Cases by Issue - Right to Counsel

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-352

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Friday, January 6, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, April 18, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 26, 2006

Advocates

Jeffrey L. Fisher (argued the cause for Respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez hired Joseph Low, an attorney, to represent him in a federal criminal trial. The district court judge refused to allow Low to represent Gonzalez-Lopez, however, because the judge ruled that Low had violated a court rule in a previous case. Gonzalez-Lopez was subsequently convicted. On appeal, he argued that his Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of his own choosing had been violated and that the conviction should therefore be overturned. The Eighth Circuit agreed, holding that the trial judge had misinterpreted the court rule and that Low's conduct had been acceptable under a proper understanding of the rule. The decision to not allow him to represent Gonzalez-Lopez was therefore wrong, and resulted in a violation of Gonzalez- Lopez's Sixth Amendment rights significant enough to warrant overturning the conviction.

Question

If a trial court judge wrongly denies a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney of his own choosing, is the defendant automatically entitled to have his conviction overturned?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Gonzalez-Lopez, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court held that a denial of the Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of one's own choosing is "structural" error. Unlike some other kinds of errors in which a defendant must also prove that the result would likely have been different had his rights not been violated, structural errors must result in automatic reversal of the conviction. "[T]he erroneous denial of counsel bears directly on the 'framework within which the trial proceeds,'" Justice Scalia wrote. "It is impossible to know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the proceedings. ... Harmless error analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe."

Rompilla v. Beard

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-5462

Petitioner

Ronald Rompilla

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Amy Zapp (argued the cause for Respondent)

Billy H. Nolas (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Pennsylvania court convicted Ronald Rompilla of murder. During the sentencing phase, the prosecution presented to the jury Rompilla's previous rape and assault conviction, as an aggravating factor to justify the death sentence. The jury sentenced Rompilla to death and the state supreme court affirmed. Rompilla's new lawyers filed an additional appeal, arguing that Rompilla's trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence about his various personal problems. The state courts found that Rompilla's counsel had sufficiently investigated mitigation possibilities. After Rompilla filed a federal habeas petition, a district court reversed the sentence and ruled the state supreme court had unreasonably applied the U.S. Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington. Had the state court followed that case, the district court ruled, the court would have found Rompilla's trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate obvious signs of Rompilla's troubled childhood, mental illness and alcoholism. The Third Circuit reversed.

Question

Did the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel require counsel to try to obtain material counsel had known the prosecution would probably use at the trial's sentencing phase?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Rompilla, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Rompilla's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make reasonable efforts to examine the file on Rompilla's prior conviction for rape and assault. Moreover, counsel had known the prosecution would probably present the prior conviction to the jury during sentencing. In that file counsel would have found mitigating evidence about Rompilla's troubled childhood and mental health.

Florida v. Nixon

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-931

Petitioner

Florida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Joe Elton Nixon

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 175 (2004)

Granted

Monday, March 1, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 2, 2004

Decided

Monday, December 13, 2004

Advocates

Edward H. Tillinghast (argued the cause for Respondents)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

George S. Lemieux (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Florida court convicted Joe Elton Nixon of murder and sentenced him to death. During the trial Nixon's lawyer told the jury Nixon was guilty. Nixon appealed and argued he received ineffective counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Nixon said he did not agree to the lawyer's strategy. After several appeals the Florida Supreme Court granted Nixon a new trial. The court said Nixon's lawyer's comments were essentially a guilty plea and that because Nixon did not explicitly agree to the strategy, the lawyer was "per se ineffective."

Question

1.) Is a defense lawyer's use of a strategy that concedes the defendant's guilt ineffective assistance of counsel if the strategy was pursued without the explicit approval of the defendant? 2.) Should counsel be held to a standard that considers whether counsel's statements were deficient and prejudicial to the defendant, or should counsel be considered ineffective per se?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Florida, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

In a unanimous 8-0 decision, the Court ruled that Nixon's lawyer's strategy - pursued without Nixon's express approval - did not automatically qualify the lawyer as ineffective. The Court reversed the ruling of the Florida Supreme Court, faulting that court for inappropriately applying presumptions of prejudice and deficient performance. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that "When counsel informs the defendant of the strategy counsel believes to be in the defendant's best interest and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel's strategic choice is not impeded by any blanket rule demanding the defendant's explicit consent." Nixon's lawyer would have needed Nixon's consent for a formal guilty plea, but the Court ruled that the tactic of effectively conceding guilt in order to concentrate on the sentencing phase of the trial was legitimate as long as the defendant was informed of the strategy. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the decision of the case.

Iowa v. Tovar

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1541

Petitioner

Iowa

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Felipe Edgardo Tovar

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 77 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, September 30, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, January 21, 2004

Decided

Monday, March 8, 2004

Advocates

Thomas J. Miller (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Theresa R. Wilson (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Felipe E. Tovar was charged with drunk-driving in Iowa three times in four years. Tovar pleaded guilty both times and waived his right to an attorney the first time. The third time, because Iowa law increases sentencing for successive drunk-driving, Tovar faced up to five years in prison. Tovar argued that his first conviction was an invalid waiver of his 6th Amendment right to counsel and should not increase his third sentence. The waiver was invalid, Tovar argued, because the judge did not warn him of the consequences of entering a guilty plea without an attorney. The Iowa district court rejected Tovar's argument and sentenced him to 30 days in jail. The court of appeals affirmed. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed.

Question

Given the 6th Amendment's right to counsel, to what extent must a defendant be informed of the consequences of pleading guilty while waiving the right to an attorney?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Iowa, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Tovar's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated. In a case like Tovar's, the Sixth Amendment requires the judge to inform the accused of the charges against him, of his right to counsel regarding his plea, and of the range of punishments he faces if he pleads guilty. The Court decided Tovar's trial court judge satisfied these requirements and that Tovar's waiver of his right to counsel was "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent."

Fellers v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-6320

Petitioner

John J. Fellers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 519 (2004)

Granted

Monday, March 10, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Decided

Monday, January 26, 2004

Advocates

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After a grand jury indicted Fellers, police arrested him at home. Fellers made incriminating statements during the arrest. Police officially interrogated Fellers at county jail and told him of his Miranda rights. Fellers signed a waiver of these rights and restated incriminating statements he had made at home. Fellers later argued that, when he was arrested in his home without a lawyer, police "deliberately elicited" incriminating statements. Pointing to his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Fellers argued it would be unconstitutional to admit at trial his incriminating statements made in jail, because these were the "fruits" of comments made at home without a lawyer.

Fellers was convicted in federal district court. A federal appellate court affirmed the conviction and ruled that officers did not violate Fellers' Sixth Amendment right to counsel either at home or in the jailhouse.

Question

(1) Was the appellate court correct to rule that officers did not violate Fellers' Sixth Amendment right to counsel because officers did not interrogate him? (2) Should Fellers' statements in the jailhouse - given after police Mirandized him - be suppressed because they were fruits of an unconstitutional interview in his home?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fellers, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

Question 1: No. Question 2: Remanded. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that officers violated Fellers' Sixth Amendment right to counsel by deliberately eliciting incriminating information from him after an indictment and in the absence of a lawyer. The Court rejected the appellate court's argument that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was irrelevant because police did not "interrogate" Fellers at his home. The Court sent the case back to the appellate court to determine - under the Sixth Amendment - whether Fellers' statements in jail should be suppressed because they were "fruits" of his unconstitutional questioning at home.

Wiggins v. Smith

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-311

Petitioner

Wiggins

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Smith

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 510 (2003)

Argued

Monday, March 24, 2003

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 2003

Advocates

Gary E. Bair (Baltimore, Maryland, argued the cause for the respondents)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (On behalf of the petitioner)

Dan Himmelfarb (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Kevin Wiggins was convicted and sentenced to death for a 1988 murder. He appealed, claiming that his attorney's decision not to tell jurors about Wiggins' troubled childhood amounted to ineffective counsel because it resulted in a harsher sentence. Prosecutors countered that the attorney's decision had been carefully considered, and that a different decision would not necessarily have resulted in a different outcome. Therefore, they said, it was not ineffective counsel. A Maryland district court sided with Wiggins; the Maryland Supreme Court reversed, siding with the state. On appeal to federal court, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling for Maryland.

Question

Does a criminal defendant's attorneys' failure to investigate his background and present mitigating evidence of his unfortunate life history at his capital sentencing proceedings constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Wiggins, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the performance of Wiggins's attorneys at sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court reasoned that Wiggins's counsel did not conduct a reasonable investigation because, among other things, standard practice in Maryland in 1989 included the preparation of a social history report, which his attorneys did not commission even though the necessary funds were available. The Court concluded that Wiggins's counsels' failures prejudiced his defense. "Had the jury been able to place [Wiggins's] excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance," wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.

Alabama v. Shelton

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:31 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1214

Petitioner

Alabama

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shelton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 654 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 2002

Decided

Monday, May 20, 2002

Advocates

William H. Mills (Argued the cause for the respondent)

William H. Pryor, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Charles Fried (on behalf of amicus curiae in opposition to the judgment below)

Steven B. Duke (on behalf of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.

Question

Does the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel, as defined in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, apply to a defendant who was sentenced to a suspended sentence?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Shelton, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held, according to Argersinger, that a suspended sentence that may "end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty" may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded "the guiding hand of counsel" in the prosecution for the crime charged. The Court reasoned that, because the invocation of the suspended incarceration would constitute a prison term imposed for the assault offense of which defendant was convicted without the assistance of counsel, the Constitution required the provision of counsel. Justice Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined, dissented. Justice Scalia argued that the Court's prior decisions emphasized actual imprisonment as the touchstone of entitlement to appointed counsel.

Mickens v. Taylor

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-9285

Petitioner

Mickens

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Taylor

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 162 (2002)

Argued

Monday, November 5, 2001

Decided

Wednesday, March 27, 2002

Advocates

Robert Q. Harris (Richmond, Virginia, argued the cause for the respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (Argued the cause as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, in support of the respondent)

Robert J. Wagner (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Virginia jury convicted Walter Mickens, Jr., of the premeditated murder of Timothy Hall during or following the commission of an attempted forcible sodomy and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, Mickens filed a federal habeas petition, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because one of his court-appointed attorneys had a conflict of interest at trial - his lead attorney, Bryan Saunders, had represented Hall on criminal charges at the time of the murder. Saunders had not disclosed to the court, his co-counsel, or Mickens that he had represented Hall. Ultimately, the en banc Court of Appeals rejected MIckens's argument that the juvenile court judge's failure to inquire into a potential conflict either mandated automatic reversal of his conviction or relieved him of the burden of showing that a conflict of interest adversely affected his representation. Subsequently, the appellate court concluded that Mickens had not demonstrated adverse effect.

Question

Must a defendant show that a conflict of interest adversely affected his representation in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation when the trial court fails to inquire into a potential conflict of interest about which it knew or reasonably should have known?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Taylor, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 6: Other Sixth Amendment Provisions

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation in such a situation, a defendant must establish that a conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel's performance. The Court rejected Mickens's argument that where the trial judge neglects a duty to inquire into a potential conflict the defendant, to obtain reversal, need only show that his lawyer was subject to a conflict of interest, not that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. In doing so, the Court noted that a defendant alleging ineffective assistance generally must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Texas v. Cobb

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1702

Petitioner

Texas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cobb

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 162 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, January 16, 2001

Decided

Monday, April 2, 2001

Advocates

Gregory S. Coleman (Austin, Texas, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Lisa S. Blatt (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the court, supporting the petitioner)

Roy E. Greenwood (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, while under arrest for an unrelated offense, Raymond Levi Cobb confessed to a home burglary. Cobb, however, denied knowledge of the disappearance of a woman and child from the home. In 1995, after counsel was appointed to represent him in the burglary case, Cobb confessed to killing the woman and child to his father, who contacted the police. Cobb, now in custody, waived his rights under Miranda and confessed to the murders. Cobb was then indicted, convicted, and sentenced to death. On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Cobb argued that his confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which he claimed attached when counsel was appointed in the burglary case. In reversing, the court held that once the right to counsel attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches to any other offense that is very closely factually related to the offense charged.

Question

Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extend to crimes that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Texas, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 6: Other Sixth Amendment Provisions

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "offense specific," it does not necessarily extend to offenses that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged. Since the right to counsel was offense specific, and the offenses were separate, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not bar police from interrogating [Cobb] regarding the murders, and [Cobb's] confession was therefore admissible." Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Glover v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-8576

Petitioner

Glover

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 198 (2001)

Argued

Monday, November 27, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, January 9, 2001

Advocates

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Michael L. Waldman (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In the 1980's and early 1990's, Paul Glover was the Vice President and General Counsel of the Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union. Ultimately, Glover was convicted of federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion, among other things, after using his control over the union's investments to enrich himself through kickbacks. Glover's probation officer, in his pre-sentence investigation report, recommended that Glover's federal labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion convictions be grouped under the United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual section 3D1.2, which allows the grouping of counts involving substantially the same harm. The Federal Government objected to the grouping and the District Court agreed. Glover's offense level was thus increased by two levels, resulting in an increased sentence of between 6 and 21 months. Glover's counsel did not pursue the grouping issue on appeal. Glover then filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence, arguing that his counsel's failure to pursue the issue was ineffective assistance, without which his offense level would have been lower. The District Court denied Glover's motion, concluding that a 6 to 21 month sentencing increase was not significant enough to establish prejudice under the test for ineffective assistance of counsel articulated in Strickland v. Washington. Thus, the court denied his ineffective-assistance claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is a significant increase on a prison sentence required in order to show prejudice in a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Glover, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Court of appeals erred in engrafting onto the prejudice branch of the Strickland test the requirement that any increase in sentence must meet a standard of significance. Thus, the denial of Glover's motion to correct his sentence was reversed and remanded. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that the Court of Appeals erred "because there is no obvious dividing line by which to measure how much longer a sentence must be for the increase to constitute substantial prejudice. ... Although the amount by which a defendant's sentence is increased by a particular decision may be a factor to consider in determining whether counsel's performance in failing to argue the point constitutes ineffective assistance, ...it cannot serve as a bar to a showing of prejudice."

United States v. Martinez-Salazar

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1255

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Martinez-Salazar

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 304 (2000)

Argued

Monday, November 29, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 19, 2000

Advocates

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for petitioner)

Michael Gordon (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Abel Martinez-Salazar was charged with a variety of federal narcotics and weapons offenses. The District Court allotted him 10 peremptory challenges exercisable in the selection of 12 jurors. After prospective juror Don Gilbert indicated several times that he would favor the prosecution, Martinez- Salazar's counsel challenged him for cause. The court declined to excuse Gilbert. After twice objecting, unsuccessfully, to the for-cause ruling, Martinez-Salazar used a peremptory challenge to remove him. Subsequently, Martinez-Salazar exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Thereafter, Martinez-Salazar's counsel did not object to the final seating of the jurors. Martinez-Salazar was then convicted on all counts. On appeal, Martinez-Salazar argued that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Gilbert for cause and that this error used one of his peremptory challenges wrongly. The Court of Appeals agreed that the District Court's refusal to strike Gilbert for cause was an abuse of discretion. Ultimately, the court found that the District Court's error resulted in a violation of Martinez- Salazar's Fifth Amendment due process rights because it forced him to use a peremptory challenge curatively, which impaired his right to a full complement of peremptory challenges. The Court of Appeals held that the error required an automatic reversal.

Question

s a defendant's peremptory challenge right impaired or denied when he or she peremptorily challenges a potential juror, whom the district court erroneously refused to excuse for cause, and the defendant thereafter exhausts his peremptory challenges?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use such a challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "if the defendant elects to cure such an error by exercising a peremptory challenge, and is subsequently convicted by a jury on which no biased juror sat, he has not been deprived of any rule-based or constitutional right." The Court also concluded that the loss of a peremptory challenge did not constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.

Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-7809

Petitioner

Martinez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 152 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2000

Advocates

Ronald D. Maines (By appointment of the Court, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner)

Robert Foster (San Diego, California, argued the cause for respondent)

Facts of the Case

Salvador Martinez, a self-described self-taught paralegal with 25 years of experience at 12 different law firms, was working for a Santa Ana, California law firm when a client gave him $6,000.00 to bail her boyfriend out of jail. The bail was never posted and Martinez was subsequently charged with grand theft and the fraudulent appropriation of the property of another. Martinez chose to represent himself at trial before a jury, which acquitted him of theft, but convicted him of embezzlement. Martinez then filed a timely notice of appeal, a motion to represent himself, and a waiver of counsel. The motion to represent himself was denied by the California Court of Appeal. The court explained: "There is no constitutional right to self-representation on the initial appeal as of right. The right to counsel on appeal stems from the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the Sixth Amendment....The denial of self-representation at this level does not violate due process or equal protection guarantees."

Question

Does a criminal defendant have a constitutional right to choose to represent himself on direct appeal?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that here is no constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction. "We are not aware of any historical consensus establishing a right of self-representation on appeal," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Noting that the rights established by the Sixth Amendment "are presented strictly as rights that are available in preparation for trial and at the trial itself" and that the Amendment "does not include any right to appeal," Justice Stevens concluded, "[i]t necessarily follows that the Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal." Justice Stevens added "[o]ur experience has taught us that "a pro se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly when compared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal defense attorney." Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Antonin Scalia wrote concurring opinions.

Roe v. Flores-Ortega

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1441

Petitioner

Roe

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Flores-Ortega

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 470 (2000)

Argued

Monday, November 1, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 2000

Advocates

Paul E. O'Connor (Sacramento, California argued the cause for the petitioner)

Edward C. DuMont (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Quin Denvir (Sacramento, California, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Lucio Flores-Ortega, who does not speak English fluently, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. At his sentencing, the trial judge advised him that he had 60 days to file an appeal. His counsel, a public defender, did not file a notice of appeal in the period set by the court even though her file contained the words "bring appeal papers." Flores-Ortega's subsequent attempt to file such notice was rejected as untimely. Flores-Ortega's efforts to secure state habeas corpus relief were unsuccessful. Represented by a federal defender, Flores-Ortega then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, alleging constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel based his counsel's failure to file the notice after promising to do so. The District Court denied relief. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Flores-Ortega was entitled to relief because, under its precedent, a habeas petitioner need only show that his counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal was without the petitioner's consent.

Question

Does trial counsel have a duty to file a notice of appeal following a guilty plea if the defendant has not requested so, but has been informed of his appeal rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Roe, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that counsel is not always required to file a notice of appeal after their clients plead guilty unless the clients specifically ask them to so. "We cannot say, as a constitutional matter, that in every case counsel's failure to consult with the defendant about an appeal is necessarily unreasonable and therefore deficient," Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority. "We therefore reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal," concluded Justice O'Connor. In dissent, Justice David Souter, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens, wrote that attorneys should be required to consult with their clients about possible appeals in virtually all cases, even those in which the defendants plead guilty.

Nichols v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-8556

Petitioner

Nichols

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 738 (1994)

Argued

Monday, January 10, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 6, 1994

Advocates

William B. M. Carter (on behalf of the Petitioner)

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department Of Correction v. Fretwell

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:01:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-1393

Petitioner

Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department Of Correction

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fretwell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

506 U.S. 364 (1993)

Argued

Tuesday, November 3, 1992

Decided

Monday, January 25, 1993

Advocates

Winston Bryant (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Ricky Reed Medlock (on behalf of the Respondent)

Amy L. Wax (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae supporting the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Lockhart, Director, Arkansas Department Of Correction, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

McNeil v. Wisconsin

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:23 +0000

Location

Milwaukee County Jail

949 North 9th Street Milwaukee WI 53233

Milwaukee, WI 53233

United States

43° 2' 32.3124" N, 87° 55' 22.8252" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-5319

Petitioner

Paul McNeil

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wisconsin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 171 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 13, 1991

Advocates

Gary M. Luck (argued the cause for petitioner)

David J. Becker (Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for respondent)

Stephen L. Nightingale (argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance)

Facts of the Case

When arrested for armed robbery, Paul McNeil did not initially invoke his Miranda right to counsel provided by the Fifth Amendment. However, he had a public defender represent him at a pretrial hearing at a county court in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. After the hearing, sheriffs asked him about his involvement in a unrelated set of crimes, including murder. The sheriffs informed McNeil of his Miranda rights again, but he signed a waiver authorizing his testimony. His answers incriminated him for the crimes and he was charged in a state trial court. He unsuccessfully petitioned the court to invalidate his testimony as evidence. A jury convicted him and sentenced him to 60 years in prison. He contended that having the public defender represent him invoked his Miranda rights, which were later violated. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled against him.

Question

Does the accused's invocation of the Sixth Amendment's provision of legal counsel for one charge also invoke the Fifth Amendment's right to counsel for unrelated offenses charged later?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Wisconsin, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Sixth Amendment ensures competent legal representation in courts of law, whereas the Fifth Amendment ensures adequate counsel when confronting police. Because the Amendments have different purposes, invoking the Sixth Amendment by retaining a public defender does not invoke the Fifth Amendment when speaking with the police about an unrelated criminal charge. The Court reasoned that "[o]ne might be quite willing to speak to the police without counsel present concerning many matters, but not the matter under prosecution." McNeil's decision to have a public defender represent him at a pretrial hearing for armed robbery could not possibly indicate the choices he wished to make in the future regarding other confrontations with police.

Michigan v. Harvey

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-512

Petitioner

Michigan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harvey

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

494 U.S. 344 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, October 11, 1989

Decided

Monday, March 5, 1990

Advocates

Timothy A. Baughman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Robert M. Morgan (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Michigan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

United States v. Monsanto

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-454

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Monsanto

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

491 U.S. 600 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, March 21, 1989

Decided

Thursday, June 22, 1989

Advocates

Edward M. Chikofsky (on behalf of the Petitioner)

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 853

None

Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1729

Petitioner

Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

491 U.S. 617 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, March 21, 1989

Decided

Thursday, June 22, 1989

Advocates

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Peter Van N. Lockwood (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 853

None

Perry v. Leeke

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-6325

Petitioner

Perry

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Leeke

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

488 U.S. 272 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, November 8, 1988

Decided

Sunday, January 1, 1989

Advocates

Donald John Zelenka (on behalf of Respondents)

W. Gaston Fairey (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Leeke, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Patterson v. Illinois

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-7059

Petitioner

Patterson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

487 U.S. 285 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 1988

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1988

Advocates

Andrew J. Pincus (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae supporting respondent)

Donald S. Honchell (on behalf of the petitioner)

Jack Donatelli (on behalf of the respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Illinois, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Wheat v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-4

Petitioner

Wheat

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

486 U.S. 153 (1988)

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 1988

Decided

Monday, May 23, 1988

Advocates

John J. Cleary (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Michael K. Kellogg (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Satterwhite v. Texas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-6284

Petitioner

Satterwhite

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Texas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

486 U.S. 249 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, December 8, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 1988

Advocates

Charles A. Palmer (on behalf of the Respondent)

Richard D. Woods (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Satterwhite, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Burger v. Kemp

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-5375

Petitioner

Burger

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kemp

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

483 U.S. 776 (1987)

Argued

Monday, March 30, 1987

Decided

Friday, June 26, 1987

Advocates

Joseph M. Nursey (on behalf of the Petitioner)

William B. Hill, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kemp, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Kimmelman v. Morrison

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1661

Petitioner

Kimmelman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Morrison

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

477 U.S. 365 (1986)

Argued

Wednesday, March 5, 1986

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 1986

Advocates

Allan J. Nodes (on behalf of the petitioner)

William E. Staehle (on behalf of the respondent, appointed by this Court)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Morrison, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

None

Kuhlmann v. Wilson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:49 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1479

Petitioner

Kuhlmann

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wilson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

477 U.S. 436 (1986)

Argued

Tuesday, January 14, 1986

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 1986

Advocates

Steven P. Kartagener (on behalf of Petitioner)

Philip S. Weber (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kuhlmann, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Darden v. Wainwright

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-5319

Petitioner

Darden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wainwright

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

477 U.S. 168 (1986)

Argued

Monday, January 13, 1986

Decided

Monday, June 23, 1986

Advocates

Richard W. Prospect (on behalf of the respondent)

Robert A. Harper, Jr. (on behalf of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Wainwright, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Michigan v. Jackson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1531

Petitioner

Michigan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jackson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 84-1539

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

475 U.S. 625 (1986)

Argued

Monday, December 9, 1985

Decided

Tuesday, April 1, 1986

Advocates

Ronald J. Bretz (on behalf of Respondent Rudy Bladel)

James Krogsrud (on behalf of Respondent Robert Bernard Jackson)

Brian E. Thiede (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Jackson, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Nix v. Whiteside

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1321

Petitioner

Nix

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Whiteside

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

475 U.S. 157 (1986)

Argued

Tuesday, November 5, 1985

Decided

Wednesday, February 26, 1986

Advocates

Patrick Reilly Grady (on behalf of Respondent)

Brent R. Appel (on behalf of Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Nix, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Maine v. Moulton

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-786

Petitioner

Maine

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Moulton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

474 U.S. 159 (1985)

Argued

Tuesday, October 8, 1985

Decided

Tuesday, December 10, 1985

Advocates

Anthony Whitcomb Beardsley (on behalf of the Respondent)

Wayne S. Moss (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Moulton, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Hill v. Lockhart

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1103

Petitioner

Hill

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lockhart

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

474 U.S. 52 (1985)

Argued

Monday, October 7, 1985

Decided

Monday, November 18, 1985

Advocates

John Steven Clark (on behalf of the Respondent)

Jack T. Lassiter (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lockhart, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Evitts v. Lucey

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1378

Petitioner

Evitts

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lucey

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

469 U.S. 387 (1985)

Argued

Wednesday, October 10, 1984

Decided

Monday, January 21, 1985

Advocates

William M. Radigan (on behalf of the Respondent)

J. Gerald Henry (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Lucey, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

United States v. Gouveia

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-128

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gouveia

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

467 U.S. 180 (1984)

Argued

Tuesday, March 20, 1984

Decided

Tuesday, May 29, 1984

Advocates

Andrew L. Frey (on behalf of petitioner)

Charles P. Diamond (on behalf of respondents)

Joel Levine (on behalf of respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Nix v. Williams

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:17 +0000

Location

Police Car

I-80 West Williamsburg IA 52361

Williamsburg, IA 52361

United States

41° 39' 40.0284" N, 92° 0' 32.6412" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-1651

Petitioner

Nix

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Williams

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

467 U.S. 431 (1984)

Argued

Wednesday, January 18, 1984

Decided

Monday, June 11, 1984

Advocates

Robert Bartels (By appointment of the Court, argued the cause for the respondent)

Kathryn A. Oberly (Rgued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Brent R. Appel (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Williams was arrested for the murder of a ten-year-old girl who's body he disposed of along a gravel road. State law enforcement officials engaged in a massive search for the child's body. During the search, after responding to an officer's appeal for assistance, Williams made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead the searchers to the child's body. The defendant's Miranda rights were only read to him after his arrest.

Question

Should evidence resulting in an arrest be excluded from trial because it was improperly obtained?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Nix, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Exclusionary rule (admissibility of evidence allegedly in violation of the Right to Counsel)

No. The Court relied on the "inevitable discovery doctrine," as it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the child's body as evidence since it was clear that the volunteer search teams would have discovered the body even absent Williams's statements.

United States v. Cronic

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-660

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cronic

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

466 U.S. 648 (1984)

Argued

Tuesday, January 10, 1984

Decided

Monday, May 14, 1984

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Steven B. Duke (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Strickland v. Washington

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:17 +0000

Location

Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida - Dade County

73 West Flagler Miami FL 33130

Miami, FL 33130

United States

25° 46' 28.5672" N, 80° 11' 42.5256" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-1554

Petitioner

Strickland

Respondent

Washington

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

466 U.S. 668 (1984)

Argued

Tuesday, January 10, 1984

Decided

Monday, May 14, 1984

Advocates

Carolyn M. Snurkowski (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Richard E. Shapiro (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

David Washington pleaded guilty to murder in a Florida state court. At sentencing, his attorney did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric evaluation. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Mr. Washington to death finding no mitigating circumstances to rule otherwise. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Strickland sought habeas corpus relief in a Florida federal district court. He argued that his Sixth Amendment right was violated because he had ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the Sixth Amendment accorded criminal defendants a right to counsel rendering "reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances." It then remanded the case to the district court to apply this standard and determine whether Mr. Washington's counsel was sufficiently prejudicial to justify the reversal of his sentence.

Question

What standard should be applied to determine whether a convicted person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated so as to require reversal of a conviction or to set aside a death sentence?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Strickland, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

The Supreme Court held that: (1) counsel's performance must be deficient; and (2) the deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. With Justice Sandra Day O'Connor writing for the majority, the Court counseled that in making a showing of deficient performance, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness." The Court also noted that to show prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a "reasonable probability" that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. Here, the Court reasoned that Mr. Washington's counsel was not unreasonable. Moreover, the Court stated that even if counsel was unreasonable, counsel's conduct did not cause sufficient prejudice to Mr. Washington to warrant setting aside his death sentence.

Justice William J. Brennan wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He viewed the death sentence as per se cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, he would not have upheld Mr. Washington's sentence. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote separately, dissenting. He disagreed with the majority's holding in that in its attempt to make a uniform standard, it created one so malleable as to be virtually useless.

Mckaskle v. Wiggins

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-1135

Petitioner

Mckaskle

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wiggins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

465 U.S. 168 (1984)

Argued

Wednesday, November 9, 1983

Decided

Monday, January 23, 1984

Advocates

Leslie A. Benitez (on behalf of Petitioner)

Craig Smyser (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Mckaskle, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Jones v. Barnes

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-1794

Petitioner

Jones

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Barnes

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

463 U.S. 745 (1983)

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 1983

Decided

Tuesday, July 5, 1983

Advocates

Sheila Ginsberg Riesel (on behalf of the Respondent)

Barbara D. Underwood (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Jones, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Morris v. Slappy

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-1095

Petitioner

Morris

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Slappy

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

461 U.S. 1 (1983)

Argued

Wednesday, December 1, 1982

Decided

Wednesday, April 20, 1983

Advocates

Michael B. Bassi (on behalf of the Respondent)

Dane R. Gillette (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Morris, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Lassiter v. Department Of Social Services

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-6423

Petitioner

Lassiter

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Department Of Social Services

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

452 U.S. 18 (1981)

Argued

Monday, February 23, 1981

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1981

Advocates

Leowen Evans (on behalf of the Petitioner pro hac vice)

Steven Mansfield Shaber (on behalf of North Carolina as amicus curiae)

Thomas Russell Odom (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Department Of Social Services, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

United States v. Morrison

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:15 +0000

Location

Residence of Morrison PA

United States

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-395

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hazel Morrison

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

449 U.S. 361 (1981)

Argued

Wednesday, December 10, 1980

Decided

Tuesday, January 13, 1981

Advocates

Peter Buscemi (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Salvatore J. Cucinotta (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Hazel Morrison was indicted for distributing heroine and obtained private counsel for her defense. Without her counsel's knowledge two agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) conversed with her regarding a related investigation. During this conversation the agents advised that she have a public defender represent her instead of her private counsel. They also told her that the severity of her punishment would depend on how well she cooperated with them. Morrison notified her counselor immediately and did not speak to the agents about the investigation. She unsuccessfully petitioned the District Court to dismiss her indictment on the ground that the agents had violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Morrison then entered a guilty plea to one count of the indictment. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that Morrison's Sixth Amendment rights had been violated and ruled to drop all charges against her.

Question

Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit wrongfully dismiss criminal charges on the ground that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated in a way that had no tangible effect upon court proceedings?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

Yes. Justice Byron White authored the opinion for the Court unanimously reversing the Third Circuit's decision. For sake of argument, the Court granted that Morrison's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated, but held that this did not merit the dismissal of all charges since the conduct of the agents did not prejudice the outcome of the trial. The Court maintained that Sixth Amendment violations should not be remedied beyond the scope of the harm they inflicted upon the defendant.

Estelle v. Smith

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:28:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-1127

Petitioner

Estelle

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Smith

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

451 U.S. 454 (1981)

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 1980

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1981

Advocates

Joel Berger (on behalf of the Respondent)

Anita Ashton (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Smith, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Self-Incrimination

None

Cuyler v. Sullivan

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:07 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

78-1832

Petitioner

Cuyler

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sullivan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

446 U.S. 335 (1980)

Argued

Wednesday, February 20, 1980

Decided

Monday, May 12, 1980

Advocates

Marilyn J. Gelb (on behalf of the respondent)

Steven H. Goldblatt (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Cuyler, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

None

United States v. Henry

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-121

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Henry

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

447 U.S. 264 (1980)

Argued

Wednesday, January 16, 1980

Decided

Monday, June 16, 1980

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Henry, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Baldasar v. Illinois

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-6219

Petitioner

Baldasar

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

446 U.S. 222 (1980)

Argued

Monday, November 26, 1979

Decided

Tuesday, April 22, 1980

Advocates

Michael Mulder (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Michael B. Weinstein (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Baldasar, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Scott v. Illinois

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:12:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-1177

Petitioner

Scott

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Illinois

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

440 U.S. 367 (1979)

Argued

Monday, December 4, 1978

Decided

Monday, March 5, 1979

Advocates

John S. Elson (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Gerri Papushkewych (Argued the cause for respondent)

Facts of the Case

Scott was convicted in a bench trial of shoplifting and fined $50. The statute applicable to his case set the maximum penalty at a $500 fine and/or one year in jail.

Question

Did the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require Illinois to provide Scott with trial counsel?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Illinois, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

A plurality held that Illinois had not violated the Constitution. Writing for four of the justices, Rehnquist clarified the Court's holding in Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) and argued that states could only sentence a convicted criminal to imprisonment if that person had been represented by counsel. Since Scott was not sentenced to imprisonment, even though the applicable statute allowed for it, the state was not obligated to provide counsel. Rehnquist called that line of reasoning "the central premise of Argersinger."

Weatherford v. Bursey

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

75-1510

Petitioner

Weatherford

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bursey

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

429 U.S. 545 (1977)

Argued

Tuesday, December 7, 1976

Decided

Tuesday, February 22, 1977

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Weatherford, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Brewer v. Williams

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-1263

Petitioner

Brewer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Williams

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

430 U.S. 387 (1977)

Argued

Monday, October 4, 1976

Decided

Wednesday, March 23, 1977

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Williams, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Geders v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:18:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-5968

Petitioner

Geders

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

425 U.S. 80 (1976)

Argued

Monday, December 1, 1975

Decided

Tuesday, March 30, 1976

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Geders, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None

Herring v. New York

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:33:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

73-6587

Appellee

New York

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Herring

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

422 U.S. 853 (1975)

Argued

Wednesday, February 26, 1975

Decided

Monday, June 30, 1975

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Herring, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Counsel

None