Cases by Issue - Due Process

Dixon v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-7053

Petitioner

Keshia Cherie Ashford Dixon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Friday, January 13, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, April 25, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 22, 2006

Advocates

J. Craig Jett (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Keshia Dixon was arrested for illegally purchasing firearms. At her trial, Dixon raised a duress defense, claiming that her boyfriend abused her and that she feared he would harm or kill her or her daughters if she did not buy the firearms. Upon being convicted, Dixon appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that she should not bear the evidentiary burden of proving her duress claim. The Circuit Court rejected Dixon's argument, noting that the circuit's previous cases had clearly established that the duress defense requires the defendant to prove duress by a preponderance of evidence. This ruling conflicted with a ruling on a similar case in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Dixon appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the narrow question of the burden of proof.

Question

When a defendant raises a duress defense, is the burden of proof on the defendant to prove duress by a preponderance of the evidence, or on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that duress is not applicable?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

The burden of proof is on the defendant. In a 7-to-2 decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court held that the government meets its evidentiary burden when it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted "knowingly" and "willfully." Dixon had argued that duress would make it impossible for a defendant to act "willfully" (and that the government therefore had to prove she did not act under duress in order to prove she acted willfully). The Court rejected that argument, however, because under Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, acting "willfully" means simply that a defendant "acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful."

Holmes v. South Carolina

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1327

Petitioner

Bobby Lee Holmes

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

South Carolina

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, February 22, 2006

Decided

Monday, May 1, 2006

Advocates

Donald John Zelenka (argued the cause for Respondent)

John H. Blume (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Steffen N. Johnson (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Bobby Lee Holmes was sentenced to death after he was convicted of murder and several other crimes. At trial, he was not permitted to introduce evidence suggesting that another person had committed the crimes.

Under South Carolina law, defendants "seeking to present evidence of third- party guilt must [limit the evidence] to such facts as are inconsistent with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to his own innocence." Evidence that merely casts a bare suspicion on another person is not admissible. Using this standard, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision not to allow the evidence.

Question

Does South Carolina's rule governing the admissibility of evidence of third- party guilt violate a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and compulsory process (the ability to compel witnesses to testify)?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Holmes, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court. The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito - his first as a Supreme Court Justice - held that evidence of third-party guilt brought by the defense could not be excluded only on the basis of the strength of the prosecution's case. Although the Constitution is not violated by the exclusion of evidence based on "certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury," the Court held that exclusion of a defendant's evidence based on the strength of the prosecution's evidence denies the defendant his constitutional right to "'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'"

Jones v. Flowers

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1477

Petitioner

Gary Kent Jones

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Linda K. Flowers, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, January 17, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, April 26, 2006

Advocates

Michael T. Kirkpatrick (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Respondents)

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, Gary Jones moved out of his house and into an apartment, while his wife continued to live in the house. Jones failed to notify the state of his new address, however, and after several years of unpaid property taxes the tax authority sent a letter by certified mail to the house notifying him that, if the taxes went unpaid, the house would be sold. The letter was returnes as "unclaimed" (because Jones was not living at the house) and the property was eventually sold to Linda Flowers, the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands.

Jones sued in state court, claiming that the sale violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because he was never actually notified of the sale. The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed, however, finding that under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dusenberg v. United States actual notice is not required as long as the state makes a reasonable effort to notify the party of his rights.

Question

When mailed notice of a tax sale or property forfeiture is returned undelivered, does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause require the government to make any additional effort to locate the owner before taking the property?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Jones, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 5-3 decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court overruled the Arkansas Supreme Court, ruling that "additional reasonable steps" are required after a mailed notice is returned undelivered. The Court noted that the Due Process Clause does not require that every property owner receive actual notice, but the government must make a sincere effort. In this case, the government knew that its first effort to notify Jones had failed. Therefore, the Court ruled that the government should have taken additional steps, such as remailing the notice or posting a notice on the house's door. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Alito took no part in the decision.

Wilkinson v. Austin

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-495

Petitioner

Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Charles E. Austin, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, March 30, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

Deanne E. Maynard (argued the cause for Petitioners)

James M. Petro (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Jules Lobel (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

When Ohio's highest security prison first opened, no official policy governed placement there, resulting in haphazard and erroneous placements. Ohio ultimately issued the "New Policy," which required formal procedures for evaluating whether prisoners classified for placement into the facility. The New Policy also required a three-tier review process after a recommendation for Supermax placement was made. For instance, the state had to explain a placement recommendation to an inmate and that inmate had to have an opportunity for rebuttal at a hearing. Prisoners in the facility sued in federal district court, alleging the prison placement policy violated the 14th Amendment's due process clause. The court agreed that the New Policy violated due process and ordered elaborate and far-reaching modifications to the policy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed but set aside the substantive modifications on the ground they exceeded the court's authority.

Question

Did the placement policies for Ohio's highest security prison violate the 14th Amendment's due process clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wilkinson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the procedures by which the New Policy classified prisoners for placement at the facility provided sufficient protection to comply with the due process clause. The Court reasoned that procedural protections afforded to prisoners were necessarily limited, and that the New Policy sufficiently minimized risk of erroneous placement. The Court also cited Ohio's interests in prison security against gangs and in preserving scarce resources.

San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-340

Petitioner

San Remo Hotel, L.P., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2004

Argued

Monday, March 28, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Paul F. Utrecht (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The owners and operators of a hotel in San Francisco sued the city in state court, arguing a $567,000 conversion fee they had to pay in 1996 was an unconstitutional taking of private property. After California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued in federal district court that the fee violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that had been resolved in their state-court suit. The federal full faith and credit statute, however, barred litigants from suing in federal court when that suit was based on issues that had been resolved in state court (the rule of "issue preclusion"). The hoteliers asked the district court to exempt from the statute claims brought under the takings clause.

Question

Should federal courts make an exception to the full faith and credit statute for Fifth Amendment takings clause claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for San Francisco, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. In a 9-0 judgment delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court refused to create an exception to the full faith and credit statute in order to provide a federal forum for litigants seeking to advance federal takings claims. The Court rejected the argument that whenever plaintiffs reserved their federal takings claims in state court, federal courts should review the reserved federal claims, regardless of the issues decided by the state court. Moreover, federal courts were not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute simply to guarantee that all takings plaintiffs can sue in federal court.

Castle Rock v. Gonzales

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-278

Petitioner

Town of Castle Rock, Colorado

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jessica Gonzales, Individually and as Next Best Friend of Her Deceased Minor Children, Rebecca Gonzales, Katheryn Gonzales, and Leslie Gonzales

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, November 1, 2004

Argued

Monday, March 21, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

John C. Eastman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

John P. Elwood (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Brian J. Reichel (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Jessica Gonzales requested a restraining order against her estranged husband. A state trial court issued the order, which prohibited the husband from seeing Gonzales or their three daughters except during pre-arranged visits. A month later, Gonzales's husband abducted the three children. Gonzales repeatedly urged the police to search for and arrest her husband, but the police told her to wait until later that evening and see if her husband brought the children back. During the night Gonzales's husband murdered all three children and then opened fire inside a police station, where police returned fire and killed him. Gonzales brought a complaint in federal District Court, alleging that the Castle Rock police had violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by willfully or negligently refusing to enforce her restraining order. The Due Process Clause states: "No state shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." The District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that no principle of substantive or procedural due process allowed Gonzales to sue a local government for its failure to enforce a restraining order. On appeal, however, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Gonzales had a legitimate procedural due process claim. A rehearing by the full appeals court agreed, ruling that Gonzales had a "protected property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her restraining order," which the police had violated.

Question

Can the holder of a restraining order bring a procedural due process claim against a local government for its failure to actively enforce the order and protect the holder from violence?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Castle Rock, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that Gonzales had no constitutionally- protected property interest in the enforcement of the restraining order, and therefore could not claim that the police had violated her right to due process. In order to have a "property interest" in a benefit as abstract as enforcement of a restraining order, the Court ruled, Gonzales would have needed a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the benefit. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia found that state law did not entitle the holder of a restraining order to any specific mandatory action by the police. Instead, restraining orders only provide grounds for arresting the subject of the order. The specific action to be taken is up to the discretion of the police. The Court stated that "This is not the sort of 'entitlement' out of which a property interest is created." The Court concluded that since "Colorado has not created such an entitlement," Gonzales had no property interest and the Due Process Clause was therefore inapplicable. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented.

Deck v. Missouri

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-5293

Petitioner

Carman L. Deck

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Missouri

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 622 (2005)

Granted

Monday, October 18, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 1, 2005

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

Cheryl C. Nield (argued the cause for Respondent)

Rosemary E. Percival (Attorneys for Petitioner, Counsel of Record)

Facts of the Case

After the Missouri Supreme Court set aside Carman Deck's death sentence, Deck was presented at his new sentence hearing shackled with leg irons, handcuffs and a belly chain. Deck was again sentenced to death. The state supreme court rejected Deck's claim that his shackling violated the U.S. Constitution.

Question

Does shackling a convicted offender during the penalty phase of a capital case violate the due process clauses of the Fifth and 14th Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Deck, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the Court's 7-2 holding that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during both a capital trial's guilt and penalty phases, unless such shackling is justified by an essential state interest specific to the defendant on trial (such as courtroom security). The majority argued that the law has long forbidden use of visible shackles during a capital trial's guilt phase, and that the reasons underlying this prohibition (like the possibility shackles will bias the jury) extend this rule to the penalty phase.

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-163

Petitioner

Linda Lingle, Governor of Hawaii, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 528 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

Mark J. Bennett (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Craig E. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Hawaii enacted a limit on the rent oil companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service stations. The rent cap was a response to concerns about the effects of market concentration on gasoline prices. Chevron, one of the state's largest oil companies, argued in federal district court that the the cap was an unconstitutional taking of its property. The district court held that the cap amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it did not substantially advance Hawaii's asserted interest in controlling gas prices. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980), where the Court declared that government regulation of private property is "a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests." The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Does a regulation amount to an unconstitutional taking "if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests?"

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lingle, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the Court's unanimous opinion that the Court needed to "correct course" and make clear that the "substantially advances" formula put forth in Agins was inappropriate for determining whether a regulation amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking. Takings clause challenges to regulations had to be based on the severity of the burden that the regulation imposed upon property rights, not the effectivness of the regulation in furthering the governmental interest. The Court insisted that its ruling did not "disturb any of its prior holdings."

Kelo v. City of New London

Fri, 29 Oct 2010 18:40:17 +0000

Location

City of New London Town Hall

181 State Street

New London, CT 06320

United States

41° 21' 14.4" N, 72° 5' 45.6" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-108

Petitioner

Susette Kelo, et al.

Respondent

City of New London, Connecticut, et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. 469 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

Scott G. Bullock (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Wesley W. Horton (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

New London, a city in Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The city said developing the land would create jobs and increase tax revenues. Kelo Susette and others whose property was seized sued New London in state court. The property owners argued the city violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which guaranteed the government will not take private property for public use without just compensation. Specifically the property owners argued taking private property to sell to private developers was not public use. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled for New London.

Question

Does a city violate the Fifth Amendment's takings clause if the city takes private property and sells it for private development, with the hopes the development will help the city's bad economy?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for City of New London, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the majority held that the city's taking of private property to sell for private development qualified as a "public use" within the meaning of the takings clause. The city was not taking the land simply to benefit a certain group of private individuals, but was following an economic development plan. Such justifications for land takings, the majority argued, should be given deference. The takings here qualified as "public use" despite the fact that the land was not going to be used by the public. The Fifth Amendment did not require "literal" public use, the majority said, but the "broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose.'"

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Cuba

United States

19° 54' 7.9992" N, 75° 5' 56.0004" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-6696

Petitioner

Yaser Esam Hamdi and Esam Fouad Hamdi, as Next Friend of Yaser Esam Hamdi

Respondent

Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 507 (2004)

Granted

Friday, January 9, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, April 28, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 28, 2004

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondents)

Frank W. Dunham, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In the fall of 2001, Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was arrested by the United States military in Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against the U.S., declared an "enemy combatant," and transfered to a military prison in Virginia. Frank Dunham, Jr., a defense attorney in Virginia, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in federal district court there, first on his own and then for Hamdi's father, in an attempt to have Hamdi's detention declared unconstitutional. He argued that the government had violated Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely and not giving him access to an attorney or a trial. The government countered that the Executive Branch had the right, during wartime, to declare people who fight against the United States "enemy combatants" and thus restrict their access to the court system.

The district court ruled for Hamdi, telling the government to release him. On appeal, a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the separation of powers required federal courts to practice restraint during wartime because "the executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the conduct of overseas conflict in a way that the judiciary simply is not." The panel therefore found that it should defer to the Executive Branch's "enemy combatant" determination.

Question

Did the government violate Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely, without access to an attorney, based solely on an Executive Branch declaration that he was an "enemy combatant" who fought against the United States? Does the separation of powers doctrine require federal courts to defer to Executive Branch determinations that an American citizen is an "enemy combatant"?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Hamdi, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes and no. In an opinion backed by a four-justice plurality and partly joined by two additional justices, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that although Congress authorized Hamdi's detention, Fifth Amendment due process guarantees give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The plurality rejected the government's argument that the separation-of-powers prevents the judiciary from hearing Hamdi's challenge. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred with the plurality that Hamdi had the right to challenge in court his status as an enemy combatant. Souter and Ginsburg, however, disagreed with the plurality's view that Congress authorized Hamdi's detention. Justice Antonin Scalia issued a dissent joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented separately.

Sell v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-5664

Petitioner

Sell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 166 (2003)

Argued

Monday, March 3, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 16, 2003

Advocates

Barry A. Short (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, the Federal Government charged Charles Sell with submitting fictitious insurance claims for payment. Although Sell has a long history of mental illness and was initially found competent to stand trial for fraud and attempted murder, a Federal Magistrate Judge ordered his hospitalization to determine whether he would attain the capacity to allow his trial to proceed. Subsequently, the Magistrate authorized forced administration of antipsychotic drugs. In affirming, the District Court concluded that medication was the only viable hope of rendering Sell competent to stand trial and was necessary to serve the Federal Government's interest in obtaining an adjudication of his guilt or innocence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On the fraud charges, the appellate court found that the Federal Government had an essential interest in bringing Sell to trial, that the treatment was medically appropriate, and that the medical evidence indicated that Sell would fairly be able to participate in his trial.

Question

May the Federal Government administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal defendant in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial for serious, but nonviolent, crimes?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Sell, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Constitution allows the Federal Government to administer antipsychotic drugs, even against the defendant's will, in limited circumstances. The Court reasoned that such conditions include if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the trial's fairness, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests. Finding that the District Court and Court of Appeals's findings did not satisfy these conditions, the Court vacated the appellate court's judgment. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the case.

Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1325

Petitioner

Brown

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Legal Foundation of Washington

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 216 (2003)

Argued

Monday, December 9, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, March 26, 2003

Advocates

David J. Burman (Argued the cause for the respondent Legal Foundation of Washington)

Charles Fried (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the respondents, Justices of the Supreme Court of Washington)

Facts of the Case

Every state uses interest on lawyers' trust accounts (IOLTA) to pay for legal services for the needy. Among it rules, Washington's program requires that funds that cannot earn net interest for the client be deposited in an IOLTA account. The Supreme Court of Washington extended its IOLTA rules to cover Limited Practice Officers (LPOs), nonlawyers who are licensed to act as escrowees in real estate closings. Allen Brown and Greg Hayes alleged that they regularly purchase and sell real estate, in the course of such transactions they deliver funds to LPOs who are required to deposit them in IOLTA accounts, and the taking of the interest earned on their funds in IOLTA accounts violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court found, among other things, that Brown and Hayes had lost nothing. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals reasoned that there was no taking because Brown and Hayes had suffered neither an actual loss nor an interference with any investment-backed expectations.

Question

Does the use of interest on lawyers' trust accounts to pay for legal services provided to the needy constitute a state taking in violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Legal Foundation of Washington, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that state law that requires client funds that could not otherwise generate net earnings for the client to be deposited in an IOLTA account is not a regulatory taking. Moreover, the Court reasoned that, because compensation is measured by the owner's pecuniary loss, which is zero whenever the Washington law is obeyed, there is no violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Court's decision created an exception to its general rule that the just compensation owed to former owners of confiscated property is the fair market value of the property taken. Justice Kennedy also filed a separate dissent.

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

Lake Tahoe Basin

United States

38° 58' 40.6668" N, 119° 51' 43.6464" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1167

Petitioner

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council

Respondent

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 302 (2002)

Argued

Monday, January 7, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, April 23, 2002

Advocates

Michael M. Berger (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) imposed two moratoria from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983 and from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984, totaling 32 months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin while formulating a comprehensive land-use plan for the area. Real estate owners affected by the moratoria and an association representing such owners, including the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., filed suits, claiming that TRPA's actions constituted a taking of their property without just compensation. The District Court found that TRPA had not effected a partial taking; however, it concluded that the moratoria did constitute a categorical taking because TRPA temporarily deprived real estate owners of all economically viable use of their land. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that because the regulations had only a temporary impact, no categorical taking had occurred.

Question

Does a moratorium on development imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that that the mere enactment of the regulations implementing the moratoria did not constitute a per se taking of the landowners' property. The Court reasoned that whether a taking occurred depended upon the considerations of landowners' expectations, actual impact, public interest, and reasons for the moratoria. Moreover, the Court concluded that the adoption of a categorical rule that any deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief, constituted a compensable taking would impose unreasonable financial obligations upon governments for the normal delays involved in processing land use applications. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas also filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia.

Kansas v. Crane

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-957

Petitioner

Kansas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Crane

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 407 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, January 22, 2002

Advocates

Carla J. Stovall (Topeka, Kansas, argued the cause for the petitioner)

John C. Donham (Kansas, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346. In doing so, the Court characterized a dangerous sexual offender's confinement as civil rather than criminal and held that the confinement criterion embodied in the statute's words -- "mental abnormality or personality disorder" -- satisfied substantive due process. When the state of Kansas filed a petition in a Kansas district court to have Michael T. Crane, a previously convicted sexual offender, committed, the Kansas District Court ordered his civil commitment. In reversing, the State Supreme Court concluded that Hendricks requires a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior even if, as provided by Kansas law, problems of emotional, and not volitional, capacity prove the source of behavior warranting commitment. The trial court had made no such finding.

Question

Did the Kansas Supreme Court interpret Kansas v. Hendricks in an overly restrictive manner by ruling that it requires a finding that a sexual offender, who has only an emotional or personality disorder, rather than a volitional impairment, has an inability to control dangerous behavior?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Kansas, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Hendricks set forth no requirement of total or complete lack of control, but that the Constitution does not permit commitment of the type of dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination. Such required proof, the Court continued, had to be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjected the offender to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case. The Court concluded that an absolute finding of lack of control since this approach would risk barring the civil commitment of some highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities.

Dusenbery v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-6567

Petitioner

Dusenbery

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 161 (2002)

Argued

Monday, October 29, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, January 8, 2002

Advocates

Allison M. Zieve (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

While Larry Dean Dusenbery was in prison on federal drug charges, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began an administrative process to forfeit cash that officers seized when they executed a search warrant for the residence where he was arrested. The FBI sought to notify Dusenbery by sending certified mail addressed to him care of the federal correctional institution where he was incarcerated; to the address of the residence where he was arrested; and to an address in the town where his mother lived. The FBI received no response in the time allotted and turned over the cash to the United States Marshals Service. When Dusenbery moved for the return of all the property and funds seized in his criminal case, the District Court denied the motion. On remand, the District Court ruled that the Government's sending of notice by certified mail to Dusenbery's place of incarceration satisfied his due process rights as to the cash. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the FBI's notice of intended forfeiture by sending certified letters to inmates while incarcerated satisfy due process?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the FBI's notice of the cash forfeiture satisfied due process. The Court reasoned that the means employed to provide notice to the prisoner were reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the prisoner of the forfeiture. The prisoner did not actually have to receive the notice, noted Chief Justice Rehnquist. "The Government could, for example, have allowed [Dusenbery] to make an escorted visit to the post office himself in order to sign for his letter. But the Due Process Clause does not require such heroic efforts by the Government; it requires only that the Government's effort be 'reasonably calculated' to apprise a party of the pendency of the action." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that the Court was condoning a procedure that was too lax to reliably insure that a prisoner would receive a legal notice.

Lujan v. G&G Fire Sprinklers

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-152

Petitioner

Lujan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

G&G Fire Sprinklers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 189 (2001)

Argued

Monday, February 26, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, April 17, 2001

Advocates

Thomas S. Kerrigan (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Stephen A. Seideman (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The California Labor Code requires that contractors and subcontractors on public works project pay their workers a prevailing wage that is determined by the state. The Code authorizes the state to withhold payments from contractors who fail to pay the prevailing wage. The contractor can, in turn, withhold payments to subcontractors who fail to pay the wage. To recover the wages or penalties withheld, the Code permits the contractor to sue for breach of contract. After the State Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) determined that G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., a public works subcontractor, had violated the Code, it withheld from the contractors an amount equal to the wages and penalties forfeited due to G & G's violations. After its payment was withheld, G & G filed suit against DLSE, claiming that the lacking of a hearing deprived it of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Granting G & G summary judgment, the District Court declared the relevant Code sections unconstitutional. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court reasoned that G & G's rights were violated not because it was deprived of immediate payment, but because the state statutory scheme afforded no hearing at all.

Question

Must states provide contractors and subcontractors a hearing to challenge a decision to withhold wage payments from contractors and subcontractors who fail to pay prevailing wages to satisfy due process?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lujan, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that because California state law affords G & G sufficient opportunity to pursue its claim for payment under its contracts in state court, the statutory scheme does not deprive it of due process. A contractor's claim for payment is "an interest...that can be fully protected by an ordinary breach-of-contract suit," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. The Chief Justice continued that "if California makes ordinary judicial process available to [G & G] for resolving its contractual dispute, that process is due process."

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

Rhode Island General Assembly

82 Smith St Providence RI 02903

Providence, RI 02903

United States

41° 49' 53.6448" N, 71° 24' 53.3664" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-2047

Petitioner

Palazzolo

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rhode Island

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 606 (2001)

Argued

Monday, February 26, 2001

Decided

Thursday, June 28, 2001

Advocates

James S. Burling (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Sheldon Whitehouse (State of Rhode Island, argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Anthony Palazzolo owns a waterfront parcel of land in Rhode Island. Most of the property is salt marsh, subject to tidal flooding. The Rhode Island Resources Management Council's Coastal Resources Management Program regulations designate salt marshes as protected "coastal wetlands," on which development is greatly limited. After multiple development proposals of his were denied, Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior Court. Palazzolo asserted that the State's wetlands regulations had taken his property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the Council's action had deprived him of "all economically beneficial use" of his property. Ruling against Palazzolo, the court held that his takings claim was not ripe, that he had no right to challenge the regulations predating his acquisition of the property's title, and that he could not assert a takings claim based on the denial of all economic use of his property in light of undisputed evidence that he had $200,000 in development value remaining on an upland parcel of the property.

Question

May a property owner who acquired title to the property after is was subject to wetlands regulations still bring a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Palazzolo, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "the State Supreme Court erred in finding [Palazzolo's] claims were unripe and in ruling that acquisition of title after the effective date of the regulations barred the takings claims. The court did not err in finding that [Palazzolo] failed to establish a deprivation of all economic value, for it is undisputed that the parcel retains significant worth for construction of a residence." Discussing the post-regulation acquisition of title, Justice Kennedy wrote, "[w]ere we to accept the State's rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land."

Rogers v. Tennessee

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-6218

Petitioner

Rogers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tennessee

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 451 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, November 1, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 14, 2001

Advocates

Michael E. Moore (Nashville, Tennessee, argued the cause for the respondent)

W. Mark Ward (Memphis, Tennessee, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Wilbert K. Rogers was convicted in Tennessee of second degree murder. The victim, James Bowdery, died 15 months after Rogers stabbed him. On appeal, Rogers argued that the Tennessee common law "year and a day rule," under which no defendant could be convicted of murder unless his victim died by the defendant's act within a year and a day of the act, persisted and precluded his conviction. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. In affirming, the Tennessee Supreme Court ultimately abolished the rule and upheld Rogers' conviction. The court rejected Rogers' contention that abolishing the rule would violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Tennessee and Federal Constitutions. The court reasoned that those provisions referred only to legislative acts. Additionally, the court concluded its decision would not offend due process.

Question

Did the Supreme Court of Tennessee deny a defendant due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when it retroactively applied a decision to abolish the state's common law "year-and-a-day rule?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Tennessee, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Tennessee Supreme Court's retroactive application to a defendant of its decision abolishing the year-and-a-day rule did not deny Rogers due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. "The Tennessee court's abolition of the year and a day rule was not unexpected and indefensible," wrote Justice O'Connor. "Far from a marked and unpredictable departure from prior precedent, the court's decision was a routine exercise of common law decisionmaking in which the court brought the law into conformity with reason and common sense," continued O'Connor. Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia and Stephen G. Breyer wrote separate dissents. Justices Clarence Thomas, Stevens and Breyer joined Justice Scalia's dissent.

Seling v. Young

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1185

Petitioner

Seling

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Young

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 250 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, October 31, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, January 17, 2001

Advocates

Robert C. Boruchowitz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Maureen A. Hart (Olympia, Washington, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Washington State's Community Protection Act of 1990 (Act) authorizes the civil commitment of "sexually violent predators," or persons who suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes them likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. After his imprisonment for committing six rapes, Andre Brigham Young was scheduled to be released from prison in 1990. Prior to his release, the state successfully filed a petition to commit Young as a sexually violent predator. Ultimately, Young instituted a federal habeas action. Initially, the District Court granted the writ, finding that the Act was criminal rather than civil, and that it violated the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees of the Constitution. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court denied Young's petition. The court determined that the Act was civil and, therefore, it could not violate the double jeopardy and ex post facto guarantees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the case turned on whether the Act was punitive "as applied" to Young.

Question

May an act, found to be civil, be deemed punitive "as applied" to an individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses, thereby providing a cause for release?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Seling, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 10: Ex Post Facto

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that because the Washington Community Protection Act of 1990 had been found to be civil, it could not be deemed punitive as applied to Young for the purposes of double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges. Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority that an "as-applied" analysis would be "unworkable" because it would "never conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a final determination of the scheme's validity under the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses." Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Brentwood Acad. v. TN Sec. School Ath. Assn.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-901

Petitioner

Brentwood Acad.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

TN Sec. School Ath. Assn.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 288 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, October 11, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, February 20, 2001

Advocates

Richard L. Colbert (Argued the case for the respondents)

James F. Blumstein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Barbara D. Underwood (Argued the cause, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (Association) is a not- for-profit membership corporation organized to regulate interscholastic sports among its members, a large portion of the public and private high schools in Tennessee. The Association's role in regulating interscholastic competition in public schools has been long acknowledged by the State Board of Education. Brentwood Academy sued the Association after it penalized the academy for placing "undue influence" on football recruits. At the time, all the voting members of the Association were public school administrators. Brentwood claimed that the rule's enforcement was state action that violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court agreed and enjoined the rule's enforcement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no state action.

Question

May a statewide association, incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary schools, be regarded as engaging in state action when it enforces a rule against a member school?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Brentwood Acad., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the ostensibly private organization, which regulated school sports, and the state education board's acknowledgment of the organization, indicated that the organization is a state actor for civil rights purposes. "The nominally private character of the Association is overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its composition and workings, and there is no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional standards to it," wrote Justice Souter for the majority. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined Justice Clarence Thomas' dissent.

Apprendi v. New Jersey

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-478

Petitioner

Apprendi

Respondent

New Jersey

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 466 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, March 28, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 26, 2000

Advocates

Joseph D. O'Neill (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Edward C. DuMont (Argued the cause on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Lisa S. Gochman (Trenton, New Jersey, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Charles C. Apprendi, Jr. fired several shots into the home of an African- American family. While in custody, Apprendi made a statement, which he later retracted, that he did not want the family in his neighborhood because of their race. Apprendi was charged under New Jersey law with second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, which carries a prison term of 5 to 10 years. The count did not refer to the state's hate crime statute, which provides for an enhanced sentence if a trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the crime with a purpose to intimidate a person or group because of race. After Apprendi pleaded guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance the sentence. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the shooting was racially motivated and sentenced Apprendi to a 12-year term on the firearms count. In upholding the sentence, the appeals court rejected Apprendi's claim that the Due Process Clause requires that a bias finding be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The State Supreme Court affirmed.

Question

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Apprendi, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In an 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Due Process Clause requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that "the New Jersey procedure challenged in this case is an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system." Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Stephen G. Breyer wrote dissenting opinions that were joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.

Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-502

Petitioner

Nelson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Adams USA, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 460 (2000)

Argued

Monday, March 27, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, April 25, 2000

Advocates

Debra J. Dixon (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jack A. Wheat (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Ohio Cellular Products Corporation (OCP) sued Adams USA, Inc. (Adams), for patent infringement. After the District Court ruled in Adams' favor by dismissing the suit, Adams motioned for attorney fees and costs. In granting the motion, the court found that Donald Nelson, who was at all relevant times president and sole shareholder of OCP, had acted in a way that constituted inequitable conduct chargeable to OCP. Fearing it would be unable to collect the award, Adams moved under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to amend its pleading to add Nelson, personally, as a party from whom fees could be collected. Additionally, Adams asked the court, under Rule 59(e), to amend the judgment to make Nelson immediately liable for the fee award. The District Court granted the motion in full. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision simultaneously making Nelson a party and subjecting him to judgement.

Question

May a party, who has been made a party to a civil action, be simultaneously made personally liable?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Nelson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the District Court erred in amending the judgment immediately upon permitting the amendment of the pleading. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "[d]ue process, as reflected in Rule 15 as well as Rule 12, required that Nelson be given an opportunity to respond and contest his personal liability for the award after he was made a party and before the entry of judgment against him." Thus, the District Court's granting of Adams' motion to simultaneously make Nelson a party and personally liable violated due process.

Fiore v. White

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:31 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-942

Appellee

White

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Fiore

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 23 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, November 30, 1999

Advocates

Robert A. Graci (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; argued the cause for the respondents)

James B. Lieber (Pennsylvania; argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

William Fiore and his co-defendant, David Scarpone, were convicted of operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit in violation of Pennsylvania State law after deliberately altering a monitoring pipe. Fiore appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the conviction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then denied further review of Fiore's case, and his conviction became final. Scarpone appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which noted the existence of a "valid permit" and set aside the conviction. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed and found that Scarpone's conduct did not constitute the operation of the facility without a permit because the law Fiore and Scarpone were convicted under does not apply to those who possess a permit but deviate radically from the permit's terms. Fiore had asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review his case after it had agreed to review Scarpone's case and twice more after it decided Scarpone. The court denied Fiore's requests. Ultimately, Fiore sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the U.S. Constitution required that his conviction be set aside because his conduct was not criminal under the statutory section charged. The District Court granted his petition. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that state courts have no obligation to apply their decisions retroactively.

Question

Should federal habeas corpus relief be extended to protect a defendant whose conviction was upheld even though his co-defendant's conviction under the same law was invalidated after a state court ruled that he had been prosecuted under the wrong law? Does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause require that the defendant's conviction be set aside?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fiore, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

The questions were left pending. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court certified to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the question whether the court's interpretation of the statute set forth in Scarpone's case stated the correct interpretation of Pennsylvania law on the date which Fiore's conviction became final. The Court also reserved judgment and further proceedings in the case pending a response by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "the answer to this question will help determine the proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in this case."

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-2000

Petitioner

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sullivan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 40 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, January 19, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, March 3, 1999

Advocates

Michael W. McConnell (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Loralyn McKinley (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court)

Facts of the Case

Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act (Act) provides that once an employer's liability for an employee's injury has been established, then either the self-insured employer or insurer (collectively insurers) is responsible for paying for the employee's "reasonable" and "necessary" medical treatment. In 1993, this system was amended to allow insurers to withhold payment for disputed treatments, pending the outcome of an independent utilization review. Ten employees and two organizations representing employees that had received benefits under the Act filed suit against state officials, the self-insured school district of Philadelphia, and a number of private insurance companies. Their complaint alleged that the state and private defendants, acting under color of state law, had deprived them of property in violation of due process.

Question

1) Can the private insurers' decision to withhold payment for disputed medical treatment be considered state action, so as to bring them within the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment? (2) Do workers have a constitutionally protected property interest in continuing payment of disputed medical treatment before such treatment is determined to be reasonable and necessary?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No to both. A finding of state action requires both that the deprivation be caused by actions taken under state law and that the deprivation be fairly attributable to the state. While the alleged deprivation in this case was clearly taken pursuant to state law, the decision of private insurers to withhold medical payments for disputed treatment is not fairly attributable to the state. Mere creation of a new dispute resolution mechanism by the state does not constitute state encouragement or authorization. Nor has Pennsylvania delegated to private insurers powers that were exclusively those of the state, as Pennsylvania has simply authorized insurers to do what they would do in the absence of regulation: dispute payment of unreasonable and unnecessary treatment. Further, under Pennsylvania law no due process protection attaches to payment of disputed medical expenses before the reasonableness and necessity of those expenses is determined. The Act does not entitle an employee to payment of all medical treatment, but only that treatment which is reasonable and necessary. In order to assert a protected property interest a worker must demonstrate not only that his or her employer was liable for a work related injury, but also that the treatment for which payment is sought was reasonable and necessary. In this case the plaintiffs had only established their initial eligibility for treatment, not that treatment was reasonable and necessary.

Chicago v. Morales

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1121

Petitioner

Chicago

Respondent

Morales

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 41 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, December 9, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 10, 1999

Advocates

Lawrence Rosenthal (For the petitioner)

Harvey Grossman (For the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places. If a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member loitering in a public place with one or more persons, he shall order them to disperse. A violation of the ordinance arises when anyone does not promptly obey a dispersal order. An officer's discretion was purportedly limited by confining arrest authority to designated officers, establishing detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein, and providing for designated, but publicly undisclosed, enforcement areas. In 1993, Jesus Morales was arrested and found guilty under the ordinance for loitering in a Chicago neighborhood after he ignored police orders to disperse. Ultimately, after Morales challenged his arrest, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated due process of law in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.

Question

Does Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Morales, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a plurality ruling, Justice John Paul Stevens delivered an opinion for a marjority on several key points. The Court held that Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and provided law enforcement officials too much discretion to decide what activities constitute loitering. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that the ordinance's definition of loitering as "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose" does not give people adequate notice of what is prohibited and what is permitted, even if a person does not violate the law until he refuses to disperse. "'[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits,'" noted Justice Stevens, "[i]f the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty."

City of West Covina v. Perkins

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1230

Petitioner

City of West Covina

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Perkins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 234 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, November 3, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, January 13, 1999

Advocates

Patrick S. Smith (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Jeffrey S. Sutton (For Ohio et al., as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

David D. Lawrence (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Police officers of the city of West Covina lawfully seized Perkins Lawrence's personal property from his home. The officers left a notice form specifying the facts of the search, its date, the searching agency, the date of the warrent, the issuing judge and his court, the persons to be contacted for information, and an itemized list of the property seized. The officers did not leave the search warrant number. Lawrence filed suit after attempts to obtain the seized property failed. The District Court ultimately ruled in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It held that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that Lawrence be provided a detailed notice of state procedures for the return of seized property and the information to be able to invoke the procedures, along with the information he was already provided. This meant the search warrant number must be furnished or at least the method for obtaining it.

Question

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require officers who seize someone's property lawfully to provide the owner with state procedures for the property's return?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for City of West Covina, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a decision authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause does not require police officers to provide property owners with information on how to recover their property in a lawful seizure. The Due Process clause only requires that officers inform property owners that something they own has been seized. Justice Kennedy said the property owner could turn to public sources to learn about the procedures available.

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-42

Petitioner

Eastern Enterprises

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Apfel

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 498 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 1998

Advocates

Peter Buscemi (on behalf of the Respondents UMWA)

Edwin S. Kneedler (supporting the Federal Respondents)

John T. Montgomery (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Currently unknown.

Question

Currently unknown.

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Eastern Enterprises, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

Currently unknown.

Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1578

Petitioner

Phillips

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Washington Legal Foundation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 156 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, January 13, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1998

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Richard A. Samp (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Darrell E. Jordan (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Under Texas' Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) program, lawyers must deposit their client's funds into a special interest-bearing "NOW" account upon determination that the funds could not earn the client interest or compensate for other financial and accounting fees. Interest federally funded interest accrued on IOLTA accounts is then paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation (TEAJF) which supports legal services for low-income persons. Acting on behalf of others opposed to IOLTA, the Washington Legal Foundation (the "Foundation") challenged TEAJF's receipt and use of the IOLTA funds. On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a favorable district court decision, the Supreme Court granted the Foundation certiorari.

Question

Does Texas' public use of interest accrued on principal client funds, deposited by mandate into federally funded accounts, violate the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Washington Legal Foundation, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that TEAJF's used of IOLTA interest funds violated the Takings Clause which prohibits the taking of "private property for public use, without just compensation." The Court noted that since the principal client fees deposited into the IOLTA account are private property, any accrued interest on such fees attaches as a property right incident to ownership of the underlying principal. Thus, since they may not redistribute the principal deposits, TEAJF is also prohibited from assigning any interest accumulated thereon.

Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1769

Petitioner

Ohio Adult Parole Authority

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Woodard

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 272 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, December 10, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, March 25, 1998

Advocates

William A. Klatt (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

S. Adele Shank (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After Eugene Woodard's death sentence was finalized, the Ohio Adult Parole Authority commenced a clemency investigation. The Authority informed Woodard of his voluntary interview and clemency hearing. Ultimately, Woodard filed suit, alleging that Ohio's clemency process violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right and his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals held that Woodard had failed to establish a life or liberty interest protected by due process arising out of the clemency proceeding itself. The appellate court, however, also held that Woodard's pretrial life and liberty interests were protected because a minimal amount of due process attached to clemency due to its distance from trial. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a determination as to what that process should be.

Question

Does an inmate have a protected life or liberty interest in clemency proceedings? Does the option of voluntarily participating in an interview as part of the clemency process violate an inmate's Fifth Amendment rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Woodard, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court unanimously held that Ohio had not violated the Woodard's privilege against compelled self-incrimination by giving him the option of voluntarily participating in a clemency interview without the benefit of counsel or a grant of immunity for any statements. In an 8-1 split, with Justice John Paul Stevens dissenting, the Court held that Ohio's clemency procedures do not violate due process. The eight-member majority was unable to agree on an opinion as to the extent of due process protections required in clemency proceedings.

LaChance v. Erickson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1395

Petitioner

LaChance

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Erickson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 262 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, December 2, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, January 21, 1998

Advocates

Paul E. Marth (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Federal employees subject to adverse actions by their respective agencies, each made false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action. Separately, each employee appealed the actions taken against him or her to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld the portion of each penalty that was based on the underlying charge. The Board overturned each false statement charge. The Board held that an employee's false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employee's credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employee's underlying misconduct. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board and held that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim.

Question

Does either the Due Process Clause or the Civil Service Reform Act preclude a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding alleged employment-related misconduct on the part of the employee?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for LaChance, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In an unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that neither the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause nor the Civil Service Reform Act precludes a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding his alleged employment-related misconduct. "The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. "But we reject, on the basis of both precedent and principle," continued Chief Justice Rehnquist, "the view expressed by the Court of Appeals in this case that a 'meaningful opportunity to be heard' includes a right to make false statements with respect to the charged conduct."

Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University v. Homar

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-651

Petitioner

Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hamar

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 924 (1997)

Argued

Monday, March 24, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 9, 1997

Advocates

Gwendolyn T. Mosley (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Ann Hubbard (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

James V. Fareri (on behalf of the Respondents)

Gregory O'Duden (on behalf of the National Treasury Employees Union, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Richard J. Homar, a tenured policeman for East Stroudsburg University (ESU), was arrested for possession of illegal drugs. ESU, a Pennsylvania state institution, immediately suspended him without pay until his culpability could be determined. State police dropped the charges but the suspension continued. At a later hearing ESU demoted Homar to groundskeeper, relying on his confession to police. Homar argued that ESU president James Gilbert had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the suspension. A district court granted summary judgment to ESU. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the decision, holding that it was illegal to withhold pay without first providing a hearing.

Question

Does a state institution violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by suspending a tenured employee without pay before holding a hearing in which the employee can voice objections?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Gilbert, President, East Stroudsburg University, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. The Court ruled unanimously that a pre-suspension hearing is not necessary to protect the rights of a tenured employee who is suspended without pay. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia balanced three factors relevant to constitutional due process: 1) the weight of the private interest of the accused; 2) the chance of wrongfully depriving the private interest; and 3) the weight of the government's interest. The Court held that "[s]o long as the suspended employee receives a sufficiently prompt post suspension hearing, the lost income is relatively insubstantial."

Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-243

Petitioner

Suitum

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 725 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, February 26, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 1997

Advocates

R. S. Radford (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Richard J. Lazarus (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Bernadine Suitum owned an undeveloped lot near Lake Tahoe. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency determined that the lot was ineligible for development under agency regulations. However, the agency determined that Suitum was entitled to "Transferable Development Rights" (TDRs) that she could sell to other landowners with the agency's approval. Rather than sell her TDRs, Suitum filed suit claiming that the agency's determination amounted to a regulatory taking of her property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court held that Suitum's claim was unjusticible because she had not attempted to sell her TDRs. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that an agency action on a TDR transfer application would be the requisite "final decision" regarding Suitum's lot in order for her claim to be ripe for adjudication.

Question

Must property owners attempt to sell their developmental rights before claiming the regulatory taking of property without just compensation, in accordance with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Suitum, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Suitum's regulatory taking claim was ripe for adjudication. Justice Souter reasoned that, by determining that Suitum's property was ineligible for development, the agency had had made final determination, even though she had not attempted to sell the TDRs which she had received, or was eligible to receive, under the agency plan. "While the pleadings raise issues about the significance of the TDRs both to the claim that a taking has occurred and to the constitutional requirement of just compensation, we have no occasion to decide, and we do not decide, whether or not these TDRs may be considered in deciding the issue of whether there has been a taking in this case, as opposed to the issue of whether just compensation has been afforded for such a taking," wrote Justice Souter.

Kansas v. Hendricks

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:28 +0000

Location

Larned State Hospital

1301 Kansas 264 Hwy Larned KS 67550

Larned, KS 67550

United States

38° 10' 50.0484" N, 99° 5' 55.3668" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1649

Petitioner

Kansas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hendricks

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 95-9075

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 346 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, December 10, 1996

Decided

Monday, June 23, 1997

Advocates

Carla J. Stovall (Argued the cause for Kansas)

Thomas J. Weilert (Argued the cause for Hendricks)

Facts of the Case

As the time neared for Leroy Hendricks' release from prison, having served for his long history of child sexual molestation, the State of Kansas sought his commitment under its Sexually Violent Predator Act (Act). After testifying that he agreed with the diagnosis that he still suffered from pedophilia and is likely to molest children again, Hendricks became a candidate for civil commitment under the Act which provided for the institutionalization of persons likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence" brought on by "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder[s]." On appeal from a court ordered commitment, the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the Act as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Kansas certiorari.

Question

Did the Act's civil commitment provisions, based on its definition of what constitutes a "mental abnormality," violate substantive due process and double jeopardy requirements?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kansas, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. Despite Hendricks' claim that a certification of "mental illness" alone was too arbitrary to sustain a civil commitment order, the Court held that the Act met substantive due process standards by requiring considerable evidence of past violent sexual behavior and a present mental inclination to repeat such offenses. Furthermore, the Court held that since it required the release of confined persons who became mentally stable and no longer dangerous, did not speak of scienter, and lacked other procedural safeguards characteristic of criminal trials, the Act did not violate double jeopardy guarantees since it merely authorized "civil" rather than "criminal" commitments

Young v. Harper

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1598

Petitioner

Young

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harper

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 143 (1997)

Argued

Monday, December 9, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, March 18, 1997

Advocates

Sandra D. Howard (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Margaret Winter (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program took effect whenever the state prisons became overcrowded and authorized the conditional release of prisoners before their sentences expired. The Pardon and Parole Board determined who could participate in it, and an inmate could be placed on preparole after serving 15% of his sentence. An inmate was eligible for parole only after one third of his sentence had elapsed, and the Governor, based on the Board's recommendation, decided to grant parole. Program participants and parolees were released subject to similar constraints. Upon reviewing Leroy L. Young's criminal record and prison conduct, the Board recommended him for parole and released him under the Program. At that time, he had served 15 years of a life sentence. After he spent five months outside the penitentiary, the Governor denied him parole, whereupon he was ordered to, and did, report back to prison. Despite his claim that his summary reincarceration deprived him of liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, he was denied habeas relief by the state trial court, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Federal District Court. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that preparole was sufficiently like parole that a Program participant was entitled to procedural protections.

Question

Is Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program sufficiently like parole that participants are entitled to procedural protections, such as the due process safeguards set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Harper, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Supervision Program, as it existed when Leroy L. Young was released, was equivalent to parole and therefore he was entitle to procedural due process safeguards.

Babbitt v. Youpee

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:06 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1595

Petitioner

Babbitt

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Youpee

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 234 (1997)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, January 21, 1997

Advocates

Rene A. Martell (Montana, argued the cause for the respondents)

James A. Feldman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

A late nineteenth century congressional Indian land program resulted in the extreme fractionation of Indian lands as allottees passed their undivided interests on to multiple heirs. In 1983, Congress adopted the Indian Land Consolidation Act to reduce the fractionated ownership of allotted lands. Section 207 of the Act--the "escheat" provision--prohibited the descent of fractional interests that constituted 2 percent or less of the total acreage in an allotted tract and earned less than $100 in the preceding year. The interests described in Section 207 would escheat to the tribe, thereby consolidating the ownership of Indian lands. Section 207 made no provision for the payment of compensation to those who held such fractional interests. The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the original version of Section 207 on the ground that it was a taking of private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Congress then amended Section 207. which looks back five years instead of one year to determine the income produced from a small interest. The will of William Youpee, an enrolled member of the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes, devised to the respondents, all of them enrolled tribal members, his several undivided interests in allotted lands on reservations. An administrative law judge found that interests devised to each of the respondents fell within amended Section 207 and should therefore escheat to the relevant tribal governments. The respondents, asserting the unconstitutionality of amended Section 207, appealed the order to the Board of Indian Appeals, which dismissed the appeal. The respondents then filed a suit against the Secretary of the Interior, alleging that amended Section 207 violates the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court agreed with respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does amended Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act violate the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Youpee, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 2206

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Court ruled that the amended Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act does not cure the constitutional deficiency The Court identified in the original version of Section 207, which amounted to a taking of private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Ginsburg wrote Section 207 is unconstitutional because it "severely restricts the right of an individual to direct the descent of his property."

Richards v. Jefferson County

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-386

Petitioner

Richards

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jefferson County

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

517 U.S. 793 (1996)

Argued

Tuesday, March 26, 1996

Decided

Monday, June 10, 1996

Advocates

William J. Baxley (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

William M. Slaughter (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Jason Richards and others, who are privately employed in Jefferson County, filed a state court class action suit claiming that the county's occupation tax violates the Federal and Alabama Constitutions. The Alabama trial court found that their state claims were barred by a prior adjudication, Bedingfield v. Jefferson County. The unsuccessful Bedingfield adjudication of the tax was brought by Birmingham's acting finance director and the city itself, consolidated with a suit by three county taxpayers. However, the court found that their federal claims had not been decided in that case. On appeal, the county argued that the federal claims were also barred. The State Supreme Court agreed, concluding that the doctrine of res judicata applied because Richard and others were adequately represented in the Bedingfield action.

Question

May the Alabama residents, who claim that the Jefferson County occupation tax violates the Federal and Alabama Constitutions, proceed with their class action suit in court in light of a prior, similar adjudication?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Richards, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that because Richards and others received neither notice of, nor sufficient representation in, the Bedingfield litigation, that adjudication, as a matter of federal due process, may not bind them and thus cannot bar them from challenging an allegedly unconstitutional deprivation of their property.

Montana v. Egelhoff

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-566

Petitioner

Montana

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Egelhoff

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

518 U.S. 37 (1996)

Argued

Wednesday, March 20, 1996

Decided

Thursday, June 13, 1996

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Joseph P. Mazurek (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Ann Celestine German (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

James Allen Egelhoff was tried in Montana courts for two counts of homicide. Egelhoff claimed that extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing or recalling the crimes. Montana law did not allow Egelhoff's intoxicated condition to be considered. Subsequently, Egelhoff was found guilty. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the decision. It held Egelhoff had a due process right to present all relevant evidence. Moreover, it held that Montana law's denial of such a presentation relieved the state from part of its burden of proof needed to convict Egelhoff.

Question

May a state restrict the elements of a defense in criminal prosecution, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Montana, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. The Court could not reach a majority on the reasons for its decision. Justice Antonin Scalia, who announced the judgment of the Court, declared that defendants do not have an absolute constitutional right to present all relevant evidence in their defense.

Cooper v. Oklahoma

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-5207

Petitioner

Cooper

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oklahoma

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

517 U.S. 348 (1996)

Argued

Wednesday, January 17, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, April 16, 1996

Advocates

W. A. Edmondson (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Robert Alan Ravitz (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Byron Keith Cooper was charged with the murder of an 86-year-old man in the course of a burglary. After an Oklahoma jury found him guilty of first-degree murder and recommended punishment by death, the trial court imposed the death penalty. Cooper's competence was considered on five separate occasions, whether he had the ability to understand the charges against him and to assist defense counsel. Oklahoma law presumes that a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial unless he proves his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. Despite Cooper's bizarre behavior and conflicting expert testimony, he was found competent on separate occasions before and during his trial. In affirming the conviction and sentence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Cooper's argument that the State's presumption of competence, combined with its clear and convincing evidence standard, placed such an onerous burden on him as to violate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Question

May state law presume that defendants are competent to stand trial unless they prove their incompetence by clear and convincing evidence without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cooper, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that because Oklahoma's procedural rule allows the State to try a defendant who is more likely than not incompetent, it violates due process. Justice Stevens wrote for the court that the stringent standard is "incompatible with the dictates of due process," and that criminal defendants must be allowed to avoid trial if they prove incompetence by a "preponderance of the evidence."

Lewis v. Casey

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-1511

Petitioner

Lewis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Casey

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

518 U.S. 343 (1996)

Argued

Wednesday, November 29, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 24, 1996

Advocates

Grant Woods (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Elizabeth Alexander (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Fletcher Casey, Jr. and other inmates of various prisons operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), brought a class action against ADOC officials, alleging that the ADOC officials were furnishing them with inadequate legal research facilities and thereby depriving them of their right of access to the courts, in violation of Bounds v. Smith. Bounds held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." The District Court found the ADOC officials in violation of Bounds and issued an injunction mandating detailed, systemwide changes in ADOC's prison law libraries and in its legal assistance programs. The Court of Appeals affirmed both the finding of a Bounds violation and the injunction's major terms.

Question

Did a federal trial judge err when ruling that Arizona prison officials unconstitutionally failed to provide inmates with adequate legal research facilities?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Lewis, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the success of Casey's systemic challenge was dependent on the ability to show widespread actual injury, and the District Court's failure to identify anything more than isolated instances of actual injury rendered its finding of a systemic Bounds violation invalid. Justice Scalia said the court's 1977 ruling in Bounds v. Smith "does not guarantee [inmates] the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims."

Bennis v. Michigan

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-8729

Petitioner

Bennis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

516 U.S. 442 (1996)

Argued

Wednesday, November 29, 1995

Decided

Monday, March 4, 1996

Advocates

Larry L. Roberts (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Richard H. Seamon (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance)

Stefan B. Herpel (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Bennis's husband was convicted of gross indecency following his sexual activity with a prostitute in the couple's jointly-owned car. The local county prosecutor filed a complaint alleging the car was a public nuisance subject to abatement (i.e., to eliminate or confiscate the car). The Circuit Court entered the abatement order, but the Appeals Court reversed. After granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the appellate court's decision and re-entered the abatement order. Bennis appealed to the Supreme Court.

Question

Does the abatement order entered against Bennis's car constitute a taking of private property for public use in violation of the property clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Michigan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Writing for a 5-to-4 majority, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist held that the abatement order against Bennis's car did not violate the takings clause. Her innocence and lack of knowledge concerning her husband's illegal and indecent activity, in the couple's jointly owned car, could not serve as a defense against her vehicle's forfeiture. Furthermore, under the present circumstances, the vehicle's forfeiture did not violate Bennis's property rights without due process. Michigan's abatement policy, aimed at deterring criminal uses of property, lawfully transferred her's vehicle to the state. As such, Michigan is not required to compensate Bennis for the vehicle's forfeiture.

Sandin, Unit Team Manager, Halawa Correctional Facility v. Conner

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1911

Petitioner

Sandin, Unit Team Manager, Halawa Correctional Facility

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Conner et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 472 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, February 28, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 19, 1995

Advocates

Steven S. Michaels (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Paul L. Hoffman (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Sandin, Unit Team Manager, Halawa Correctional Facility, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-3

Petitioner

Reynoldsville Casket Co. et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hyde

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 749 (1995)

Argued

Monday, February 27, 1995

Decided

Monday, May 15, 1995

Advocates

William E. Riedel (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Timothy B. Dyk (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Reynoldsville Casket Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 6, Section 2: Supremacy Clause

None

Dolan v. City of Tigard

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:27 +0000

Location

City of Tigard

13125 SW Hall Blvd Tigard OR 97223

Tigard, OR 97223

United States

45° 25' 31.836" N, 122° 45' 56.7792" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-518

Petitioner

Dolan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of Tigard

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 374 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, March 23, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1994

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (For the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Timothy V. Ramis (Argued the cause for the respondent)

David B. Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Florence Dolan wanted a permit from the City of Tigard to expand her store and pave her parking lot. The city agreed to grant her permit on the condition that she dedicate part of her land for (1) a greenway along a nearby creek to help alleviate runoff from the pavement, and (2) a pedestrian/bicycle path to relieve traffic congestion from the city's growing business district.

Question

Did the city's conditions for the permit violate the 5th Amendment's "takings" clause as absorbed by the 14th Amendment's due process clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Dolan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

Yes. The Court ruled that the city did not present conclusive evidence that the walkway/bicycle path would reduce traffic congestion, and so could not require Dolan to give up her property as a condition of the permit. In addition, the city did not explain why a public greenway was necessary, as opposed to a private one. There must be an "essential nexus" between a legitimate state interest and the permit requirements (Nollan v. California Coastal Commission), and the city failed to demonstrate that the benefits would justify the requirements.

Liteky v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-6921

Petitioner

Liteky et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 540 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, November 3, 1993

Decided

Monday, March 7, 1994

Advocates

Peter J. Thompson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Thomas G. Hungar (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 455

None

United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1180

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James Daniel Good Real Property et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 43 (1993)

Argued

Wednesday, October 6, 1993

Decided

Monday, December 13, 1993

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Christopher J. Yuen (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for James Daniel Good Real Property, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-903

Petitioner

Posters 'N' Things, Ltd., et al.

Respondent

United States

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 513 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, October 5, 1993

Decided

Monday, May 23, 1994

Advocates

Alfredo Parrish (on behalf of the Petitioners)

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 857

None

Heller v. Doe

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:26 +0000

Location

Mental Retardation Residential Treatment Center

1800 Bluegrass Avenue Louisville KY 40215

Louisville, KY 40215

United States

38° 10' 46.4304" N, 85° 47' 33.5076" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-351

Petitioner

Heller, Secretary, Kentucky Cabinet For Human Resources

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doe, By His Mother And Next Friend, Doe, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

509 U.S. 312 (1993)

Argued

Monday, March 22, 1993

Decided

Thursday, June 24, 1993

Advocates

William K. Moore (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Kelly Miller (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

A class of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons brought suit against Kentucky in a Kentucky federal court challenging the constitutionality of the state's involuntary commitment procedures. The district court agreed that the procedures were unconstitutional and prevented the enforcement of the applicable statute. After multiple appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit instructed the state to amend its procedures.

Question

Do Kentucky's involuntary commitment procedures for retarded persons violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Heller, Secretary, Kentucky Cabinet For Human Resources, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. The Supreme Court held that Kentucky's procedures for involuntarily committing mentally retarded persons did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that because retarded persons are not a suspect classification, Kentucky's statute warranted only rational basis scrutiny – the Court's lowest level of scrutiny. Consequently, the Court concluded that the state met its burden that its procedures were rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and were constitutional.

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote separately, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. She argued, in contrast to the majority, that Kentucky's commitment procedures were irrational. Justice Harold A. Blackmun also dissented. He argued that laws that discriminate against the mentally retarded warrant heightened scrutiny by the Court. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, and in part by Justice O'Connor, dissented. He argued that Kentucky's commitment procedures were not supported by any rational justification.

Lucas v. South Carolina Coast Council

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:25 +0000

Location

Charleston County Court of Common Pleas

2144 Melbourne Avenue North Charleston SC 29418

North Charleston, SC 29418

United States

32° 52' 1.7292" N, 79° 59' 33.8748" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-453

Petitioner

Lucas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

South Carolina Coast Council

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

505 U.S. 1003 (1992)

Argued

Monday, March 2, 1992

Decided

Monday, June 29, 1992

Advocates

C. C. Harness, III (on behalf of the Respondent)

A. Camden Lewis (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1986, Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island. He intended to build single-family homes as on the adjacent lots. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting permanent habitable structures on his land. The law aimed to protect erosion and destruction of barrier islands. Lucas sued and won a large monetary judgment. The state appealed.

Question

Does the construction ban depriving Lucas of all economically viable use of his property amount to a "taking" calling for "just compensation" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Lucas, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

Yes. In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court relied on the trial court's finding that Lucas's lots had been rendered valueless by the state law. "[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good...he has suffered a taking."

Medina v. California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-8370

Petitioner

Medina

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

505 U.S. 437 (1992)

Argued

Tuesday, February 25, 1992

Decided

Monday, June 22, 1992

Advocates

Michael Pescetta (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Holly D. Wilkens (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for California, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Yee v. City Of Escondido, California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:13 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1947

Petitioner

Yee et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City Of Escondido, California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

503 U.S. 519 (1992)

Argued

Wednesday, January 22, 1992

Decided

Wednesday, April 1, 1992

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (on behalf of the Respondent)

Robert J. Jagiello (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for City Of Escondido, California, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Takings Clause

None