Cases by Issue - Privacy

Scheidler v. National Organization for Women (NOW)

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1244

Petitioner

Joseph Scheidler, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Organization for Women, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women, Inc., et al., No. 04-1352

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, June 28, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, November 30, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, February 28, 2006

Advocates

Erwin Chemerinsky (argued the cause for Respondents)

Lisa S. Blatt (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Alan Edward Untereiner (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that abortion protesters do not commit extortion in violation the Hobbs Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when they blockade abortion clinics, because they do not "obtain" property, as required by the Act. The Court concluded that "Without an underlying RICO violation, the injunction [on the protesters] issued by the District Court must necessarily be vacated." The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to vacate the injunction, however, finding that the Court had only ruled on the 117 counts of extortion, and not on four additional counts of violence unrelated to extortion. The National Organization for Women (NOW) argued that acts of physical violence are sufficient to establish a violation of the Hobbs Act. Scheidler countered that the four counts of "violence-only" were irrelevant to the Hobbs Act, which he said requires that violence be used for robbery or extortion. Scheidler petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the Circuit Court had acted properly, and the Court granted certiorari. (Consolidated with No. 04-1352, Operation Rescue v. NOW.)

Question

Does the Hobbs Act prohibit violence unrelated to extortion or robbery?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Scheidler, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1951

No. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court ruled that "physical violence unrelated to robbery or extortion falls outside the scope of the Hobbs Act." Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Stephen Breyer cited statutory language, legislative history, and case law in support of the decision. He wrote, "The language of the statute makes the more restrictive reading the more natural one." Although Congress had revised the Act in 1948, making it less clear, the Court ruled that Congress did not intend for the revisions to "create a freestanding physical violence offense in the Hobbs Act."

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1144

Petitioner

Kelly A. Ayotte, Attorney General of New Hampshire

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, May 23, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, November 30, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 2006

Advocates

Jennifer E. Dalven (argued the cause for Respondents)

Kelly A. Ayotte (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After New Hampshire's state legislature approved the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act but before the act went into effect, Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenged the law in federal district court. They claimed that the law, which requires that parents be notified before their minor daughter has an abortion, violated the "undue burden" test laid out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a 1992 Supreme Court decision that reformulated the constitutional protections given to abortion in Roe v. Wade. Specifically, they argued that an exemption in the law for abortions necessary to prevent the death of the mother, but not for those abortions necessary to protect merely her health, was unconstitutionally narrow.

The federal district court agreed, rejecting the argument of New Hampshire's Attorney General that the judicial bypass procedure included in the law, in which a judge could approve an abortion without parental notification for a minor who showed she was mature enough to make the decision on her own, could be used to permit abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother. The judge also rejected New Hampshire's argument that the law could not be challenged until it had actually been implemented. A First Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously affirmed the decision.

Question

May Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenge the constitutionality of the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act in federal court before it is put into effect? Does the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act, through the judicial bypass procedure or other safeguards, adequately protect the health of minors seeking abortions?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ayotte, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a rare unanimous decision regarding abortion, the Supreme Court sidestepped the most contentious questions of the case and focused instead on the proper remedy when a portion of a statute is found unconstitutional. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that the statute would be unconstitutional when applied to the very small percentage of minors for whom an emergency abortion would be necessary to avert serious damage to their health. The lower court's decision to invalidate the entire statute based on its unconstitutional results in this small percentage of cases, however, was unnecessary. Instead, O'Connor wrote, "in this case the lower courts can issue a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting [only] the statute's unconstitutional application."

O'Connor warned, however, that a court should be wary of upholding an act while strike down some of its applications when it was obvious that a legislature would prefer the entire act be declared unconstitutional. Because of some disagreement about which course the legislature would have preferred - wholesale nullification or narrower individual rulings - the Court remanded the case to lower court to determine legislative intent.

Gonzales v. Oregon

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-623

Petitioner

Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oregon, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, October 5, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, January 17, 2006

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Robert Moorehead Atkinson (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1994 Oregon enacted the Death with Dignity Act, the first state law authorizing physicians to prescribe lethal doses of controlled substances to terminally ill patients. Attorney General John Ashcroft declared in 2001 that physician-assisted suicide violated the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA). Ashcroft threatened to revoke the medical licenses of physicians who took part in the practice. Oregon sued Ashcroft in federal district court. That court and, later the Ninth Circuit, held Ashcroft''s directive illegal. The courts held that the CSA did not authorize the attorney general to regulate physician-assisted suicide, which was the sort of medical matter historically entrusted to the states.

Question

Did the Controlled Substances Act authorize the attorney general to ban the use of controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide in Oregon?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Oregon, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 801

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Congress intended the CSA to prevent doctors only from engaging in illicit drug dealing, not to define general standards of state medical practice. Moreover, the CSA did not authorize Attorney General John Ashcroft to declare a medical practice authorized under state law to be illegitimate.

Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:52 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-475

Petitioner

Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United States, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States District Court for the District of Columbia, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 367 (2004)

Granted

Monday, December 15, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, April 27, 2004

Decided

Thursday, June 24, 2004

Advocates

Alan B. Morrison (argued the cause for Respondent Sierra Club)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Paul J. Orfanedes (argued the cause for Respondent Judicial Watch, Inc.)

Facts of the Case

In January 2001, President Bush created an advisory committee on energy policy headed by Vice President Dick Cheney. After the group issued its recommendations five months later, Judicial Watch, a non-profit government watchdog group, filed suit in federal district court. The Sierra Club, an environmentalist organization, later filed a nearly identical suit that was joined with the Judicial Watch suit. The two organizations alleged that the advisory committee had violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) by not making public all the documents that it had generated. While FACA exempts committees composed entirely of federal officials, Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club argued that the exemption did not apply because private lobbyists had participated in the energy committee's meetings.

Cheney and the advisory group asked the court to dismiss the case, claiming that it violated the Constitutional separation of powers by requiring judicial oversight of internal executive branch deliberations. The district court refused.

The government then sought summary judgment of the case (without the discovery process) based on a few administrative documents that it claimed showed that only federal officials had worked on the group. The district court denied this request as well, and the government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The appeals court refused to grant summary judgment, arguing that it could not yet rule on the separation of powers argument. The government then appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Question

Does the Federal Advisory Committee Act authorize judicial review of executive branch deliberations through a broad discovery process that allows a private organization to review internal documents of high-level advisors to the President? If such review is authorized by FACA, does it violate the Constitutional doctrine of separation of powers?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Cheney, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court sent the case back to the D.C. Court of Appeals, arguing that the appellate court should have considered separation-of-powers claims and was wrong to conclude it lacked authority to order District Court discovery to stop. Such an order (mandamus) to stop discovery proceedings should be considered because those proceedings, "by virtue of their overbreadth," could interfere with presidential activity. Further, the appellate court misinterpreted U.S. v. Nixon to mean that the government needed to assert executive privilege for separation-of-powers objections to be considered.

Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-572

Petitioner

Intel Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 241 (2004)

Granted

Monday, November 10, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, April 20, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 21, 2004

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (argued the cause for Respondent, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Patrick Lynch (argued the cause for Respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) filed a complaint against Intel with the European Commission, alleging that Intel was using its size to unfairly dominate the computer microprocessor market. Complaints filed with the European Commission are first reviewed by the commission's directorate general, which does fact- finding to decide whether or not to pursue the complaint. AMD asked the directorate to review documents containing some of Intel's trade secrets from a separate American court case involving Intel. The directorate declined.

Because European law did not provide a way for AMD to gain access to the documents, AMD filed suit against Intel in United States federal district court seeking access to the documents so that it could use them to support its complaint. The suit was filed under Title 28, Section 1782 of U.S. Code, which allows (but does not require) federal district courts to give "interested persons" access to material for proceedings before "foreign or international tribunal(s)." AMD argued that, though the directorate was only a fact-finding body, the case could eventually be appealed to a trial court and was therefore covered under section 1782. Further, it argued that the directorate's unwillingness to demand the documents was irrelevant. Intel, on the other hand, argued that the directorate was not a "foreign or international tribunal" and that the federal district court therefore did not have the authority to compel Intel to release the documents. It also argued that the directorate's unwillingness to compel production of the documents should preclude U.S. action.

The district court sided with Intel, ruling that the directorate's investigation was not a foreign tribunal and that the court therefore could not give AMD access to the documents. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed the decision. After the case was accepted for review by the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Commission filed a brief in the case supporting Intel's position that the directorate was not a foreign tribunal.

Question

Does Section 1782 of Title 28 of U.S. Code authorize a federal district court to compel the release of material for use in a "foreign tribunal" when the foreign tribunal itself is unwilling to demand production of the material? Does Section 1782 authorize a federal district court to compel the release of material for a fact-finding investigation by the directorate general of the European Commission on the theory that the information may eventually lead to an investigation by a foreign tribunal?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1782

Yes and Yes. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court ruled that just because a foreign tribunal was unwilling to demand certain documents did not mean that it would be unwilling to accept them if provided to them by other means. By permitting, but not forcing, American judges to allow discovery of certain documents, Congress allowed judges to exercise their discretion to decide whether a foreign tribunal would be receptive to the the documents at question. The Court also ruled that it would be impractical to limit the fact-finding to only the actual trial before a foreign tribunal because, in cases like this one, the foreign tribunal does not gather evidence itself but instead relies on the evidence presented to the investigatory commission (in this case the directorate general). In order to make the evidence available for the tribunal, therefore, it would be necessary to present it first to the commission.

National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-954

Petitioner

National Archives and Records Administration

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Allan J. Favish, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 157 (2004)

Granted

Monday, May 5, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, December 3, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, March 30, 2004

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (argued the cause for Petitioner)

James Hamilton (argued the cause for Respondents Anthony and Moody in support of petitioner)

Allan J. Favish (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Vincent Foster, a high-ranking White House lawyer involved in the investigation of possible fraud by the Clinton family in the Whitewater real estate venture, was found dead in a Virginia park. Two government investigations subsequently found that the death had been a suicide. Allan Favish questioned the findings of the government investigations, claiming that they were part of a government cover-up of murder. Under the Freedom of Information Act, Favish requested access to 150 photos of Foster's body in the park and during the autopsy. He later reduced his request to 129 photos.

The government initially denied him access to all the photos, but eventually gave him access to 118 of them. It withheld the rest, arguing that the privacy interest of Foster's family members in relation to Foster's death trumped the public interest served by providing Favish access to the photos. The government stated that the photos were very graphic and that releasing them would upset the family. Favish countered by arguing that the family did not have a relevant privacy interest; the only person whose privacy interests would be violated by the release of the photos was Foster, Favish argued, and Foster's death had rendered him incapable of exercising that interest.

After a series of appeals in which a Ninth Circuit panel held that the Foster family's right to privacy was relevant to the case but that the district court must look at the specific photos in order to weigh the privacy rights against Favish's right to access government information, the Ninth Circuit eventually decided that Favish should be given access to all but four of the photos. The government, joined by the Foster family, appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

Question

Do family members of a man who apparently committed suicide have a privacy right that justifies the government's withholding autopsy photos from a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for National Archives and Records Administration, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Foster family's interest in privacy outweighed the public interest in seeing pictures from Vincent Foster's death scene. The public interest could only trump privacy interests if Favish could present evidence that the government might have acted improperly. Favish failed to do so. The Court acknowledged that citizens seeking access to documents under the Freedom of Information Act normally need not explain why they seek the information. The act, however, exempts from disclosure records that would present an unwarranted invasion of privacy. In ruling that the act protected the privacy of the Foster family, the Court rejected Favish's argument that the act only protected Vincent Foster's privacy (an interest that Favish argued died with Foster).

Doe v. Chao

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1377

Petitioner

Buck Doe

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Elaine L. Chao, Secretary of Labor

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 614 (2004)

Granted

Friday, June 27, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, December 3, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, February 24, 2004

Advocates

Jack William Campbell IV (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Seven coal miners sued the Department of Labor, claiming that the department had violated the federal Privacy Act and the right to privacy found in the federal Constitution by releasing their social security numbers (SSNs). The Privacy Act stated that any "person entitled to recovery" in a suit against the government for a violation of privacy would be awarded "actual damages sustained by the individual... but in no case... [would the damages awarded be] less than the sum of $1000" and attorney fees.

The miners argued that all they needed to prove in order to receive the $1000 minimum award was that the government had violated their privacy by releasing their SSNs; they did not need to prove that they had suffered actual damages. They maintained that the inclusion of "actual damages" in the act was only intended to limit the size of judgments awarded against the government, not to require proof of actual damage. The government argued that the act required the miners to prove that they had been harmed by the government's violation of their privacy.

The district court ruled in favor of the government. A divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed.

Question

Does the federal Privacy Act require that people prove they suffered "actual damage" stemming from the government's violation of their privacy rights in order to win damages in a suit against the government?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Chao, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 552

Yes. Justice David Hackett Souter delivered the Court's 6-3 opinion that the Privacy Act requires plaintiffs prove actual damages to qualify for the minimum statutory award of $1000. The Court reasoned that "a straightforward textual analysis" of the Privacy Act shows that the statute guarantees the $1000 minimum for victims of willful Privacy Act violations only in relation to "actual damages sustained." Individuals subjected to an adverse effect - like the miners in this case - have "injury enough to open the courthouse door, but without more" have "no cause of action for damages under the Privacy Act."

Lawrence and Garner v. Texas

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

Apartment of John Lawrence Houston, TX 77006

United States

29° 45' 46.3824" N, 95° 22' 59.0232" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-102

Petitioner

Lawrence and Garner

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Texas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 558 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, March 26, 2003

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 2003

Advocates

Charles A. Rosenthal (Harris County Houston, Texas, argued the cause for Texas)

Paul M. Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling.

Question

Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Lawrence and Garner, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined, filed dissents.

Scheidler v. National Organization for Women (NOW)

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:54:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1118

Petitioner

Scheidler

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Organization for Women (NOW)

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women (NOW), No. 01-1119

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 393 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, December 4, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, February 26, 2003

Advocates

Roy T. Englert, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Fay Clayton (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

The National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW) filed a class action alleging that certain individuals and organizations that oppose legal abortion violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through "a pattern of racketeering activity" that included acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent nationwide injunction against the abortion opponents. Upholding the injunction, the Court of Appeals held, in part, that the things abortion supporters claimed were extorted from them, such as women's right to seek medical services from the clinics and the clinic doctors' rights to perform their jobs, constituted "property" that was "obtained" for purposes of the Hobbs Act. (Together with No. 01-1119, Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women.)

Question

Do abortion opponents, who protest at abortion clinics, commit extortion within the meaning of the Hobbs Act? May abortion supporters obtain injunctive relief in a civil action pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Scheidler, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1951

In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that abortion opponents did not commit extortion because they did not "obtain" property from the abortion supporters as required by the Hobbs Act. The Court further held that is first holding renders insufficient the other bases or predicate acts of racketeering supporting the jury's conclusion that the abortion opponents violated RICO. While the opponents' conduct constituted the separate offense of coercion, reasoned Chief Justice Rehnquist, the opponents neither pursued nor received something of value from the supporters that the opponents could exercise, transfer, or sell, and thus did not commit extortion. Without an underlying RICO violation, the Court vacated the District Court's injunction and did not reach the second question. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Gonzaga University v. Doe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-679

Petitioner

Gonzaga University

Respondent

Doe

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 273 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, April 24, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 2002

Advocates

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Beth S. Brinkmann (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Patricia A. Millett (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

A student at Gonzaga University planned to become a public elementary school teacher in Washington, which required all new teachers to obtain an affidavit of good moral character from their graduating colleges. Gonzaga's teacher certification specialist overheard one student tell another that the student had engaged in sexual misconduct, contacted the state agency responsible for teacher certification, and discussed the allegations, identifying the student by name. Ultimately, the student was told that he would not receive his certification affidavit. The student sued Gonzaga in state court, alleging a violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), which prohibits the federal funding of schools that have a policy or practice of permitting the release of students' education records without their parents' written consent. A jury awarded the student compensatory and punitive damages. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court acknowledged that FERPA does not give rise to a private cause of action, but reasoned that the nondisclosure provision creates a federal right that is enforceable.

Question

May a student sue a private university for damages to enforce provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Gonzaga University, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Family Educational Rights and Privacy (Buckley Amendment)

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that such an action is foreclosed because the relevant provisions of FERPA create no personal rights to enforce. The Court reasoned that the creation of individual rights required clear and unambiguous terms, which FERPA's confidentiality provisions did not contain. "FERPA's nondisclosure provisions contain no rights-creating language, they have an aggregate, not individual, focus, and they serve primarily to direct the Secretary of Education's distribution of public funds to educational institutions," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the Court's opinion "may be read as accepting the proposition that FERPA does indeed create both parental rights of access to student records and student rights of privacy in such records, but that those federal rights are of a lesser value because Congress did not intend them to be enforceable by their owners."

Board of Education v. Earls

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

Oklahoma School District

1301 East Highland Street Tecumseh OK 74873

Tecumseh, OK 74873

United States

35° 15' 12.762" N, 96° 55' 20.3088" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-332

Petitioner

Board of Education

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Earls

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 822 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, March 19, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 2002

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Graham A. Boyd (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Linda M. Meoli (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy adopted by the Tecumseh, Oklahoma School District (School District) requires all middle and high school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. Two Tecumseh High School students and their parents brought suit, alleging that the policy violates the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted the School District summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court concluded that before imposing a suspicionless drug-testing program a school must demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those tested, such that testing that group will actually redress its drug problem, which the School District had failed to demonstrate.

Question

Is the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy, which requires all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing, consistent with the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Board of Education, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, because the policy reasonably serves the School District's important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students, it is constitutional. The Court reasoned that the Board of Education's general regulation of extracurricular activities diminished the expectation of privacy among students and that the Board's method of obtaining urine samples and maintaining test results was minimally intrusive on the students' limited privacy interest. "Within the limits of the Fourth Amendment, local school boards must assess the desirability of drug testing schoolchildren. In upholding the constitutionality of the Policy, we express no opinion as to its wisdom. Rather, we hold only that Tecumseh's Policy is a reasonable means of furthering the School District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren," wrote Justice Thomas.

Owasso Independent School Dist. No. I011 v. Falvo

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1073

Petitioner

Owasso Independent School Dist. No. I011

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Falvo

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 426 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, November 27, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, February 19, 2002

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the court, supporting the petitioners)

Jerry A. Richardson (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Wilfred K. Wright, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Kristja J. Falvo asked the Owasso Independent School District to ban peer grading, or the practice of allowing students to score each other's tests, papers, and assignments as the teachers explain the correct answers to the entire class, because it embarrassed her children. When the school district declined, Falvo filed an action against the school district, claming that such peer grading violates the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). FERPA authorizes federal funds to be withheld from school districts that permit students' "education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein)" to be released without their parents' written consent and defines education records as "records, files, documents, and other materials" containing information directly related to a student, which "are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution." Disagreeing with Falvo, the District Court held that grades put on papers by another student are not "education records." In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that grades marked by students on each other's work are "education records," such that the very act of grading is an impermissible release of information to the student grader.

Question

Does the practice of peer grading violate the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Owasso Independent School Dist. No. I011, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Family Educational Rights and Privacy (Buckley Amendment)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Peer grading does not violate FERPA. The Court reasoned that peer- graded items did not constitute education records protected by FERPA until a teacher collected the grades on the students' papers or other items and recorded the grades in the teacher's grade book. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that peer-graded items were not "maintained" within in the meaning of FERPA, as the student graders only handled the items for a few moments. Moreover, the Court stated that each student grader, by grading assignments, did not constitute a person acting for an educational institution within FERPA.

Dept of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protect. Assoc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1871

Petitioner

Dept of Interior

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Klamath Water Users Protect. Assoc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 1 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, January 10, 2001

Decided

Monday, March 5, 2001

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Andrew Hitchings (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) administers the Klamath Irrigation Project (Project), which uses water from the Klamath River Basin to irrigate parts of Oregon and California. In order for the Department to provide water allocations among competing uses and users, it asked the Klamath and other Indian Tribes (Basin Tribes or Tribes) to consult with Reclamation. A memorandum of understanding solidified this relationship. When the Department's Bureau of Indian Affairs (Bureau) filed claims on behalf of the Klamath Tribe in Oregon to allocate water rights, the two exchanged written memorandums on the appropriate scope of the claims submitted by the Government for the benefit of the Tribe. Afterwards, the Klamath Water Users Protective Association (Association), a nonprofit group, whose members receive water from the Project and, generally, have interests adverse to the tribal interest because of the scarcity of water, filed requests with the Bureau under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to gain access to communications between the Bureau and the Basin Tribes. Some documents were turned over, but the Bureau held other documents under the deliberative process privileges incorporated in FOIA Exemption 5, which exempts from disclosure "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." The Association sued to compel release of the documents. The District Court granted the government summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled out any application of Exemption 5 on the ground that the Tribes with whom the Department has a consulting relationship have a direct interest in the subject matter of the consultations.

Question

Are documents shared between the Klamath and other Indian Tribes and the Department of the Interior, which address tribal interests subject to state and federal proceedings to determine water allocations, exempt from the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, as " inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters?"

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Klamath Water Users Protect. Assoc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court that there is no exemption under FOIA for the correspondence between the Tribes and the Bureau. Because the Klamath Tribe advocated its own positions in the water allocation proceedings, the communications between it and the Bureau did not equate to the role that personnel fulfils, in that personnel do not represent their own interests. Therefore, the documents were not exempt from public disclosure as inter-agency or intra-agency communications. "All of this boils down to requesting that we read an 'Indian trust' exemption into the statute, a reading that is out of the question," wrote Justice Souter for the Court.

Stenberg v. Carhart

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:31 +0000

Location

Nebraska General Assembly

2115 State Capitol Lincoln NE 68509

Lincoln, NE 68509

United States

40° 48' 32.5872" N, 96° 41' 21.0012" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-830

Petitioner

Stenberg

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Carhart

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 914 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, April 25, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2000

Advocates

Donald B. Stenberg (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Simon Heller (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Nebraska law prohibited any "partial birth abortion" unless that procedure was necessary to save the mother's life. It defined "partial birth abortion" as a procedure in which the doctor "partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the... child," and defined the latter phrase to mean "intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the [abortionist] knows will kill the... child and does kill the... child." Violation of the law is a felony, and it provides for the automatic revocation of a convicted doctor's state license to practice medicine. Leroy Carhart, a Nebraska physician who performs abortions in a clinical setting, brought suit seeking a declaration that the statute violates the U.S. Constitution, claiming the law was unconstitutionally vague and placed an undue burden on himself and female patients seeking abortions. The District Court held the statute unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Nebraska statute, which makes the performance of a "partial birth abortions" a crime, violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Carhart, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a complicated 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "Nebraska's statute criminalizing the performance of "partial birth abortion[s]" violates the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted in Casey and Roe." The sharply divided Court struck down the statute because it placed an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion and did not allow for exception in cases of threatened health. "All those who perform abortion procedures using that method must fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment," that results in "an undue burden upon a woman's right to make an abortion decision," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent concluded that "[t]he notion that the Constitution of the United States... prohibits the States from simply banning this visibly brutal means of eliminating our half-born posterity is quite simply absurd."

Hill v. Colorado

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:30 +0000

Location

Colorado State Legislature

200 E Colfax Ave Denver CO 80203

Denver, CO 80203

United States

39° 44' 24.1332" N, 104° 59' 3.9048" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1856

Petitioner

Hill

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Colorado

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 703 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2000

Advocates

Michael E. McLachlan (Denver, Colorado, argued the cause for the respondents)

Barbara D. Underwood (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondents)

Jay A. Sekulow (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

A Colorado statute makes it unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance to "knowingly approach" within 8 feet of another person, without that person's consent, in order to pass "a leaflet or handbill to, display a sign to, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person...." Leila Hill and others, sidewalk counselors who offer abortion alternatives to women entering abortion clinics, sought to enjoin the statute's enforcement in state court, claiming violations of their First Amendment free speech rights and right to a free press. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the statute imposed content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative channels of communication. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment after holding that a provision creating a speech-free floating buffer zone with a 15-foot radius violated the First Amendment. On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment. In affirming, the Colorado Supreme Court reiterated the lower court's conclusions. The court concluded that the statute struck a proper balance between a person's right to protest and a person's right to medical treatment.

Question

Does Colorado's statutory requirement that speakers obtain consent from people within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance before speaking, displaying signs, or distributing leaflets to such people violate the First Amendment rights of the speaker?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Colorado, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Colorado statute's restrictions on speech-related conduct are constitutional. The Court concluded that the statute "is not a regulation of speech. Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur." "Although the statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from anyone passing by. Nor does it place any restriction on the content of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone else, either inside or outside the regulated areas. It does, however, make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical facilities," Justice Stevens wrote for the Court. "The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases." Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony M. Kennedy dissented.

Troxel v. Granville

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:31 +0000

Location

Skagit County Superior Court

205 W Kincaid St Mount Vernon WA 98273

Mount Vernon, WA 98273

United States

48° 25' 4.008" N, 122° 20' 12.426" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-138

Petitioner

Troxel

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Granville

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 57 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 5, 2000

Advocates

Catherine W. Smith (Argued the cause for respondent)

Mark D. Olson (Argued the cause for petitioners)

Facts of the Case

During Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel's relationship, which ended in 1991, they had two daughters. Until Brad's suicide in 1993, Brad's parents Jenifer and Gary Troxel, the paternal grandparents, had regularly seen their granddaughters on weekends. However, after Brad's suicide, Granville informed the Troxels that she wished to reduced their visitation time to one short visit per month. The Troxels filed suit for the right to visit their grandchildren, under section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington, which permits "any person" to petition for visitation rights "at any time" and authorizes state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may serve a child's best interest. Granville did not oppose the petition outright but did oppose the amount of visitation time sought by the Troxels. Subsequently, a Washington Superior Court ordered more visitation than Granville desired. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that non-parents lacked standing to sue under the statute. In affirming, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the statute unconstitutionally interfered with parents' right to rear their children.

Question

Does the Washington statute, which allows any person to petition for a court- ordered right to see a child over a custodial parent's objection if such visitation is found to be in the child's best interest, unconstitutionally interfere with the fundamental right of parents to rear their children?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Granville, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 6-3 decision delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Washington Statute violated the right of parents, under the due process clause of the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that "[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy dissented.

Chandler v. Miller

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-126

Petitioner

Walker L. Chandler

Respondent

Zell D. Miller

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 305 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, January 14, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, April 15, 1997

Advocates

Walker L. Chandler (Argued the cause pro se for the petitioners )

Patricia Guilday (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Under a Georgia statute, all candidates for elected state office must pass a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to their qualifying for nomination or election. Chandler, on behalf of several state office nominees from the Libertarian Party, challenged the statute's constitutionality, naming Georgia's governor and two other regulatory officials as defendants. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Did Georgia's drug testing statute violate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against illegal search and seizures?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Chandler, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

Yes. In an 8-to-1 opinion, the Court noted that while the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits officials from conducting search and seizures without individualized suspicion, there does exist a narrowly defined category of permissible suspicionless searches and seizures. The Court held, however, that Georgia's statute did not fall in this exceptional category, since it failed to show why its desire to avoid drug users in its high political offices should outweigh candidates' privacy interests. In addition to Georgia's failure to provide evidence of a drug problem among its state officials, the Court concluded that even if such a problem did exist, the affected officials would most likely not perform the kind of high-risk, safety sensitive tasks, which might justify the statute's proposed incursion on their individual privacy rights.

Vacco v. Quill

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:29 +0000

Location

New York State Capitol

24 Eagle Street Albany NY 12207

Albany, NY 12207

United States

42° 39' 9.684" N, 73° 45' 27.1764" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1858

Petitioner

Vacco

Respondent

Quill

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 793 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, January 8, 1997

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 1997

Advocates

Dennis C. Vacco (Argued the cause for the petitioners, on behalf of the Petitioners)

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Dr. Timothy E. Quill, along with other physicians and three seriously ill patients who have since died, challenged the constitutionality of the New York State's ban on physician-assisted suicide. New York's ban, while permitting patients to refuse lifesaving treatment on their own, has historically made it a crime for doctors to help patients commit or attempt suicide, even if patients are terminally ill or in great pain. Following a District Court ruling favoring the State of New York, the Second Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted New York certiorari.

Question

Did New York's ban on physician-assisted suicide violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by allowing competent terminally ill adults to withdraw their own lifesaving treatment, but denying the same right to patients who could not withdraw their own treatment and could only hope that a physician would do so for them?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Vacco, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. Employing a rationality test to examine the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court held that New York's ban was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting medical ethics, preventing euthanasia, shielding the disabled and terminally ill from prejudice which might encourage them to end their lives, and, above all, the preservation of human life. Moreover, while acknowledging the difficulty of its task, the Court distinguished between the refusal of lifesaving treatment and assisted suicide, by noting that the latter involves the criminal elements of causation and intent. No matter how noble a physician's motives may be, he may not deliberately cause, hasten, or aid a patient's death.

Washington v. Glucksberg

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:29 +0000

Location

Dr. Harold Glucksberg's Residence Seattle, WA

United States

47° 36' 22.356" N, 122° 19' 55.4556" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-110

Petitioner

Washington

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Glucksberg

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 702 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, January 8, 1997

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 1997

Advocates

Kathryn L. Tucker (Argued the cause of the respondents)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

William L. Williams (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Dr. Harold Glucksberg -- along with four other physicians, three terminally ill patients who have since died, and a nonprofit organization that counsels individuals contemplating physician assisted-suicide -- brought this suit challenging the state of Washington's ban on physician assisted-suicide. The State of Washington has historically criminalized the promotion of suicide attempts by those who "knowingly cause or aid another person to attempt suicide." Glucksberg alleged that Washington's ban was unconstitutional. Following a District Court ruling favoring Glucksberg and his fellow petitioners, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted Washington certiorari.

Question

Did Washington's ban on physician assisted-suicide violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by denying competent terminally ill adults the liberty to choose death over life?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Washington, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. Analyzing the guarantees of the Due Process Clause, the Court focused on two primary aspects: the protection of our nation's objective fundamental, historically rooted, rights and liberties; and the cautious definition of what constitutes a due process liberty interest. The Court held that the right to assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause since its practice has been, and continues to be, offensive to our national traditions and practices. Moreover, employing a rationality test, the Court held that Washington's ban was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting medical ethics, shielding disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice which might encourage them to end their lives, and, above all, the preservation of human life.

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:28 +0000

Location

Western District Court of New York

68 Court Street Buffalo NY 14202

Buffalo, NY 14202

United States

42° 53' 8.8476" N, 78° 52' 37.5312" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1065

Petitioner

Schenck

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pro-Choice Network of Western New York

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 357 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, February 19, 1997

Advocates

Jay A. Sekulow (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Lucinda M. Finley (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

This action was filed by the Pro-Choice Network of Western New York (PCN), on behalf of health care providers, to enjoin Schenck and others from continuously staging blockades and other disruptive illegal activities in front of abortion clinics. After its restraining order proved ineffective, a District Court issued a preliminary injunction creating "fixed buffer zones" which prohibited demonstrations within fifteen feet of entrances to abortion clinics, parking lots, or driveways. The court also created "floating buffer zones" prohibiting demonstrators from coming within fifteen feet of people or vehicles seeking access to the clinics. Following the Appellate Court's decision to uphold the District Court's ruling that the "buffer zones" were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted Schenck certiorari.

Question

Did either or both types of "buffer zones" violate Schenck's First Amendment right to freedom of speech.

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Split Vote

The Court held that while the "fixed buffer zones" were constitutional, the "floating buffer zones" were not. It distinguished between the two types of "buffer zones." The Court supported the "fixed buffer zones" because they protected the government's interest in public safety, by preventing protesters from engaging in unlawful conduct (i.e. spitting on and shouting in clinic users' faces, blocking doorways), while still allowing them to be heard from a short distance. "Floating buffer zones," by contrast, were struck down by the Court since they imposed a greater burden on free speech than was required to protect the government's interest in public safety and free traffic flow. The Court found that forcing demonstrators to remain at least 15 feet away from the people they wished to communicate with would create an inordinate amount of dangerous confusion and congestion.

Vernonia School District v. Acton

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:27 +0000

Location

Vernonia High School

299 Bridge Street Vernonia OR 97064

Vernonia, OR 97064

United States

45° 51' 30.978" N, 123° 11' 22.5636" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-590

Petitioner

Vernonia School District

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Acton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 646 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, March 28, 1995

Decided

Monday, June 26, 1995

Advocates

Thomas M. Christ (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Timothy R. Volpert (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Richard H. Seamon (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.

Question

Does random drug testing of high school athletes violate the reasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Vernonia School District, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 4: Fourth Amendment

No. The reasonableness of a search is judged by "balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." In the case of high school athletes who are under State supervision during school hours, they are subject to greater control than over free adults. The privacy interests compromised by urine samples are negligible since the conditions of collection are similar to public restrooms, and the results are viewed only by limited authorities. Furthermore, the governmental concern over the safety of minors under their supervision overrides the minimal, if any, intrusion in student-athletes' privacy.

Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:27 +0000

Location

Aware Woman Center for Choice

1564 Dixie Way Melbourne FL 32935

Melbourne, FL 32935

United States

28° 10' 9.57" N, 80° 38' 47.0904" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-880

Petitioner

Madsen et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Women's Health Center, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 753 (1994)

Argued

Thursday, April 28, 1994

Decided

Thursday, June 30, 1994

Advocates

Mathew D. Staver (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Talbot D'Alemberte (on behalf of the Respondents)

Drew S. Days, III (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Women's Health Center Inc. operated several abortion clinics throughout central Florida, including the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida. In 1992, in response to anti-abortion protesters, a state court prohibited the protesters from physically abusing those entering or exiting the clinic, or otherwise interfering with access to the clinic. About 6 months later, Women's Health Center Inc. expressed a need to broaden the court order. The state court agreed, banning demonstrators from entering a 36-foot buffer- zone around the clinic, making excessive noise, using images visible to patients, approaching patients within a 300-foot radius of the clinic, and protesting within a 300-foot radius of staff residences. Petitioner Judy Madsen and her fellow protesters claimed that these restrictions violated their First Amendment right to free speech, but the Florida Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the court order.

Question

1) Is the prohibition of all protesting within the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic an infringement of the First Amendment right to free speech? 2) Is the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the clinic a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech? 3) Do the limitations imposed on noise-making constitute a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech? 4) Do the restrictions placed on the use of images violate the First Amendment right to free speech? 5) Is it a breach of the First Amendment right to free speech to bar protesters from approaching potential patients when they are within a 300-foot radius of the clinic? 6) Is it a violation of the First Amendment right to free speech to prohibit all protesting in a 300-foot radius of clinic staff residences?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Women's Health Center, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No, Yes, No, Yes, Yes, and Yes. In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the state of Florida could only restrict protesters to the extent necessary to allow the clinic to run and the staff to live in their homes without interference. Thus, the majority approved of the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic because it was essential to allow patients and staff to enter and leave the building freely, but disapproved of the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the building because it found no indication that protesting in these areas interfered with the function of the clinic. The Court also determined that the limitations placed on noise-making were necessary to insure the well-being of the patients, whereas those placed on images were not because they were easier to ignore. Finally, the Court concluded that both 300-foot radius rules were too broad, thus restricting the protestors more than was necessary. Therefore, the decision of the Florida Supreme Court was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

National Organization for Women (NOW) v. Scheidler

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-780

Petitioner

National Organization for Women (NOW)

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scheidler

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 249 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, December 8, 1993

Decided

Monday, January 24, 1994

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Fay Clayton (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

G. Robert Blakey (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The National Organization for Women (NOW) sued a coalition of anti-abortion groups called the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. N.O.W. alleged that Scheidler and other anti-abortion protesters were members in a nationwide conspiracy to obstruct women's access to abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity including the actual or implied threat of violence. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the voluntary contributions are not proceeds of racketeering and that a "racketeering enterprise" must have an economic motive, a fact that NOW could not demonstrate. The Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Does RICO require that an organization, to be defined as a racketeering enterprise, must be acting in pursuit of an economic motive?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for National Organization for Women (NOW), 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

The unanimous Court held that organizations without an economic motive can detrimentally "affect interstate or foreign commerce," satisfying the RICO definition of a racketeering enterprise. An "enterprise" does not have to be an economic organization or a principally criminal organization to trigger the RICO act. Consequently, the Court reversed the appeals court decision which allowed the original case to proceed.

United States Department Of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1223

Petitioner

United States Department Of Defense et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Federal Labor Relations Authority et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 487 (1994)

Argued

Monday, November 8, 1993

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

Advocates

David M. Smith (on behalf of the Respondents)

Christopher J. Wright (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States Department Of Defense, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

None

United States Department Of Justice v. Landano

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:01:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-2054

Petitioner

United States Department Of Justice et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Landano

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

508 U.S. 165 (1993)

Argued

Wednesday, February 24, 1993

Decided

Monday, May 24, 1993

Advocates

Neil Marc Mullin (on behalf of the Respondent)

John F. Daly (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Landano, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

None

Planned Parenthood v. Casey

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:25 +0000

Location

Pennsylvania State Capitol

North 3rd and State Streets Harrisburg PA 17101

Harrisburg, PA 17101

United States

40° 15' 50.4216" N, 76° 53' 5.8128" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-744

Petitioner

Planned Parenthood

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Casey

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania, et al. v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania et al., No. 91-902

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

505 U.S. 833 (1992)

Argued

Wednesday, April 22, 1992

Decided

Monday, June 29, 1992

Advocates

Kathryn Kolbert (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Ernest D. Preate, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Kenneth W. Starr (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement.

Question

Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours, and, if minors, obtain parental consent, without violating their right to abortions as guaranteed by Roe v. Wade?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Planned Parenthood, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

In a bitter, 5-to-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. The opinion for the Court was unique: It was crafted and authored by three justices.

Bray v. Alexandria Clinic

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-985

Petitioner

Bray

Respondent

Alexandria Clinic

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

506 U.S. 263 (1993)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 1991

Reargued:

Tuesday, October 6, 1992

Decided

Wednesday, January 13, 1993

Advocates

Jay A. Sekulow (Argued and reargued the case for the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued and reargued the case for the United States supporting the petitioners)

John H. Schafer (Argued the case for the respondents)

Deborah Ellis (Reargued the case for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Several abortion clinics sued to prevent Jayne Bray and other anti-abortion protesters from conducting demonstrations at clinics in Washington, D.C. The clinics claimed that the protesters had violated 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies to deprive "any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." The protesters had sought to deny women their "right to abortion" and their right to interstate travel, the clinics argued. The District Court agreed, holding that Bray and others, by blocking access to the clinics, had conspired to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. The District Court also ruled for the clinics on state law trespassing and public nuisance claims, ordering the protesters to stop trespassing on or obstructing access to clinics. Finally, the District Court ordered the protesters to pay the clinics' attorney's fees and costs on the 1985(3) claim.

Question

Did anti-abortion protesters who obstructed access to Washington, D.C. abortion clinics violate 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) by conspiring to deny women their "right to abortion" or right to interstate travel?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Bray, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1985)

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the protesters had not violated section 1985(3) by obstructing access to the abortion clinics. Justice Antonin Scalia, in the majority opinion, wrote that under the Court's decision in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, there must be a "class- based, invidiously discriminatory animus [underlying] the conspirators' action" for it to violate 1985(3). The clinics' claim that the protesters had demonstrated "animus" toward women as a class was unfounded because the demonstrations were not directed at women but rather were intended to protect the victims of abortion, stop its practice, and reverse its legalization. Opposition to abortion cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect gender-based intent, Justice Scalia wrote, because there are common and respectable reasons for opposing abortion other than a derogatory view of women.

In addition to holding that the protesters did not exercise discriminatory animus, Scalia also addressed the specific rights on which the clinics based their arguments. The right to interstate travel, Scalia pointed out, was not affected here because the protests were carried out entirely within the District of Columbia and were not aimed specifically at interstate travelers. Nor was the "right to abortion" implicated, he wrote, because that right was merely one to be free of governmental interference in the decision. The protesters, acting as private individuals, could not possibly violate that right.

United States Department Of State v. Ray

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-747

Petitioner

United States Department Of State

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ray et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

502 U.S. 164 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, October 9, 1991

Decided

Monday, December 16, 1991

Advocates

Michael Dean Ray (on behalf of the Respondents)

Kent L. Jones (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States Department Of State, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

None

Rust v. Sullivan

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:23 +0000

Location

The Department of Health and Human Services

200 Independence Avenue S.W. Washington DC 20201

Washington, DC 20201

United States

38° 53' 15.1764" N, 77° 0' 51.9012" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1391

Petitioner

Rust

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sullivan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 89-1392

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 173 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 1990

Decided

Thursday, May 23, 1991

Advocates

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Kenneth W. Starr (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The national government provides funds for family planning services (Title X). The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations limiting the ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities. Title X funds were to be used only to support preventive family planning services.

Question

Do the regulations violate the First and Fifth Amendment rights of clients and health providers?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Sullivan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1008

No. The intent of Congress in the enactment of Title X is ambiguous with regard to abortion counseling. Consequently, the Court will defer to the expertise of the administrative agency. The Court held that the "regulations promulgated by the Secretary [of HHS] do not raise the sort of 'grave and doubtful constitutional questions' that would lead us to assume Congress did not intend to authorize their issuance." Should government subsidize one protected right (family planning), as it does in this case, it does not follow that government must subsidize analogous counterpart rights (abortion services).

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:22 +0000

Location

Residence of Cruzan Carterville, MO

United States

37° 8' 57.21" N, 94° 26' 34.8108" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1503

Petitioner

Cruzan

Respondent

Director, Missouri Dept. of Health

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

497 U.S. 261 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, December 6, 1989

Decided

Monday, June 25, 1990

Advocates

William H. Colby (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Robert L. Presson (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Kenneth W. Starr (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance)

Facts of the Case

In 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan was involved in an automobile accident which left her in a "persistent vegetative state." She was sustained for several weeks by artificial feedings through an implanted gastronomy tube. When Cruzan's parents attempted to terminate the life-support system, state hospital officials refused to do so without court approval. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state's policy over Cruzan's right to refuse treatment.

Question

Did the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permit Cruzan's parents to refuse life-sustaining treatment on their daughter's behalf?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that while individuals enjoyed the right to refuse medical treatment under the Due Process Clause, incompetent persons were not able to exercise such rights. Absent "clear and convincing" evidence that Cruzan desired treatment to be withdrawn, the Court found the State of Missouri's actions designed to preserve human life to be constitutional. Because there was no guarantee family members would always act in the best interests of incompetent patients, and because erroneous decisions to withdraw treatment were irreversible, the Court upheld the state's heightened evidentiary requirements.

Hodgson v. Minnesota

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:07 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1125

Petitioner

Hodgson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Minnesota

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Minnesota et al. v. Hodgson et al., No. 88-1309

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

497 U.S. 417 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, November 29, 1989

Decided

Monday, June 25, 1990

Advocates

Janet Benshoof (Argued the cause for Hodgson)

John R. Tunheim (Chief Deputy Attorney General of Minnesota argued the cause for Minnesota)

Facts of the Case

Under Section 2 of a Minnesota statute regulating a minor's access to abortion, women under 18 were denied access to the procedure until 48 hours after both their parents had been notified. Exceptions were made in the cases of medical emergencies and women who were victims of parental abuse. Section 6 of the law allowed the courts to judicially bypass Section 2 if the young woman could maturely demonstrate that notification would be unwise.

Question

Did the Minnesota abortion notification statute unconstitutionally restrict a minor's access to having an abortion?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Minnesota, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

The Court found Section 2 of the statute unconstitutional because requiring notification of both parents, whether or not both wanted to know or had taken responsibility for raising the child, did not serve a legitimate state interest. The Court favored notification of only one parent and a 48 hour waiting period. The Court upheld Section 6 of the law.

Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-805

Appellee

Akron Center for Reproductive Health

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Ohio

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

497 U.S. 502 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, November 29, 1989

Decided

Monday, June 25, 1990

Advocates

Rita S. Eppler (on behalf of the Appellant)

Linda R. Sogg (on behalf of the Appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Ohio, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1083

Petitioner

John Doe Agency

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John Doe Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

493 U.S. 146 (1989)

Argued

Monday, October 2, 1989

Decided

Monday, December 11, 1989

Advocates

Milton Eisenberg (on behalf of the Respondent)

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for John Doe Agency, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

None

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:21 +0000

Location

Reproductive Health Services

4251 Forest Park Avenue St. Louis MO 63108

St. Louis, MO 63108

United States

38° 38' 13.722" N, 90° 15' 4.3452" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-605

Appellee

Reproductive Health Services

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Webster

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

492 U.S. 490 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, April 26, 1989

Decided

Monday, July 3, 1989

Advocates

Frank Susman (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Charles Fried (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

William L. Webster (Pro se, argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortions. The statute's preamble indicated that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception," and the law codified the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life; encouragement and counseling to have abortions was prohibited; and physicians were to perform viability tests upon women in their twentieth (or more) week of pregnancy. Lower courts struck down the restrictions.

Question

Did the Missouri restrictions unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to privacy or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Webster, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

In a controversial and highly fractured decision, the Court held that none of the challenged provisions of the Missouri legislation were unconstitutional. First, the Court held that the preamble had not been applied in any concrete manner for the purposes of restricting abortions, and thus did not present a constitutional question. Second, the Court held that the Due Process Clause did not require states to enter into the business of abortion, and did not create an affirmative right to governmental aid in the pursuit of constitutional rights. Third, the Court found that no case or controversy existed in relation to the counseling provisionsof the law. Finally, the Court upheld the viability testing requirements, arguing that the State's interest in protecting potential life could come into existence before the point of viability. The Court emphasized that it was not revisiting the essential portions of the holding in Roe v. Wade.

Department Of Justice v. Tax Analysts

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-782

Petitioner

Department Of Justice

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tax Analysts

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

492 U.S. 136 (1989)

Argued

Monday, April 24, 1989

Decided

Friday, June 23, 1989

Advocates

William A. Dobrovir (on behalf of the Respondent)

Lawrence G. Wallace (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Tax Analysts, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

None

Public Citizen v. Department Of Justice

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-429

Appellee

Department Of Justice

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Public Citizen

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 88-494

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

491 U.S. 440 (1989)

Argued

Monday, April 17, 1989

Decided

Wednesday, June 21, 1989

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Department Of Justice, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 1

None

U.S. Dept. Of Justice v. Reporters Committee

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1379

Petitioner

U.S. Dept. Of Justice

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reporters Committee

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

489 U.S. 749 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, December 7, 1988

Decided

Wednesday, March 22, 1989

Advocates

Roy T. Englert, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Kevin T. Baine (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

CBS requested the criminal identification records of Charles Medico from the FBI. When the FBI refused the request, a CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) challenged the denial as a violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). RCFP claimed that since Medico was an identified organized crime figure with corrupt ties to a United States Congressman, Medico's criminal record was a matter of "public record" and "interest." On appeal from an unfavorable appellate decision, the Supreme Court granted the U.S. Department of Justice certiorari.

Question

Is a refusal to disclose an individual's personal FBI crime record to a third party justifiable under the "personal privacy" invasion exemption of the Freedom of Information Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for U.S. Dept. Of Justice, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that an individual's interest in nondisclosure of any criminal records that the FBI might have on him or her is precisely the sort of "personal privacy" that Congress intended to protect when it enacted FOIA exemptions. Balancing public knowledge interests against privacy considerations, the Court explained that RCFP's request was overly broad. The request sought access to all FBI records on Medico, rather than specific information concerning his file. Moreover, the Court stated that public interest in criminal record information is not increased simply because the requesting party is a news agency.

Hartigan v. Zbaraz

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-673

Petitioner

Hartigan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Zbaraz

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Opinion

484 U.S. 171 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, November 3, 1987

Decided

Monday, December 14, 1987

Advocates

Colleen K. Connell (on behalf of the Appellees)

Michael J. Hayes (on behalf of the Appellants)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Zbaraz, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Church Of Scientology Of California v. Irs

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-472

Petitioner

Church Of Scientology Of California

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Irs

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Opinion

484 U.S. 9 (1987)

Argued

Monday, October 5, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, November 10, 1987

Advocates

Michael Lee Hertzberg (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Albert G. Lauber, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Irs, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

None

Societe Nat. Ind. Aero. v. U.S. Dist. Court

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1695

Petitioner

Societe Nat. Ind. Aero.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

U.S. Dist. Court

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

482 U.S. 522 (1987)

Argued

Wednesday, January 14, 1987

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1987

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (on behalf of the United States and Securities and Exchange Commission, as amicus curiae)

John W. Ford (on behalf of the petitioners)

Richard H. Doyle (on behalf of the respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Societe Nat. Ind. Aero., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Treaty

None

Bowers v. Hardwick

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:19 +0000

Location

Hardwick's Apartment Atlanta, GA

United States

33° 44' 56.382" N, 84° 23' 16.7352" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-140

Petitioner

Bowers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hardwick

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

478 U.S. 186 (1986)

Argued

Monday, March 31, 1986

Decided

Monday, June 30, 1986

Advocates

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Michael E. Hobbs (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Michael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in the act of consensual homosexual sodomy with another adult in the bedroom of his home. After being charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, Hardwick challenged the statute's constitutionality in Federal District Court. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to state a claim, the court dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. Georgia's Attorney General, Michael J. Bowers, appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.

Question

Does the Constitution confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy, thereby invalidating the laws of many states which make such conduct illegal?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bowers, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. The divided Court found that there was no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy, and that states could outlaw those practices. Justice Byron White argued that the Court has acted to protect rights not easily identifiable in the Constitution only when those rights are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" (Palko v. Connecticut, 1937) or when they are "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition" (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). The Court held that the right to commit sodomy did not meet either of these standards. White feared that guaranteeing a right to sodomy would be the product of "judge-made constitutional law" and send the Court down the road of illegitimacy.

Cia v. Sims

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1075

Petitioner

Cia

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sims

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 83-1249

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

471 U.S. 159 (1985)

Argued

Tuesday, December 4, 1984

Decided

Tuesday, April 16, 1985

Advocates

Paul Alan Levy (on behalf of respondents in No. 83-1075 and petitioners in No. 83-1249)

Richard K. Willard (on behalf of petitioners in No. 83-1075 and respondents in 83-1249)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cia, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

None

FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-371

Petitioner

Federal Communications Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

ITT World Communications, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

466 U.S. 463 (1984)

Argued

Wednesday, March 21, 1984

Decided

Monday, April 30, 1984

Advocates

Grant S. Lewis (on behalf of Respondents)

Albert G. Lauber, Jr. (on behalf of Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for FCC, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

None

United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-1616

Petitioner

United States

Respondent

Weber Aircraft Corp.

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

465 U.S. 792 (1984)

Argued

Wednesday, January 11, 1984

Decided

Tuesday, March 20, 1984

Advocates

Samuel A. Alito, Jr. (on behalf of Petitioner)

Jacques E. Soiret (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

None

Ftc v. Grolier Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-372

Petitioner

Ftc

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Grolier Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

462 U.S. 19 (1983)

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 1983

Decided

Monday, June 6, 1983

Advocates

Daniel S. Mason (on behalf of the Respondent)

Kenneth S. Geller (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ftc, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

None

Simopoulos v. Virginia

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-185

Appellee

Virginia

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Simopoulos

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

462 U.S. 506 (1983)

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 1982

Decided

Wednesday, June 15, 1983

Advocates

William G. Broaddus (on behalf of the Appellee)

Roy Lucas (on behalf of the Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Virginia, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-1255

Petitioner

Planned Parenthood Assn.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ashcroft

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 81-1623

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

462 U.S. 476 (1983)

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 1982

Decided

Wednesday, June 15, 1983

Advocates

Frank Susman (on behalf of Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City)

John Ashcroft (on behalf of John Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Planned Parenthood Assn., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:16 +0000

Location

Akron City Council

166 S. High Street Akron OH 44308

Akron, OH 44308

United States

41° 4' 50.4156" N, 81° 31' 5.0952" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-746

Petitioner

Akron

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Akron Center For Reproductive Health

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., et al. v. City of Akron et al., No. 81-1172

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

462 U.S. 416 (1983)

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 1982

Decided

Wednesday, June 15, 1983

Facts of the Case

In 1978 the Akron City Council enacted an ordinance which established seventeen provisions to regulate the performance of abortions. Among other things, the ordinance required: all abortions performed after the first trimester to be done in hospitals, parental consent before the procedure could be performed on an unmarried minor, doctors to counsel prospective patients, a twenty-four hour waiting period, and that fetal remains be disposed of in a "humane and sanitary manner." Some of the ordinance's provisions were invalidated by a federal district court.

Question

Did several provisions of the Akron ordinance violate a woman's right to an abortion as guaranteed by the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade and the right- to-privacy doctrine as implied by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Akron Center For Reproductive Health, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

The Court affirmed its commitment to protecting a woman's reproductive rights by invalidating the provisions of Akron's ordinance. Generally, Justice Powell's opinion reiterates the Court's findings in Roe and reasons that certain provisions of the ordinance violated the Constitution because they were clearly intended to direct women away from choosing the abortion option. They were not implemented out of medical necessities. The fetal disposal clause was struck down because its language was too vague to determine conduct subject to criminal prosecution.

Department Of State v. Washington Post Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-535

Petitioner

Department Of State

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Washington Post Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

456 U.S. 595 (1982)

Argued

Wednesday, March 31, 1982

Decided

Monday, May 17, 1982

Advocates

David E. Kendall (on behalf of the Respondent)

Kenneth S. Geller (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Department Of State, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

None

Fbi v. Abramson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:52 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-1735

Petitioner

Fbi

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Abramson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

456 U.S. 615 (1982)

Argued

Monday, January 11, 1982

Decided

Monday, May 24, 1982

Advocates

Sharon T. Nelson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Kenneth S. Geller (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Fbi, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Freedom of Information, Sunshine, or Privacy Act

None