Cases by Issue - State Tax

Missouri Director of Revenue v. CoBank ACB

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1792

Petitioner

Missouri Director of Revenue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

CoBank ACB

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 316 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, November 28, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, February 20, 2001

Advocates

Richard A. Hanson (Argued the cause for the respondent)

David C. Frederick (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

James R. Layton (Jefferson City, Missouri, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Farm Credit Act of 1933 created various lending institutions, including banks for cooperatives, which are designated as federally chartered instrumentalities of the United States. CoBank ACB is the successor to all rights and obligations of the National Bank for Cooperatives. In 1996, CoBank filed amended returns on behalf of that bank, requesting an exemption from all Missouri corporate income taxes and refunds on the taxes it paid for 1991 through 1994. CoBank asserted that the Supremacy Clause accords federal instrumentalities immunity from state taxation unless Congress has expressly waived this immunity, which the Act did not expressly do. The state of Missouri denied the request, but the State Supreme Court reversed, stating that because the Act's current version is silent as to the banks' tax immunity, Congress cannot be said to have expressly consented to state income taxation and, thus, the banks are exempt.

Question

Is the National Bank for Cooperatives, which Congress has designated as a federally chartered instrumentality of the United States, exempt from state income taxation?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Missouri Director of Revenue, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 12 U.S.C. 2134

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that banks for cooperatives are subject to taxation. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that nothing in the 1985 amendments to the Farm Credit Act indicated a repeal of the previous express approval of state taxation and that the structure of the Act indicated by negative implication that banks for cooperatives were not entitled to immunity.

Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board of California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-2043

Petitioner

Hunt-Wesson, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Franchise Tax Board of California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 458 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, February 22, 2000

Advocates

Walter Hellerstein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David Lew (Oakland, California, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

California's "unitary business" income-calculation system for determining the State's taxable share of a multistate corporation's business income authorizes a deduction for interest expense. The system, however, permits use of that deduction only to the extent that the amount exceeds certain out-of-state income arising from the unrelated business activity of a discrete business enterprise. Hunt-Wesson, Inc. is a successor in interest to a nondomiciliary corporation that incurred interest expense. California disallowed a deduction for the expense insofar as it had received nonunitary dividend and interest income. Hunt-Wesson challenged the validity of the disallowance. The California Court of Appeal found the disallowance constitutional. The California Supreme Court denied review.

Question

Does California's exception to its interest expense deduction, which it measures by the amount of nonunitary dividend and interest income that a nondomiciliary corporation has received, violate the Due Process and Commerce Clauses?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the provision violates the Due Process and Commerce Clauses. "California's statute does not directly impose a tax on nonunitary income. Rather, it simply denies the taxpayer use of a portion of a deduction from unitary income..., income which does bear a 'rational relationship' or 'nexus' to California," wrote Justice Breyer. "Because California's offset provision is not a reasonable allocation of expense deductions to the income that the expense generates, it constitutes impermissible taxation of income outside its jurisdictional reach," concluded Justice Breyer.

Jefferson County v. Acker

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-10

Petitioner

Jefferson County

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Acker

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 423 (1999)

Argued

Monday, March 29, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 21, 1999

Advocates

Alan B. Morrison (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Jeffrey M. Sewell (Birmingham, Alabama, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kent L. Jones (Argued the cause for the United States, supporting the petitioner, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court)

Facts of the Case

Two U.S. District Judges, William M. Acker, Jr., and U. W. Clemon, who maintain their principal offices in Jefferson County, Alabama, resisted payment of a state-approved, county-authorized occupational tax on the ground that it violates the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. The county instituted collection suits in Alabama small claims court against the judges, who removed the suits to the Federal District Court under the federal officer removal statute. The federal court denied the county's motions to remand and granted summary judgment for the judges, holding the county tax unconstitutional under the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine to the extent that it reached federal judges' compensation. The en banc Court of Appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Jefferson County's initial petition for certiorari and remanded for further consideration of whether the Tax Injunction Act deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its prior en banc decision. Certiorari was granted again to consider whether the removal from state court to federal court was unauthorized by the federal officer removal statute, the Tax Injunction Act issue, and the merits of the case.

Question

May Jefferson County impose a "license or privilege tax" upon two U.S. District Judges? Was the dispute properly transferred to the federal district court under the federal officer removal statute? Does the Tax Injunction Act deprive the district court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Jefferson County, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 4 U.S.C. 111

Yes, yes, and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Jefferson County may impose an occupation tax on the U.S. District Judges, for "Jefferson County's tax operates as a nondiscriminatory tax on the judges' compensation, to which the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939 consents when it allows States to tax the pay that federal employees receive if the taxation does not discriminate against [that] employee because of the source of the pay or compensation." Further, the Court held that the case was properly removed under the federal officer removal statute because the Jefferson County tax effects the judges' "performance of federal judicial duties in the county and risks interfering with the Federal Judiciary's operation in violation of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine." The Court also concluded that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar federal-court adjudication of the matter.

South Central Bell Telephone v. Alabama

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:14 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-2045

Petitioner

South Central Bell Telephone

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alabama

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 160 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, January 19, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, March 23, 1999

Advocates

Mark L. Evans (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Charles J. Cooper (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Alabama requires each corporation doing business in that state to pay a franchise tax based on the firm's capital. A domestic firm, organized under the laws of Alabama, has leeway in controlling its own tax base and tax liability. A foreign firm, organized under the laws of a State other than Alabama, does not have similar leeway to control its tax base. In 1986, the Reynolds Metals Company and other foreign corporations sued Alabama's tax authorities, seeking a refund of the foreign franchise tax they had paid on the ground that the tax discriminated against foreign corporations in violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected Reynolds' claims, holding that the special burden imposed on foreign corporations simply offset a different burden imposed exclusively on domestic corporations by Alabama's domestic shares tax. During the Reynolds case, the South Central Bell Telephone Company and others brought a suit asserting similar Commerce and Equal Protection Clause claims. The Alabama trial court agreed with South Central Bell that the tax substantially discriminated against foreign corporations, but nonetheless dismissed their claims as barred by res judicata in light of the State Supreme Court's Reynolds decision. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.

Question

Does Alabama's franchise tax discriminates against interstate commerce, in violation of the Commerce Clause? Did the Alabama Supreme Court's refusal to permit the South Central Bell Telephone Company and others to raise their constitutional claims because of res judicata deprive them of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for South Central Bell Telephone, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Alabama franchise tax was unconstitutional. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that, "Alabama law gives domestic corporations the ability to reduce their franchise tax liability..., while it denies foreign corporations that same ability. And no one claims that the different tax rates for foreign and domestic corporations offset the difference in the tax base. The tax therefore facially discriminates against interstate commerce and is unconstitutional unless the State can offer a sufficient justification for it." The Court concluded the State could not justify the tax. The Court also held that the State Supreme Court's decision was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee because the South Central Bell case was unrelated to the court's prior judgement and thus could not be bound by it. Furthermore, the Court rejected the State's argument that the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.

Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1462

Petitioner

Lunding

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

New York Tax Appeals Tribunal

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 287 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, November 5, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 1998

Advocates

Andrew D. Bing (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Christopher H. Lunding (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

New York Tax Law section 631(b)(6) denies only nonresident taxpayers a state income tax deduction for alimony paid. In 1990, Christopher Lunding and his wife, residents of Connecticut, were required to pay higher taxes on their New York income when the State denied their attempted deduction of a pro rata portion of the alimony Lunding paid a previous spouse. Lunding commenced suit, asserting that section 631(b)(6) discriminates against New York nonresidents in violation of the Privileges and Immunities, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals held that section 631(b)(6) was adequately justified because New York residents who are subject to taxation on all of their income regardless of source should be entitled to the benefit of full deduction of expenses, while personal expenses of a nonresident taxpayer are more appropriately allocated to the State of residence.

Question

Does New York Tax Law section 631(b)(6), which effectively denies only nonresident taxpayers a state income tax deduction for alimony paid, violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 4, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Privileges and Immunities Clause

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that, in the absence of a substantial reason for the difference in treatment of nonresidents, section 631(b)(6) violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause by denying only nonresidents an income tax deduction for alimony payments. "The alimony obligation may be of a 'personal' nature, but it cannot be viewed as geographically fixed in the manner that other expenses, such as business losses, mortgage interest payments, or real estate taxes, might be," wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined.

Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:28 +0000

Location

Camp Newfound Owatonna

4 Camp Newfound Rd. Harrison ME 04040

Harrison, ME 04040

United States

44° 4' 49.1268" N, 70° 40' 26.5044" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-1988

Petitioner

Camps Newfound/Owatonna

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harrison

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 564 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, October 9, 1996

Decided

Monday, May 19, 1997

Advocates

William L. Plouffe (Argued the cause for the respondents)

William H. Dempsey (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. (Camps) operates a children's church camp in Maine and finances its operations through a $400 per camper weekly tuition charge. The majority of its campers are out of state children. Maine's tax scheme exempts charitable institutions incorporated in the state, and provides a more limited tax benefit for institutions which principally benefit non- Maine residents so long as their weekly service charge does not exceed $30 per person. Ineligible for any exemptions, Camps challenged the constitutionality of Maine's tax exemption statute. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari following a reversal of a favorable Superior Court ruling by the Supreme Court of Maine.

Question

Did Maine's tax exemption statute violate the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that Maine's tax exemption statute violated the dormant commerce clause since it selectively awarded greater tax benefits to those institutions which served mostly state residents, while penalizing institutions that conducted mostly interstate business. By imposing such selective benefits on a commercial activity in which it did not directly participate, the Court found Maine's governmental tax regulations to be an unconstitutional form of economic protectionism favoring local consumers and business providers.

General Motors Corp. v. Tracy

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1232

Petitioner

General Motors Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tracy

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 278 (1997)

Argued

Monday, October 7, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, February 18, 1997

Advocates

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Columbus, Ohio, argued the cause for the respondent)

Timothy B. Dyk (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The State of Ohio imposes general sales and use taxes on natural gas purchases from all sellers, whether in-state or out-of-state, that do not meet its statutory definition of a "natural gas company." Ohio's state-regulated natural gas utilities, known as local distribution companies or LDC's, satisfy the definition. Other producers and independent marketers, according to the State Supreme Court, generally do not. During the period in question, General Motors Corporation (GMC) bought virtually all the gas for its plants from out- of-state independent marketers, rather than from LDC's, making it subject to the Ohio tax. In front of the State Supreme Court, GMC argued that denying a tax exemption to sales by marketers but not LDC's violates the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. After an initial conclusion, the court held that GMC lacked standing to bring a Commerce Clause challenge. The court then dismissed the equal protection claim as buried in GMC's Commerce Clause argument.

Question

Does the State of Ohio's different tax treatment of sales of gas by domestic utilities subject to regulation and sales of gas by other entities violate the Commerce Clause or Equal Protection Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Tracy, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Ohio's differential tax treatment of natural gas sales by public utilities and independent marketers violated neither the Commerce Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause. After concluding that GMC had standing to raise a Commerce Clause challenge, Justice Souter wrote for the Court, "we conclude that Ohio's regulatory response to the needs of the local natural gas market has resulted in a noncompetitive bundled gas product that distinguishes its regulated sellers from independent marketers to the point that the enterprises should not be considered 'similarly situated' for purposes of a claim of facial discrimination under the Commerce Clause. GMC's argument that the State discriminates between regulated local gas utilities and unregulated marketers must therefore fail." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Fulton Corporation v. Faulkner

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-1239

Petitioner

Fulton Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Faulkner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

516 U.S. 325 (1996)

Argued

Tuesday, October 31, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, February 21, 1996

Advocates

Jasper L. Cummings, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Charles A. Rothfeld (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After North Carolina levied an "intangibles tax" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by state residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax, the Fulton Corporation, a North Carolina company, filed a state-court action against the State Secretary of Revenue, seeking judgment that the tax violated the Federal Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The trial court ruled for the Secretary, but North Carolina's Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the taxable percentage deduction violated the Commerce Clause. In reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that the State's scheme imposed a valid compensatory tax and that the intangibles tax imposed less of a burden on interstate commerce than the corporate income tax placed on intrastate commerce.

Question

Does North Carolina's "intangibles tax" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by North Carolina residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax violate the Federal Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fulton Corporation, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that North Carolina's intangibles tax discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. Justice Souter reasoned that the tax discriminated on face against interstate commerce by taxing stock only to the extent that its issuing corporation participated in interstate commerce. "North Carolina's intangibles tax facially discriminates against interstate commerce, it fails justification as a valid compensatory tax, and, accordingly, it cannot stand," wrote Justice Souter. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion.

Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1677

Petitioner

Oklahoma Tax Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jefferson Lines, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 175 (1995)

Argued

Monday, November 28, 1994

Decided

Monday, April 3, 1995

Advocates

Stanley P. Johnston (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Steven D. DeRuyter (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Oklahoma Tax Commission, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Reich v. Collins, Revenue Commissioner Of Georgia

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-908

Petitioner

Reich

Respondent

Collins, Revenue Commissioner Of Georgia, et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 106 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, October 11, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, December 6, 1994

Advocates

Carlton M. Henson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Warren R. Calvert (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Reich, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Barclays Bank Plc v. Franchise Tax Board Of California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1384

Petitioner

Barclays Bank Plc

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Franchise Tax Board Of California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 92-1839

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 298 (1994)

Argued

Monday, March 28, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 20, 1994

Advocates

James P. Kleier (on behalf of the Petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Company)

Drew S. Days, III (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Joanne M. Garvey (on behalf of the Petitioner Barclays Bank)

Timothy G. Laddish (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

California used a "worldwide combined reporting" method to determine tax liability for multinational corporations operating inside the state. Under this method, the multinational's income was taxed in proportion to the average percentage of worldwide payroll, property, and sales located inside the state. Barclays Bank of California (Barcal) was wholly owned by a multinational corporation, Barclays Bank International Limited (BBI). Barcal did not include financial data for BBI in its 1977 tax filings. The California Franchise Tax Board (Tax Board) determined that Barcal misrepresented the proportion of income subject to taxation, causing a tax deficiency of over one hundred thousand dollars. Barcal and BBI paid, but then sued for the amount paid, complaining that the cost to provide BBI's worldwide financial data was disproportionately large considering that Barcal operated largely independently of BBI and BBI operated largely outside of California. Barcal and BBI contended that this violated the Commerce Clause-derived anti- discrimination requirement, which prevents States from imposing disproportionately large tax compliance burdens upon corporations. The Tax Board allowed BBI to make a "reasonable approximation" of financial data to minimize costs, but BBI claimed that this action violated Due Process by admitting financial data that was possibly inaccurate.

The California Supreme Court found no constitutional violation and remanded the case to a California Court of Appeals, which also did not find the burden disproportionate. Barcal and BBI also contended that the "worldwide combined reporting" method risked double taxation by the state and the federal government. Additionally, The "worldwide combined reporting" method deviated from taxing methods employed by other states, thus transgressing the federal government's interest in providing uniform standards for taxing foreign commerce. (The case was consolidated with Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Board Of California.)

Question

1) Does a state violate the Due Process Clause by accepting "reasonable approximations" of financial data?

2) By requiring multinational corporations to provide exhaustive financial information to calculate taxes, does a State impose a disproportionately large compliance burden upon the corporation and thereby violate the anti- discrimination requirement of the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Franchise Tax Board Of California, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Justice Ruth Ginsburg wrote the opinion for a 7-2 Court. (1) The Court dismissed the alleged Due Process violation because a corporation could take action against the Tax Board if it felt the approximated amount was inaccurate. (2) Reasoning that the use of "reasonable approximations" minimized a multinational's compliance burden, the Court also dismissed the alleged Commerce Clause violation. The Court recognized that the "worldwide combined reporting" method carried a risk of double taxation by both the state and the federal government, but reasoned that this did not violate the Commerce Clause because every other method employed by the state to tax foreign commerce carried the same risk. Also, the Court found no "specific indications of congressional intent" to enforce uniformity in taxation of foreign commerce by preempting the California tax laws.

Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:49 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-397

Petitioner

Associated Industries of Missouri

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lohman

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 641 (1994)

Argued

Monday, March 28, 1994

Decided

Monday, May 23, 1994

Advocates

Don M. Downing (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Thomas C. Walsh (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Following Missouri's imposition of a 1.5% statewide "use tax," the Associated Industries of Missouri - representing Missouri businesses that had to collect the tax and a manufacturing firm that had to pay it - filed suit alleging that the tax violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. Such discrimination was said to result from the fact that the use tax exceeded many in-state localities' sales tax rate.

Question

Does Missouri's use tax violate the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce in those localities where the use tax exceeds the local sales tax?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Associated Industries of Missouri, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. The Court held that the use tax was discriminatory in those localities where it exceeded the local sales tax. Such discrepancies, between certain localities' sales taxes and the state use tax, prevented the latter tax from being a valid "compensatory" tax, since it obviously did not impose a "substantially similar" burden on the interstate and intrastate commerce of such localities. The Court added that in those localities where the use tax did not exceed the local sales tax, no discriminatory treatment resulted and so the use tax's application would not be struck down in its entirety. Instead, the Court remanded the case back to Missouri for a decision on how to best correct certain of its localities' existing tax discrepancies.

Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:27 +0000

Location

Landfill

18177 Cedar Springs Ln Arlington OR 97812

Arlington, OR 97812

United States

45° 34' 25.9752" N, 120° 17' 48.8292" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-70

Petitioner

Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Department of Environmental Quality of The State of Oregon et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 93-108

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 93 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 1994

Decided

Monday, April 4, 1994

Advocates

Andrew J. Pincus (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Thomas A. Balmer (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1989, Oregon Legislature imposed a surcharge on solid waste generated out- of-state and disposed of within the state. The Department of Environmental Quality, determined the amount of the surcharge to be $2.25 per ton, significantly higher than the $0.85 per ton fee charged for in-state waste. Two waste disposal companies —Waste Systems Inc. and Columbia Resource Company (CRC) — disposed of waste generated out-of-state in Oregon. Waste Systems Inc. managed and owned a landfill in Oregon, and CRC transported waste from Washington State to Oregon. The companies challenged the surcharge in the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing that it breached the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. However, the appellate court upheld the surcharge, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.

Question

Is the surcharge that Oregon imposed on the in-state disposal of waste produced out-of-state a violation of the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Oregon Waste Systems, Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. In a majority decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court noted that the Commerce Clause prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, and a regulation is discriminatory if it "taxes a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines." The majority determined that the surcharge was clearly discriminatory because waste disposal companies were required to pay three times more to dispose of waste produced out-of- state. Thus, for the surcharge to comply with the Commerce Clause, the Department of Environmental Quality needed to demonstrate that it had no choice but to use discriminatory means to serve some local purpose, but it failed to do so. Consequently, the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court was reversed.

Department Of Revenue Of Oregon v. Acf Industries, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-74

Petitioner

Department Of Revenue Of Oregon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Acf Industries, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 332 (1994)

Argued

Monday, November 8, 1993

Decided

Monday, January 24, 1994

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (on behalf of the Respondents)

Kent L. Jones (as amicus curiae in support of the Petitioner)

Virginia L. Linder (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Department Of Revenue Of Oregon, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 1150

None

Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston, Commissioner Of Revenue Of Tennessee

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:01:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-321

Petitioner

Itel Containers International Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Huddleston, Commissioner Of Revenue Of Tennessee

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

507 U.S. 60 (1993)

Argued

Wednesday, October 14, 1992

Decided

Tuesday, February 23, 1993

Advocates

Philip W. Collier (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Charles W. Burson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Huddleston, Commissioner Of Revenue Of Tennessee, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department Of Revenue And Finance

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1918

Petitioner

Kraft General Foods, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Iowa Department Of Revenue And Finance

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

505 U.S. 71 (1992)

Argued

Wednesday, April 22, 1992

Decided

Thursday, June 18, 1992

Advocates

Marcia Mason (on behalf of the Respondent)

Kent L. Jones (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae supporting Respondent)

Jerome B. Libin (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Kraft General Foods, Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, Governor Of Alabama

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-471

Petitioner

Chemical Waste Management, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hunt, Governor Of Alabama, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

504 U.S. 334 (1992)

Argued

Tuesday, April 21, 1992

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1992

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (as amicus curiae, supporting Petitioner)

Bert S. Nettles (on behalf of the Respondents)

Andrew J. Pincus (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Allied-Signal, Inc., As Successor-In-Interest To Bendix Corp. v. Director, Division Of Taxation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-615

Petitioner

Allied-Signal, Inc., As Successor-In-Interest To Bendix Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Director, Division Of Taxation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

504 U.S. 768 (1992)

Argued

Wednesday, March 4, 1992

Reargued:

Wednesday, April 22, 1992

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1992

Advocates

Mary R. Hamill (on behalf of the Respondent)

Walter Hellerstein (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Allied-Signal, Inc., As Successor-In-Interest To Bendix Corp., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Nordlinger v. Hahn

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:25 +0000

Location

Residence of Stephanie Nordlinger

Baldwin Hills neighborhood Los Angeles CA

Los Angeles, CA

United States

34° 1' 9.4836" N, 118° 21' 59.9328" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1912

Petitioner

Nordlinger

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hahn

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

505 U.S. 1 (1992)

Argued

Tuesday, February 25, 1992

Decided

Thursday, June 18, 1992

Advocates

Carlyle W. Hall, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

In a statewide ballot, California residents approved the addition of Article XIIIA to their State Constitution. Article XIIIA's "acquisition value" provision limited property assessment value increases to two percent, if caused by changes in ownership or new construction improvements. Article XIIIA exempted two types of transfers from this reassessment limit: first, if the principal seller is 55 or older and moved to a home of equal or lower value, and second, when a transfer occurred between parents and children. One of Article XIIIA's effects is that over time the taxes of new property owners, adjusted to reflect recent values, would be substantially higher than long- term property owner's taxes. A new property owner filed suit to challenge the state constitutional amendment.

Question

Does Article XIIIA's "acquisition value provision," which created a dramatic disparity in the property taxes paid by long-term property owners as compared with new property owners, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against new property owners?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Hahn, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

The Court, through Justice Blackmun, held that California's new property tax system rationally and plausibly furthered legitimate state interests in restraining increasing property taxes and preserving local neighborhood stability. The discrepancy which Article XIIIA created between new and long time property owners is warranted, because the latter had a far greater reliance interest in their property than the former. Thus, long-time property owners deserved more protection from higher property taxes than new property owners. This demonstrated a significant difference between the two property owner types. In addition, both of Article XIIIA's exemptions rationally promoted a legitimate state interest. The first exemption did not discourage older people from moving to a smaller home that is likely to better suit their smaller family and income. The second exemption aimed at preserving family unity and neighborhood stability. Accordingly, the Court held that Article XIIIA did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

Wisconsin Department Of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-119

Petitioner

Wisconsin Department Of Revenue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

William Wrigley, Jr., Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

505 U.S. 214 (1992)

Argued

Wednesday, January 22, 1992

Decided

Friday, June 19, 1992

Advocates

F. Thomas Creeron, III (on behalf of the Petitioner)

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Wisconsin Department Of Revenue, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 381

None

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, By And Through Its Tax Commissioner, Heitkamp

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:25 +0000

Location

North Dakota State Tax Commissioner

600 E Boulevard Ave Bismarck ND 58505

Bismarck, ND 58505

United States

46° 49' 0.4008" N, 100° 46' 58.1484" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-194

Petitioner

Quill Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

North Dakota, By And Through Its Tax Commissioner, Heitkamp

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

504 U.S. 298 (1992)

Argued

Wednesday, January 22, 1992

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 1992

Advocates

John E. Gaggini (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Nicholas Spaeth (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Through its Tax Commissioner, the state of North Dakota filed an action in state court to force the Quill Corporation, an out-of-state mail-order office equipment retailer, to charge a North Dakota use tax on Quill merchandise to be used within the state. The state court ruled in favor of Quill, grounding its decision on Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 _. In this 1967 case, the United States Supreme court found a similar Illinois statute to be in violation of both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on a rejection of _Bellas Hess in light of the "tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations" since it had been decided.

Question

1) Had Bellas Hess become obsolete? 2) Was North Dakota's imposition of a use tax upon the merchandise of the Quill Corporation in compliance with the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Quill Corp., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No and No. In a majority opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court admitted that, over time, subsequent cases have allowed for more flexibility than Bellas Hess. Nevertheless, the Court maintained that this evolution does not suggest a rejection of Bellas Hess. The Court also determined that North Dakota's imposition of the use tax did not constitute a breach of the Due Process Clause because the Quill Corporation had sufficient contact with the state's residents and benefited from the state's tax revenue. However, it found the use tax to be unconstitutional because it interfered with interstate commerce, rendering it a violation of the Commerce Clause. Consequently, the Court reversed the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision by ruling in favor of the Quill Corporation.

Leathers v. Medlock

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-29

Petitioner

Leathers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Medlock

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Meddlock v. Leathers, Commissioner of Revenue of Arkansas, No. 90-38

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 439 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, January 9, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, April 16, 1991

Advocates

William E. Keadle (Argued the cause for petitioner in No. 90-29 and respondents in No. 90-38)

Eugene G. Sayre (Argued the cause for the petitioners in No. 90-38 and the respondents in No. 90-29)

Facts of the Case

In 1987, Arkansas amended its Gross Receipts Act (GRA), imposing a tax on cable television but not on print media. Cable companies and others filed suit in the State Chancery Court, alleging that taxing cable services, but not print and satellite broadcast services, violated their First Amendment expressive rights and 14th Amendment equal protection rights. In 1989, after the Chancery Court upheld the amendment, Arkansas again amended the GRA, extending the tax to satellite broadcast services. On appeal, the State Supreme Court upheld the GRA. However, the court ruled that the First Amendment prohibits differential taxation among members of the same medium. Therefore, because cable and scrambled satellite television services are essentially the same, the tax was unconstitutional when it applied only to cable services.

Question

Does differential taxation of different media violate the First and 14th Amendments? Does differential taxation of members of the same medium violate the First and 14th Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Leathers, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held 7-2 that without the intent or effect of suppressing expression, the First Amendment allows differential taxation of different media and differential taxation of some members of the same medium. Specifically, the Court held that the GRA was a generally applicable sales tax, and that its burden on cable television, while exempting the print media, was content- neutral, not directed at a select few, and not intended to interfere with expression. The Court went on to rule that the First Amendment allows a differential tax burden on some members of pay television services (that is, a tax on cable but not satellite services), if the tax is not intended to suppress expression. The Court ordered the State Supreme Court to address the 14th Amendment claim on remand. Dissenting, Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, argued that the First Amendment non- discrimination principle prohibits a heavier tax burden on one medium and not other media.

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Department Of Revenue, Florida

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:31 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1847

Petitioner

Ford Motor Credit Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Department Of Revenue, Florida

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 172 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 1990

Decided

Monday, May 20, 1991

Advocates

Mark L. Evans (on behalf of the Appellant, appointed by this Court)

H. Bartow Farr, III (on behalf of the Appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Department Of Revenue, Florida, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. Of Treasury

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1106

Petitioner

Trinova Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan Dept. Of Treasury

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 358 (1991)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Advocates

Richard R. Roesch (on behalf of the Respondent)

Peter S. Sheldon (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Michigan Dept. Of Treasury, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

American Trucking Associations v. Smith

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-325

Petitioner

American Trucking Associations

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Smith

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

496 U.S. 167 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, March 22, 1989

Reargued:

Wednesday, December 6, 1989

Decided

Monday, June 4, 1990

Advocates

A. Raymond Randolph (Reargued the cause for the respondents)

Andrew L. Frey (Reargued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1983, the American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA) challenged the flat tax portion of Arkansas' Highway Use Equalization (HUE) tax, alleging that it violated the Commerce Clause. The Arkansas Supreme Court, relying on Supreme Court precedent, rejected this claim. Subsequently, on June 23, 1987, the Supreme Court decided American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), which held that state application of flat highway use taxes was unconstitutional. Pending re-hearing in the Arkansas Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun ordered, in August 1987, that all new taxes collected be kept in escrow. Subsequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that HUE was unconstitutional, but that Scheiner did not apply retroactively. The court went on to decide that taxes already collected for the tax year beginning July 1, 1987, could remain in the state treasury, but that those funds placed in the escrow account ordered by Justice Blackmun should be refunded, as they had not been spent or budgeted for future spending.

Question

(1) Does the Court's decision in Scheiner apply retroactively? (2) Even if the Scheiner decision does not apply retroactively, can the state keep taxes collected before the escrow account was established when those taxes are for the tax year July 1, 1987 to June 30, 1988, a period after Scheiner?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Smith, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No and no. A plurality of the Court held that Scheiner did not apply retroactively, and that state collection of taxes for the tax year beginning July 1, 1987, before the establishment of the escrow account, was unconstitutional. Applying the test of non-retroactivity articulated in Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the Court found that Scheiner clearly established a new principle of law; that the purpose of the Commerce Clause did not support retroactive application; and that equitable considerations weighed heavily against retroactivity. The Court went on to reverse the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision not to refund taxes already collected for the tax year beginning July 1, 1987, reasoning that the conduct to which Scheiner applied prospectively was the use of the highway, not the payment of money therefor. Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but disagreed with the plurality's retroactivity analysis. He found that the only reason to follow Scheiner, which he believed to be wrongly decided, was the doctrine of stare decisis, which only applies prospectively.

McKesson Corp. v. Florida Alcohol & Tobacco Division

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-192

Petitioner

McKesson Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida Alcohol & Tobacco Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

496 U.S. 18 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, March 22, 1989

Reargued:

Wednesday, December 6, 1989

Decided

Monday, June 4, 1990

Advocates

David G. Robertson (ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER IN No. 88-192)

A. Raymond Randolph (ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS IN No. 88-325)

H. Bartow Farr, III (ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS IN No. 88-192)

Andrew L. Frey (ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS IN No. 88-325)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for McKesson Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

None

Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal v. Webster County

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1303

Petitioner

Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Webster County

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 87-1310

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

488 U.S. 336 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, December 7, 1988

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 1989

Advocates

William Ullrich (on behalf of the Respondent)

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

None

Amerada Hess Corp. v. N. J. Taxation Di

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-453

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Amerada Hess Corp. v. N. J. Taxation Di

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 87-464

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

490 U.S. 66 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, November 29, 1988

Decided

Monday, April 3, 1989

Advocates

Mark L. Evans (on behalf of the Appellants)

Mary R. Hamill (on behalf of the Appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for N. J. Taxation Di, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Goldberg v. Sweet

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:07 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-826

Appellee

Sweet

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Goldberg

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 87-1101

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

488 U.S. 252 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, October 12, 1988

Decided

Tuesday, January 10, 1989

Advocates

Walter A. Smith, Jr. (on behalf of the Appellants)

Andrew L. Frey (on behalf of the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Sweet, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

New Energy Company of Indiana v. Limbach

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-654

Appellee

Limbach

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

New Energy Company of Indiana

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

486 U.S. 269 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 1988

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 1988

Advocates

Herman Schwartz (on behalf of the Appellant)

Richard C. Farrin (on behalf of the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

An Indiana law gave a tax credit against the Ohio motor vehicle fuel sales tax for each gallon of ethanol sold by fuel dealers, provided that the ethanol was produced in Ohio or in a state that grants similar tax advantages as the Ohio scheme.

Question

Did the law discriminate against interstate commerce and violate the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for New Energy Company of Indiana, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. The unanimous Court held that the law's primary purpose was to confer favorable tax treatment on Ohio-produced ethanol which imposed "an economic disadvantage upon out-of-state sellers." Ohio was unable to advance a legitimate local purpose for the law

D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-267

Appellant

D. H. Holmes Co.

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

McNamara

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

486 U.S. 24 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 1988

Decided

Monday, May 16, 1988

Advocates

Andrew Rinker, Jr. (on behalf of the appellant)

Robert G. Pugh (on behalf of the appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Mcnamara, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-357

Appellee

Scheiner

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

American Trucking Associations, Inc.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

483 U.S. 266 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, April 28, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, June 23, 1987

Advocates

Stephen M. Shapiro (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Suellen M. Wolfe (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

One of the types of fees that Pennsylvania used to finance the cost of its highway maintenance was lump-sum annual fees, also known as flat taxes. In 1980, Pennsylvania increased the fee for an identification marker required of every truck over a certain weight from $2 to $25, but exempted trucks registered in Pennsylvania from the fee _ the marker fee was "deemed" to be included in the registration fee that local truckers had to pay. In 1982, the marker tax was reduced to $5, but a new tax was introduced, taxing trucks by the axle. The axle tax applied to all trucks weighing more than 26,000 pounds, but the registration fee for Pennsylvania trucks was reduced in an amount calculated to offset that new tax for most trucks. These flat taxes were contested in two state court cases on the ground, inter alia, that they violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Since Pennsylvania- based trucks travel, on average, about five times as many miles in Pennsylvania as out-of-state trucks, the cost of the flat taxes was approximately five times as high per mile of road use for out-of-state vehicles as for local vehicles. For that reason, the lower courts in Pennsylvania found that both the marker tax and the axle tax violated the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered both cases together and reversed.

Question

Do flat state taxes on the use of a state's highways run afoul of the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for American Trucking Associations, Inc., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the flat taxes violated the basic principle that the Commerce Clause created an area of trade free from interference by the states. One problem with the flat taxes is that they do not pass the "internal consistency" test, which is to say that they could not be applied by every state without interfering with free trade. If many states adopted them, truckers would pay more to go through those states than to drive the same distance in only one state. This would disrupt the market for interstate transportation services. In addition, because the cost to out-of- state truckers is approximately five times as heavy per mile, the taxes have a discriminatory effect. It is no defense that Pennsylvania's registration fee is fairly high, conferring a competitive advantage to trucks based in other states; the solution to that problem is to lower the level of the registration fee. It is also no defense to describe the flat taxes as user fees because such fees are acceptable only insofar as they are neither discriminatory nor excessive. Finally, Pennsylvania cannot appeal to administrative convenience because it has shown itself capable of administering taxes that reflect the quantity of highway use.

Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dept. Of Re

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-251

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dept. Of Re

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

482 U.S. 182 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, March 31, 1987

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1987

Advocates

Patricia Rosen (on behalf of Appellees)

Erwin N. Griswold (on behalf of Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ill. Dept. Of Re, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 31 U.S.C. 3124

None

Burlington No. R. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-337

Petitioner

Burlington No. R. Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Okla. Tax Comm'n

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

481 U.S. 454 (1987)

Argued

Wednesday, March 25, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, April 28, 1987

Advocates

Betty Jo Christian (on behalf of Petitioner)

David W. Lee (on behalf of Respondent)

Albert G. Lauber, Jr. (on behalf of Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Burlington No. R. Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 1150

None

Tyler Pipe Industries v. Dept. Of Revenue

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:33 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1963

Appellee

Dept. Of Revenue

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Tyler Pipe Industries

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 85-2006

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

483 U.S. 232 (1987)

Argued

Monday, March 2, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, June 23, 1987

Advocates

William B. Collins (on behalf of Appellants)

D. Michael Young (on behalf of Appellants in No. 85-2006)

Neil J. O'Brien (on behalf of Appellant in No. 85-1963)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Tyler Pipe Industries, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1370

Appellee

Ragland

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

481 U.S. 221 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, January 20, 1987

Decided

Wednesday, April 22, 1987

Advocates

John Steven Clark (on behalf of Appellee)

Anne Owings Wilson (on behalf of Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Western Air Lines v. Board Of Equalization

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-732

Appellee

Board Of Equalization

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Western Air Lines

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

480 U.S. 123 (1987)

Argued

Monday, November 3, 1986

Decided

Tuesday, February 24, 1987

Advocates

Mark V. Meierhenry (on behalf of Appellees)

Raymond J. Rasenberger (on behalf of Appellants)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Board Of Equalization, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 1513

None

R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:34:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1021

Appellee

Durham County

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 85-1022

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

479 U.S. 130 (1986)

Argued

Monday, October 6, 1986

Decided

Tuesday, December 9, 1986

Advocates

Erwin N. Griswold (on behalf of the appellant)

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of the appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Durham County, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1257

None

Williams v. Vermont

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-592

Appellee

Vermont

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Williams

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

472 U.S. 14 (1985)

Argued

Tuesday, March 19, 1985

Decided

Tuesday, June 4, 1985

Advocates

Andrew M. Eschen (on behalf of the appellees)

Norman Charles Williams (on behalf of appellants)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Williams, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

None

Cory v. Western Oil & Gas Assn.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-16

Petitioner

Cory

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Western Oil & Gas Assn.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

471 U.S. 81 (1985)

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 1985

Decided

Wednesday, March 27, 1985

Advocates

Dennis M. Eagan (on behalf of the Appellants)

Philip K. Verleger (on behalf of the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Western Oil & Gas Assn., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:33 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1274

Appellee

Ward

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

470 U.S. 869 (1985)

Argued

Wednesday, October 31, 1984

Decided

Tuesday, March 26, 1985

Advocates

Matthew J. Zinn (on behalf of Appellants)

Warren B. Lightfoot (on behalf of Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

None

First National Bank v. Bartow Cty. Tax Assessors

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1620

Appellee

Bartow Cty. Tax Assessors

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

First National Bank

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

470 U.S. 583 (1985)

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 1984

Decided

Tuesday, March 19, 1985

Advocates

Grace P. Evans (on behalf of Appellees)

Charles T. Zink (on behalf of appellant)

Alan I. Horowitz (on behalf of U.S. as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bartow Cty. Tax Assessors, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 31 U.S.C. 742

None

Armco Inc. v. Hardesty

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-297

Appellee

Hardesty

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Armco Inc.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

467 U.S. 638 (1984)

Argued

Tuesday, April 17, 1984

Decided

Tuesday, June 12, 1984

Advocates

Robert Digges, Jr. (on behalf of the Appellee)

Richard R. Dailey (on behalf of the Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Armco Inc., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:33 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-96

Petitioner

Limbach

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hooven & Allison Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

466 U.S. 353 (1984)

Argued

Wednesday, February 22, 1984

Decided

Wednesday, April 18, 1984

Advocates

Michael Nims (on behalf of the Respondent)

Richard C. Farrin (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Limbach, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10, Paragraph 2: Export-Import Clause

None

Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-1565

Appellee

Dias

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Bacchus Imports Ltd.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

468 U.S. 263 (1984)

Argued

Wednesday, January 11, 1984

Decided

Friday, June 29, 1984

Advocates

Frank H. Easterbrook (Argued the cause for the appellants)

William D. Dexter (Argued the cause for the appellee Dias)

Facts of the Case

The Hawaii Liquor Tax, enacted in 1939, imposed a twenty percent excise tax on wholesale liquor sales. Certain locally produced alcohol products, such as okolehao brandy and fruit wine, were exempt from the tax. Bacchus Imports, a liquor wholesaler, challenged the law's validity and sought a refund of $45 million from the state of Hawaii.

Question

Did Hawaii law violate the Import-Export Clause and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bacchus Imports Ltd., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

The Court found that the Hawaii Liquor Tax violated the Constitution. Justice White reaffirmed what he called a "cardinal rule of Commerce Clause jurisprudence" in arguing that states are prohibited from imposing taxes which discriminate in the traffic of interstate commerce. Since the law was originally enacted to support local industries in Hawaii, and the alcoholic products which the law exempted competed with different beverages produced outside the state, Justice White concluded that there were clear constitutional violations in this case.

American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-1717

Petitioner

American Bank & Trust Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dallas County

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

463 U.S. 855 (1983)

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 1983

Decided

Tuesday, July 5, 1983

Advocates

Ernest J. Brown (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae)

Marvin S. Sloman (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Carroll R. Graham (on behalf of the Respondents)

Earl Luna (on behalf of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for American Bank & Trust Co., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 31 U.S.C. 742

None

Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-1020

Appellee

Eagerton

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Exxon Corp.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 81-1268

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

462 U.S. 176 (1983)

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 1983

Decided

Wednesday, June 8, 1983

Advocates

Rae M. Crowe (on behalf of the Appellants)

John J. Breckenridge (on behalf of the Appellees)

C. B. Arendall, Jr. (on behalf of the Appellants)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Exxon Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

None

Minn. Star & Trib. Co. v. MN Comm. of Rev.

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:16 +0000

Location

Minnesota State Legislature

100 Constitution Ave St. Paul MN 55103

St. Paul, MN 55103

United States

44° 57' 16.2288" N, 93° 6' 13.6224" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-1839

Appellee

MN Comm. of Rev.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Minn. Star & Trib. Co.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

460 U.S. 575 (1983)

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 1983

Decided

Tuesday, March 29, 1983

Advocates

Lawrence C. Brown (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Paul R. Kempainen (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

From 1967 to 1971, the Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company, a publisher of a morning and evening newspaper in Minneapolis, was exempt from a state sales and use tax provided periodic publications. In 1971, the Minnesota legislature imposed a "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in publishing. In 1974, the legislature exempted the first $100,000 worth of ink and paper consumed a year. After the enactment of this exemption, the Star Tribune found itself paying roughly two-thirds of the total revenue raised by the tax.

Question

Did the taxing scheme enacted by the Minnesota legislature violate the freedom of press guaranteed by the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Minn. Star & Trib. Co., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

The Court held that while the First Amendment did not prohibit all regulation of the press, Minnesota had "created a special tax that applie[d] only to certain publications protected by the First Amendment." Noting that there was "substantial evidence that differential taxation of the press would have troubled the Framers of the First Amendment," the Court held that when states single out the press "the threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute." The Court concluded that "recognizing a power in the State not only to single out the press but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press presents such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the scheme."

Washington v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-969

Appellee

United States

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Washington

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

460 U.S. 536 (1983)

Argued

Monday, January 10, 1983

Decided

Tuesday, March 29, 1983

Advocates

Kenneth O. Eikenberry (on behalf of the Appellants)

Stuart A. Smith (on behalf of the United States)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Washington, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 6, Section 2: Supremacy Clause

None

Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-523

Appellee

Franchise Tax Bd.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Container Corp.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

463 U.S. 159 (1983)

Argued

Monday, January 10, 1983

Decided

Monday, June 27, 1983

Advocates

Neal J. Gobar (on behalf of the Appellee)

Franklin C. Latcham (on behalf of the Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Franchise Tax Bd., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None