Cases by Issue - Death Penalty

Kansas v. Marsh

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1170

Petitioner

Kansas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael Lee Marsh, II

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, May 31, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, December 7, 2005

Reargued:

Tuesday, April 25, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 26, 2006

Advocates

Phill Kline (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Rebecca E. Woodman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Michael Lee Marsh II was convicted of murdering a mother and her young daughter. During the sentencing phase of the trial, jurors found that the mitigating factors and aggravating factors were in equipoise (i.e., of equal weight). The Kansas capital punishment statute specifically provided for the imposition of the death penalty in that circumstance, so Marsh was sentenced to death. After Marsh's sentencing, however, the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Kleypas found fault with the concept of the death penalty as a "tie-breaker." The ruled in Kleypas that "fundamental fairness requires that a 'tie goes to the defendant' when life or death is at issue." The State argued that while the prosecution has the burden of proof during the trial, the burden can be shifted to the defendant during the sentencing phase, so that the defendant must show that he deserves less than a death sentence. The Kansas Supreme Court disagreed, and overturned Kansas's death penalty statute as unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.

Question

(1) Does a statute that provides for the death penalty when mitigating and aggravating factors are in equipoise violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment? (2) Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review the Kansas Supreme Court's judgment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kansas, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No and Yes. By a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court and upheld the Kansas death penalty statute. The Court found that the Kansas Supreme Court's decision had necessarily rested on a federal constitutional issue, so the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. The opinion by Justice Thomas drew a comparison with a similar death penalty statute in Arizona that was upheld in Walton v. Arizona. The Court decided to let the Walton precedent stand and uphold the Kansas statute as well. Even apart from the Walton precedent, however, the Court would have upheld the statute as "consistent with Eighth Amendment requirements." As long as juries are allowed to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence, states are allowed to require the death penalty when aggravating and mitigating factors are equally balanced. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented from the Court's opinion. Justice Souter wrote that various death penalty precedents suggested that the statute could not stand up to "reasoned moral judgment." He called the Kansas death penalty statute "morally absurd," "a moral irrationality," and "obtuse by any moral or social measure." Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent arguing that the Court should never have agreed to hear the case.

Oregon v. Guzek

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-928

Petitioner

Oregon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Randy Lee Guzek

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, April 25, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, December 7, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 2006

Advocates

Kannon K. Shanmugam (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Mary H. Williams (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Richard L. Wolf (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A jury found Randy Lee Guzek guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court overturned the death sentence. Guzek was sentenced to death again, and the Oregon Supreme Court again threw out the death sentence. When Guzek was sentenced to death a third time, the Oregon Supreme Court again overturned his sentence and also considered his complaint that he had not been allowed to present testimony about his alibi at the sentencing phase of the trial. Oregon law requires that evidence of innocence, such as an alibi, be presented during the trial, not during the sentencing hearing. The Oregon Supreme Court accepted Guzek's argument that he had a constitutional right under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to introduce the alibi testimony at his sentencing proceeding. Oregon appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that it was reasonable to restrict the introduction of evidence of innocence to the guilt phase of the trial.

Question

Is there a constitutional right under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to introduce evidence of innocence during the sentencing phase of a trial?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Oregon, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for the Court: "We can find nothing in the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments that provides a capital defendant a right to introduce new evidence of this kind at sentencing." States are free "to set reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant can submit, and to control the manner in which it is submitted." This can include excluding the introduction of evidence of innocence from the sentencing phase.

Brown v. Sanders

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-980

Petitioner

Jill L. Brown, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ronald L. Sanders

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, March 28, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, October 11, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, January 11, 2006

Advocates

Jane N. Kirkland (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Nina Rivkind (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

A California trial court sentenced Sanders to death for murder. The jury was told to consider four special aggravating circumstances during sentencing. On appeal, however, the state supreme court invalidated two of these circumstances, but still upheld Sanders's sentence. Sanders then filed a federal habeas petition, which was rejected by the district court but granted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In overturning Sanders's sentence, it held that the sentence had been substantially affected by jury instructions to consider invalid aggravating circumstances. The Ninth Circuit faulted the state supreme court for its standard of review: The court should have determined whether the invalid circumstances were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in affecting the jury's sentence.

Question

Was the Eighth Amendment violated when the California Supreme Court upheld a death sentence even though two of the four special aggravating circumstances considered by the jury were found to be invalid?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Brown, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No. The Court upheld the sentence in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia. The Court established a new rule: invalidated sentencing factors make a sentence unconstitutional if they added aggravating weight to the jury's weighing process, "unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances." In Sanders's case, the two remaining valid special circumstances were sufficient to make him eligible for the death penalty. Furthermore, the two invalided circumstances did not add any improper aggravating weight, because another valid sentencing factor - an omnibus "circumstances of the crime" factor - gave aggravating weight to the same facts. Therefore, the Court ruled, "the erroneous factor could not have 'skewed' the sentence, and no constitutional violation occurred." Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, which Justice Souter joined. Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent, which Justice Ginsburg joined.

Brown v. Payton

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1039

Petitioner

Jill L. Brown, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

William Charles Payton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 133 (2005)

Granted

Monday, May 24, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, November 10, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Advocates

Andrea N. Cortina (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Dean R. Gits (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

A California court sentenced William Payton to death for murder and attempted murder. Payton appealed and alleged the jury, when imposing the death penalty, did not consider the potentially mitigating evidence of his post-crime religious conversion. California's death penalty statute required jurors to weigh 11 factors when imposing a death penalty. The first 10 factors were specific to the crime and the eleventh factor was a "catch-all factor" that allowed the judge or jury to consider any other circumstance the defendant presented in mitigation of a death sentence. Payton alleged the judge's jury instructions effectively prevented the jury from considering his post-crime religious conversion. The California Supreme Court ruled there was nothing wrong with the judge's jury instructions. A federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Payton and reversed the death sentence. The Ninth Circuit said the California Supreme Court's application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable. According to the Ninth Circuit, the clearly established precedent required juries to consider mitigating post-crime evidence when considering a death sentence.

Question

Was the 9th Circuit correct to rule the California Supreme Court objectively unreasonable in holding that California's "catch-all" mitigation instruction in capital cases is constitutional as applied to post-crime evidence in mitigation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Brown, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the California Supreme Court was not unreasonable to decline to distinguish between pre-crime and postcrime mitigating evidence. The California Supreme Court reasonably read the relevant precedent, Boyde v. California (1990), as establishing that the catch-all factor's text was broad enough to accommodate Payton's post-crime religious conversion.

Roper v. Simmons

Fri, 29 Oct 2010 18:40:16 +0000

Location

Meramec River Fenton, MO

United States

38° 30' 47.1924" N, 90° 26' 9.4308" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-633

Petitioner

Donald P. Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center

Respondent

Christopher Simmons

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 551 (2005)

Granted

Monday, January 26, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 1, 2005

Advocates

James R. Layton (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court stayed Simmon's execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally ill. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally ill violated the Eighth and 14th Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case.

Using the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided, 6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional.

On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at "evolving standards" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people.

Question

Does the execution of minors violate the prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" found in the Eighth Amendment and applied to the states through the incorporation doctrine of the 14th Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Simmons, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that standards of decency have evolved so that executing minors is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The majority cited a consensus against the juvenile death penalty among state legislatures, and its own determination that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for minors. Finally the Court pointed to "overwhelming" international opinion against the juvenile death penalty. Chief Justice William Rhenquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Clarence Thomas all dissented.

Ring v. Arizona

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-488

Petitioner

Ring

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arizona

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 584 (2002)

Argued

Monday, April 22, 2002

Decided

Monday, June 24, 2002

Advocates

Janet Napolitano (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Andrew D. Hurwitz (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

At Timothy Ring's trial for murder, the jury deadlocked on premeditated murder, but found Ring guilty of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. Under Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death, unless further findings were made by a judge conducting a separate sentencing hearing and only if the judge finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Because the jury had convicted Ring of felony murder, not premeditated murder, Ring would be eligible for the death penalty only if he was the victim's actual killer. Citing accomplice testimony at the sentencing hearing, the judge found that Ring was the killer. The judge then found two aggravating factors, one of them being that the offense was committed for pecuniary gain, as well as one mitigating factor, Ring's minimal criminal record, and ruled that the latter did not call for leniency.

Question

Does Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violate the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee by entrusting to a judge the finding of facts sufficient to impose the death penalty?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Ring, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Trial By Jury

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operates as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense," the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be "exposed...to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone," the Court overruled Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, insofar it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. "The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death," wrote Justice Ginsburg.

Atkins v. Virginia

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

York County Court

300 Ballard Street Yorktown VA 23690

Yorktown, VA 23690

United States

37° 13' 57.4248" N, 76° 30' 42.3648" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-8452

Petitioner

Atkins

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Virginia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 304 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, February 20, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 2002

Advocates

James W. Ellis (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Pamela A. Rumpz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. In the penalty phase of Atkins' trial, the defense relied on one witness, a forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded. The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. During resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified, but this time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded.

Question

Is the execution of mentally retarded persons "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Atkins, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Since it last confronted the issue, the Court reasoned that a significant number of States have concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. Moreover, the Court concluded that there was serious concern whether either justification underpinning the death penalty - retribution and deterrence of capital crimes - applies to mentally retarded offenders, due to their lessened culpability. "Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving standards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender," wrote Justice Stevens. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia filed dissenting opinions. Justice Clarence Thomas joined both. "This newest invention promises to be more effective than any of the others in turning the process of capital trial into a game," argued Justice Scalia.

Penry v. Johnson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-6677

Petitioner

Penry

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Johnson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 782 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, March 27, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 4, 2001

Advocates

Andy Taylor (Austin, Texas, argued the cause for the respondent)

Robert S. Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Gene C. Schaerr (As amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Johnny Paul Penry had been sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment after finding that Texas' special issues questions did not permit the jury to consider mitigating evidence involving his mental retardation. On retrial in 1990, Penry was again found guilty of capital murder. The defense again put on extensive evidence regarding Penry's mental impairments. Ultimately, a psychiatric evaluation, which stated that Penry would be dangerous to others if released, prepared at the request of Penry's former counsel, was cited. Upon submission to the jury, the trial judge instructed the jury to determine Penry's sentence by answering the same special issues in the original Penry case. Additionally, the trial judge gave a supplemental instruction on mitigating evidence. The court sentenced Penry to death in accordance with the jury's answers to the special issues. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Penry's claims that the admission of language from the psychiatric evaluation violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and that the jury instructions were constitutionally inadequate because they did not permit the jury to consider and give effect to his particular mitigating evidence. Penry's petitions for state and federal habeas corpus relief failed.

Question

Was a Texas trial court's supplemental instruction on mitigating evidence of mental retardation under the state's "special circumstances" for sentencing in capital murder cases to a jury constitutionally adequate? Does the admission into evidence of statements from a psychiatric report based on an uncounseled interview with the defendant violate the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Penry, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Self-Incrimination

No and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the supplemental instruction was constitutionally inadequate. "Any realistic assessment of the manner in which the supplemental instruction operated would therefore lead to the same conclusion we reached in Penry I," wrote Justice O'Connor "'A reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence.'" Unanimously, the Court held that "considerable doubt" that the psychiatric report "even if erroneous, had a 'substantial and injurious effect'" on the verdict, meant not overturning the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' rejection of Penry's Fifth Amendment claim.

Jones v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-9361

Petitioner

Jones

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 373 (1999)

Argued

Monday, February 22, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 21, 1999

Advocates

Timothy Crooks (Fort Worth, Texas, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Louis Jones, Jr., kidnapped Private Tracie Joy McBride at gunpoint from the Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas. After sexually assaulting McBride, Jones killed her with repeated blows to the head from a tire iron. The Federal Government charged Jones with kidnapping resulting in the victim's death, in violation of 18 USC section 1201(a)(2), an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death. Pursuant to the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, the government sought the death sentence. A jury found Jones guilty. The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty at Jones's sentencing hearing. The District Court imposed the death sentence in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The court refused Jones' request to include in the jury instructions an instruction that in the event of a jury deadlock concerning what sentence to impose -- either death or life imprisonment without possibility of release -- the District Court would impose no less of a sentence than of life imprisonment without possibility of release. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is a death-sentence-eligible defendant entitled to a jury instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock? Is there a reasonable likelihood that a jury might believe that a death-sentence-eligible defendant would receive a court- imposed sentence less than life imprisonment in the event that they could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Jones was not entitled to an instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not require such an instruction and the Court declined to exercise its supervisory powers to require such an instruction in every capital case. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "in a capital sentencing proceeding, the Government has 'a strong interest in having the jury express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.' [A] charge to the jury of the sort proposed by petitioner might well have the effect of undermining this strong governmental interest." Furthermore, the Court concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury had been led to believe that Jones would receive a court-imposed sentence less than life imprisonment in the event that the jury could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation. Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed the view that, "'[a]ccurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a [jury's] determination of whether a defendant shall live or die.' That 'indispensable prerequisite' was not satisfied in this case."

Hopkins, Warden v. Reeves

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1693

Petitioner

Hopkins, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reeves

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 88 (1998)

Argued

Monday, February 23, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Roy W. McLeese (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Donald B. Stenberg (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Paula Hutchinson (Appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Randolph K. Reeves was charged with two counts of felony murder for the sexual assault and murder of Janet Mesner and Victoria Lamm, both of Lincoln, Nebraska. Under Nebraska law, felony murder is a form of first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of certain felonies, including sexual assault. A conviction for felony murder renders a defendant eligible for the death penalty; however the jury does not charge the defendant because capital sentencing is a judicial function. In his trial Reeves requested the jury be given other options rather than just felony murder. The trial court judge denied Reeves's motion and he was subsequently convicted on both counts. A three-judge panel sentenced Reeves to death. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. After exhausting his state remedies, Reeves filed a federal habeas corpus petition that the trial court's failure to give the requested instructions was unconstitutional. The District Court granted relief on an unrelated due process claim. The Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's decision, but held that a constitutional error had occurred.

Question

Does the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require jurors in capital cases to be given an option to convict a defendant of offenses that are not lesser-included offenses of the crime charged? Did the Nebraska trial court err in failing to give the requested jury instructions?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Hopkins, Warden, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No and no. The Court held 8-1, in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, that (1) in capital cases, a state trial court is not required, under the Constitution, to instruct the jury on offenses that are not lesser included offenses of the charged crime under state law; and (2) the Nebraska trial court did not commit federal constitutional error in failing to give the requested jury instructions as to second-degree murder and manslaughter.

Buchanan v. Angelone

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-8400

Petitioner

Buchanan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Angelone

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 269 (1998)

Argued

Monday, November 3, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 1998

Advocates

Gerald T. Zerkin (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Katherine P. Baldwin (Argued the cause for respondents)

Facts of the Case

Following Douglas Buchanan's conviction for the capital murders of his father, stepmother, and two brothers, the prosecutor sought the death penalty based on Virginia's aggravating factor that the crime was vile. The trial court instructed the jury that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Buchanan's conduct was vile, "then you may fix the punishment...at death," but "if you believe from all the evidence that...death...is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment...at life imprisonment." Buchanan sought four additional instructions on particular mitigating factors and a general instruction on the concept of mitigating evidence. The court denied Buchanan, refusing to single out certain mitigating factors to the sentencing jury. The jury returned with a verdict for the death penalty.

Question

Does the Eighth Amendment require that a capital jury be instructed on particular statutory mitigating factors and the concept of mitigating evidence generally?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Angelone, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the concept of mitigation generally and on the four mitigating factors did not violate Buchanan's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that the court's instructions, by directing the jury to base the decision on "all the evidence," afforded the jurors an opportunity to consider mitigating evidence and did not constrain the manner in which the jury was able to give effect to mitigation. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, "'there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jurors in [Buchanan's] case understood the challenged instructions to preclude consideration of relevant mitigating evidence offered by [Buchanan].'" Justices Stephen G. Breyer, John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg disagreed in a dissent by Justice Breyer.

Harris v. Alabama

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-7659

Petitioner

Harris

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alabama

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 504 (1995)

Argued

Monday, December 5, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 1995

Advocates

P. David Bjurberg (on behalf of the Respondent)

Ruth Friedman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Alabama, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Tuilaepa v. California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-5131

Petitioner

Tuilaepa

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 93-5161

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 967 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 1994

Decided

Thursday, June 30, 1994

Advocates

William George Prahl (on behalf of the Respondent)

Howard W. Gillingham (on behalf of the Petitioner Tuilaepa)

Wendy Cole Lascher (on behalf of the Petitioner Proctor)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for California, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Romano v. Oklahoma

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-9093

Petitioner

Romano

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oklahoma

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 1 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 13, 1994

Advocates

Andre' Diane Blalock (on behalf of the Respondent)

Lee Ann Jones Peters (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Oklahoma, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Johnson v. Texas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:01:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-5653

Petitioner

Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Texas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

509 U.S. 350 (1993)

Argued

Monday, April 26, 1993

Decided

Thursday, June 24, 1993

Advocates

Michael E. Tigar (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Dana E. Parker (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Texas, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Arave, Warden v. Creech

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:01:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-1160

Petitioner

Arave, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Creech

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

507 U.S. 463 (1993)

Argued

Tuesday, November 10, 1992

Decided

Tuesday, March 30, 1993

Advocates

Lynn E. Thomas (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Clifford Gardner (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Arave, Warden, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Richmond v. Lewis, Director, Arizona Department Of Corrections

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:01:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-7094

Petitioner

Richmond

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lewis, Director, Arizona Department Of Corrections, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

506 U.S. 40 (1992)

Argued

Tuesday, October 13, 1992

Decided

Tuesday, December 1, 1992

Advocates

Paul Joseph McMurdie (on behalf of the Respondents)

Timothy K. Ford (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Richmond, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Sochor v. Florida

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-5843

Petitioner

Sochor

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

504 U.S. 527 (1992)

Argued

Monday, March 2, 1992

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1992

Advocates

Gary Caldwell (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Carolyn M. Snurkowski (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Sochor, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Payne v. Tennessee

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:23 +0000

Location

Shelby County Criminal Court

201 Poplar Avenue Memphis TN 38103

Memphis, TN 38103

United States

35° 8' 57.2568" N, 90° 2' 50.9388" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-5721

Petitioner

Pervis Tyrone Payne

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tennessee

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 808 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, April 24, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 1991

Advocates

J. Brooke Lathram (argued the cause for petitioner)

Charles W. Burson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Dick Thornburgh (Attorney General, Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Tennessee court tried Pervis Payne for murdering Charisse Christopher and her daughter Lacie. In hopes of avoiding the death penalty, Payne provided four witnesses testifying to his good character. The prosecution had Charisse's mother share how Charisse's death had impacted her surviving son Nicholas. In closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced Nicholas' loss of his mother when calling for the death penalty. The jury convicted him and sentenced him to death. Payne argued that the prosecution could not use testimony of how the victim's death impacted family members when contending for the death penalty. The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled against him.

Question

Does the Eighth Amendment prohibit a capital sentencing jury from considering the impact that a victim's death had upon surviving family members?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Tennessee, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Court overruled Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers which prohibited the submission of evidence relating to the harms caused by the victim's death. The Court reasoned that since "[v]irtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances," the prosecution must be allowed to submit similar counter evidence. Evidence regarding the "assessment of the harm caused by the defendant has long been an important factor in determining the appropriate punishment, and victim impact evidence is simply another method of informing the sentencing authority about such harm."

Lankford v. Idaho

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-7247

Petitioner

Lankford

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Idaho

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 110 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 20, 1991

Advocates

Larry Echohawk (on behalf of the Respondent)

Joan Marie Fisher (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lankford, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Parker v. Dugger

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-5961

Petitioner

Parker

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dugger

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 308 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, November 7, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, January 22, 1991

Advocates

Carolyn M. Snurkowski (on behalf of the Respondents)

Robert J. Link (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Parker, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Lewis v. Jeffers

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-189

Petitioner

Lewis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jeffers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

497 U.S. 764 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, February 21, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, June 27, 1990

Advocates

Gerald R. Grant (on behalf of the Petitioners)

James S. Liebman (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lewis, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Walton v. Arizona

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-7351

Petitioner

Walton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arizona

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

497 U.S. 639 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, January 17, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, June 27, 1990

Advocates

Paul Joseph McMurdie (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Timothy K. Ford (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Arizona, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 6: Other Sixth Amendment Provisions

None

Boyde v. California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:06 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-6613

Petitioner

Boyde

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

494 U.S. 370 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, November 28, 1989

Decided

Monday, March 5, 1990

Advocates

Frederick R. Millar, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Dennis A. Fischer (on behalf of the Petitioner, (appointed by this Court))

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for California, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Clemons v. Mississippi

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-6873

Petitioner

Clemons

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mississippi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

494 U.S. 738 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, November 28, 1989

Decided

Wednesday, March 28, 1990

Advocates

Kenneth S. Resnick (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Marvin L. White, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Clemons, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Blystone v. Pennsylvania

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:06 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-6222

Petitioner

Blystone

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pennsylvania

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

494 U.S. 299 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, October 10, 1989

Decided

Wednesday, February 28, 1990

Advocates

Ernest D. Preate, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Paul R. Gettleman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Pennsylvania, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

McKoy v. North Carolina

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:52 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-5909

Petitioner

McKoy

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

North Carolina

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

494 U.S. 433 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, October 10, 1989

Decided

Monday, March 5, 1990

Advocates

Joan Herre Byers (on behalf of the Respondent)

Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for McKoy, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

South Carolina v. Gathers

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-305

Petitioner

South Carolina

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gathers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

490 U.S. 805 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, March 28, 1989

Decided

Monday, June 12, 1989

Advocates

Donald John Zelenka (on behalf of the Petitioner)

William Isaac Diggs (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Gathers, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Stanford v. Kentucky

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:21 +0000

Location

Checker Gasoline Station

Cane Run Road Louisville KY

Louisville, KY

United States

38° 10' 42.3804" N, 85° 51' 39.5208" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-5765

Petitioner

Kevin Stanford

Respondent

Kentucky

Consolidation

No. 87-6026

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

492 U.S. 361 (1989)

Argued

Monday, March 27, 1989

Decided

Monday, June 26, 1989

Advocates

Frederic J. Cowan (Argued the cause for Kentucky)

Nancy A. McKerrow (Argued the cause for the petitioner Wilkins)

John M. Morris, III (Argued the cause for Missouri)

Frank W. Heft, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner Stanford)

Facts of the Case

At 17 years old, Kevin Stanford was convicted by a Kentucky jury of murder, sodomy, robbery, and the receipt of stolen property. Stanford was sentenced to death under a state statute which permitted juvenile offenders to receive the death penalty for Class A felonies or capital crimes. Stanford appealed his sentence and his case was consolidated with that of Wilkins v. Missouri, involving a 16 year old's appeal of his death sentence following a conviction for murder in Missouri. Both Stanford and Wilkins alleged that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders as young as themselves violated their constitutional rights.

Question

Does the imposition of the death sentence on convicted capital offenders below the age of 18 years old, violate the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kentucky, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court held that in weighing whether the imposition of capital punishments on offenders below the age of eighteen is cruel and unusual, it is necessary to look at the given society's evolving decency standards. With respect to American society, there is no national consensus regarding the imposition of capital punishments on 17- or 16-year- old individuals. Of the 37 states which permit capital punishment, 12 prohibit the death penalty for offenders below the age of 17 while 15 states prohibit capital punishment for 16 year olds. Moreover, discrepancies in national opinion polls, interest group views, and professional association studies, all indicate a lack of unanimity concerning the acceptability of death sentences for such relatively young offenders. Thus, the decision whether to subject 17 or 16 year olds to capital punishment must be made locally by the states and cannot be categorically pronounced as cruel and unusual punishment at this time.

Penry v. Lynaugh

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:21 +0000

Location

Victim's residence Livingston, TX

United States

30° 42' 39.7044" N, 94° 55' 58.764" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-6177

Petitioner

Penry

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lynaugh

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

492 U.S. 302 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, January 11, 1989

Decided

Monday, June 26, 1989

Advocates

Curtis C. Mason (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Charles A. Palmer (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Penry, a retarded man with the mental age of barely seven years, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During the trial's proceedings, the jury was not instructed that it could consider the mitigating circumstances of Penry's mental retardation in imposing its sentence.

Question

Was Penry's sentence cruel and unusual punishment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lynaugh, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The Court partially affirmed and partially reversed the lower court's decision. Justice O'Connor argued that the jury was improperly instructed and should have been told that it could have considered Penry's mental deficiencies when imposing its sentence. However, she rejected Penry's blanket claim that generally the Eighth Amendment does not allow death sentences for retarded defendants.

Johnson v. Mississippi

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-5468

Petitioner

Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mississippi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

486 U.S. 578 (1988)

Argued

Monday, April 25, 1988

Decided

Monday, June 13, 1988

Advocates

Marvin L. White, Jr. (on behalf of Respondent)

Floyd Abrams (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Johnson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Maynard v. Cartwright

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-519

Petitioner

Maynard

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cartwright

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

486 U.S. 356 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, April 19, 1988

Decided

Monday, June 6, 1988

Advocates

Susan S. Dickerson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Mandy Welch (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cartwright, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Mills v. Maryland

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-5367

Petitioner

Mills

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Maryland

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

486 U.S. 367 (1988)

Argued

Wednesday, March 30, 1988

Decided

Monday, June 6, 1988

Advocates

George E. Burns, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Charles O. Monk, II (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Mills, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Franklin v. Lynaugh

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-5546

Petitioner

Franklin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lynaugh

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

487 U.S. 164 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, March 1, 1988

Decided

Wednesday, June 22, 1988

Advocates

William C. Zapalac (on behalf of Respondent)

Mark Stevens (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Lynaugh, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Thompson v. Oklahoma

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-6169

Petitioner

Thompson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oklahoma

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

487 U.S. 815 (1988)

Argued

Monday, November 9, 1987

Decided

Wednesday, June 29, 1988

Advocates

Harry F. Tepker, Jr. (By appointment of the Court, argued the cause for the petitioner)

David W. Lee (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

At the age of 15 years Thompson was tried as an adult, convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Thompson certiorari.

Question

Would the execution of a 15 year old violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments"?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Thompson, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Yes. After noting that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the execution of a person under the age of 16 was unconstitutional. In noting the uniform ban among all relevant state statutes against the execution of one under the age of 16, the Court explained that such an act would violate the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." The case was reversed and remanded.

Lowenfield v. Phelps

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-6867

Petitioner

Lowenfield

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Phelps

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Opinion

484 U.S. 231 (1988)

Argued

Wednesday, October 14, 1987

Decided

Wednesday, January 13, 1988

Advocates

David Klingsberg (on behalf of the petitioner)

John M. Mamoulides (on behalf of the respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Phelps, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Sumner v. Shuman

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-246

Petitioner

Sumner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shuman

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

483 U.S. 66 (1987)

Argued

Monday, April 20, 1987

Decided

Monday, June 22, 1987

Advocates

M. Daniel Markoff (on behalf of the Respondent)

D. Brian McKay (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Shuman, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Booth v. Maryland

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:31 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-5020

Petitioner

Booth

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Maryland

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

482 U.S. 496 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, March 24, 1987

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1987

Advocates

George E. Burns, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Charles O. Monk, II (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

John Booth was convicted of the murders of an elderly couple and chose to have the jury determine his sentence instead of the judge. A Maryland statute required that a victim impact statement "describing the effect of the crime on the victim and his family" be included in the pre-sentence report in felony cases. In this case, the victim impact statement described the victims, the impact of the crime on their family, and the family members' opinions of the defendant and the crime.

Question

Does the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which protects a defendant from cruel and unusual punishment, prohibit a jury from considering a victim impact statement during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Booth, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Yes. The Court found that the victim impact statement created "a constitutionally unacceptable risk" and violated the Eighth Amendment. Justice Powell argued that in a capital case, the jury's sentencing task is based on the defendant as a unique individual and not on the character or impact of the crime on the victim's family. Allowing the content of a victim impact statement to influence the jury could lead it to choose the death penalty for reasons which "were irrelevant to the [defendant's] decision to kill," thus diverting attention from the facts of the crime. Furthermore, concluded Powell, introducing the "emotionally-charged opinions" of family members into the process would erode the "reasoned decisionmaking" which is crucial in capital cases.

Tison v. Arizona

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-6075

Petitioner

Tison

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arizona

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

481 U.S. 137 (1987)

Argued

Monday, November 3, 1986

Decided

Tuesday, April 21, 1987

Advocates

William J. Schafer III (appointed by this Court)

Alan M. Dershowitz ()

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Tison, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

McCleskey v. Kemp

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:19 +0000

Location

Dixie Furniture Store Atlanta, GA

United States

33° 44' 56.382" N, 84° 23' 16.7352" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-6811

Petitioner

McCleskey

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kemp

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

481 U.S. 279 (1987)

Argued

Wednesday, October 15, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, April 22, 1987

Advocates

John Charles Boger (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Mary Beth Westmoreland (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

McCleskey, a black man, was convicted of murdering a police officer in Georgia and sentenced to death. In a writ of habeas corpus, McCleskey argued that a statistical study proved that the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia depended to some extent on the race of the victim and the accused. The study found that black defendants who kill white victims are the most likely to receive death sentences in the state.

Question

Did the statistical study prove that McCleskey's sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kemp, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

The Court held that since McCleskey could not prove that purposeful discrimination which had a discriminatory effect on him existed in this particular trial, there was no constitutional violation. Justice Powell refused to apply the statistical study in this case given the unique circumstances and nature of decisions that face all juries in capital cases. He argued that the data McCleskey produced is best presented to legislative bodies and not to the courts.

Hitchcock v. Dugger

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-6756

Petitioner

Hitchcock

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dugger

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

481 U.S. 393 (1987)

Argued

Wednesday, October 15, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, April 22, 1987

Advocates

Craig S. Barnard (on behalf of Petitioner)

Sean Daly (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hitchcock, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Ford v. Wainwright

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-5542

Petitioner

Ford

Respondent

Wainwright

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

477 U.S. 399 (1986)

Argued

Tuesday, April 22, 1986

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 1986

Advocates

Richard H. Burr (on behalf of Petitioner)

Joy B. Shearer (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1974, a Florida court sentenced Alvin Bernard Ford to death for first- degree murder. At the time of the murder, trial, and sentencing phase, there was no indication that Ford was suffering from any mental deficiencies. While awaiting execution, Ford's mental condition worsened. His competency was assessed in accordance with Florida procedures. Following this assessment, Florida's Governor signed Ford's death warrant. A state court declined to hear arguments raised about Ford's competency. Without the benefit of a hearing, Ford's habeas corpus petition was then denied by the a federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the imposition of the death penalty upon the insane?
Did the Federal District Court err when it declined to hear Ford's petition?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Ford, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Yes and yes. In a 7-2 decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall writing for the majority noted that English common law found executing the insane "savage and inhumane." In addition, no State permitted such executions. Opponents of such executions maintained that it "offends humanity" and that such executions had neither a deterrent nor a retributive effect. On the second question, Marshall observed that no state court had heard arguments that Ford was insane. In addition, Florida's competency procedures were inadequate.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, in a separate concurring opinion, agreed that executing an insane inmate violated the Eighth Amendment. For Powell, "the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it." Powell argued that Florida's procedure for determining the competency of the inmate violated due process.

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined by Justice Byron R. White, dissented in part. They agreed that Florida's procedures did not protect Ford's due process rights but that "the Eighth Amendment does not create a substantive right not to be executed while insane." Justice William H. Rehnquist further, joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, also maintained that no substantive right was created. In addition, Rehnquist argued that the State's procedures drew sustenance from the common law and were not out of step with contemporary practice.

This abstract was prepared by Adam J. Ruggles, Gloria R. Thornburg, and Peter Watkins.

Skipper v. South Carolina

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-6859

Petitioner

Skipper

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

South Carolina

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

476 U.S. 1 (1986)

Argued

Monday, February 24, 1986

Decided

Tuesday, April 29, 1986

Advocates

Harold M. Coombs, Jr. (on behalf of the respondent)

David I. Bruck (on behalf of the petitioner, appointed by this Court)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Skipper, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Darden v. Wainwright

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-5319

Petitioner

Darden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wainwright

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

477 U.S. 168 (1986)

Argued

Monday, January 13, 1986

Decided

Monday, June 23, 1986

Advocates

Richard W. Prospect (on behalf of the respondent)

Robert A. Harper, Jr. (on behalf of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Wainwright, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Turner v. Murray

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:06 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-6646

Petitioner

Turner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Murray

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

476 U.S. 28 (1986)

Argued

Thursday, December 12, 1985

Decided

Wednesday, April 30, 1986

Advocates

James E. Kulp (on behalf of the respondent)

J. Lloyd Snook, III (on behalf of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Turner, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 6: Other Sixth Amendment Provisions

None

Cabana v. Bullock

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1236

Petitioner

Cabana

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bullock

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

474 U.S. 376 (1986)

Argued

Tuesday, November 5, 1985

Decided

Wednesday, January 22, 1986

Advocates

Joseph T. Mc Laughlin (on behalf of the respondent)

Marvin L. White, Jr. (on behalf of the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Cabana, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Baldwin v. Alabama

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-5743

Petitioner

Baldwin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alabama

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

472 U.S. 372 (1985)

Argued

Wednesday, March 27, 1985

Decided

Monday, June 17, 1985

Advocates

Edward E. Carnes (on behalf of Respondent)

John L. Carroll (on behalf of Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Alabama, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Caldwell v. Mississippi

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-6607

Petitioner

Caldwell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mississippi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

472 U.S. 320 (1985)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 1985

Decided

Tuesday, June 11, 1985

Advocates

E. Thomas Boyle (on behalf of the petitioner)

William S. Boyd, III (on behalf of the respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Caldwell, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Spaziano v. Florida

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-5596

Petitioner

Spaziano

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Florida

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

468 U.S. 447 (1984)

Argued

Tuesday, April 17, 1984

Decided

Monday, July 2, 1984

Advocates

Craig S. Barnard (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Mark C. Menser (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Florida, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Pulley v. Harris

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-1095

Petitioner

Pulley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harris

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

465 U.S. 37 (1984)

Argued

Monday, November 7, 1983

Decided

Monday, January 23, 1984

Advocates

Michael D. Wellington (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Anthony G. Amsterdam (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Pulley, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None