Cases by Issue - Obscenity

City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1609

Petitioner

City of Littleton, Colorado

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., a Limited Liability Company, dba Christal's

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 774 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, October 14, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, March 24, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 7, 2004

Advocates

Douglas R. Cole (argued the cause for Petitioner)

J. Andrew Nathan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Michael W. Gross (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Littleton required adult businesses to apply for a permit to operate from the city. If the city denied the license, the business could appeal to a state district court under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Z.J. Gifts, an adult bookstore, wanted to operate in a place not zoned for adult businesses. Rather than apply for a license, they challenged the licensing law itself as unconstitutional, claiming that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provide merely for prompt judicial review of city denial, not for a prompt judicial decision. Because stores denied a license cannot operate until the court has made its decision, they could potentially be forced to wait indefinitely for a license based solely on the content of the material they intend to sell. This, Z.J. argued, violated the Supreme Court's holding in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, that censorship laws must provide for "prompt judicial determination."

The federal district court sided with Littleton. A Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.

Question

Did Littleton's adult business licensing ordinance violate the First Amendment protection of Free Speech because it did not guarantee a prompt judicial decision when a business appeals the denial of a license?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for City of Littleton, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In an opinion by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Colorado did not have to explicitly provide for a "prompt judicial determination" to make the law constitutional. As long as Colorado courts did not unnecessarily delay such claims, the normal judicial review process could be expected to provide a decision quickly enough to satisfy the constitutional demands. If the courts failed to make a prompt decision in a specific case, the business in that particular case could sue, but the absence of explicit "prompt judicial determination" language in the statute did not make it unconstitutional.

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-218

Petitioner

John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Civil Liberties Union, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 656 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, October 14, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, March 2, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, June 29, 2004

Advocates

Ann E. Beeson (argued the cause for Respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) to prevent minors from accessing pornography online. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and online publishers sued in federal court to prevent enforcement of the act, arguing that it violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court agreed. On appeal, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed, holding that because the act used "community standards" to decide which material was harmful to minors, it would prohibit material that was felt offensive in the most "puritanical" communities from being displayed in more "tolerant" ones.

On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the "community standards" provision alone did not make the act unconstitutional and sent the case back to the Third Circuit for further evaluation.

The Third Circuit again prohibited implementation of the act, holding that it was likely to fail the "strict scrutiny" test because it was not narrowly tailored - that is, it prevented online publishers from publishing some material that adults had a right to access - and because it did not use the least restrictive means possible to protect children (the court found that blocking software installed on home computers by parents would do as good a job without preventing free speech). For similar reasons, the panel found that the act was unconstitutionally "overbroad" - that is, it applied to too much protected material.

Question

Is the Child Online Protection Act's requirement that online publishers prevent children from accessing "material that is harmful to minors" likely to violate the First Amendment by restricting too much protected speech and using a method that is not the least restrictive one available?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for American Civil Liberties Union, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In an interesting 5-to-4 vote, with Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg on one side and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Breyer and O'Connor on the other, the Court found that Congress had not yet met its burden to show that the COPA requirements were more effective than other methods of preventing minors. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in the majority opinion, wrote that the district court's injunction "was not an abuse of discretion, because on this record there are a number of plausible, less restrictive alternatives to the statute." The majority also emphasized that barring the statute's enforcement during the trial would be less harmful than allowing it, because allowing it would be likely to prevent online publishers from publishing certain material.

United States v. American Library Association

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington D.C. 20500

Washington 20500

United States

38° 53' 55.4928" N, 77° 2' 11.8536" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-361

Appellee

American Library Association

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 194 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, March 5, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 23, 2003

Advocates

Paul M. Smith (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Congress passed the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) in 2000, requiring public libraries to install internet filtering software on their computers in order to qualify for federal funding. The American Library Association and others challenged the law, claiming that it improperly required them to restrict the First Amendment rights of their patrons. As stipulated by the law, a three judge panel heard the case, and ruled unanimously that the CIPA violated the First Amendment.

Question

Does Congress have the authority to require libraries to censor internet content in order to receive federal funding?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 6-3 judgment delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that, because public libraries' use of Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons' First Amendment rights, CIPA does not induce libraries to violate the Constitution and is a valid exercise of Congress's spending power. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas joined the Chief Justice's opinion. Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Both noted that CIPA imposed a comparatively small burden on library Internet users that was not disproportionate to any potential speech-related harm, especially in light of the libraries' ability to unblock sites. Justices John Paul Stevens and David H. Souter dissented. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent.

City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

Los Angeles City Hall

200 North Spring Street Los Angeles CA 90012

Los Angeles, CA 90012

United States

34° 3' 12.3264" N, 118° 14' 34.9404" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-799

Petitioner

City of Los Angeles

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alameda Books, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 425 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, December 4, 2001

Decided

Monday, May 13, 2002

Advocates

Michael L. Klekner (Los Angeles, California argued the cause for the petitioner)

John H. Weston (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Based on its 1977 study concluding that concentrations of adult entertainment establishments are associated with higher crime rates in surrounding communities, the city of Los Angeles enacted Municipal Code section 12.70(C), which prohibited such enterprises within 1,000 feet of each other. The city later amended the ordinance to prohibit more than one adult entertainment business in the same building. Alameda Books, Inc. and Highland Books, Inc., two adult establishments that openly operate combined bookstores/video arcades, sued, alleging that the ordinance violates the First Amendment. Finding that the ordinance was not a content-neutral regulation of speech, the District Court reasoned that the 1977 study did not support a reasonable belief that multiple-use adult establishments produce the secondary effects the city asserted as content-neutral justifications for its prohibition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that, even if the ordinance were content neutral, the city failed to present evidence upon which it could reasonably rely to demonstrate that its regulation of multiple-use establishments was designed to serve its substantial interest in reducing crime.

Question

May a city rely on a study it conducted to demonstrate whether an ordinance serves a substantial government interest?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for City of Los Angeles, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the city of Los Angeles may reasonably rely on a study it conducted some years before enacting the present version of section 12.70(C) to demonstrate that its ban on multiple-use adult establishments serves its interest in reducing crime. Three other Justices joined in this holding. Concurring, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concluded that Los Angeles may impose its regulation in the exercise of the zoning authority, and that the city is not, at least, to be foreclosed by summary judgment. Justice David H. Souter, with whom Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined, dissented. Justice Souter argued that the 1977 study, while pursuing a policy of dispersing adult establishments, evolved to a policy of breaking-up combined bookstores/video arcades, for which the study's evidence was insufficient.

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

ACLU Headquarters

125 Broad Street New York NY 10004

New York, NY 10004

United States

40° 42' 8.2548" N, 74° 0' 38.088" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1293

Petitioner

Ashcroft

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Civil Liberties Union

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 564 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 2001

Decided

Monday, May 13, 2002

Advocates

Ann E. Beeson (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Unlike the Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web, covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only "material that is harmful to minors." Moreover, COPA requires jurors to apply "contemporary community standards" in assessing material. Before it was scheduled to go into effect, a number of organizations affected by COPA filed suit, alleging that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and was substantially overbroad. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, reasoning that COPA's use of contemporary community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad.

Question

Does the Child Online Protection Act's use of "community standards" to identify "material that is harmful to minors" violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Ashcroft, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U.S.C. 231

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that COPA's reliance on community standards to identify what material is harmful to minors does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for First Amendment purposes. The Court expressed no view as to whether COPA was overbroad for other reasons or was unconstitutionally vague and did not vacate the preliminary injunction because it could not do so without addressing matters yet to be considered. "In its original form, the community standard provided a shield for communications that are offensive only to the least tolerant members of society," argued Justice John Paul Stevens in his dissent. "In the context of the Internet, however, community standards become a sword, rather than a shield. If a prurient appeal is offensive in a puritan village, it may be a crime to post it on the World Wide Web."

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

Free Speech Coalition

P.O. Box 10480 Canoga Park CA 91309

Canoga Park, CA 91309

United States

34° 12' 4.0176" N, 118° 35' 53.3112" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-795

Petitioner

Ashcroft

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Free Speech Coalition

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 234 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, April 16, 2002

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

H. Louis Sirkin (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) prohibits "any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture" that "is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," and any sexually explicit image that is "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression" it depicts "a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." The Free Speech Coalition, an adult-entertainment trade association, and others filed suit, alleging that the "appears to be" and "conveys the impression" provisions are overbroad and vague and, thus, restrain works otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held the CPPA invalid on its face, finding it to be substantially overbroad because it bans materials that are neither obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, nor produced by the exploitation of real children as in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747.

Question

Does the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 abridge freedom of speech where it where it proscribes a significant universe of speech that is neither obscene under Miller v. California nor child pornography under New York v. Ferber?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Free Speech Coalition, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2252

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the two prohibitions described above are overbroad and unconstitutional. The Court found the CPPA to be inconsistent with Miller insofar as the CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity, because it lacks the required link between its prohibitions and the affront to community standards prohibited by the obscenity definition. Moreover, the Court found the CPPA to have no support in Ferber since the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production. Provisions of the CPPA cover "materials beyond the categories recognized in Ferber and Miller, and the reasons the Government offers in support of limiting the freedom of speech have no justification in our precedents or in the law of the First Amendment" and abridge "the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech," wrote Justice Kennedy.

Reno v. ACLU

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:29 +0000

Location

Attorney General Office

"950 Pennsylvania Avenue**** NW" Washington D.C. 20530

Washington 20530

United States

38° 53' 31.8084" N, 77° 1' 30.2196" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-511

Petitioner

ACLU

Respondent

Reno

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 844 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, March 19, 1997

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 1997

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages as well as the transmission of information which depicts or describes "sexual or excretory activities or organs" in a manner deemed "offensive" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions.

Question

Did certain provisions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act violate the First and Fifth Amendments by being overly broad and vague in their definitions of the types of internet communications which they criminalized?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for ACLU, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment because its regulations amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech. The Act failed to clearly define "indecent" communications, limit its restrictions to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact adults), provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of internet communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of "offensive" material is devoid of any social value. The Court added that since the First Amendment distinguishes between "indecent" and "obscene" sexual expressions, protecting only the former, the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it dropped the words "or indecent" from its text. The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.

United States v. X-Citement Video

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-723

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

X-Citement Video

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 64 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, October 5, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, November 29, 1994

Advocates

Stanley Fleishman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Drew S. Days, III (Argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 prohibited the interstate transportation, shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of visual materials containing children engaged in sexually explicit acts. Richard Gottesman, owner and manager of X-Citement Video, sold forty-nine tapes to undercover officers. Gottesman shipped the videos, containing pornographic acts by industry legend Traci Lords before she turned eighteen, to Hawaii. Although he claimed he did not know the tapes contained underage pornographic acts, Gottesman was arrested for violating the sexual exploitation act.

Question

Did the Act's use of the term "knowingly" violate the First Amendment's Free Speech clause by not mandating a showing that the alleged offender knew which materials contained under-age performances?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2252

No. The Court relied on an awkward grammatical construction as it held that the term "knowingly" applied to the entire passage of the law. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated that other interpretations failed to make sense since Congress obviously did not envision people accidentally mailing underage pornographic materials. All the law required was a showing that alleged violators intentionally distributed illegal pornography, regardless of whether they knew it depicted underage performances.

Alexander v. United States

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:26 +0000

Location

City of Minneapolis

300 South Fourth Street Minneapolis MN 55415

Minneapolis, MN 55415

United States

44° 58' 41.6388" N, 93° 15' 52.9236" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-1526

Petitioner

Ferris Alexander

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

509 U.S. 544 (1993)

Argued

Tuesday, January 12, 1993

Decided

Monday, June 28, 1993

Advocates

Kenneth W. Starr (on behalf of the Respondent)

John H. Weston (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Ferris Alexander was the owner of a chain of stores and theaters in Minnesota that distributed sexually explicit media. He was charged with violating federal obscenity laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The federal District Court in Minnesota found him guilty of both charges. The court ordered him to forfeit his businesses, sentenced him to a six-year prison term, and fined him $100,000.

Alexander appealed, claiming that the confiscation of his stores for his dealings in obscene material amounted to 'prior restraint' on his subsequent distribution of adult materials, and therefore violated his First Amendment rights. He also claimed that the seizure of his business violated his Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment on the First Amendment claim, and declined to review the Eighth Amendment claim on the ground that no sentence less severe than life imprisonment without parole could justify an Eighth Amendment review.

Question

Does property forfeiture under RICO as punishment for the distribution of obscene materials constitute 'prior restraint' on speech in violation of the First Amendment?
Does the forfeiture of a business as punishment for the sale of obscene media constitute an 'excessive fine'?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Prohibition of Excessive Fines

No and undecided. Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote for a 5-4 majority that the application of RICO in Alexander's case was neither a 'prior restraint' on speech, nor a criminalization of speech typically protected under the Constitution. His sentence established no conditions on his behavior after its completion; once he paid the fine, surrendered his business and went to prison, he could theoretically distribute adult media without prejudice from the government. "To accept petitioner's argument," Rehnquist wrote, "would virtually obliterate the distinction [...] between prior restraints and subsequent punishments."

In a separate and unanimous vote, the Court ruled that the forfeiture did in fact merit Eighth Amendment review. The case was returned to the Eighth Circuit for an analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause.

Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc.

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:23 +0000

Location

Theatre and Lounge South Bend, IN

United States

41° 41' 0.1716" N, 86° 15' 0.0252" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-26

Petitioner

Barnes

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Glen Theatre Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 560 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 1991

Decided

Friday, June 21, 1991

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Wayne E. Uhl (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Glen Theatre and the Kitty Kat Lounge in South Bend, Indiana, operated entertainment establishments with totally nude dancers. An Indiana law regulating public nudity required dancers to wear "pasties" and a "G-string" when they perform. The Theatre and Lounge sued to stop enforcement of the statute.

Question

Does a state prohibition against complete nudity in public places violate the First Amendment's freedom of expression guarantee?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Barnes, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. The Court was fractured and there was no majority opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a plurality opinion, conceded that nude dancing was a form of expressive activity. But he maintained that the public indecency statute is justified despite the incidental limitations on such expressive activity. The statute "furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality." The proscription on public nudity is unrelated to the erotic message the dancers seek to convey.

Osborne v. Ohio

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:22 +0000

Location

Residence of Clyde Osborne

"793 North Park Street**** No. 3" Columbus OH 43215

Columbus, OH 43215

United States

39° 58' 41.8476" N, 83° 0' 20.9268" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-5986

Appellee

Ohio

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Osborne

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

495 U.S. 103 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, December 5, 1989

Decided

Wednesday, April 18, 1990

Advocates

S. Adele Shank (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Ronald J. O'Brien (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

After obtaining a warrant, Ohio police searched the home of Clyde Osborne and found explicit pictures of naked, sexually aroused male adolescents. Osborne was then prosecuted and found guilty of violating an Ohio law that made the possession of child pornography illegal.

Question

Did Ohio's ban on the possession of child pornography violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Ohio, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

The Court held that Ohio could constitutionally proscribe the possession of child pornography. The Court argued that the case at hand was distinct from Stanley v. Georgia, "because the interest underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying the Georgia law at issue in Stanley." Ohio did not rely on "a paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne's mind;" rather, Ohio merely attempted to protect the victims of child pornography. The Court argued that regulations on production and distribution of child pornography were insufficient and could not dry up the market for pornographic materials. The Court also found that an error in jury instructions in the lower courts mandated Osborne be given a new trial.

FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-2012

Petitioner

FW/PBS, Inc.

Respondent

Dallas

Consolidation

No. 87-2051

No. 88-49

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

493 U.S. 215 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, October 4, 1989

Decided

Tuesday, January 9, 1990

Advocates

Analeslie Muncy (on behalf of the Respondent)

John H. Weston (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for FW/PBS, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Sable Communications of California v. FCC

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:21 +0000

Location

Sable Communications of California Los Angeles, CA

United States

34° 3' 8.0424" N, 118° 14' 37.266" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-515

Appellee

FCC

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Sable Communications of California

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 88-525

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

492 U.S. 115 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, April 19, 1989

Decided

Friday, June 23, 1989

Advocates

Richard G. Taranto (Argued the cause for appellees in No. 88-515 and for appellants in No. 88-525)

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for appellant in No. 88-515 and for appellee in No. 88-525)

Facts of the Case

In 1988, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to ban indecent and obscene interstate commercial phone messages. Sable Communications had been in the dial-a-porn business since 1983. A judge in District Court upheld the ban on obscene messages, but enjoined the Act's enforcement against indecent ones.

Question

Did the amended Communications Act violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for FCC, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U.S.C. 223

The Court upheld the District Court's ruling. Since the First Amendment does not protect obscene speech, as the Court found in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton (1973), the ban on obscene speech was legitimate. However, sexual expression that is simply indecent is protected. Thus, banning adult access to indecent messages "far exceeds that which is necessary" to shield minors from dial-a-porn services.

Massachusetts v. Oakes

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:06 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1651

Petitioner

Massachusetts

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oakes

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

491 U.S. 576 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, January 17, 1989

Decided

Wednesday, June 21, 1989

Advocates

Richard J. Vita (on behalf of the Respondent)

James M. Shannon (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Massachusetts, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-470

Petitioner

Fort Wayne Books, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Indiana

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 87-614

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

489 U.S. 46 (1989)

Argued

Monday, October 3, 1988

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 1989

Advocates

Stephen Goldsmith (on behalf of the Respondents)

John H. Weston (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fort Wayne Books, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Pope v. Illinois

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1973

Petitioner

Pope

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

481 U.S. 497 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, February 24, 1987

Decided

Monday, May 4, 1987

Advocates

Glenn A. Stanko (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Sally Louise Dilgart (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Pope, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

New York v. P. J. Video, Inc.

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:19 +0000

Location

Network Video

5868 Transit Road Depew NY 14043

Depew, NY 14043

United States

42° 54' 55.7676" N, 78° 41' 48.93" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-363

Petitioner

New York

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

P. J. Video, Inc. et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

475 U.S. 868 (1986)

Argued

Tuesday, March 4, 1986

Decided

Tuesday, April 22, 1986

Advocates

John J. DeFranks (on behalf of the petitioner)

Paul John Cambara, Jr. (on behalf of the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Investigator David Groblewski from the Erie County District Attorney's Office viewed videos rented from P.J. Video and determined their content violated New York obscenity statutes. He drafted an affidavit describing the content on the videos and filed a warrant authorizing their seizure. A village justice in Depew NY issued the warrant and the police seized ten movies suspected to contain obscene content. A local court determined five of the movies violated obscenity standards. P.J. Video argued that the justice issued the warrant without probable cause since he did not personally view the movies. The court agreed and suppressed the videos as evidence. The County Court of Erie County affirmed the decision, and the New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. It asserted that warrants authorizing the seizure of items that were both non- dangerous and mediums of speech needed to satisfy a higher level of proof of "probable-cause" than other types of warrants because of First Amendment concerns.

Question

If a warrant is issued for the seizure of items that can be considered as mediums of speech, does the First Amendment require this warrant to satisfy a "higher" level of proof for probable-cause than warrants issued for other forms of evidence?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for New York, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Court determined that the police department did not discriminate based on content. It seized the videos in order to preserve evidence rather than to suppress speech. In nondiscriminatory cases, the Court held that the same test for preventing Fourth Amendment wrongful search violations also secured against First Amendment free speech violations. Particularly, "the First Amendment should be evaluated under the same probable-cause standard used to review warrant applications." The officers met this standard by describing content in the videos that clearly violated the obscenity statutes.

Renton v. Playtime Theatres Inc.

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:18 +0000

Location

Playtime Theatres, Inc. Renton, WA

United States

47° 28' 58.3608" N, 122° 13' 1.4376" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1360

Petitioner

Renton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Playtime Theatres Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

475 U.S. 41 (1986)

Argued

Tuesday, November 12, 1985

Decided

Tuesday, February 25, 1986

Advocates

Jack R. Burns (Argued the cause for the appellees)

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

The city of Renton, Washington, enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating with in 1,000 feet of "any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school." Playtime Theatres, Inc., challenged the ordinance and sought a permanent injunction against its enforcement.

Question

Did the Renton ordinance violate either the First or Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Renton, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the zoning ordinance did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that the ordinance was a form of time, place, and manner regulation, not a ban on adult theaters altogether. The Court reasoned that the law was not aimed at the content of the films shown at adult motion picture theaters, "but rather the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community." The Court found that the ordinance was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest in preserving the quality of life and allowed for "reasonable alternative avenues of communication."

Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-28

Appellee

Spokane Arcades, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Brockett

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 84-143

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

472 U.S. 491 (1985)

Argued

Wednesday, February 20, 1985

Decided

Wednesday, June 19, 1985

Advocates

Christine O. Gregoire (on behalf of the Appellant)

John H. Weston (on behalf of the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Brockett, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

New York v. Ferber

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:16 +0000

Location

Bookstore Manhattan, NY

United States

40° 47' 0.366" N, 73° 57' 58.5" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-55

Petitioner

New York

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ferber

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

458 U.S. 747 (1982)

Argued

Tuesday, April 27, 1982

Decided

Friday, July 2, 1982

Advocates

Robert M. Pitler (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Herald P. Fahringer (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A New York child pornography law prohibited persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such performances.

Question

Did the law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for New York, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In the Court's first examination of a statute specifically targeted against child pornography, it found that the state's interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors was a compelling "government objective of surpassing importance." The law was carefully drawn to protect children from the mental, physical, and sexual abuse associated with pornography while not violating the First Amendment.

Flynt v. Ohio

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-420

Petitioner

Flynt

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ohio

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

451 U.S. 619 (1981)

Argued

Tuesday, March 24, 1981

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1981

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Ohio, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1257

None

Schad v. Mount Ephraim

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-1640

Appellee

Mount Ephraim

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Schad

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

452 U.S. 61 (1981)

Argued

Wednesday, February 25, 1981

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1981

Advocates

Arnold N. Fishman (on behalf of the Appellee)

Robert E. Levy (on behalf of the Appellants)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Schad, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

78-1588

Appellee

Universal Amusement Co.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Vance

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

445 U.S. 308 (1980)

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 1979

Decided

Tuesday, March 18, 1980

Advocates

Lonny F. Zwiener (on behalf of the Appellants)

Frierson M. Graves, Jr. (on behalf of the Appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Universal Amusement Co., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Pinkus v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:33:52 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-39

Petitioner

Pinkus

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

436 U.S. 293 (1978)

Argued

Tuesday, February 28, 1978

Decided

Tuesday, May 23, 1978

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Pinkus, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Ward v. Illinois

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:13 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

76-415

Appellee

Illinois

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Ward

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

431 U.S. 767 (1977)

Argued

Wednesday, April 27, 1977

Decided

Thursday, June 9, 1977

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Illinois, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Splawn v. California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

76-143

Petitioner

Splawn

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

431 U.S. 595 (1977)

Argued

Wednesday, March 23, 1977

Decided

Monday, June 6, 1977

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for California, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Smith v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

75-1439

Petitioner

Smith

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

431 U.S. 291 (1977)

Argued

Wednesday, December 8, 1976

Decided

Monday, May 23, 1977

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1461

None

Marks v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:14 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

75-708

Petitioner

Marks

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

430 U.S. 188 (1977)

Argued

November 1-2, 1976

Decided

Tuesday, March 1, 1977

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Marks, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Young v. American Mini Theatres

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:09 +0000

Location

Nortown Theater

7706 E. 7 Mile Rd Detroit MI 48234

Detroit, MI 48234

United States

42° 26' 2.1624" N, 83° 1' 30.3888" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

75-312

Petitioner

Coleman Young

Respondent

American Mini Theatres, Inc.

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

427 U.S. 50 (1976)

Argued

Wednesday, March 24, 1976

Decided

Thursday, June 24, 1976

Advocates

Maureen P. Reilly (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Stephen M. Taylor (argued the cause for the respondents American Mini Theaters)

John H. Weston (argued the cause for the respondent Nortown Theatre Inc.)

Facts of the Case

American Mini Theaters opened two theaters that showed adult movies in the city of Detroit. Two city ordinances enacted in 1972 prohibited the opening of adult theaters within 1,000 feet of other buildings with "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of any residential district. American Mini sued city officials challenging the ordinances on two grounds: that the ordinances imposed an undue burden on First Amendment rights and that ordinances violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. A federal district court ruled in favor of the city, a decision that was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appeals court concluded that the ordinances posed a prior restraint based on content and that the ordinances ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.

Question

(1): Did Detroit's 1972 ordinances violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

(2): Did the ordinances qualify as a restriction on free speech in violation of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Young, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion, the court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that Detroit's ordinances were reasonable, and although erotic material could not be completely suppressed, Detroit had adequate reasons to restrict the distribution of such material. Justice John Paul Stevens doubted that Voltaire's observation – "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it" – applied to pornographic films. This prompted a stinging rebuke from Justice Potter Stewart who maintained that the free expression is neither defined nor circumscribed by popular opinion.

Mckinney v. Alabama

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:18:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-532

Petitioner

Mckinney

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alabama

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

424 U.S. 669 (1976)

Argued

Monday, December 15, 1975

Decided

Tuesday, March 23, 1976

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Mckinney, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:08 +0000

Location

University Drive-In Theater

University Blvd. Jacksonville FL 32205

Jacksonville, FL 32205

United States

30° 18' 49.3704" N, 81° 43' 35.3856" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

73-1942

Petitioner

Richard Erznoznik

Respondent

City of Jacksonville

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

422 U.S. 205 (1975)

Argued

Wednesday, February 26, 1975

Decided

Monday, June 23, 1975

Advocates

Michael A. Maness (argued the cause for the appellant)

William Lee Allen (argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

The University Drive-In Theater in Jacksonville, Florida had a screen that was visible from nearby public streets. The theater showed an R-rated film containing female nudity, which violated a Jacksonville city ordinance that prohibited the showing of films containing nudity if the film was visible from a public area. Richard Erznoznik, the theater’s manager, was charged with a Class C offense under the ordinance. He challenged the ordinance in Duval County Circuit Court, which upheld the statute. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari.

Question

Did Jacksonville’s ordinance violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Erznoznik, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court struck down the Jacksonville ordinance. While individuals did have a right to not be exposed to offensive films, the ordinance singled out "some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others," Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote for the majority. Since the "offended viewer readily can avert his eyes" from the films shown, Jacksonville’s distinction between films with nudity and films without nudity was unconstitutional. Under Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, "government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." The ordinance was "broader than permissible" in trying to protect children from exposure to nudity and "invalid" as an attempt to prevent traffic accidents. Justice William O. Douglas authored a concurring opinion.

Jenkins v. Georgia

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:34:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

73-557

Appellee

Georgia

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Jenkins

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

418 U.S. 153 (1974)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 1974

Decided

Monday, June 24, 1974

Advocates

Louis Nizer (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Tony H. Hight (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

An Albany, Georgia theater manager was convicted under a Georgia obscenity law when he showed the critically acclaimed film "Carnal Knowledge." The film explored social conceptions of sexuality and starred Jack Nicholson and Ann Margaret.

Question

Did the manager's conviction violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jenkins, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

A unanimous Court held that the Georgia Supreme Court misapplied the obscenity test announced in Miller v. California (1973). Justice Rehnquist argued that Miller did not give juries "unbridled discretion" to determine what is patently offensive. Only material that displays "hard core sexual conduct" is prohibited. Since "Carnal Knowledge" did not contain scenes of that nature it merited constitutional protection.

Hamling v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:34:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

73-507

Petitioner

Hamling

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

418 U.S. 87 (1974)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 1974

Decided

Monday, June 24, 1974

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Heller v. New York

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

71-1043

Petitioner

Heller

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

New York

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

413 U.S. 483 (1973)

Argued

Tuesday, November 14, 1972

Decided

Monday, June 25, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Heller, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Roaden v. Kentucky

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

71-1134

Petitioner

Roaden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kentucky

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

413 U.S. 496 (1973)

Argued

Tuesday, November 14, 1972

Decided

Monday, June 25, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Roaden, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

Alexander v. Virginia

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

71-1315

Petitioner

Alexander

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Virginia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

413 U.S. 836 (1973)

Argued

Thursday, October 19, 1972

Decided

Monday, June 25, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Alexander, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:06 +0000

Location

Paris Adult Theater

"320 Peachtree Street**** N.E." Atlanta GA 30308

Atlanta, GA 30308

United States

33° 45' 49.302" N, 84° 23' 11.4684" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

71-1051

Petitioner

Paris Adult Theatre

Respondent

Slaton

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

413 U.S. 49 (1973)

Argued

Thursday, October 19, 1972

Decided

Thursday, June 21, 1973

Advocates

Thomas E. Moran (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Robert Eugene Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

State officials in Georgia sought to enjoin the showing of allegedly obscene films at the Paris Adult Theatre. The Theatre clearly warned potential viewers of the sexual nature of the films and required that patrons be at least 21 years of age. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the films were "hard core" pornography unprotected by the Constitution.

Question

Did the Georgia injunction against the films violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Paris Adult Theatre, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene films did not acquire constitutional protection simply because they were exhibited for consenting adults only. Conduct involving consenting adults, the Court argued, was not always beyond the scope of governmental regulation. The Court found that there were "legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity," including the community's quality of life and public safety. The Court also noted that conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene materials was not necessary to justify the Georgia law.

The Court remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court with instructions to reconsider its decision in light of the obscenity standard spelled out in Miller v. California. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the works in question were obscene and directed the trial judge to issue an order permanently enjoining the theatre from exhibiting the films.

Kaplan v. California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

71-1422

Petitioner

Kaplan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

413 U.S. 115 (1973)

Argued

Thursday, October 19, 1972

Decided

Thursday, June 21, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kaplan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

California v. Larue

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:49 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

71-36

Appellee

Larue

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

California

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

409 U.S. 109 (1972)

Argued

Tuesday, October 10, 1972

Decided

Tuesday, December 5, 1972

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for California, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Rabe v. Washington

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:32:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

71-247

Petitioner

Rabe

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Washington

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

405 U.S. 313 (1972)

Argued

Tuesday, February 29, 1972

Decided

Monday, March 20, 1972

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Rabe, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

United States v. Orito

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:32:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

70-69

Appellee

Orito

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

413 U.S. 139 (1973)

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 1972

Reargued:

Tuesday, November 7, 1972

Decided

Thursday, June 21, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels Of Film

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:30:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

70-2

Appellee

12 200-Ft. Reels Of Film

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

413 U.S. 123 (1973)

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 1972

Reargued:

Tuesday, November 7, 1972

Decided

Thursday, June 21, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Miller v. California

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:06 +0000

Location

Collectors Publications

1016 East Cypress Street Covina CA 91722

Covina, CA 91722

United States

34° 5' 38.0112" N, 117° 54' 39.7224" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

70-73

Appellant

Marvin Miller

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

California

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

413 U.S. 15 (1973)

Argued

January 18-19, 1972

Reargued:

Tuesday, November 7, 1972

Decided

Thursday, June 21, 1973

Advocates

Burton Marks (Reargued the cause for the appellant)

Michael R. Capizzi (Reargued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings.

Question

Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Miller, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that "[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of the Memoirs decision.

United States v. Reidel

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

534

Appellee

Reidel

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1970-1971)

Decided By

Burger Court (1970-1971)

Opinion

402 U.S. 351 (1971)

Argued

Wednesday, January 20, 1971

Decided

Monday, May 3, 1971

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

133

Appellee

Thirty-Seven Photographs

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1970-1971)

Decided By

Burger Court (1970-1971)

Opinion

402 U.S. 363 (1971)

Argued

Wednesday, January 20, 1971

Decided

Monday, May 3, 1971

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Grove Press, v. Maryland State Board Of Censors

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellee

Maryland State Board Of Censors

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Grove Press,

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1970-1971)

Decided By

Burger Court (1970-1971)

Opinion

401 U.S. 480 (1971)

Argued

Tuesday, November 10, 1970

Decided

Monday, March 8, 1971

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Maryland State Board Of Censors, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Blount v. Rizzi

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellee

Rizzi

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Blount

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 58

Heard By

Burger Court (1970-1971)

Decided By

Burger Court (1970-1971)

Opinion

400 U.S. 410 (1971)

Argued

Tuesday, November 10, 1970

Decided

Thursday, January 14, 1971

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Rizzi, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 39 U.S.C. 4006

None

Rowan v. U. S. Post Office Dept.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:39:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

399

Appellee

U. S. Post Office Dept.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Rowan

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1969-1970)

Decided By

Burger Court (1969-1970)

Opinion

397 U.S. 728 (1970)

Argued

Thursday, January 22, 1970

Decided

Monday, May 4, 1970

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for U. S. Post Office Dept., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Stanley v. Georgia

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:03 +0000

Location

Stanley's Home

"280 Springside Drive**** S.E." Atlanta GA 30354

Atlanta, GA 30354

United States

33° 40' 38.4312" N, 84° 22' 48.0324" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

293

Petitioner

Georgia

Respondent

Stanley

Heard By

Warren Court (1967-1969)

Decided By

Warren Court (1967-1969)

Opinion

394 U.S. 557 (1969)

Argued

January 14-15, 1969

Decided

Monday, April 7, 1969

Advocates

J. Robert Sparks (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Wesley R. Asinof (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Facts of the Case

Law enforcement officers, under the authority of a warrant, searched Stanley's home pursuant to an investigation of his alleged bookmaking activities. During the search, the officers found three reels of eight-millimeter film. The officers viewed the films, concluded they were obscene, and seized them. Stanley was then tried and convicted under a Georgia law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials.

Question

Did the Georgia statute infringe upon the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Stanley, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

The Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited making private possession of obscene materials a crime. In his majority opinion, Justice Marshall noted that the rights to receive information and to personal privacy were fundamental to a free society. Marshall then found that "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." The Court distinguished between the mere private possession of obscene materials and the production and distribution of such materials. The latter, the Court held, could be regulated by the states.

Ginsberg v. New York

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:41:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Appellee

New York

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Ginsberg

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Warren Court (1967-1969)

Decided By

Warren Court (1967-1969)

Opinion

390 U.S. 629 (1968)

Argued

Tuesday, January 16, 1968

Decided

Monday, April 22, 1968

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for New York, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None