facilities," Justice Stevens wrote for the Court. "The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases." Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony M. Kennedy dissented.

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:28 +0000

Location

Western District Court of New York

68 Court Street Buffalo NY 14202

Buffalo, NY 14202

United States

42° 53' 8.8476" N, 78° 52' 37.5312" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1065

Petitioner

Schenck

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pro-Choice Network of Western New York

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 357 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, February 19, 1997

Advocates

Jay A. Sekulow (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Lucinda M. Finley (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

This action was filed by the Pro-Choice Network of Western New York (PCN), on behalf of health care providers, to enjoin Schenck and others from continuously staging blockades and other disruptive illegal activities in front of abortion clinics. After its restraining order proved ineffective, a District Court issued a preliminary injunction creating "fixed buffer zones" which prohibited demonstrations within fifteen feet of entrances to abortion clinics, parking lots, or driveways. The court also created "floating buffer zones" prohibiting demonstrators from coming within fifteen feet of people or vehicles seeking access to the clinics. Following the Appellate Court's decision to uphold the District Court's ruling that the "buffer zones" were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted Schenck certiorari.

Question

Did either or both types of "buffer zones" violate Schenck's First Amendment right to freedom of speech.

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Split Vote

The Court held that while the "fixed buffer zones" were constitutional, the "floating buffer zones" were not. It distinguished between the two types of "buffer zones." The Court supported the "fixed buffer zones" because they protected the government's interest in public safety, by preventing protesters from engaging in unlawful conduct (i.e. spitting on and shouting in clinic users' faces, blocking doorways), while still allowing them to be heard from a short distance. "Floating buffer zones," by contrast, were struck down by the Court since they imposed a greater burden on free speech than was required to protect the government's interest in public safety and free traffic flow. The Court found that forcing demonstrators to remain at least 15 feet away from the people they wished to communicate with would create an inordinate amount of dangerous confusion and congestion.

Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:27 +0000

Location

Aware Woman Center for Choice

1564 Dixie Way Melbourne FL 32935

Melbourne, FL 32935

United States

28° 10' 9.57" N, 80° 38' 47.0904" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-880

Petitioner

Madsen et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Women's Health Center, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 753 (1994)

Argued

Thursday, April 28, 1994

Decided

Thursday, June 30, 1994

Advocates

Mathew D. Staver (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Talbot D'Alemberte (on behalf of the Respondents)

Drew S. Days, III (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Women's Health Center Inc. operated several abortion clinics throughout central Florida, including the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida. In 1992, in response to anti-abortion protesters, a state court prohibited the protesters from physically abusing those entering or exiting the clinic, or otherwise interfering with access to the clinic. About 6 months later, Women's Health Center Inc. expressed a need to broaden the court order. The state court agreed, banning demonstrators from entering a 36-foot buffer- zone around the clinic, making excessive noise, using images visible to patients, approaching patients within a 300-foot radius of the clinic, and protesting within a 300-foot radius of staff residences. Petitioner Judy Madsen and her fellow protesters claimed that these restrictions violated their First Amendment right to free speech, but the Florida Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the court order.

Question

1) Is the prohibition of all protesting within the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic an infringement of the First Amendment right to free speech? 2) Is the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the clinic a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech? 3) Do the limitations imposed on noise-making constitute a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech? 4) Do the restrictions placed on the use of images violate the First Amendment right to free speech? 5) Is it a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech to bar protesters from approaching potential patients when they are within a 300-foot radius of the clinic? 6) Is it a violation of the First Amendment right to free speech to prohibit all protesting in a 300-foot radius of clinic staff residences?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Women's Health Center, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No, Yes, No, Yes, Yes, and Yes. In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the state of Florida could only restrict protesters to the extent necessary to allow the clinic to run and the staff to live in their homes without interference. Thus, the majority approved of the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic because it was essential to allow patients and staff to enter and leave the building freely, but disapproved of the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the building because it found no indication that protesting in these areas interfered with the function of the clinic. The Court also determined that the limitations placed on noise-making were necessary to insure the well-being of the patients, whereas those placed on images were not because they were easier to ignore. Finally, the Court concluded that both 300-foot radius rules were too broad, thus restricting the protestors more than was necessary. Therefore, the decision of the Florida Supreme Court was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

National Organization for Women (NOW) v. Scheidler

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-780

Petitioner

National Organization for Women (NOW)

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scheidler

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 249 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, December 8, 1993

Decided

Monday, January 24, 1994

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Fay Clayton (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

G. Robert Blakey (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The National Organization for Women (NOW) sued a coalition of anti-abortion groups called the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. N.O.W. alleged that Scheidler and other anti-abortion protesters were members in a nationwide conspiracy to obstruct women's access to abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity including the actual or implied threat of violence. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the voluntary contributions are not proceeds of racketeering and that a "racketeering enterprise" must have an economic motive, a fact that NOW could not demonstrate. The Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Does RICO require that an organization, to be defined as a racketeering enterprise, must be acting in pursuit of an economic motive?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for National Organization for Women (NOW), 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

The unanimous Court held that organizations without an economic motive can detrimentally "affect interstate or foreign commerce," satisfying the RICO definition of a racketeering enterprise. An "enterprise" does not have to be an economic organization or a principally criminal organization to trigger the RICO act. Consequently, the Court reversed the appeals court decision which allowed the original case to proceed.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:25 +0000

Location

Pennsylvania State Capitol

North 3rd and State Streets Harrisburg PA 17101

Harrisburg, PA 17101

United States

40° 15' 50.4216" N, 76° 53' 5.8128" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-744

Petitioner

Planned Parenthood

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Casey

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania, et al. v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania et al., No. 91-902

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

505 U.S. 833 (1992)

Argued

Wednesday, April 22, 1992

Decided

Monday, June 29, 1992

Advocates

Kathryn Kolbert (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Ernest D. Preate, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Kenneth W. Starr (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement.

Question

Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours, and, if minors, obtain parental consent, without violating their right to abortions as guaranteed by Roe v. Wade?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Planned Parenthood, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

In a bitter, 5-to-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. The opinion for the Court was unique: It was crafted and authored by three justices.

Bray v. Alexandria Clinic

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-985

Petitioner

Bray

Respondent

Alexandria Clinic

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

506 U.S. 263 (1993)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 1991

Reargued:

Tuesday, October 6, 1992

Decided

Wednesday, January 13, 1993

Advocates

Jay A. Sekulow (Argued and reargued the case for the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued and reargued the case for the United States supporting the petitioners)

John H. Schafer (Argued the case for the respondents)

Deborah Ellis (Reargued the case for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Several abortion clinics sued to prevent Jayne Bray and other anti-abortion protesters from conducting demonstrations at clinics in Washington, D.C. The clinics claimed that the protesters had violated 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies to deprive "any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." The protesters had sought to deny women their "right to abortion" and their right to interstate travel, the clinics argued. The District Court agreed, holding that Bray and others, by blocking access to the clinics, had conspired to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. The District Court also ruled for the clinics on state law trespassing and public nuisance claims, ordering the protesters to stop trespassing on or obstructing access to clinics. Finally, the District Court ordered the protesters to pay the clinics' attorney's fees and costs on the 1985(3) claim.

Question

Did anti-abortion protesters who obstructed access to Washington, D.C. abortion clinics violate 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) by conspiring to deny women their "right to abortion" or right to interstate travel?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Bray, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1985)

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the protesters had not violated section 1985(3) by obstructing access to the abortion clinics. Justice Antonin Scalia, in the majority opinion, wrote that under the Court's decision in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, there must be a "class- based, invidiously discriminatory animus [underlying] the conspirators' action" for it to violate 1985(3). The clinics' claim that the protesters had demonstrated "animus" toward women as a class was unfounded because the demonstrations were not directed at women but rather were intended to protect the victims of abortion, stop its practice, and reverse its legalization. Opposition to abortion cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect gender-based intent, Justice Scalia wrote, because there are common and respectable reasons for opposing abortion other than a derogatory view of women.

In addition to holding that the protesters did not exercise discriminatory animus, Scalia also addressed the specific rights on which the clinics based their arguments. The right to interstate travel, Scalia pointed out, was not affected here because the protests were carried out entirely within the District of Columbia and were not aimed specifically at interstate travelers. Nor was the "right to abortion" implicated, he wrote, because that right was merely one to be free of governmental interference in the decision. The protesters, acting as private individuals, could not possibly violate that right.

Rust v. Sullivan

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:23 +0000

Location

The Department of Health and Human Services

200 Independence Avenue S.W. Washington DC 20201

Washington, DC 20201

United States

38° 53' 15.1764" N, 77° 0' 51.9012" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1391

Petitioner

Rust

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sullivan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 89-1392

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 173 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 1990

Decided

Thursday, May 23, 1991

Advocates

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Kenneth W. Starr (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The national government provides funds for family planning services (Title X). The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations limiting the ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities. Title X funds were to be used only to support preventive family planning services.

Question

Do the regulations violate the First and Fifth Amendment rights of clients and health providers?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Sullivan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1008

No. The intent of Congress in the enactment of Title X is ambiguous with regard to abortion counseling. Consequently, the Court will defer to the expertise of the administrative agency. The Court held that the "regulations promulgated by the Secretary [of HHS] do not raise the sort of 'grave and doubtful constitutional questions' that would lead us to assume Congress did not intend to authorize their issuance." Should government subsidize one protected right (family planning), as it does in this case, it does not follow that government must subsidize analogous counterpart rights (abortion services).

Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-805

Appellee

Akron Center for Reproductive Health

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Ohio

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

497 U.S. 502 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, November 29, 1989

Decided

Monday, June 25, 1990

Advocates

Rita S. Eppler (on behalf of the Appellant)

Linda R. Sogg (on behalf of the Appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Ohio, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Hodgson v. Minnesota

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:07 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1125

Petitioner

Hodgson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Minnesota

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Minnesota et al. v. Hodgson et al., No. 88-1309

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

497 U.S. 417 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, November 29, 1989

Decided

Monday, June 25, 1990

Advocates

Janet Benshoof (Argued the cause for Hodgson)

John R. Tunheim (Chief Deputy Attorney General of Minnesota argued the cause for Minnesota)

Facts of the Case

Under Section 2 of a Minnesota statute regulating a minor's access to abortion, women under 18 were denied access to the procedure until 48 hours after both their parents had been notified. Exceptions were made in the cases of medical emergencies and women who were victims of parental abuse. Section 6 of the law allowed the courts to judicially bypass Section 2 if the young woman could maturely demonstrate that notification would be unwise.

Question

Did the Minnesota abortion notification statute unconstitutionally restrict a minor's access to having an abortion?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Minnesota, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

The Court found Section 2 of the statute unconstitutional because requiring notification of both parents, whether or not both wanted to know or had taken responsibility for raising the child, did not serve a legitimate state interest. The Court favored notification of only one parent and a 48 hour waiting period. The Court upheld Section 6 of the law.

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:21 +0000

Location

Reproductive Health Services

4251 Forest Park Avenue St. Louis MO 63108

St. Louis, MO 63108

United States

38° 38' 13.722" N, 90° 15' 4.3452" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-605

Appellee

Reproductive Health Services

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Webster

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

492 U.S. 490 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, April 26, 1989

Decided

Monday, July 3, 1989

Advocates

Frank Susman (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Charles Fried (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

William L. Webster (Pro se, argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortions. The statute's preamble indicated that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception," and the law codified the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life; encouragement and counseling to have abortions was prohibited; and physicians were to perform viability tests upon women in their twentieth (or more) week of pregnancy. Lower courts struck down the restrictions.

Question

Did the Missouri restrictions unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to privacy or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Webster, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

In a controversial and highly fractured decision, the Court held that none of the challenged provisions of the Missouri legislation were unconstitutional. First, the Court held that the preamble had not been applied in any concrete manner for the purposes of restricting abortions, and thus did not present a constitutional question. Second, the Court held that the Due Process Clause did not require states to enter into the business of abortion, and did not create an affirmative right to governmental aid in the pursuit of constitutional rights. Third, the Court found that no case or controversy existed in relation to the counseling provisionsof the law. Finally, the Court upheld the viability testing requirements, arguing that the State's interest in protecting potential life could come into existence before the point of viability. The Court emphasized that it was not revisiting the essential portions of the holding in Roe v. Wade.

Hartigan v. Zbaraz

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-673

Petitioner

Hartigan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Zbaraz

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Opinion

484 U.S. 171 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, November 3, 1987

Decided

Monday, December 14, 1987

Advocates

Colleen K. Connell (on behalf of the Appellees)

Michael J. Hayes (on behalf of the Appellants)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Zbaraz, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:16 +0000

Location

Akron City Council

166 S. High Street Akron OH 44308

Akron, OH 44308

United States

41° 4' 50.4156" N, 81° 31' 5.0952" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-746

Petitioner

Akron

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Akron Center For Reproductive Health

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., et al. v. City of Akron et al., No. 81-1172

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

462 U.S. 416 (1983)

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 1982

Decided

Wednesday, June 15, 1983

Facts of the Case

In 1978 the Akron City Council enacted an ordinance which established seventeen provisions to regulate the performance of abortions. Among other things, the ordinance required: all abortions performed after the first trimester to be done in hospitals, parental consent before the procedure could be performed on an unmarried minor, doctors to counsel prospective patients, a twenty-four hour waiting period, and that fetal remains be disposed of in a "humane and sanitary manner." Some of the ordinance's provisions were invalidated by a federal district court.

Question

Did several provisions of the Akron ordinance violate a woman's right to an abortion as guaranteed by the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade and the right- to-privacy doctrine as implied by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Akron Center For Reproductive Health, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

The Court affirmed its commitment to protecting a woman's reproductive rights by invalidating the provisions of Akron's ordinance. Generally, Justice Powell's opinion reiterates the Court's findings in Roe and reasons that certain provisions of the ordinance violated the Constitution because they were clearly intended to direct women away from choosing the abortion option. They were not implemented out of medical necessities. The fetal disposal clause was struck down because its language was too vague to determine conduct subject to criminal prosecution.

Simopoulos v. Virginia

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-185

Appellee

Virginia

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Simopoulos

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

462 U.S. 506 (1983)

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 1982

Decided

Wednesday, June 15, 1983

Advocates

William G. Broaddus (on behalf of the Appellee)

Roy Lucas (on behalf of the Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Virginia, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-1255

Petitioner

Planned Parenthood Assn.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ashcroft

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 81-1623

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

462 U.S. 476 (1983)

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 1982

Decided

Wednesday, June 15, 1983

Advocates

Frank Susman (on behalf of Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City)

John Ashcroft (on behalf of John Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Planned Parenthood Assn., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

H. L. v. Matheson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-5903

Appellee

Matheson

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

H. L.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

450 U.S. 398 (1981)

Argued

Monday, October 6, 1980

Decided

Monday, March 23, 1981

Advocates

Paul M. Tinker (on behalf of the Appellees)

David S. Dolowitz (on behalf of the Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Matheson, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Harris v. McRae

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:14 +0000

Location

Congress

Constitution and Delaware Street Washington D.C. 20002

Washington 20002

United States

38° 53' 31.1496" N, 77° 0' 29.1744" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-1268

Appellee

McRae

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Harris

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

448 U.S. 297 (1980)

Argued

Monday, April 21, 1980

Decided

Monday, June 30, 1980

Advocates

Rhonda Copelon (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Wade H. McCree (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Facts of the Case

In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program, via Title XIX of the Social Security Act, to provide federal financial assistance to states that chose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. Beginning in 1976, Congress passed a number of versions of the "Hyde Amendment" that severely limited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program. Cora McRae, a pregnant Medicaid recipient, challenged the Amendment and took action against Patricia R. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services.

Question

Did the Hyde Amendment violate the right to privacy, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Harris, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Medicaid--provisions of the Social Security Act

No. The Court held that states participating in the Medicaid program were not obligated to fund medically necessary abortions under Title XIX. The Court found that a woman's freedom of choice did not carry with it "a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices." The Court ruled that because the Equal Protection Clause was not a source of substantive rights and because poverty did not qualify as a "suspect classification," the Hyde Amendment did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Finally, the Court held that the coincidence of the funding restrictions of the statute with tenets of the Roman Catholic Church did not constitute an establishment of religion.

Williams v. Zbaraz

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-4

Petitioner

Zbaraz

Respondent

Williams

Consolidation

No. 79-5

No. 79-491

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

448 U.S. 358 (1980)

Argued

Monday, April 21, 1980

Decided

Monday, June 30, 1980

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Williams, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

None

Bellotti v. Baird

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:12 +0000

Location

Massachusetts General Assembly

1 Ashburton Place Boston MA 02108

Boston, MA 02108

United States

42° 21' 33.0156" N, 71° 3' 44.5176" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

78-329

Appellee

Baird

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Bellotti

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

Hunerwadel v. Baird, No. 78-330

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

443 U.S. 622 (1979)

Argued

Tuesday, February 27, 1979

Decided

Monday, July 2, 1979

Facts of the Case

A Massachusetts law required minors to gain parental consent before having an abortion. However, if either or both of the parents refused, a judge of the superior court could allow a minor to have the procedure "for good cause shown."

Question

Did the law unconstitutionally restrict the right of a minor to have an abortion?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Baird, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

The Court found the statute unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it allowed judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a minor who is mature and competent enough to make the decision independently. Second, it required parental notification in all cases (parents were required to be notified if their daughter initiated proceedings in superior court) without allowing the minor to seek an independent judicial assessment of her competence to decide the abortion issue.

Colautti v. Franklin

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-891

Appellee

Franklin

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Colautti

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

439 U.S. 379 (1979)

Argued

Tuesday, October 3, 1978

Decided

Tuesday, January 9, 1979

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Franklin, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Beal v. Doe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

75-554

Petitioner

Beal

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

432 U.S. 438 (1977)

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 1977

Decided

Monday, June 20, 1977

Advocates

Judd F. Crosby (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Norman J. Watkins (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In the wake of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, abortion opponents turned to state and local legislators in an effort to curb the practice of abortion. This case involved a Pennsylvania law which restricted Medicaid-funded abortions only to indigent women in situations in which a doctor determined the procedure was medically necessary.

Question

Did Title XIX of the Social Security Act require states that participate in the Medicaid program to fund the cost of nontherapeutic abortions?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Beal, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Medicaid--provisions of the Social Security Act

No. The Court held that states could exclude nontherapeutic abortions from coverage under their Medicaid programs. Justice Powell argued that in its provisions, Title XIX of the Social Security Act made no specific reference to abortion nor did it require states to fund every medical procedure which could possibly fall under its umbrella. Powell made clear however that the federal statute did give states the option to fund therapeutic abortions if they chose to do so.

Poelker v. Doe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

75-442

Petitioner

Poelker

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

432 U.S. 519 (1977)

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 1977

Decided

Monday, June 20, 1977

Advocates

Frank Susman (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Eugene P. Freeman (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

A St. Louis policy prohibited non-therapeutic abortions in the city's two publicly run hospitals.

Question

Did the policy violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Poelker, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. The Court held that St. Louis could enact a "policy choice" to refuse to provide publicly financed hospitals for nontherapeutic abortions even though it provided facilities for childbirth. Relying on its reasoning in Maher v. Roe (1977), the Court distinguished between a state interfering with a protected activity and simply encouraging an alternative activity. Since the state did not deny women the right to have an abortion, the law was consistent with the Constitution.

Maher v. Roe

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:09 +0000

Location

Connecticut Welfare Department (Now Department of Social Services)

25 Sigourney Street Hartford CT 06106

Hartford, CT 06106

United States

41° 45' 50.6556" N, 72° 41' 37.8312" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

75-1440

Appellee

Roe

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Maher

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

432 U.S. 464 (1977)

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 1977

Decided

Monday, June 20, 1977

Advocates

Lucy V. Katz (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Edmund C. Walsh (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Facts of the Case

In the wake of Roe v. Wade, the Connecticut Welfare Department issued regulations limiting state Medicaid benefits for first-trimester abortions to those that were "medically necessary." An indigent woman ("Susan Roe") challenged the regulations and sued Edward Maher, the Commissioner of Social Services in Connecticut.

Question

Did the Connecticut law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Maher, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Connecticut law placed no obstacles in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion, and that it did not "impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe." The Court noted that there was a distinction between direct state interference with a protected activity and "state encouragement of alternative activity consonant with legislative policy." Holding that financial need alone did not identify a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court found that the law was "rationally related" to a legitimate state interest and survived scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Carey v. Population Services International

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

75-443

Appellee

Population Services International

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Carey

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

431 U.S. 678 (1977)

Argued

Monday, January 10, 1977

Decided

Thursday, June 9, 1977

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Population Services International, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Planned Parenthood Of Missouri v. Danforth

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:18:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-1151

Appellee

Danforth

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Planned Parenthood Of Missouri

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 74-1419

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

428 U.S. 52 (1976)

Argued

Tuesday, March 23, 1976

Decided

Thursday, July 1, 1976

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Planned Parenthood Of Missouri, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Doe v. Bolton

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:32:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

70-40

Appellee

Bolton

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Doe

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1971-1972)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

410 U.S. 179 (1973)

Argued

Monday, December 13, 1971

Reargued:

Wednesday, October 11, 1972

Decided

Monday, January 22, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Bolton, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Roe v. Wade

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:05 +0000

Location

US District Court for the Northern District of Texas

1100 Commerce St Dallas TX 75242

Dallas, TX 75242

United States

32° 46' 43.8744" N, 96° 48' 7.6284" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

70-18

Petitioner

Jane Roe

Respondent

Henry Wade

Heard By

Burger Court (1971-1972)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

410 U.S. 113 (1973)

Argued

Monday, December 13, 1971

Reargued:

Wednesday, October 11, 1972

Decided

Monday, January 22, 1973

Advocates

Sarah R. Weddington (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Jay Floyd (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Robert C. Flowers (Rergued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. Texas law prohibited abortions except to save the pregnant woman's life. After granting certiorari, the Court heard arguments twice. The first time, Roe's attorney -- Sarah Weddington -- could not locate the constitutional hook of her argument for Justice Potter Stewart. Her opponent -- Jay Floyd -- misfired from the start. Weddington sharpened her constitutional argument in the second round. Her new opponent -- Robert Flowers -- came under strong questioning from Justices Potter Stewart and Thurgood Marshall.

Question

Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Roe, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision gave a woman total autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimesters. As a result, the laws of 46 states were affected by the Court's ruling.

United States v. Vuitch

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellee

Vuitch

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1970-1971)

Decided By

Burger Court (1970-1971)

Opinion

402 U.S. 62 (1971)

Argued

Tuesday, January 12, 1971

Decided

Wednesday, April 21, 1971

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Leavitt v. Jane L.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1242

Petitioner

Leavitt, Governor of Utah

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jane L.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

518 U.S. 137 (1996)

Decided

Monday, June 17, 1996

Facts of the Case

A Utah district court held that a state statutory provision regulating early- term abortions was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that a similar provision regulating later-term abortions should be invalidated along with the earlier-term provision. The Tenth Circuit held that the Utah Legislature would only have wanted to regulate later-term abortions if it could also regulate earlier-term abortions, and thus concluded that the provisions were not severable (i.e. separable). Utah governor Michael Leavitt appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Utah Legislature intended the two provisions to be severable.

Question

Was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit correct to invalidate a Utah statutory provision regulating later-term abortions after a similar provision regulating earlier-term abortions was ruled unconstitutional?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Leavitt, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's ruling. The anonymous Per Curiam opinion held that the Utah Legislature had explicitly stated that each of the two abortion provisions was meant to stand independent of the other. The Court called the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the Utah legislature's intent "questionable when considered in isolation" and "plainly error" when considered in light of the statutory text. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the case should not have been granted, because it dealt with an issue of Utah state law that was better left to the lower courts.

Lambert v. Wicklund

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-858

Petitioner

Lambert

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wicklund

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 292 (1997)

Decided

Monday, March 31, 1997

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Montana enacted the Parental Notice of Abortion Act, which prohibits a physician from performing an abortion on a minor unless the physician has notified one of the minor's parents or legal guardian 48 hours in advance. The Act provides for a waiver, or judicial bypass, of the notification requirement under certain circumstances, including if the notification of a parent or guardian was not in the best interests of the minor. Several physicians challenged the statute's validity. The Federal District Court, asserting that a parental notice requirement must be waived whenever an abortion would be in the minor's best interests, ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. In affirming, the Court of Appeals ruled that a judicial bypass based on the consideration of a minor's best interests only with respect to the possible consequences of parental notification was constitutionally impermissible, in that the bypass did not sufficiently protect the right of minors to have an abortion.

Question

Is a Montana statute authorizing the judicial bypass of parental notification as to a minor's abortion, under conditions including a showing that notification is not in best interests of minor, constitutional?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lambert, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals's ruling was in direct conflict with the Court's precedents to the effect that the allowance of a judicial bypass if a minor showed that parental notification was not in her best interests met the constitutional requirement that the minor be allowed to show that the desired abortion would be in her best interests. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in the judgment.

Mazurek v. Armstrong

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1104

Petitioner

Mazurek

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Armstrong

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 968 (1997)

Decided

Monday, June 16, 1997

Facts of the Case

In 1995, the Montana Legislature enacted a statute restricting the performance of abortions to licensed physicians. A group of licensed physicians and one physician-assistant brought suit, challenging that statute under the Constitution. The District Court denied the practitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not established any likelihood of prevailing on their claim that the law imposed an undue burden concerning abortion rights. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the practitioners had shown a fair chance of success on the merits of their claim and thus had met the threshold requirement for preliminary injunctive. On remand, the District Court entered an injunction pending appeal and postponed a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion until the U.S. Supreme Court's disposition of the state attorney general's certiorari petition.

Question

Did a Court of Appeals err in holding that the parties seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a Montana statute, which restricted the performance of abortions to licensed physicians, had shown a fair chance of success on the merits of their claim of undue burden concerning abortion rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Mazurek, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals' finding that the practitioners had shown a fair chance of success on the merits was erroneous. The Court noted that its precedents repeatedly stated that the performance of abortions could be restricted to physicians, where there was no evidence of an unlawful motive on the part of the state legislature. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented.