Cases by Issue - Vehicles

Florida v. Harris

mgruhn — Mon, 02 Jul 2012 16:49:24 +0000

Location

Liberty County Courthouse

10818 NW SR 20

Bristol, FL

United States

30° 25' 57.1512" N, 84° 56' 48.0516" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-817

Petitioner

Florida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Clayton Harris

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, March 26, 2012

Argued

Wednesday, October 31, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Advocates

Gregory G. Garre (for the petitioner)

Joseph R. Palmore (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Glen P. Gifford (for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The State of Florida charged Clayton Harris with possession of pseudoephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. At trial, Harris moved to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his car. Police searched the car during a traffic stop for expired registration when a drug detection dog alerted the officer. This dog was trained to detect several types of illegal substances, but not pseudoephedrine. During the search, the officer found over 200 loose pills and other supplies for making methamphetamine. Harris argued that the dog’s alert was false and did not provide probable cause for the search. The trial court denied Harris motion, holding that the totality of the circumstances indicated that there was probable cause to conduct the search. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State did not prove the dog’s reliability in drug detection sufficiently to show probable cause.

Question

Does a drug-detection dog's alert to the exterior of a vehicle provide an officer with probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the interior of the vehicle?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Florida, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fourth Amendment

Yes. Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the Florida Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s rigid requirement that police officers show evidence of a dog’s reliability in the field to prove probable cause. Probable cause is a flexible common sense test that takes the totality of the circumstances into account. A probable cause hearing for a dog alert should proceed like any other, allowing each side to make their best case with all evidence available. The record in this case supported the trial court’s determination that police had probable cause to search Harris' car.

Illinois v. Caballes

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-923

Petitioner

Illinois

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Roy I. Caballes

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 405 (2005)

Granted

Monday, April 5, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, November 10, 2004

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2005

Advocates

Ralph E. Meczyk (argued the cause for Respondent)

Lisa Madigan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Christopher A. Wray (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

During a routine traffic stop, a drug-detection dog alerted police to marijuana in Roy Caballes' car trunk. An Illinois court convicted Caballes of cannabis trafficking. Caballes appealed and argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and ruled police performed the canine sniff without specific and articulable facts to support its use, "unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation."

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure clause require a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a canine sniff during a routine traffic stop?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Illinois, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the Court's 7-2 opinion that Caballes' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The Constitution did not require police to have reasonable suspicion to use a drug-detection dog on a car during a legal traffic stop. No legitimate privacy was at risk, the Court argued, because the dog only alerted to an illegal drug.

Thornton v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-5165

Petitioner

Marcus Thornton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 615 (2004)

Granted

Monday, November 3, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, March 31, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 24, 2004

Advocates

Frank W. Dunham, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Marcus Thornton was stopped after getting out of his vehicle by a police officer who had noticed that the license plate on Thornton's Lincoln Town Car belonged to a Chevy two-door car. During his conversation with Thornton, the officer asked if he could search him. During the search he found two bags of drugs. The officer arrested Thornton, then searched his vehicle (which Thornton had already exited by the time the police officer spoke with him, though the officer had seen him exit it). In the vehicle the officer found a gun.

Thornton was convicted of drug and firearms offenses. On appeal, he moved to have the gun dismissed as evidence because, he claimed, it had been found as the result of an unconstitutional search. He argued that the officer had contacted him after he had left the vehicle and that the search therefore did not fall within the "search incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (the exception allows police to search the person being arrested and the area "within his immediate control").

A Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel rejected his argument, holding that requiring officers to signal their intent to arrest a person before he exited his vehicle would be dangerous because it would give him a chance to get any weapons in the vehicle or to use the vehicle to get away or run over the officers.

Question

Under the "search incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment, may police search the vehicle of a person they have arrested if they did not make contact with him until after he left the vehicle?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court ruled that forcing officers to decide whether a suspect had noticed them before exiting the car (with the understanding that only if he had could the car be searched) would be too subjective and leave officers uncertain of whether they could perform searches. Further, it found that weapons or contraband inside a vehicle could still be easily accessed by someone who had just exited it, providing the same reason for searching the vehicle that was present in cases where suspects were arrested while still inside it (that is, the possibility that illegal material would be destroyed or officers attacked with concealed weapons). Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the majority opinion, wrote, "Once an officer determines there is probable cause to make an arrest, it is reasonable to allow officers to ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by searching the entire passenger compartment."

United States v. Flores-Montano

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1794

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Manuel Flores-Montano

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 149 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, October 14, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, February 25, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 30, 2004

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Steven F. Hubachek (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

When Manuel Flores-Montano approached the U.S.-Mexico border, U.S. Customs inspectors noticed his hand shaking; an inspector tapped Flores-Montano's gas tank with a screwdriver and noticed that the tank sounded solid; a drug- sniffing dog alerted to the vehicle. After a mechanic began disassembling the car's fuel tank, inspectors found 37 kilograms of marijuana bricks in the tank.

Flores-Montano was charged in federal district court in California for importing and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. Flores-Montano moved to suppress the marijuana finding on Fourth Amendment grounds. He argued that the search that yielded the marijuana finding was intrusive and non- routine and therefore required reasonable suspicion (which, he argued, was not present in his case).

Relying on U.S. v. Molina-Tarazon, a case decided by the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2002 (with similar circumstances), the district court agreed that the search was non-routine and thus required reasonable suspicion. The government, the court held, failed to prove that reasonable suspicion prompted its search. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment require customs officers at the international border to have reasonable suspicion in order to remove, disassemble, and search a vehicle's gas tank for illegal material?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that the government had authority to inspect a vehicle's fuel tank at the border without suspicion. Though the Fourth Amendment "'protects property as well as privacy,'" interference with a vehicle owner's gas tank "is justified by the Government's paramount interest in protecting the border." The Court rejected the argument that the requirement of suspicion for highly intrusive searches of people be carried over to cars (especially at the border): "Complex balancing tests...have no place in border searches of vehicles."

Illinois v. Lidster

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1060

Petitioner

Illinois

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robert S. Lidster

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 419 (2004)

Granted

Monday, May 5, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, November 5, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, January 13, 2004

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Donald J. Ramsell (argued the cause for Respondent)

Gary Feinerman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Police stopped Robert Lidster at a checkpoint set up to find information about a recent hit-and-run accident. Lidster was arrested, and later convicted, for drunk driving. Lidster successfully appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court. It relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) holding that a checkpoint is unconstitutional if its only purpose is to uncover "ordinary criminal wrongdoing." The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.

Question

Does Indianapolis v. Edmond, which dealt with the Fourth and 14th Amendment prohibitions of unreasonable searches and seizures, prohibit checkpoints organized to question motorists about a previous offense and arrest motorists for drunk driving?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Illinois, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court held 6-3 that the Illinois checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and was constitutional. It ruled that the checkpoint was reasonable because it advanced a "grave" public interest - "investigating a crime that had resulted in a human death" - and interfered minimally with Fourth Amendment liberty. The Court distinguished Illinois's "information-seeking" checkpoint from the "crime control" checkpoint struck down in Edmond. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg - while agreeing that Edmond does not invalidate the Illinois checkpoint - dissented from the majority's decision granting constitutional approval to the checkpoint. They argued that the case should have been remanded to the Illinois courts.

Maryland v. Pringle

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-809

Petitioner

Maryland

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Joseph Jermaine Pringle

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 366 (2003)

Granted

Monday, March 24, 2003

Argued

Monday, November 3, 2003

Decided

Monday, December 15, 2003

Advocates

Gary E. Bair (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Nancy S. Forster (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A police officer stopped a car for speeding, searched the car, and seized money from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. The officer arrested the car's three occupants after they denied ownership of the drugs and money. A state court sentenced Pringle, the front- seat passenger, for possessing and intending to distribute cocaine after he signed a written confession. The state appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was in the front-seat of a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for arrest for possession.

Question

Does an arrest of a front-seat passenger in a car driven by its owner, after police find cocaine in the car's back armrest, lack probable cause and violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Maryland, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court ruled that because the officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle, the arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned that "a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe that Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine."

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

Travis County Jail

3614 Bill Price Road Del Valle TX 78617

Del Valle, TX 78617

United States

30° 11' 45.4992" N, 97° 38' 43.8936" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1408

Petitioner

Atwater

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of Lago Vista

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 318 (2001)

Argued

Monday, December 4, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, April 24, 2001

Advocates

Andy Taylor (Et al., as amici curiae, supporting the respondent)

Robert C. De Carli (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Roger J. George, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Under Texas law, it is a misdemeanor, punishable only by a fine, either for a front-seat passenger in a car equipped with safety belts not to wear one or for the driver to fail to secure any small child riding in front. In 1997, Gail Atwater was driving her truck in Lago Vista. Neither of Atwater's children, who were sitting in the front seat, was wearing seatbelts. Lago Vista policeman Bart Turek observed the violations and pulled Atwater over. Ultimately, Atwater was handcuffed, placed in jail, and released on bond. Atwater then filed suit alleging that Turek's actions had violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. In granting the city summary judgment, the District Court ruled the claim meritless. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the arrest was not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes because no one disputed that Turek had probable cause to arrest Atwater, and there was no evidence the arrest was conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to Atwater's privacy interests.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limit a police officer's authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for City of Lago Vista, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. "If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender," wrote Justice Souter for the Court. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissenting opinion argued that the Court's decision "neglects the Fourth Amendment's express command in the name of administrative ease" and thus "cloaks the pointless indignity that Gail Atwater suffered with the mantle of reasonableness."

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:31 +0000

Location

Roadblock Indianapolis, IN

United States

39° 46' 1.2576" N, 86° 9' 22.518" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1030

Petitioner

City of Indianapolis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Edmond

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 32 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, October 3, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, November 28, 2000

Advocates

A. Scott Chinn (Argued the cause for petitioners)

Patricia A. Millett (Argued the cause for petitioners)

Kenneth Falk (Argued the cause for respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office would walk a narcotics-detection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints. They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. The District Court denied a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Are highway checkpoint programs, whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics, consistent with the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Edmond, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that because the checkpoint program's primary purpose was indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment. "We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime," wrote Justice O'Connor. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the reasonableness of the city's roadblocks depended on whether they served a "significant state interest with minimal intrusion on motorists."

Florida v. White

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-223

Petitioner

Florida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

White

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 559 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, March 23, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 17, 1999

Advocates

Carolyn M. Snurkowski (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court)

David P. Gauldin (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Two months after officers observed Tyvessel Tyvorus White using his car to deliver cocaine, he was arrested at his workplace on unrelated charges. At the same time, the arresting officers seized his car, without securing a warrant, because they believed that it was subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. During a subsequent inventory search, the police discovered cocaine in the car. White was then charged with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Florida law. At White's trial on the drug charge, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search, arguing that the car's warrantless seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, thereby making the cocaine the "fruit of the poisonous tree." After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court denied the motion. On appeal, the Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed. The court also certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless seizure of an automobile under the Act violated the Fourth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court answered that the warrantless seizure did violate the Fourth Amendment, quashed the lower court opinion, and remanded. The court reasoned that although the police developed probable cause to believe a violation of the Act had occurred, this alone did not justify a warrantless seizure.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment require the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Florida, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband. Thomas wrote: "Although the police here lacked probable cause to believe that [White's] car contained contraband, they had probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was contraband under Florida law. ... [T]he need to seize readily movable contraband before it is spirited away...is equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed to its contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure." In dissenting, Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg concluded that the seizure was not reasonable without a warrant.

Wyoming v. Houghton

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:13 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-184

Petitioner

Wyoming

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Houghton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 295 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, January 12, 1999

Decided

Monday, April 5, 1999

Advocates

Barbara B. McDowell (Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Paul S. Rehurek (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Donna D. Domonkos (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After pulling Sandra Haughton's friend over during a routine traffic stop, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer noticed a needle in the driver's shirt pocket. Upon learning that the needle was used for drugs, the officer searched the car and Haughton's purse, where he found more drug paraphernalia. Haughton challenged her subsequent arrest on drug charges, alleging that the officer's search of her purse was unconstitutional. On appeal from an adverse appeals court ruling, overturning a favorable trial court decision, the Supreme Court granted Wyoming certiorari.

Question

May police officers, with probable cause to search a car, inspect personal items belonging to its passengers without violating the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Wyoming, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court held that so long as there is probable cause to search a stopped vehicle, all subsequent searches of its contents are legal as well. The Court added that such searches are especially warranted if aimed at looking into objects or personal belongings capable of concealing items that are the object of the search.

Knowles v. Iowa

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:30 +0000

Location

Knowles' Car Jasper County, IA

United States

41° 38' 29.3712" N, 93° 1' 3.2556" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-7597

Petitioner

Knowles

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Iowa

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 113 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, November 3, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, December 8, 1998

Advocates

Bridget A. Chambers (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Paul Rosenberg (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After stopping him for speeding, an Iowa police officer issued Patrick Knowles a citation and conducted a full search of his car without probable cause or Knowles' consent. When his search turned up a "pot pipe" and some marijuana, the officer arrested Knowles on state drug charges. Knowles challenged these on grounds that because he was not arrested at any time prior to the search, the search was unconstitutional. On appeal from consecutive adverse rulings in lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Knowles certiorari.

Question

Can a search of a stopped vehicle, that occurs prior to the driver's arrest, be sustained under the "search incident to arrest" exception that permits officers to search stopped vehicles without first obtaining a search warrant?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Knowles, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. In a unanimous opinion that Court held that full stopped-car searches can only be conducted when the safety of the officers is at risk. One significant indication of such danger is when an officer arrests the subject as a reaction to possible or actual threat. In the present case, no serious danger accompanied the stop of Knowles car as evidenced by the officer's initial decision not to arrest Knowles or even issue him a ticket. As such, regardless of its uncovered contents, the subsequent search violated the "search incident to arrest" power and the Fourth Amendment's prohibition again unlawful search and seizures.

Maryland v. Wilson

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:28 +0000

Location

Wilson's Car

I-95 Baltimore County MD

Baltimore County, MD

United States

39° 52' 53.6808" N, 75° 15' 11.9016" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1268

Petitioner

Maryland

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wilson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 408 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, December 11, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, February 19, 1997

Advocates

J. Joseph Curran, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Janet Reno (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae supporting the petitioner)

Byron L. Warnkbn (on behalf of the Respondent)

Byron L. Warnken (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After a Maryland state trooper stopped the speeding car in which he was riding, a nervous Wilson was ordered to step out. As he did, a quantity of cocaine fell on the ground. When arrested for possession with intent to distribute, Wilson challenged the manner in which the evidence against him was obtained. After the Baltimore County Circuit Court ruled to suppress the evidence against Wilson, Maryland appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals - which affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Maryland certiorari.

Question

Did Maryland's state trooper violate the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure guarantees by ordering Wilson, a mere passenger in the suspect vehicle, to exit the car during a traffic stop?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Maryland, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. The Court held that after lawfully stopping a speeding vehicle, an officer may order its passengers to step out. While burdening their personal liberty somewhat, officers must be permitted such authority over passengers if the overriding government's interest in officer safety is to be protected.

Ohio v. Robinette

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-891

Petitioner

Ohio

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robinette

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 33 (1996)

Argued

Tuesday, October 8, 1996

Decided

Monday, November 18, 1996

Advocates

Carley J. Ingram (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

James D. Ruppert (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae, in support of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After stopping Robinette for speeding, an Ohio deputy warned him, returned his license, and asked him if he had any illegal contraband, weapons, or drugs in his car. Robinette answered "no" but after agreeing to have his car searched, the officer found some marijuana and a pill that later proved to be a powerful drug. On appeal from the Ohio Court of Appeals' reversal of his lower court conviction for possession of a controlled substance, the Ohio Supreme Court Affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Ohio certiorari.

Question

Does the Fourth Amendment's protection against illegal search and seizures require that a lawfully detained defendant be told that he is "free to go" before he can be said to have voluntarily agreed to any subsequent search?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Ohio, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. After establishing its federal jurisdiction, despite a claim that the matter involved aspects of Ohio's Constitution, the Court held that when looking at the totality of the circumstances it may be reasonably concluded that if a defendant consents to be searched, even if not first advised that he is "free to go," the ensuing search will be recognized as voluntary. The Court also added that Robinette's arrest on drug possession charges was lawful, even though the arresting officer did not stop him on an initial suspicion of drug possession nor intend to even issue him a speeding ticket.

Whren v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:49 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-5841

Petitioner

Whren

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

517 U.S. 806 (1996)

Argued

Wednesday, April 17, 1996

Decided

Monday, June 10, 1996

Advocates

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the Respondent)

Lisa Burget Wright (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Whren and Brown were driving in a 'high drug area.' Some plainclothes officers, while patrolling the neighborhood in an unmarked vehicle, noticed Whren and Brown sitting in a truck at an intersection stop-sign for an usually long time. Suddenly, without signaling, Whren turned his truck and sped away. Observing this traffic violation, the officers stopped the truck. When they approached the vehicle, the officers saw Whren holding plastic bags of crack cocaine. Whren and Brown were arrested on federal drug charges. Before trial, they moved to suppress the evidence contending that the officers used the traffic violation as a pretext for stopping the truck because they lacked either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop them on suspicion of drug dealing. The District Court denied the motion to suppress and convicted the petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Did the officers conduct an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. The unanimous Court held that as long as officers have a reasonable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, they may stop any vehicle. In the present case, the officers had reasonable cause to stop the petitioners for a traffic violation since they sped away from a stop sign at an 'unreasonable speed' and without using their turn signal. Thus, since an actual traffic violation occurred, the ensuing search and seizure of the offending vehicle was reasonable, regardless of what other personal motivations the officers might have had for stopping the vehicle. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim that the anxiety, confusion, and haste which the petitioners experienced from the stop-and-search outweighed the government's interest in traffic safety. While the Fourth Amendment does require a balancing test between a search-and-seizure's benefits and the harm it might cause to the individual, such a test only applies to unusually harmful searches and seizures. There was nothing unusually harmful about this traffic stop.

Arizona v. Evans

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1660

Petitioner

Arizona

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Evans

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 1 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, December 7, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, March 1, 1995

Advocates

Carol A. Carrigan (on behalf of the Respondent)

Gerald R. Grant (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Arizona, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Exclusionary Rule (admissibility of evidence allegedly in violation of the Fourth Amendment)

None

United States v. Padilla

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-207

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Padilla et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

508 U.S. 77 (1993)

Argued

Wednesday, March 24, 1993

Decided

Monday, May 3, 1993

Advocates

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Walter B. Nash, III (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Florida v. Jimeno

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-622

Petitioner

Florida

Respondent

Jimeno

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 248 (1991)

Argued

Monday, March 25, 1991

Decided

Thursday, May 23, 1991

Advocates

Michael J. Neimand (Argued the case for the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the case for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Jeffrey S. Weiner (Argued the case for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

A Dade County police officer overheard Enio Jimeno arranging what appeared to be a drug transaction over a public telephone. He followed in his car, and eventually pulled Jimeno over for a traffic violation. He told him he had reason to believe Jimeno had drugs in the car, and asked for permission to search it. Jimeno consented, and a search revealed a brown paper bag with cocaine inside it. At trial, Jimeno argued that his consent to the search of the car did not extend to the closed paper bag within the car. The trial court agreed, excluded the drugs found inside the bag as the product of an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court both affirmed.

Question

Does a suspect's consent to a search of his vehicle extend to closed containers found inside?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Florida, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches. "The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," wrote Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in the majority opinion. "We think it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container."

Florida v. Bostick

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:23 +0000

Location

Bus where Bostick boarded Fort Lauderdale, FL

United States

26° 7' 20.3088" N, 80° 8' 36.1644" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1717

Petitioner

Florida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bostick

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 429 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 1991

Advocates

Kenneth W. Starr (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Joan Fowler (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Donald B. Ayer (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In Broward County, Florida, Sheriff's Department officers regularly boarded buses during stops to ask passenger for permission to search their luggage. Terrance Bostick, a passenger, was questioned by two officers who sought permission to search his belongings and advised him of his right to refuse. After obtaining Bostick's permission, the officers searched his bags, found cocaine, and arrested him on drug trafficking charges. Bostick filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained, but the trial court denied the motion. Following an affirmance and certification from the Florida Court of Appeals, the State Supreme Court held that the bus searches were per se unconstitutional because police did not afford passengers the opportunity to "leave the bus" in order to avoid questioning. Florida appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Is the acquisition of evidence during random bus searches, conducted pursuant to passengers' consent, a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unconstitutional search and seizure?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Florida, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. The Court, in a 6-to-3 decision, noted that when deciding if a search request is overly coercive, within a confined space such as a bus, one must not look at whether a party felt "free to leave," but whether a party felt free to decline or terminate the search encounter. The Court held that in the absence of intimidation or harassment, Bostick could have refused the search request. Moreover, the fact that he knew the search would produce contraband had no bearing on whether his consent was voluntarily obtained. The test of whether a "reasonable person" felt free to decline or terminate a search presupposes his or her innocence.

California v. Acevedo

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:23 +0000

Location

Acevedo's Car

West Stevens Avenue Santa Ana CA 92707

Santa Ana, CA 92707

United States

33° 41' 40.8228" N, 117° 52' 16.8204" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1690

Petitioner

California

Respondent

Acevedo

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 565 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 1991

Decided

Thursday, May 30, 1991

Advocates

Robert Foster (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Fred W. Anderson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

California police officers saw Charles Acevedo enter an apartment known to contain several packages of marijuana and leave a short time later carrying a paper bag approximately the same size as one of the packages. When Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car and began to drive away, the officers stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Avecedo made a motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence, since the police had not had a search warrant. When the trial court denied his motion, Acevedo pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, ruling that the marijuana should have been suppressed as evidence. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that officers can thoroughly search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe there is evidence somewhere in the vehicle (U.S. v. Ross), and also that officers need a warrant to search a closed container (U.S. v. Chadwick). The California Court of Appeal decided that the latter case was more relevant. Since the officers only had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence - not the car generally - they could not open the bag without a search warrant. The California Supreme Court denied review, but the Supreme Court granted the State's petition.

Question

Under the Fourth Amendment, may police conduct a warrantless search of a container within an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that the container holds evidence?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for California, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled that the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's general search-warrant requirement is broad enough to cover a situation where the police only have probable cause to believe there is evidence in a specific movable container within the car. The Court noted that the warrant requirement previously had depended on a "curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." In place of that uncertain distinction, the Court adopted a single rule: "The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." Justices White, Stevens, and Marshall dissented.

Alabama v. White

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-789

Petitioner

Alabama

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

White

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

496 U.S. 325 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, April 17, 1990

Decided

Monday, June 11, 1990

Advocates

David B. Byrne, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Joseph G. L. Marston, III (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Alabama, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:22 +0000

Location

Michigan State Police Department

333 S. Grand Ave. Lansing MI 48909

Lansing, MI 48909

United States

42° 43' 50.9304" N, 84° 33' 2.4228" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1897

Petitioner

Michigan Department of State Police

Respondent

Rick Sitz

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

496 U.S. 444 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, February 27, 1990

Decided

Thursday, June 14, 1990

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Stephen L. Nightingale (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Mark Granzotto (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1986, the Michigan State Police Department created a sobriety checkpoint program aimed at reducing drunk driving within the state. The program included guidelines governing the location of roadblocks and the amount of publicity to be given to the operation. Before the first roadblock went into effect, Rick Sitz, a licensed Michigan driver, challenged the checkpoints and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Sitz was victorious in the Michigan lower courts.

Question

Did the drunk driving checkpoints violate motorists' privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Michigan Department of State Police, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the roadblocks did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted that "no one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it." The Court then found that "the weight bearing on the other scale--the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints--is slight." The Court also found that empirical evidence supported the effectiveness of the program.

Florida v. Wells

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:07 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1835

Petitioner

Florida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wells

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

495 U.S. 1 (1990)

Argued

Monday, December 4, 1989

Decided

Wednesday, April 18, 1990

Advocates

Michael J. Neimand (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Huntley Johnson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wells, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

Brower v. Inyo County

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-248

Petitioner

Brower

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Inyo County

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

489 U.S. 593 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, January 11, 1989

Decided

Tuesday, March 21, 1989

Advocates

Philip W. McDowell (on behalf of the Respondents)

Robert Gene Gilmore (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Brower, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

Colorado v. Bertine

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-889

Petitioner

Colorado

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bertine

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

479 U.S. 367 (1987)

Argued

Monday, November 10, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, January 14, 1987

Advocates

John M. Haried (on behalf of Petitioner)

Cary C. Lacklen (on behalf of Respondent)

Richard J. Lazarus (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, supporting Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Colorado, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

New York v. Class

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1181

Petitioner

New York

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Class

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

475 U.S. 106 (1986)

Argued

Monday, November 4, 1985

Decided

Tuesday, February 25, 1986

Advocates

Mark C. Cogan (Pro Hac Vice)

Steven P. Kartagener (on behalf of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for New York, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

Oklahoma v. Castleberry

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:14 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-2126

Petitioner

Oklahoma

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Castleberry

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

471 U.S. 146 (1985)

Argued

Wednesday, March 20, 1985

Decided

Monday, April 1, 1985

Advocates

Charles Foster Cox (on behalf of the respondent)

David W. Lee (on behalf of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Castleberry, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

United States v. Johns

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1625

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Johns

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

469 U.S. 478 (1985)

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 1984

Decided

Monday, January 21, 1985

Advocates

Alan I. Horowitz (on behalf of petitioner)

William G. Walker (on behalf of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

California v. Carney

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-859

Petitioner

California

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Carney

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

471 U.S. 386 (1985)

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 1984

Decided

Monday, May 13, 1985

Advocates

Thomas F. Homann (on behalf of respondent)

Louis R. Hanoian (on behalf of petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for California, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

Texas v. Brown

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-419

Petitioner

Texas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brown

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

460 U.S. 730 (1983)

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 1983

Decided

Tuesday, April 19, 1983

Advocates

Allan K. Butcher (on behalf of the Respondent)

C. Chris Marshall (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Texas, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

United States v. Ross

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:15 +0000

Location

Vehicle of Ross

439 Ridge Street Washington D.C. 20001

Washington 20001

United States

38° 54' 24.0228" N, 77° 1' 3.0288" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-2209

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ross

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

456 U.S. 798 (1982)

Argued

Monday, March 1, 1982

Decided

Tuesday, June 1, 1982

Advocates

Andrew L. Frey (Argued the cause for the United States)

William J. Garber (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Acting on a tip that Ross was selling drugs from his car in the District of Columbia, police officers pulled Ross over, opened his trunk, and discovered a bag of heroin. After returning to the station, another search uncovered $3200 in cash. Officers acted without a warrant in each search.

Question

Did the police violate the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

The Court held that since the search was done with probable cause and extended into the realm (Ross's car) of which a magistrate issuing a warrant would have approved, the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stevens defended the search of the vehicle's trunk, arguing that if probable cause justifies a vehicle search, then every part of the vehicle is open to inspection.

Robbins v. California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-148

Petitioner

Robbins

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

453 U.S. 420 (1981)

Argued

Monday, April 27, 1981

Decided

Wednesday, July 1, 1981

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Robbins, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

New York v. Belton

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-328

Petitioner

New York

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Belton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

453 U.S. 454 (1981)

Argued

Monday, April 27, 1981

Decided

Wednesday, July 1, 1981

Advocates

Paul J. Cambria, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

James R. Harvey (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Andrew L. Frey (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for New York, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

United States v. Cortez

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-404

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cortez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

449 U.S. 411 (1981)

Argued

Monday, December 1, 1980

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 1981

Advocates

Barbara E. Etkind (on behalf of the Petitioner)

S. Jeffrey Minker (on behalf of the Respondent, Jesus E. Cortez)

Bernardo P. Velasco (on behalf of the Respondent Pedro Hernandez-Loera)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

Arkansas v. Sanders

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-1497

Petitioner

Arkansas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sanders

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

442 U.S. 753 (1979)

Argued

Tuesday, February 27, 1979

Decided

Wednesday, June 20, 1979

Advocates

Joseph H. Purvis (Argued the cause for the petitioner pro hac vice)

Jack T. Lassiter (By appointment of the Court, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Local police in Little Rock, Arkansas received a tip that an individual would be arriving at the airport with a suitcase containing a significant quantity of marijuana. Upon arriving, the suspect retrieved his suitcase and left in a taxi. The police officers pursued and stopped the taxi, and ordered the driver to open the trunk which revealed the suitcase in question. The police opened the suitcase without obtaining permission from its owner and found nearly ten pounds of marijuana.

Question

Did the warrantless search of the suitcase by the police violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments which prohibit unreasonable searches?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Sanders, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile. In this case, Justice Powell applied the principle which the Court had identified in United States v. Chadwick (1977), namely, that a locked footlocker which had been loaded into a vehicle could not be opened without a warrant. Since the Little Rock police officers had exclusive control of the luggage at the time of their search, there was no danger that its contents could have been tampered with or removed before a valid warrant could have been obtained. Powell concluded that since "luggage is a common repository of one's personal effects" it is "associated with the expectation of privacy."

Delaware v. Prouse

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-1571

Petitioner

Delaware

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Prouse

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

440 U.S. 648 (1979)

Argued

Wednesday, January 17, 1979

Decided

Tuesday, March 27, 1979

Advocates

Charles M. Oberly, III (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David M. Lukoff (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Delaware patrolman stopped William Prouse's car to make a routine check of his driver's license and vehicle registration. The officer had not observed any traffic violation or suspicious conduct on the part of Prouse. After stopping the car, the officer uncovered marijuana. The marijuana was later used to indict Prouse.

Question

Did the officer's search of Prouse's automobile constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Prouse, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the privacy interests of travelers outweighed the state interests in discretionary spot checks of automobiles. The Court found that random checks made only marginal contributions to roadway safety and compliance with registration requirements; less intrusive means could have been used to serve the same ends. Officers must be held to a "probable cause" standard for searches, otherwise individuals would be subject to "unfettered governmental intrusion" each time they entered an automobile.

Massachusetts v. White

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-1388

Petitioner

Massachusetts

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

White

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

439 U.S. 280 (1978)

Argued

Tuesday, November 28, 1978

Decided

Monday, December 11, 1978

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for White, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Rakas v. Illinois

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-5781

Petitioner

Rakas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

439 U.S. 128 (1978)

Argued

Tuesday, October 3, 1978

Decided

Tuesday, December 5, 1978

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Illinois, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

United States v. Chadwick

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

75-1721

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chadwick

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

433 U.S. 1 (1977)

Argued

Tuesday, April 26, 1977

Decided

Tuesday, June 21, 1977

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Chadwick, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:18:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-1560

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Martinez-Fuerte

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 75-5387

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

428 U.S. 543 (1976)

Argued

Monday, April 26, 1976

Decided

Tuesday, July 6, 1976

Facts of the Case

Martinez-Fuerte and others were charged with transporting illegal Mexican aliens. They were stopped at a routine fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of the vehicle's occupants on a major highway not far from the Mexican border.

Question

Do such stops violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No, because if there is a reasonable collective suspicion, then individuals can be searched in the interest of public safety. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., writing for the 7-to-2 majority, said: "The defendants note correctly that to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.... But the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion."

Prepared by Michael Brandow.

South Dakota v. Opperman

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:18:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

75-76

Petitioner

South Dakota

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Opperman

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

428 U.S. 364 (1976)

Argued

Monday, March 29, 1976

Decided

Tuesday, July 6, 1976

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for South Dakota, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

United States v. Watson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:18:43 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-538

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Watson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

423 U.S. 411 (1976)

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 1975

Decided

Monday, January 26, 1976

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

United States v. Ortiz

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:33:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

73-2050

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ortiz

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

422 U.S. 891 (1975)

Argued

Tuesday, February 18, 1975

Decided

Monday, June 30, 1975

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ortiz, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:33:31 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-114

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brignoni-Ponce

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

422 U.S. 873 (1975)

Argued

Tuesday, February 18, 1975

Decided

Monday, June 30, 1975

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Brignoni-Ponce, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

Cardwell v. Lewis

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:34:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

72-1603

Petitioner

Cardwell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lewis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

417 U.S. 583 (1974)

Argued

Monday, March 18, 1974

Decided

Monday, June 17, 1974

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Cardwell, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

Gustafson v. Florida

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:34:52 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

71-1669

Petitioner

Gustafson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

414 U.S. 260 (1973)

Argued

Tuesday, October 9, 1973

Decided

Tuesday, December 11, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Florida, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

United States v. Robinson

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:07 +0000

Location

Robinson's car during a traffic stop

9th St NW & U St NW Washington DC 20001

Washington, DC 20001

United States

38° 55' 1.1568" N, 77° 1' 26.1912" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

72-936

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robinson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

414 U.S. 218 (1973)

Argued

Tuesday, October 9, 1973

Decided

Tuesday, December 11, 1973

Facts of the Case

A police officer pulled over and arresting Robinson for operating an automobile without a valid permit. The officer then frisked Robinson and discovered a crumpled cigarette package containing fourteen vials of heroin in his pocket.

Question

Did the officer's search violate the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

The Court upheld the search. Distinguishing between searches done to discover concealed weapons and those conducted coextensive with an arrest, Justice Rehnquist argued since the officer did not conduct the search in an abusive or extreme manner, and because he acted consistent with the authority vested in a police officer when making an arrest, his actions were legitimate.

Cady v. Dombrowski

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

72-586

Petitioner

Cady

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dombrowski

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

413 U.S. 433 (1973)

Argued

Wednesday, March 21, 1973

Decided

Thursday, June 21, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Cady, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

71-6278

Petitioner

Almeida-Sanchez

Respondent

United States

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

413 U.S. 266 (1973)

Argued

Monday, March 19, 1973, Wednesday, March 28, 1973

Decided

Thursday, June 21, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Almeida-Sanchez, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

71-732

Petitioner

Schneckloth

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bustamonte

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

412 U.S. 218 (1973)

Argued

Tuesday, October 10, 1972

Decided

Tuesday, May 29, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Schneckloth, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None

Adams v. Williams

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:32:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

70-283

Petitioner

Adams

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Williams

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

407 U.S. 143 (1972)

Argued

Monday, April 10, 1972

Decided

Monday, June 12, 1972

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Adams, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

None