Cases by Issue - Unions

IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1238

Petitioner

Abdela Tum, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gabriel Alvarez, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Tum v. Barber Foods, No. 04-66

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Argued

Monday, October 3, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, November 8, 2005

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Petitioner in 03-1238 and respondent in 04-66)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Respondents in 03-1238 and petitioners in 04-66)

Thomas C. Goldstein (argued the cause for Respondents in 03-1238 and petitioners in 04-66)

Facts of the Case

In two separate cases, employees sued Barber Foods and IBP in federal district court. The employees alleged the companies violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by not paying them for time spent walking to the worksite after putting on required equipment. The district court and later the First Circuit ruled against the Barber employees. A separate district court ruled IBP must compensate its employees for the disputed time. The Ninth Circuit agreed. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the cases.

Question

Did the Fair Labor Standards Act require employers to pay employees for time spent walking to and from stations that distributed required safety equipment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Alvarez, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, for a unanimous Court, wrote that putting on required safety equipment qualified as a "principal activity" under the FLSA. The workday began when employees started that activity and therefore included the subsequent time spent walking to the worksite. The time spent waiting to put on safety equipment before that, however, was not included in the workday because it was a "preliminary" activity under the Portal-to-Portal Act.

BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-518

Petitioner

BE & K Construction Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 516 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, April 16, 2002

Decided

Monday, June 24, 2002

Advocates

Maurice Baskin (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In filing suit against a group of unions, BE&K; Construction Company alleged that the unions had engaged in lobbying, litigation, and other concerted activities in order to delay a project it had been hired for because it employed nonunion workers. After BE&K; lost on or withdrew each of its claims, the National Labor Relations Board issued an administrative complaint, alleging that BE&K;, by filing and maintaining its lawsuit, had violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which prohibits employers from restraining, coercing, or interfering with employees' exercise of rights related to self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities. Finding that the lawsuit was filed to retaliate against the unions, whose conduct was protected under the NLRA, the Board ordered BE&K; to cease and desist from prosecuting such suits. In granting the Board's enforcement petition, the Court of Appeals held that because the Judiciary had already found BE&K;'s claims against the unions unmeritorious or dismissed, evidence of a simple retaliatory motive sufficed to adjudge BE&K; of committing an unfair labor practice.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the National Labor Relations Board may impose liability on an employer for filing a losing retaliatory lawsuit, even if the employer could show the suit was not objectively baseless?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for BE & K Construction Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Board lacked authority to assess liability under the standard of prosecuting an unsuccessful suit with a retaliatory motive. The Court reasoned that the Board's definition of a retaliatory suit as one brought with a motive to interfere with the exercise of protected NLRA rights covers a substantial amount of genuine petitioning. "Because there is nothing in the statutory text indicating that [the NLRA] must be read to reach all reasonably based but unsuccessful suits filed with a retaliatory purpose, we decline to do so. Because the Board's standard for imposing liability under the NLRA allows it to penalize such suits, its standard is thus invalid," wrote Justice O'Connor.

Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-927

Petitioner

Chao

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 235 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, October 31, 2001

Decided

Wednesday, January 9, 2002

Advocates

Patrick J. Veters (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Matthew D. Roberts (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, an explosion on board Mallard Bay Drilling Rig 52, a oil and gas exploration barge, killed or injured several workers while the barge was drilling a well in Louisiana's territorial waters. The Coast Guard's subsequent investigation did not accuse Mallard of anything, but did note that the barge was not an "inspected vessel" subject to comprehensive Coast Guard regulation. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) then cited Mallard for violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act) of 1970. Mallard challenged OSHA's jurisdiction to issue the citations on the grounds that Rig 52 was not a "workplace" under section 4(a) of the Act and that section 4(b)(1) of the Act pre-empted OSHA jurisdiction because the Coast Guard had exclusive authority to prescribe and enforce occupational safety and health standards on vessels such as Rig 52. Rejecting both arguments, an Administrative Law Judge found that Rig 52 was a "workplace" under the Act and held that the Coast Guard had not pre-empted OSHA's jurisdiction. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the Coast Guard's exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of seamen's working conditions aboard vessels such as Rig 52 precluded OSHA's regulation under section 4(b)(1), and that this pre-emption encompassed both inspected and uninspected vessels.

Question

Does the Occupational Safety and Health Administration have jurisdiction under the Occupational Safety and Health Act to issue citations to uninspected vessels, which are subject to minimal Coast Guard regulation?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Chao, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Occupational Safety and Health

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that OSHA had jurisdiction under the Act to issue the citations. The Court reasoned that section 4(b)(1) did not pre-empt, in favor of Coast Guard jurisdiction, OSHA jurisdiction over the barge, as the Coast Guard had not exercised its authority over the barge because the Guard has neither affirmatively regulated the working conditions at issue, nor asserted comprehensive regulatory jurisdiction over working conditions on uninspected vessels. "Mere possession by another federal agency of unexercised authority to regulate certain working conditions is insufficient to displace OSHA's jurisdiction," wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Antonin Scalia took no part in the decision of this case.

EEOC v. Waffle House

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1823

Petitioner

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Waffle House

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 279 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, October 10, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, January 15, 2002

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (On behalf of the petitioner)

David L. Gordon (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Waffle House, Inc.'s employees must each sign an agreement requiring employment disputes to be settled by binding arbitration. After he suffered a seizure and was fired by Waffle House, Eric Baker filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that his discharge violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The EEOC then filed suit, alleging that Baker?s discharge violated the ADA, and sought injunctive relief and specific relief for Baker, including backpay, reinstatement, and compensatory damages, and punitive damages for malicious and reckless conduct. Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), Waffle House petitioned to stay the EEOC's suit and compel arbitration. The District Court did not stay the action. The Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House did not foreclose the enforcement action because the EEOC was not a party to the contract, but had independent statutory authority to bring suit in any federal district court where venue was proper. The appellate court also held that the EEOC was limited to injunctive relief.

Question

Does an agreement between an employer and an employee to arbitrate employment- related disputes bar the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief in an enforcement action alleging that the employer has violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for EEOC, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 9 U.S.C. 1

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the arbitration agreement did not bar the EEOC from pursuing victim- specific judicial relief in an ADA enforcement action. The Court reasoned that the EECO's statutory enforcement powers unambiguously authorized the EEOC to obtain the relief that it sought in its complaint, if it could prove its case against the employer. The Court further noted that no language existed to suggest that an arbitration agreement between private parties materially changed the EEOC's statutory function or the remedies otherwise available. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia joined.

NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1815

Petitioner

National Labor Relations Board

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ky. River Cmty. Care

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 706 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, February 21, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, May 29, 2001

Advocates

Michael W. Hawkins (Argued the case for the respondents)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, a labor union petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to represent a unit of all the employees at the Caney Creek Developmental Complex, which is operated by Kentucky River Community Care, Inc. Kentucky River objected to the inclusion of its registered nurses in the unit because they were "supervisors" under National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Under the NLRA, employees are deemed to be "supervisors" and thereby excluded from the NLRA if they exercise "independent judgment" in "responsibly...directing" other employees "in the interest of the employer." At the ensuing representation hearing, the NLRB placed the burden of proving supervisory status on Kentucky River and found that it had not carried its burden. The NLRB rejected Kentucky River's proof of supervisory status on the ground that employees do not use "independent judgment" under the NLRA when they exercise "ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less-skilled employees to deliver services in accordance with employer-specified standards." Kentucky River then refused to bargain with the union. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals refused to enforce a bargaining order issued by the NLRB at an unfair labor practice proceeding. The court rejected the NLRB's interpretation of "independent judgment" under the NLRA's test for supervisory status and held that NLRB had erred in placing the burden of proving supervisory status on Kentucky River.

Question

Does the party claiming that an employee is a supervisor bear the burden of proving supervisor status in a representation hearing and unfair labor practice proceeding under the National Labor Relations Act? Under the National Labor Relations Act, is judgment "independent judgment" when it is informed by professional or technical training or experience?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Ky. River Cmty. Care, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the burden of proving the applicability of the supervisory exception of the Act falls on the party asserting it. Justice Scalia wrote that the "Act does not...expressly allocate the burden of proving or disproving a challenged employee's supervisory status. The Board therefore has filled the statutory gap with the consistent rule that the burden is borne by the party claiming that the employee is a supervisor." Additionally, in a 5-4 split, the Court held that the NLRB's application of its interpretation of "independent judgment" to create categorical exclusion for nurses who exercised ordinary professional or technical judgment in directing less- skilled employees to deliver services was unlawful under the NLRA.

Circuit City v. Adams

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1379

Petitioner

Circuit City

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Adams

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 105 (2001)

Argued

Monday, November 6, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, March 21, 2001

Advocates

Michael Rubin (Argued the cause for the respondent)

David E. Nagle (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Saint Clair Adams, who was hired as a sales counselor, signed an employment application with Circuit City. A provision in Adams' application required all employment disputes to be settled by arbitration. In 1997, Adams filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Circuit City in California state court. Circuit City then filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to enjoin the state-court action and to compel arbitration of Adams' claims under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The District Court entered the requested order. The court concluded that Adams was obligated by the arbitration agreement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the arbitration agreement between Adams and Circuit City was contained in a "contract of employment," and thus not subject to the FAA under section 1 of the Act. Section 1 of the FAA excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" from the Act's coverage.

Question

Does the Federal Arbitration Act, which excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" from the Act's coverage, apply to employment contracts?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Circuit City, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 9 U.S.C. 1

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that section 1 exemption is confined to transportation workers. "The wording of [section 1] calls for the application of the maxim ejusdem generis, the statutory canon that 'where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words,'" wrote Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy continued that "[u]nder this rule of construction the residual clause should be read to give effect to the terms 'seamen' and 'railroad employees,' and should itself be controlled and defined by reference to the enumerated categories of workers which are recited just before it; the interpretation of the clause pressed by respondent fails to produce these results." Therefore, section 1 "exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers."

Christensen v. Harris County

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1167

Petitioner

Christensen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harris County

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 576 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 1, 2000

Advocates

Matthew D. Roberts (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court)

Michael P. Fleming (Houston, Texas, argued the cause for the respondents)

Michael T. Leibig (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) permits governmental entities to compensate their employees for overtime work by granting them compensatory time in lieu of cash payment. If the employees do not use their accumulated compensatory time, the employer must pay cash compensation under certain circumstances. Harris County, Texas, found that too many of its deputy sheriffs had too many hours of accrued compensatory time. Fearing a budget crisis, the county adopted a policy under which its employees could be ordered to schedule compensatory time at specified times in order to reduce the amount of accrued time that would otherwise require cash payment. Edward Christensen and 128 other deputy sheriffs in Harris County believed they had the right to use their compensatory time when they saw fit. The sheriffs sued, claiming that the FLSA does not permit an employer to compel an employee to use compensatory time in the absence of an agreement permitting the employer to do so. The District Court ruled in favor of the sheriffs, concluding that the policy violated the FLSA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the FLSA did not address the issue in question and thus did not prohibit the county from implementing a compensatory time policy.

Question

Does the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 prohibit a public employer from compelling its employees to use their compensatory time without a preexisting agreement?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Harris County, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held 6-3 that "[n]othing in the FLSA or its implementing regulations prohibits a public employer from compelling the use of compensatory time." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "under the FLSA, an employer is free to require an employee to take time off work, and an employer is also free to use the money it would have paid in wages to cash out accrued compensatory time. The compelled use of compensatory time challenged in this case merely involves doing both of these steps at once."

NASA v. FLRA

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-369

Petitioner

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 229 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, March 23, 1999

Decided

Thursday, June 17, 1999

Advocates

Stuart Kirsch (Argued the cause for respondent American Federation of Government Employees)

David M. Smith (Argued the cause for respondent Federal Labor Relations Authority)

David C. Frederick (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

After enacting the Inspector General Act (IGA), which created an Office of Inspector General (OIG) in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and other federal agencies, Congress enacted the Federal Service Labor- Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS). The FSLMRS permits union participation at an employee examination conducted "by a representative of the agency" if the employee believes that the examination will result in disciplinary action and requests such representation. In January 1993, NASA's OIG (NASA-OIG) conducted an investigation of certain threatening activities of a NASA employee. A NASA-OIG investigator interviewed the employee and permitted the employee's union representative to attend. Subsequently, the employee's union filed a charge with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority), alleging that NASA and its OIG had committed an unfair labor practice when the investigator limited the union representative's participation in the interview. In ruling for the union, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that the OIG investigator was a "representative" of NASA within FSLMRS' meaning, and that the investigator's behavior had violated the employee's right to union representation. On review, the Authority agreed and granted relief against both NASA and NASA-OIG. The Court of Appeals upheld the Authority's rulings and granted the Authority's application for enforcement of its order.

Question

May an investigator employed in NASA's Office of Inspector General be considered a "representative" of NASA when examining a NASA employee, such that the right to union representation in the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute may be invoked?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for FLRA, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 7114

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that an investigator from NASA's Office of Inspector General is a "representative" of NASA when conducting an employee examination covered by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, such that the right to union representation in the FSLMRS may be invoked. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, declared: "[E]mploying ordinary tools of statutory construction...we have no difficulty concluding that [the law] is not limited to agency investigators representing an entity that collectively bargains with the employee's union." Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia, dissented, citing the independence guaranteed Inspectors General by the Inspector General Act as reason for investigators not representing management with the meaning of the FSLMRS.

NFFE, Local 139 v. Department of the Interior

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1184

Petitioner

NFFE, Local 139

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Department of the Interior

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 97-1243

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 86 (1999)

Argued

Monday, November 9, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, March 3, 1999

Advocates

David M. Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Gregory O'Duden (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (Department of Justice, on behalf of the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The National Federation of Federal Employees, a federal employees' union, proposed to include a provision obligating the Interior Department to negotiate midterm matters not in the original contract between the union and the Agency. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, that created the Federal Labor Relations Authority, requires federal agencies and their employees' unions to negotiate in good faith to arrive at a collective bargaining agreement. Initially, the Authority held that the good-faith bargaining clause did not extend to union-initiated proposals during the term of the basic contract. The Court of Appeals did not agree and, in turn, the Authority reversed its decision. The Interior Department refused the proposal on the ground that union-initiated midterm bargaining is inconsistent with the Statute. The Authority then ordered the Agency to comply with the bargaining.

Question

Can federal agencies be required to bargain with federal employees' unions over issues that arise during the duration of a contract?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for NFFE, Local 139, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 7101

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, announced by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute gave the Federal Labor Relations Authority power to determine whether parties must engage in midterm bargaining. Justice Breyer wrote, "Congress delegated to the authority the power to determine -- within appropriate legal bounds...whether, when, where and what sort of midterm bargaining is required."

Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-889

Petitioner

Wright

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Universal Maritime Service Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 70 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, October 7, 1998

Decided

Monday, November 16, 1998

Advocates

Charles A. Edwards (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Ray P. McClain (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Barbara D. Underwood (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Ceasar Wright worked as a longshoreman. He belonged to the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO, a union that supplied workers to the South Carolina Stevedores Association (SCSA). In 1992, Wright sustained a worked-related; he sought compensation for permanent disability under federal law. In 1995, Wright returned to Longshoremen's Association to be referred for work. When the stevedoring companies, to which he was referred, discovered that he had previously settled a claim for permanent disability, they informed the union they would not accept Wright for employment. Under the collective- bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Longshoremen's Association and the SCSA, Wright was not qualified to perform longshore work if he was permanently disabled. Wright chose not to file a grievance under the CBA, but instead to file a claim under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). He alleged the stevedoring companies and the SCSA had discriminated against him by refusing him work. The District Court dismissed the case because Wright had failed to pursue the grievance procedure -- arbitration -- provided by the CBA. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

May employees sue over alleged discrimination under the ADA when their union contract requires grievances to be handled through arbitration?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wright, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the CBA's arbitration clause did not require Wright to use the arbitration procedure for the alleged violation of the ADA. In his opinion, Scalia wrote that the CBA did not contain a waiver of the employee's right to a judicial forum for federal claims of employment discrimination.

Air Line Pilots Association v. Miller

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-428

Petitioner

Air Line Pilots Association

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Miller

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 866 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 23, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 1998

Advocates

Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Jerry D. Anker (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), a private-sector labor organization, represents pilots employed by Delta Air Lines. The collective-bargaining agreement between ALPA and Delta includes an "agency shop" clause that requires nonunion Delta pilots to pay ALPA a monthly service charge for representing them. 153 Delta pilots challenged in federal-court action the manner in which ALPA calculated agency fees. Under ALPA policy pilots who object to the fee calculation may request arbitration proceedings. When 174 Delta pilots filed objections to the agency-fee calculation, the ALPA treated the objections as requests for arbitration. The arbitrator sustained ALPA's calculation. The District Court concluded that the pilots seeking to challenge the fee calculation must exhaust arbitral remedies before proceeding in court. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It found no legal basis for requiring objectors to arbitrate agency-fee challenges when they had not agreed to do so.

Question

Must the nonunion pilots go through arbitration before going to court to challenge the fees they are required to pay to the union under the "agency- shop" agreement?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Miller, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled the nonunion pilots cannot be forced to go through arbitration. "Unless they agree to the procedure, agency-fee objectors may not be required to exhaust an arbitration remedy before bringing their claims in federal court," wrote Ginsburg.

Allentown Mack Sales v. NLRB

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-795

Petitioner

Allentown Mack Sales

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 359 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, October 15, 1997

Decided

Monday, January 26, 1998

Advocates

Jonathan Nuechterlein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Stephen D. Shawe (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1990, Mack Trucks, Inc., sold its Allentown, Pennsylvania, branch to Allentown Mack Sales, Inc. A number of Mack employees made statement to the new owners suggesting that Local Lodge 724 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, had lost the support of bargaining- unit members generally. Subsequently, Allentown refused Local 724's request for recognition and commencement of collective-bargaining negotiations. Allentown, under a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedent, claimed a good-faith reasonable doubt as to the union's support in order to conduct an internal poll of employee support for the union. The employees voted 19 to 13 against the union. Local 724 then filed an unfair-labor-practice charge with the NLRB. Ultimately, an Administrative Law Judge held that Allentown's poll was conducted in compliance with procedural standards, but that Allentown did not have an "objective reasonable doubt" about the majority status of the union. The Court of Appeals enforced the NLRB's order for Allentown to recognize and bargain with Local 724.

Question

Is the National Labor Relations Board's "good-faith reasonable doubt" standard for polling employees on union support rational and consistent with the National Labor Relations Act? Is the NLRB's factual determination that Allentown Mack Sales, Inc. lacked such doubt supported by substantial evidence in the record?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Allentown Mack Sales, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

Split Vote

Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "the Board's 'reasonable doubt' test for employer polls is facially rational and consistent with the Act." However, in a separate 5-4 split, the Court held that "the Board's factual finding that Allentown Mack Sales lacked such a doubt is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Justice Scalia wrote, "the Board must be required to apply in fact the clearly understood legal standards that it enunciates in principle, such as good-faith reasonable doubt....Reviewing courts are entitled to take those standards to mean what they say, and to conduct substantial-evidence review on that basis. Even the most consistent and hence predictable Board departure from proper application of those standards will not alter the legal rule by which the agency's factfinding is to be judged."

Auer v. Robbins

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-897

Petitioner

Auer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Robbins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 452 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, December 10, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, February 19, 1997

Advocates

John B. Renick (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Irving L. Gornstein (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Michael T. Leibig (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Michael T. Liebig (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Francis Bernard Auer, a St. Louis police sergeant, other St. Louis police sergeants, and a lieutenant sued the respondent police commissioners, including David A. Robbins, for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). The commissioners argued that Auer and the other petitioners were "bona fide executive, administrative, or professional" employees exempted from overtime pay requirements by the FLSA. Under the Secretary of Labor's regulations, that exemption applies to employees paid a specified minimum amount on a "salary basis," which requires that the "compensation...not [be] subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed." Auer claimed that that they did not meet this test because, under the terms of the Police Department Manual, their compensation could theoretically be reduced for a variety of disciplinary infractions related to the "quality or quantity" of their work. The District Court and the Court of Appeals disagreed with Auer's claim. Both courts held that the salary basis test was satisfied.

Question

Must sergeants and lieutenants in the St. Louis Police Department be paid for working overtime pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Robbins, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards

No. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that sergeants and lieutenants are exempt as salaried employees from the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. The justices rejected the argument that the possibility of suspension without pay moves the officers out of the exempt category.

Auciello Iron Works Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-668

Petitioner

Auciello Iron Works Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

517 U.S. 781 (1996)

Argued

Monday, April 22, 1996

Decided

Monday, June 3, 1996

Advocates

Richard H. Seamon (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

John D. O'Reilly, III (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The day after Auciello Iron Works' contract offer was accepted by its union employees' collective-bargaining representative, Auciello disavowed the agreement because of a good-faith doubt, based on knowledge acquired before the offer's acceptance, that a majority of employees supported the Union. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that Auciello's withdrawal was an unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations Act and ordered that the agreement be reduced to a formal written instrument. The Court of Appeals enforced the order as reasonable after the NLRB issued a supplemental opinion to justify its refusal to consider Auciello's defense of good-faith doubt about the Union's majority status.

Question

May an employer disavow a collective-bargaining agreement because of a good- faith doubt about a union's majority status at the time the contract was made, when the doubt arises from facts known to the employer before its contract offer had been accepted by the union?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for National Labor Relations Board, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the NLRB reasonably concluded that an employer challenging an agreement under these circumstances commits an unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Court agreed with the NLRB that an employer's precontractual, good-faith doubt is inadequate to support an exception to the conclusive presumption of a union's majority status, which arises at the moment when a collective-bargaining contract offer has been accepted.

Holly Farms Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:31 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-210

Petitioner

Holly Farms Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

517 U.S. 392 (1996)

Argued

Wednesday, February 21, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, April 23, 1996

Advocates

Charles P. Roberts, III (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Richard H. Seamon (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Holly Farms Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tyson Foods, Inc., is a vertically integrated poultry producer. In 1989, the Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391, filed a representation petition with the National Labor Relations Board, seeking an election in a proposed unit that included live- haul employees working out of Holly Farms' Wilkesboro processing plant. The unit included workers described as "live-haul" crews, or teams of chicken catchers, forklift operators, and truckdrivers, who collect for slaughter chickens raised as broilers by independent contract growers, and transport the birds to the processing plant. Classifying the live-haul workers as employees protected by the National Labor Relations Act, rather than agricultural laborers excluded from the Act's coverage, the Board approved the bargaining unit. On petition for review, the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order, holding that the Board's classification rested on a reasonable interpretation of the Act and was consistent with the Board's prior decisions.

Question

Did the National Labor Relations Board correctly classify chicken catchers as employees, and not as exempt agricultural workers, for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for National Labor Relations Board, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the NLRB's determination that the producer's live-haul workers were covered employees rather than exempt agricultural laborers, was a reasonable interpretation to which a reviewing court properly deferred. The Court was also split 5-4 in upholding the Board's classification for forklift operators who work in the chicken industry. In a 9-0 vote, the Court upheld the Board's classification for the live-haul crew's truck drivers.

Brotherhood Of Locomotive Engineers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-1592

Petitioner

Brotherhood Of Locomotive Engineers et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co. et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

516 U.S. 152 (1996)

Argued

Monday, October 30, 1995

Decided

Monday, January 8, 1996

Advocates

Lawrence M. Mann (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Malcolm L. Stewart (on behalf of the Federal Respondent)

Ronald M. Johnson (on behalf of the Railroad Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 49 U.S.C. 2110

None

National Labor Relations Board v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-947

Petitioner

National Labor Relations Board

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Town & Country Electric, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

516 U.S. 85 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, October 10, 1995

Decided

Tuesday, November 28, 1995

Advocates

James K. Pease, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Town & County Electric, Inc., a non-union company, sought to fill several positions for a construction job in Minnesota. Town & Country received applications from union staff, but refused to interview any of the applicants except one, who was eventually hired and fired soon thereafter. These individuals applied with the intention to organize Town & Country and were to remain on Union payroll during their time of employment. The union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board claiming that Town & Country had refused to interview and retain the workers because of their union affiliation, a violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board held that the 11 individuals met the definition of employees under the Act and rejected Town & Country's claims that the individuals had been refused for other reasons.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that the term "employee" does not include those individuals who remain on Union payroll during their time of employment with another company.

Question

Does a worker qualify as an "employee" under the National Labor Relations Act if, while he is working, he is simultaneously paid by a union to help the union organize a company?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for National Labor Relations Board, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Supreme Court ruled for the Board and held that individuals can meet the definition of employee even if they are paid by a union to organize a non-union company while on company payroll. The Court found this result consistent with the language and purpose of the Act as well as the dictionary definition of "employee." The Court also reasoned that the language of the Act seemed to specifically take into account the possibility of workers who are paid union organizers.

National Labor Relations Board v. Health Care & Retirement Corporation Of America

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1964

Petitioner

National Labor Relations Board

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Health Care & Retirement Corporation Of America

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 571 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 1994

Decided

Monday, May 23, 1994

Advocates

Maureen E. Mahoney (on behalf of the Respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Health Care & Retirement Corporation Of America, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

None

Moreau v. Klevenhagen, Sheriff, Harris County, Texas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:01:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1

Petitioner

Moreau et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Klevenhagen, Sheriff, Harris County, Texas, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

508 U.S. 22 (1993)

Argued

Monday, March 1, 1993

Decided

Monday, May 3, 1993

Advocates

Harold M. Streicher (on behalf of the Respondents)

Michael T. Leibig (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Klevenhagen, Sheriff, Harris County, Texas, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards

None

Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Demisay

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:01:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-610

Petitioner

Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Demisay et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

508 U.S. 581 (1993)

Argued

Monday, January 11, 1993

Decided

Monday, June 14, 1993

Advocates

Ronald E. Richman (on behalf of the Respondents)

Henry Rose (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Labor-Management Relations

None

Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-970

Petitioner

Lechmere Inc.

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

502 U.S. 527 (1992)

Argued

Tuesday, November 12, 1991

Decided

Monday, January 27, 1992

Advocates

Robert P. Joy (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Lechmere owned and operated a large retail store in a shopping plaza. Nonemployee union organizers campaigned to organize the store employees by entering the company's parking lot and placing handbills on car windshields. Lechmere prohibited solicitation and literature distribution on its property. The union organizers persisted in their leafleting campaign despite continued objections from Lechmere. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against Lechmere. An NLRB judge ruled in the union's favor.

Question

May nonemployee union organizers trespass on private property to solicit union support?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Lechmere Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

No, reasoned Justice Clarence Thomas, except in situations where inaccessibility makes communication through normal channels ineffective. There were alternatives short of trespass, such as signs, mailings, and newspaper ads. (Thomas's defense of private property rights may offer a clue to his budding jurisprudence.)

Litton Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-285

Petitioner

Litton Financial Printing Div.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 190 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, March 20, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 13, 1991

Advocates

David A. Rosenfeld (on behalf of the Respondent Printing Specialties)

Mathias J. Diederich (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the Respondent NLRB in support of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Litton Financial Printing Div., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

None

American Hospital Assn v. NLRB

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-97

Petitioner

American Hospital Assn

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 606 (1991)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, April 23, 1991

Advocates

David L. Shapiro (on behalf of the Respondents)

James D. Holzhauer (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for NLRB, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

None

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-18

Petitioner

Gilmer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 20 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 14, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 13, 1991

Advocates

James B. Spears (on behalf of the Respondent)

John T. Allred (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

None

Air Line Pilots v. O'neill

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1493

Petitioner

Air Line Pilots

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

O'neill

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 65 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 14, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, March 19, 1991

Advocates

Marty Harper (on behalf of the Respondents)

Laurence E. Gold (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Air Line Pilots, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Master, Mates & Pilots v. Brown

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1330

Petitioner

Master, Mates & Pilots

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brown

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 466 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, November 27, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 1991

Advocates

W. Michel Pierson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

James A. Feldman (as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Paul Alan Levy (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Brown, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure

None

Martin v. Oshrc

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:33 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1541

Petitioner

Martin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oshrc

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 144 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, November 27, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, March 20, 1991

Advocates

Clifford M. Sloan (on behalf of the Petitioner)

John D. Faught (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Martin, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Occupational Safety and Health

None

Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1217

Petitioner

Lehnert

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ferris Faculty Assn

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 507 (1991)

Argued

Monday, November 5, 1990

Decided

Thursday, May 30, 1991

Advocates

Robert H. Chanin (on behalf of the Respondents)

Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lehnert, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Di

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1166

Petitioner

Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Di

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 168 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, October 10, 1990

Decided

Monday, December 10, 1990

Advocates

Terence V. Page (on behalf of the Respondent)

Laurence E. Gold (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Groves, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Labor-Management Relations

None

Fort Stewart Schools v. FLRA

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-65

Petitioner

Fort Stewart Schools

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

495 U.S. 641 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, January 10, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, May 29, 1990

Advocates

William E. Persina (on behalf of the Respondents)

Christopher J. Wright (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for FLRA, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 7102

None

IRS v. FLRA

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-2123

Petitioner

IRS

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

FLRA

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

494 U.S. 922 (1990)

Argued

Monday, January 8, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, April 17, 1990

Advocates

Robert J. Englehart (on behalf of the Respondent Federal Labor Relations Authority)

David L. Shapiro (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Gregory O'Duden (on behalf of the Respondent National Treasury Employees Union)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for IRS, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 7101

None

NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1685

Petitioner

National Labor Relations Board

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

494 U.S. 775 (1990)

Argued

Monday, December 4, 1989

Decided

Tuesday, April 17, 1990

Advocates

James V. Carroll, III (on behalf of the Respondent)

David L. Shapiro (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for NLRB, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

None

Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-124

Petitioner

Breininger

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sheet Metal Workers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

493 U.S. 67 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, October 10, 1989

Decided

Tuesday, December 5, 1989

Advocates

David L. Shapiro (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Laurence E. Gold (on behalf of the Respondent)

Francis J. Landry (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Breininger, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Labor-Management Relations

None

Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co. v. Railway Executives

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1589

Petitioner

Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Railway Executives

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 87-1888

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

491 U.S. 490 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, March 29, 1989

Decided

Wednesday, June 21, 1989

Advocates

John O'B. Clarke, Jr. (on behalf of Respondents)

Jeffrey P. Minear (as amicus curiae)

Richard L. Wyatt, Jr. (on behalf of Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Railway Labor

None

Consol. Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1

Petitioner

Consol. Rail Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Railway Labor Executives

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

491 U.S. 299 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, February 28, 1989

Decided

Monday, June 19, 1989

Advocates

John O'B. Clarke, Jr. (on behalf of Respondents)

Dennis J. Morikawa (on behalf of Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Consol. Rail Corp., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Railway Labor

None

Sheet Metal Workers v. Lynn

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-1940

Petitioner

Sheet Metal Workers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lynn

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

488 U.S. 347 (1989)

Argued

Monday, November 7, 1988

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 1989

Advocates

Bruce M. Stark (on behalf of the Respondent)

Donald W. Fisher (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Lynn, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure

None

Twa, Inc. v. Flight Attendants

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:14 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-548

Petitioner

Twa, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Flight Attendants

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

489 U.S. 426 (1989)

Argued

Monday, November 7, 1988

Decided

Tuesday, February 28, 1989

Advocates

Lawrence S. Robbins (as amicus curiae supporting Petitioner)

John P. Hurley (on behalf of the Respondent)

Murray Gartner (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Twa, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Railway Labor

None

Reed v. United Transportation Union

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:14 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1031

Petitioner

Reed

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United Transportation Union

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

488 U.S. 319 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, November 2, 1988

Decided

Wednesday, January 11, 1989

Advocates

Clinton J. Miller, III (on behalf of the Respondents)

John W. Gresham (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Reed, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure

None

Landers v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-2037

Petitioner

Landers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Railroad Passenger Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

485 U.S. 652 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 1988

Decided

Wednesday, April 27, 1988

Advocates

Clinton J. Miller, III (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Harold A. Ross (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for National Railroad Passenger Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Railway Labor

None

Mclaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:33 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-1520

Petitioner

Mclaughlin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Richland Shoe Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

486 U.S. 128 (1988)

Argued

Wednesday, February 24, 1988

Decided

Monday, May 16, 1988

Advocates

Leon Ehrlich (on behalf of the respondent)

Donald B. Ayer (on behalf of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Richland Shoe Co., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards

None

FLRA v. Aberdeen Proving Ground

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-1715

Petitioner

Federal Labor Relations Authority

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Aberdeen Proving Ground

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

485 U.S. 409 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, February 23, 1988

Decided

Monday, April 4, 1988

Advocates

Lawrence S. Robbins (on behalf of the respondent)

Ruth E. Peters (on behalf of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Aberdeen Proving Ground, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 7117

None

Debartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-1461

Petitioner

Debartolo Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

485 U.S. 568 (1988)

Argued

Wednesday, January 20, 1988

Decided

Wednesday, April 20, 1988

Advocates

Lawrence M. Cohen (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Louis R. Cohen (federal respondent NLRB in support of Petitioner)

Laurence E. Gold (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

None

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-1650

Petitioner

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Flight Attendants

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

485 U.S. 175 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, January 12, 1988

Decided

Wednesday, March 2, 1988

Advocates

Steven A. Fehr (on behalf of the Respondent)

Murray Gartner (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Flight Attendants, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Regents Of Univ. Of Cal. v. Public Empl. Rel. Bd.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-935

Appellee

Public Empl. Rel. Bd.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Regents Of Univ. Of Cal.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

485 U.S. 589 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, January 12, 1988

Decided

Wednesday, April 20, 1988

Advocates

Andrea L. Biren (on behalf of the Appellees)

James N. Odle (on behalf of the Appellant)

Christopher J. Wright (as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Regents Of Univ. Of Cal., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1693

None

Communications Workers v. Beck

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:49 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-637

Petitioner

Communications Workers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Beck

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

487 U.S. 735 (1988)

Argued

Monday, January 11, 1988

Decided

Wednesday, June 29, 1988

Advocates

Edwin Vieira, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondents)

Laurence E. Gold (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Beck, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

None

Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-651

Petitioner

Paperworkers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Misco, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Opinion

484 U.S. 29 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, October 13, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, December 1, 1987

Advocates

David Silberman (on behalf of the Petitioners)

A. Richard Gear (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Paperworkers, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc. v. Brock

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-88

Petitioner

Citicorp Industrial Credit, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brock

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

483 U.S. 27 (1987)

Argued

Monday, April 20, 1987

Decided

Monday, June 22, 1987

Advocates

Charles A. Rothfeld (on behalf of Respondent)

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Brock, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards

None

Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1208

Petitioner

Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Labor Relations Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

482 U.S. 27 (1987)

Argued

Monday, March 2, 1987

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1987

Advocates

Louis R. Cohen (on behalf of the Respondent)

Ira Drogin (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for NLRB, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

None

NLRB v. Electrical Workers

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1924

Petitioner

National Labor Relations Board

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Electrical Workers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

481 U.S. 573 (1987)

Argued

Wednesday, February 25, 1987

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1987

Advocates

Laurence J. Cohen (on behalf of the Respondent)

Jerrold J. Ganzfried (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Electrical Workers, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: National Labor Relations, as amended

None

West v. Conrail

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1804

Petitioner

West

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Conrail

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

481 U.S. 35 (1987)

Argued

Wednesday, February 25, 1987

Decided

Monday, April 6, 1987

Advocates

Laurence E. Gold (on behalf of Respondents)

Paul Alan Levy (on behalf of Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for West, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None