Cases by Issue - Standing to Sue

Clapper v. Amnesty International USA

mgruhn — Mon, 02 Jul 2012 16:31:51 +0000

Location

District Court for the Southern District of New York

United States

40° 42' 50.0004" N, 74° 0' 7.1712" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1025

Petitioner

James R. Clapper, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Amnesty International USA, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, May 21, 2012

Argued

Monday, October 29, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Advocates

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioners)

Jameel Jaffer (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Several groups, including attorneys, journalists, and human rights organizations, brought a facial challenge to a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The provision creates new procedures for authorizing government electronic surveillance of non-U.S. persons outside the U.S. for foreign intelligence purposes. The groups argue that the procedures violate the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment, Article III of the Constitution, and the principle of separation of powers. The new provisions would force these groups to take costly measures to ensure the confidentiality of their international communications. The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the groups did not have standing to bring their challenge. The groups only had an abstract subjective fear of being monitored and provided no proof that they were subject to the FISA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the groups had standing based on a reasonable fear of injury and costs incurred to avoid that injury.

Question

Do respondents have Article III standing to seek prospective relief under the FISA?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Clapper, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article III

No. Justice Samuel A. Alito, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the respondents did not have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because no injury occurred. Claiming a reasonable likelihood that their communications would be intercepted under FISA is not enough to show future injury for standing purposes. The Court also refused to acknowledge a present injury stemming from the respondents’ choice to take costly measures to protect their confidential communications.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the future harm to respondents is not speculative and therefore should be sufficient to establish standing. Since there is a high probability that the government will intercept at least some of the respondents’ communications, the respondents should have standing to bring the suit. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.

Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corporation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-433

Petitioner

Joseph Anza, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ideal Steel Supply Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, November 28, 2005

Argued

Monday, March 27, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 5, 2006

Advocates

Kevin P. Roddy (argued the cause for Respondent)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Ideal Steel Supply Corporation filed a civil suit against its competitor, National Steel Supply, Inc. in federal court. Ideal alleged that National had failed to charge sales tax for cash purchases, giving it a competitive (but fraudulent) advantage. Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, "[a]ny person injured in his business or property" by racketeering activity may bring a civil suit. Ideal argued that it had been injured through lost sales because of National's illegal lower prices, and therefore had standing to sue.

The federal district court disagreed, dismissing the suit because Ideal had not had any direct encounters with National or relied on their fraudulent tax records. A Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision, however, finding that a company can sue under RICO when its competitor uses racketeering to gain an advantage.

Question

Can a competitor be "injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when the competitor is not the party defrauded and did not rely on the fraudulent behavior, but claims to have lost a competitive advantage because of the fraud?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Anza, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

No. Eight members of the Supreme Court agreed that Ideal did not have standing to bring the suit because the relationship between its injuries and the fraudulent conduct of National was too remote. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a seven-member majority, wrote that "[w]hen a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff's injuries. In the instance case, the answer is no." Justice Stephen Breyer wrote separately to say that the decisive factor in this case was not just the indirectness of the injury but also the fact that legitimate business practices (the lowering of prices) had actually caused it, even though those practices were made possible by the fraud. The ninth member - Justice Clarence Thomas - wrote that while he disagreed with the other justices' concern about directness, he too would have ruled in National's favor because the case had nothing to do with organized crime, RICO's original target.

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1704

Petitioner

William W. Wilkins, Tax Commissioner for the State of Ohio, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Charlotte Cuno, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Wilkins v. Cuno, No. 04-1724

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, March 1, 2006

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2006

Advocates

Peter Enrich (argued the cause for Respondents)

Douglas R. Cole (argued the cause for Petitioners in No. 04-1724)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Petitioners in No. 04-1704)

Facts of the Case

As part of Ohio's economic development plan, DaimlerChrysler agreed to expand its operations in Toledo in exchange for tax exemptions and tax credits worth roughly $280 million. Charlotte Cuno and others challenged the deal, however, arguing that Ohio had violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by offering the tax incentives. A federal district court disagreed, ruling for DaimlerChrysler, but on appeal a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The panel found that the tax incentives coerced businesses to expand in Ohio at the expense of other states, and were therefore unconstitutional manipulations of interstate commerce.

Question

Did Ohio violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by giving businesses tax incentives to expand their manufacturing operations inside Ohio?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for DaimlerChrysler Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

The Supreme Court did not reach the central question presented, finding instead that Cuno and the other plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the suit. Chief Justice John Roberts, for the unanimous Court, wrote that simply alleging standing based on their status as taxpayers in Ohio and Michigan did not give them a sufficiently strong interest in the case. The citizens from Ohio could not definitively show that the tax incentives had decreased the amount of money available to the state treasury (and thus increased their tax burden or decreased the services available to them) because the point of the incentive was to increase long-term tax revenue. The citizens from Michigan, meanwhile, could not show that any tax revenue increase in Michigan that could have resulted from DaimlerChrysler expanding there instead of in Ohio would have actually benefited them directly, because it might have been used for programs that they did not benefit from. Without any clear injury, they had no standing to sue.

Kowalski v. Tesmer

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-407

Petitioner

John F. Kowalski, Judge, 26th Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John C. Tesmer, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 125 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, January 20, 2004

Argued

Monday, October 4, 2004

Decided

Monday, December 13, 2004

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (argued the cause for Petitioners)

David A. Moran (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

A 1994 amendment to the Michigan constitution said criminal defendants who pled guilty had no right to appeal and could appeal only with the permission of a state appellate court. Michigan then enacted a law that said in most cases judges could not appoint appellate lawyers for indigent defendants who pled guilty. Two criminal attorneys and three indigent defendants who were denied appointed appellate lawyers filed a single suit alleging the state law violated the 14th Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The district court ruled that the indigents had standing to sue and that the lawyers who sued with them had the right to sue as third-party representatives of the rights of indigents. A federal appellate court agreed the statute was unconstitutional, but based this only on the lawyers' claims. The court said the U.S. Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris required it to abstain from hearing the indigents' claims because the indigents were involved in related proceedings in state court.

Question

(1) Does the 14th Amendment guarantee an indigent criminal defendant convicted by a guilty plea the right to an appointed appellate attorney in a discretionary first appeal? (2) Do attorneys have third-party standing on behalf of potential indigent defendants to make a constitutional challenge to a state statute prohibiting appointment of appellate counsel in discretionary first appeals following convictions by guilty pleas?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kowalski, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the attorneys lacked third-party standing to sue on behalf of the Michigan indigent defendants. The attorneys did not have close relationships with the indigent defendants, nor was there a hindrance to these defendants' ability to advance their own constitutional rights against the Michigan scheme. In addition, under Younger, the indigents should have only turned to the federal courts after pursuing their claims in state court.

Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

Elk Grove Unified School District

9510 Elk Grove-Florin Blvd Elk Grove CA 95624

Elk Grove, CA 95624

United States

38° 24' 47.5416" N, 121° 22' 20.946" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1624

Petitioner

Elk Grove Unified School District and David W. Gordon, Superintendent

Respondent

Michael A. Newdow, et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 1 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, October 14, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, March 24, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 14, 2004

Advocates

Terence J. Cassidy (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Michael A. Newdow (argued the cause for Respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Respondent United States, in support of petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Michael Newdow's daughter attended public school in the Elk Grove Unified School District in California. Elk Grove teachers began school days by leading students in a voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including the words "under God" added by a 1954 Congressional act. Newdow sued in federal district court in California, arguing that making students listen - even if they choose not to participate - to the words "under God" violates the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment.

The district court dismissed Newdow's complaint for lack of standing, because he and the mother of his daughter are divorced and he does not have custody. The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Newdow did have standing "to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct the religious education of his daughter." The Ninth Circuit ruled that Congress's 1954 act adding the words "under God" to the Pledge and the school district policy requiring it be recited both violated the First Amendment's establishment clause.

Question

Does Michael Newdow have standing to challenge as unconstitutional a public school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance? Does a public school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes the words "under God," violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Elk Grove Unified School District, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court found that Newdow did not have standing to bring suit because he did not have sufficient custody over his daughter. "When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law," Justice Stevens wrote. Because it found that Newdow did not have standing, the Court failed to reach the constitutional question. Chief Justice Renquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas all wrote seperate concurrences, saying that requiring teachers to lead the Pledge is constitutional.

Vieth v. Jubelirer

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

Pennsylvania General Assembly

225 N Capitol Building Harrisburg PA 17101

Harrisburg, PA 17101

United States

40° 15' 52.8156" N, 76° 53' 6.1296" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1580

Appellee

Robert C. Jubelirer, President of the Pennsylvania Senate, et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Richard Vieth, Norma Jean Vieth, and Susan Furey

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 267 (2004)

Granted

Friday, June 27, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, April 28, 2004

Advocates

John P. Krill, Jr. (argued the cause for Appellees Jubelirer and Perzel)

Paul M. Smith (argued the cause for Appellants)

J. Bart DeLone (argued the cause for Appellees Cortes and Accurti)

Facts of the Case

After the 2000 census reduced the size of the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation by two members, the Republican-controlled state legislature passed a redistricting plan that clearly benefitted Republican candidates. Several members of the Democratic party sued in federal court, claiming that the plan was unconstitutional because it violated the one-person, one-vote principle of Article I, Section 2 of Constitution, the Equal Protection clause, the Privileges and Immunities clause, and the freedom of association.

The district court dismissed all but the Article I, Section 2 claim. It held that the voters bringing the suit had not proved that they would be denied representation, only that they would be represented by Republican officials. Because the plaintiffs (those bringing the suit) were not denied the right to vote, to be placed on the ballot box, to associate as a party, or to express their political opinions, their political discrimination claims failed.

However, the court found the act unconstitutional because it created districts with different numbers of voters, thereby violating the one-person, one-vote principle. Because the plaintiffs had shown that it was possible to create districts with smaller differences, and because the defendants had failed to justify the disparities resulting under their plan, it was therefore unconstitutional.

Question

Can voters affiliated with a political party sue to block implementation of a Congressional redistricting plan by claiming that it was manipulated for purely political reasons? Does a state violate the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment when it disregards neutral redistricting principles (such as trying to avoid splitting municipalities into different Congressional districts) in order to achieve an advantage for one political party? Does a state exceed its power under Article I of the Constitution when it draws Congressional districts to ensure that a minority party will consistently win a super-majority of the state's Congressional seats?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Jubelirer, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Composition of the House of Representatives

In a split decision that had no majority opinion, the Court decided not to intervene in this case because no appropriate judicial solution could be found. Justice Antonin Scalia, for a four-member plurality, wrote that the Court should declare all claims related to political (but not racial) gerrymandering nonjusticiable, meaning that courts could not hear them. Because no court had been able to find an appropriate remedy to political gerrymandering claims in the 18 years since the Court decided Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, which had held that such a remedy had not been found yet but might exist, Scalia wrote that it was time to recognize that the solution simply did not exist.

Justice Anthony Kennedy, however, wrote in his concurring opinion (which provided the deciding fifth vote for the judgment) that the Court should rule narrowly in this case that no appropriate judicial solution could be found, but not give up on finding one eventually.

McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:33 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1674

Petitioner

Federal Election Commission

Respondent

Mitch McConnell, United States Senator, et al.

Consolidation

National Rifle Association (NRA), et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1675

Federal Election Commission (FEC), et al. v. Mitch McConnell, United States Senator, et al., No. 02-1676

John McCain, United States Senator, et al. v. Mitch McConnell, United States Senator, et al., No. 02-1702

Republican National Committee, et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1727

National Right to Life Committee, Inc., et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1733

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1734

Victoria Jackson Gray Adams, et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1740

Ron Paul, United States Congressman, et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1747

California Democratic Party, et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1753

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1755

Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1756

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 93 (2003)

Granted

Thursday, June 5, 2003

Argued

Monday, September 8, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Defendant FEC)

Bobby R. Burchfield (argued the cause for Plaintiffs Political Party)

Kenneth W. Starr (argued the cause for Plaintiffs McConnell, et al.)

Jay A. Sekulow (argued the cause for Plaintiffs Echols, et al.)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Defendant FEC)

Laurence E. Gold (argued the cause for Plaintiffs AFL-CIO)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Defendant Intervenor)

Floyd Abrams (argued the cause for Plaintiffs McConnell, et al.)

Facts of the Case

In early 2002, a many years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for--and spent during-- political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill). Its key provisions were a) a ban on unrestricted ("soft money") donations made directly to political parties (often by corporations, unions, or well-healed individuals) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials; b) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election; and c) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of "issue ads" or "coordinated expenditures").

The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by-passing the typical federal judicial process. In May a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals.

Question

Does the "soft money" ban of the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 exceed Congress's authority to regulate elections under Article 1, Section 4 of the United States Constitution and/or violate the First Amendment's protection of the freedom to speak?
Do regulations of the source, content, or timing of political advertising in the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 violate the First Amendment's free speech clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for McConnell, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Split Vote

With a few exceptions, the Court answered "no" to both questions in a 5-to-4 decision written by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens. Because the regulations dealt mostly with soft-money contributions that were used to register voters and increase attendance at the polls, not with campaign expenditures (which are more explicitly a statement of political values and therefore deserve more protection), the Court held that the restriction on free speech was minimal. It then found that the restriction was justified by the government's legitimate interest in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and... the appearance of corruption" that might result from those contributions.

In response to challenges that the law was too broad and unnecessarily regulated conduct that had not been shown to cause corruption (such as advertisements paid for by corporations or unions), the Court found that such regulation was necessary to prevent the groups from circumventing the law. Justices O'Connor and Stevens wrote that "money, like water, will always find an outlet" and that the government was therefore justified in taking steps to prevent schemes developed to get around the contribution limits.

The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. The Court found that the law only affected state elections in which federal candidates were involved and also that it did not prevent states from creating separate election laws for state and local elections.

National Park Hospitality Assn. v. Dept. of the Interior

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-196

Petitioner

National Park Hospitality Assn.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dept. of the Interior

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 803 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, March 4, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 2003

Advocates

John P. Elwood (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Kenneth S. Geller (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) established rules governing disputes arising out of certain federal government contracts. After Congress enacted the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, which established a comprehensive concession management program for national parks, the National Park Service (NPS) issued 36 CFR section 51.3, which purported to render the CDA inapplicable to concession contracts. The National Park Hospitality Association challenged 51.3's validity. Upholding the regulation, the District Court concluded that the CDA is ambiguous as to whether it applies to concession contracts and found the NPS's interpretation reasonable. In affirming, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the NPS's reading of the CDA consistent with both the CDA and the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998.

Question

Does the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 apply to contracts between the National Park Service and concessioners in the national parks?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Dept. of the Interior, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

The Court did not answer the question. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the controversy was not yet ripe for judicial resolution. The Court reasoned that, because the NPS has no delegated rulemaking authority under the CDA, 51.3 is nothing more than a general policy statement designed to inform the public of NPS's views on the CDA's proper application and thus the National Park Hospitality Association's challenge was a facial one. Given the absence of a concrete dispute, the Court asked the parties provide supplemental briefing on whether the case was ripe for judicial action. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, dissented.

Utah v. Evans

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-714

Appellee

Evans

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Utah

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 452 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, March 27, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 2002

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (for the Federal Appellees)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the North Carolina Appellees)

Thomas R. Lee (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

In conducting the 2000 census, the Census Bureau used "hot-deck imputation" to fill in certain gaps in its information and resolved certain conflicts in the data. Under this methodology, the Bureau imputes the relevant information by inferring that the address or unit about which it is uncertain has the same population characteristics as those of its geographically closest neighbor of the same type. Hot-deck Imputation increased North Carolina's population by 0.4% while increasing Utah's population by only 0.2% such that North Carolina will receive one more Representative and Utah one less than if the Bureau had simply filled relevant informational gaps by counting the related number of individuals as zero. Utah brought suit against the officials charged with conducting the census, claiming that the Bureau's use of hot-deck imputation violates 13 USC section 195, which prohibits use of "the statistical method known as 'sampling,'" and is inconsistent with Article 1, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution, which states that an "actual Enumeration be made." Utah sought an injunction compelling a change of the official census results. The District Court found for the Bureau.

Question

Does the Census Bureau's use of "hot-deck imputation," in the 2000 census, violate the statutory provision forbidding use of the statistical method known as sampling? Is this methodology inconsistent with the Constitution's statement that an "actual Enumeration be made?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Evans, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 13 U.S.C. 195

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the use of hot-deck imputation violates neither the statute nor the Constitution. The Court reasoned that, whereas sampling seeks to extrapolate the features of a large population from a small one, the Bureau's imputation process simply sought to fill in missing data as part of an effort to count individuals one by one and that these differences placed imputation outside the scope of the prohibitive statute. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that Article 1's wording that the "actual Enumeration" shall take place "in such Manner as" Congress itself "shall by Law direct," suggested a breadth of congressional methodological authority, rather than a limitation.

Alexander v. Sandoval

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:14 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1908

Petitioner

Alexander

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sandoval

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 275 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, January 16, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, April 24, 2001

Advocates

Eric Schnapper (Argued the cause for the private respondents)

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent United States)

Facts of the Case

Because it is a recipient of federal financial assistance, the Alabama Department of Public Safety (Department) is subject to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin. Under section 602, the Department of Justice issued a regulation forbidding funding recipients to utilize criteria or administrative methods having the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on the prohibited grounds. Martha Sandoval brought a class action suit to enjoin the Department from administering state driver's license examinations only in English. Sandoval argued that the English-only policy violated the DOJ regulation because it had the effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. Ordering the Department to accommodate non-English speakers, the District Court enjoined the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. James Alexander, the Director of the Department, unsuccessfully argued before both courts that Title VI did not provide a cause of action to enforce the regulation.

Question

Does Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provide a cause of action to enforce the Department of Justice's regulation forbidding federal financial assistance recipients to utilize criteria or administrative methods that have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on race, color, or national origin?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Alexander, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that there is no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI. "Title VI itself directly reaches only instances of intentional discrimination," wrote Justice Scalia, "[n]either as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under [section 602]." Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, which was join by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer.

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-822

Petitioner

Friends of the Earth

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Laidlaw Environmental Services

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 167 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2000

Advocates

Donald A. Cockrill (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioners)

Bruce J. Terris (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

After Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. bought a wastewater treatment plant, it was granted a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The permit authorized Laidlaw to discharge treated water and limited pollutants. Laidlaw's discharge of mercury into the North Tyger River repeatedly exceeded the limits set by the permit. Ultimately, Friends of the Earth and others (FOE) filed a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Laidlaw, alleging noncompliance with the NPDES permit, seeking injunctive relief and an award of civil penalties. Laidlaw moved for summary judgement on the ground that FOE lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. The District Court denied the motion. Ultimately, the District Court found that Laidlaw violated the mercury discharge limitation. In issuing its judgment, the District Court concluded that a civil penalty of $405,800 would be adequate to forestall future violations, given that Laidlaw would have to reimburse the plaintiffs for a significant amount of legal fees and had itself incurred significant legal expenses. The court declined to order injunctive relief because Laidlaw, after the lawsuit began, had achieved substantial compliance with the terms of its permit. FOE appealed to the amount of the District Court's civil penalty judgment, but did not appeal the denial of declaratory or injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals ordered the case to be dismissed. The appellate court held that the case had become moot once Laidlaw complied with the terms of its permit. The court reasoned that the only remedy currently available to FOE, civil penalties payable to the Government, would not redress any injury FOE had suffered.

Question

Does an environmental group's citizen suit for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act become moot when the defendant, after commencement of the litigation, has come into compliance with its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Friends of the Earth, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a citizen suitor's claim for civil penalties need not be dismissed as moot when the defendant, after commencement of the litigation, has come into compliance with its NPDES permit. "A defendant's voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily does not suffice to moot a case," Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court. "Congress has found that civil penalties in the Clean Water Act cases do more than promote immediate compliance... they also deter future violations," concluded Justice Ginsburg. The Court also ruled that FOE had standing to bring the suit on behalf on its members.

Calderon v. Ashmus

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:49 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-391

Petitioner

Calderon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ashmus

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 740 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, March 24, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 1998

Advocates

Ronald S. Matthias (San Francisco, California, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Michael Laurence (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides an expedited review process for federal habeas proceedings in capital cases in States that meet certain conditions. California officials stated that they believed they qualified for Chapter 154. Troy Ashmus, a state prisoner sentenced to death, filed a class action suit, which included all capital prisoners in California whose convictions were affirmed on direct appeal after June 6, 1989, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to resolve uncertainty over whether Chapter 154 applied. Holding that California did not qualify for Chapter 154, the District Court enjoined the State from invoking the Chapter in any proceedings involving class members. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suit and that the injunction did not violate the First Amendment.

Question

Are state prisoners' challenges of the applicability of Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 to their respective states, separate from a federal habeas corpus petition challenging their state court prosecution, an Article III "case or controversy" to which federal courts are limited?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Calderon, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "this action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief is not a justiciable case within the meaning of Article III." "If the class members file habeas petitions, and the State asserts Chapter 154, the members obviously can litigate California's compliance with Chapter 154 at that time. Any risk associated with resolving the question in habeas, rather than a pre-emptive suit, is no different from risks associated with choices commonly faced by litigants," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice David H. Souter joined.

Ohio Forestry Association, Inc.v. Sierra Club

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-16

Petitioner

Ohio Forestry Association, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sierra Club

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 726 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, February 25, 1998

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1998

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the federal respondents supporting the petitioner)

Steven R. Quarles (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Frederick M. Gittes (Argued the cause for the private respondents)

Facts of the Case

Pursuant to the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), the United States Forest Service developed a Land and Resource Management Plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest. The Plan sets logging goals, selects the areas suited to timber production, and determines which probable methods of timber harvest are appropriate, but it does not itself authorize the cutting of any trees. Ultimately, the Sierra Club filed suit, alleging that erroneous analysis leads the Plan wrongly to favor logging and clearcutting. The District Court granted the Forest Service summary judgment, finding that the Forest Service had acted lawfully in making the various challenged determinations. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, finding both that the Sierra Club had standing to bring suit, and that since the suit was "ripe for review," there was no need to wait "until a site-specific action occurs," held that the Plan improperly favored clearcutting and therefore violated the NFMA.

Question

Does the United States Forest Service's Land and Resource Management Plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest present a controversy that is justiciable? If so, does the Plan conform to statutory and regulatory requirements for a forest plan?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ohio Forestry Association, Inc.v. Sierra Club, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the controversy is not yet ripe for judicial review. Justice Breyer wore for the Court that "'withhold court consideration' at present will not cause the parties significant 'hardship.'" "[B]efore the Forest Service can permit logging, it must focus upon a particular site, propose a specific harvesting method, prepare an environmental review, permit the public an opportunity to be heard, and (if challenged) justify the proposal in court," continued Justice Breyer, "[t]he Sierra Club thus will have ample opportunity later to bring its legal challenge at a time when harm is more imminent and more certain."

FEC v. Akins

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1590

Petitioner

FEC

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Akins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 11 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, January 14, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 1, 1998

Advocates

Daniel M. Schember (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) imposes recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon political committees which receive more than $1,000 in "contributions" or which make more than $1,000 in "expenditures" in a year "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." Certain assistance does not count toward the expenditure cap if it takes the form of a "communication" by a "membership organization or corporation" "to its members" as long as the organization is not "organized primarily for the purpose of influencing [any individual's] nomination... or election." A complaint filed by a group of voters asked the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to order the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to make public the information that FECA demands of political committees. Ultimately, the FEC found that AIPAC was not a political committee because its major purpose was not the nomination or election of candidates. The en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the FEC's major purpose test improperly interpreted FECA's definition of a political committee.

Question

Do voters have the proper legal standing to challenge the Federal Election Commission's decisions regarding political committees?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for FEC, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 2 U.S.C. 431

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that voters seeking information, to which they believe FECA entitles them, have standing to challenge the FEC's decision not to bring an enforcement action. Because FECA seeks to address the voters' injury, the failure to obtain relevant information, Justice Breyer concluded that the voters had prudential standing. Furthermore, because the voters' inability to obtain information constitutes an "injury in fact," continued Justice Breyer, the voters had standing under Article III. The Court did not address the FEC's major purpose test, allowing the FEC to address the issue under newly proposed rules. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas joined.

Texas v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-29

Appellee

United States

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Texas

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 296 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, January 14, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, March 31, 1998

Advocates

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellees)

Javier Aguilar (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, the Texas Legislature enacted Chapter 39. Chapter 39 holds local school boards accountable to the State for student achievement in the public schools. The State Commissioner of Education may select from various sanctions, including the appointment of a master or a management team and the contracting out of services, when a school district falls short of Chapter 39's accreditation criteria. Under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Texas submitted Chapter 39 to the United States Attorney General for a determination whether any of the sanctions effected voting and thus required preclearance. Ultimately, the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights cautioned that such sanctions implementation might violate section 5. Subsequently, Texas sought a declaration District Court that section 5 did not apply to such sanctions. The court concluded that Texas's claim was not ripe.

Question

Is Texas's claim for a declaratory judgment that Chapter 39's authorized sanctions against school districts for failure to meet mandated educational achievement levels do not need preclearance ripe for adjudication?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Texas's claim is not ripe for adjudication. The Court's holding turning on the fact that Texas did not indicate any school district in which an application of Chapter 39 was "foreseen or even likely." Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that, "we find it too speculative whether the problem Texas presents will ever need solving; we find the legal issues Texas raises not yet fit for our consideration, and the hardship to Texas of biding its time insubstantial."

Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-643

Petitioner

Steel Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Citizens for a Better Environment

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 83 (1998)

Argued

Monday, October 6, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, March 4, 1998

Advocates

Sanford M. Stein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David A. Strauss (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Citizens For A Better Environment, a environmental protection organization, filed an enforcement action for relief under the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986's (EPCRA) Citizen-Suit Provision. Citizens alleged that the Chicago Steel And Pickling Company had violated the EPCRA by failing to file timely toxic- and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports since 1988. Ultimately, Chicago Steel filed all of the overdue forms with the relevant agencies by the time the complaint was acted on. Arguing this fact and that the EPCRA does not allow suit for purely historical violations, Chicago Steel filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Citizens' allegation of untimeliness in filing was not a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court agreed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EPCRA authorizes citizen suits for purely past violations.

Question

Does an environmental organization have standing to bring suit against companies that fail to meet the Emergency Planning And Community Right-To-Know Act Of 1986's deadlines for filing toxic- and hazardous-chemical storage and emission reports? Does the EPCRA authorize suits for purely past violations?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Steel Company, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No and the Court did not answer the question. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held, because none of the relief sought would likely remedy its alleged injury in fact, that Citizens For A Better Environment lacked standing to maintain suit and that the Court and lower federal courts lack the jurisdiction to entertain it. While all nine Justices agreed that the organization lacked standing, they disagreed on the reasons. Lacking jurisdiction, the Court declined to answer whether the EPCRA authorizes suits for purely past violations. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Stephen G. Breyer, John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote concurring opinions.

National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-843

Petitioner

National Credit Union Administration

Respondent

First National Bank

Consolidation

No. 96-847

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 479 (1998)

Argued

Monday, October 6, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 1998

Advocates

Seth P. Waxman (on behalf of the Federal Petitioner)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (on behalf of the Private Petitioners)

Michael S. Helfer (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act provides that that "federal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district." The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) interprets section 9 to permit federal credit unions to be composed of multiple, unrelated employer groups, each having its own distinct common bond of occupation. Under this interpretation, the NCUA approved a series of charter amendments adding several unrelated employer groups to the membership of AT&T; Family Federal Credit Union, which now has approximately 110,000 members nationwide only 35% of whom are employees of AT&T; and its affiliates. Subsequently, a number of private actors brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, asserting that the NCUA's decision was contrary to law because section 109 unambiguously requires that the same common bond of occupation unite each member of an occupationally defined federal credit union and members of the new groups did not share a common bond of occupation with AT&T; Family Federal Credit Union's existing members. Ultimately, the District Court held that the private interests lack standing to challenge NCUA's decision and the Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Do banks and professional associations have standing under the Administrative Procedure Act to seek federal-court review of the National Credit Union Administration's decisions? Is the NCUA's interpretation of section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act permissible?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for First National Bank, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 12 U.S.C. 1759

Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that banks and professional associations have prudential standing under the APA to seek federal-court review of the NCUA's interpretation of section 109. By the same majority, the Court also held that the NCUA's interpretation of section 109, under which a common bond of occupation must unite only the members of each unrelated employer group, is impermissible. After concluding that the banks and professional associations' interests fall within the "zone of interests" protected by section 109, Justice Thomas wrote that the NCUA's interpretation "has the potential to read ["shall be limited"] out of the statute entirely."

Raines v. Byrd

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:29 +0000

Location

Senator Byrd's Office

311 Hart Senate Office Building Washington D.C. 20510

Washington 20510

United States

38° 53' 34.422" N, 77° 0' 13.7052" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1671

Appellee

Byrd

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Raines

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 811 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, May 27, 1997

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 1997

Advocates

Alan B. Morrison (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

Several individual members of the 104th Congress, who voted against the passage of the Line Item Veto Act (Act) giving the President authority to veto individual tax and spending measures after having signed them into law, sued to challenge the Act's constitutionality. After granting them standing, the District Court ruled in the congressmen's favor as it found the Act unconstitutional. Direct appeal was granted to the Supreme Court.

Question

Did the congressmen have Article III standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act as a violation of the Presentment Clause in Article I?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Raines, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, which avoided the question of the Act's constitutionality, the Court held that the individual congressmen lacked proper Article III standing to maintain their suit. The Court explained that the congressmen failed to show how the allegedly unconstitutional Act resulted in their personal injury, since it applied to the entire institution of Congress. Moreover, the congressmen based their claim on a loss of political power rather then a demonstration of how the Act violated one of their particularized legally protected interests. The Court concluded that, having failed to meet both of these standing requirements, the congressmen did not present the Court with a case-or-controversy over which it had jurisdiction.

Blessing v. Freestone

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1441

Petitioner

Blessing

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Freestone

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 329 (1997)

Argued

Monday, January 6, 1997

Decided

Monday, April 21, 1997

Advocates

Marsha S. Berzon (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Patricia A. Millett (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

C. Tim Delaney (Phoenix, Arizona, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Cathy Freestone and four other Arizona mothers, whose children are eligible for state child support services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, filed suit against Linda J. Blessing, the director of the state child support agency, claiming that they properly applied for child support services; that, despite their good faith efforts to cooperate, the agency never took adequate steps to obtain child support payments for them; that these omissions were largely attributable to staff shortages and other structural defects in the State's program; and that these systemic failures violated their individual rights under Title IV-D to have all mandated services delivered in substantial compliance with the title and its implementing regulations. Freestone sought relief including a declaratory judgment that the Arizona program's operation violates Title IV-D provisions creating rights in them that are enforceable and an injunction requiring the director to achieve substantial compliance with Title IV-D throughout all programmatic operations. The District Court granted summary judgment for Blessing. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Freestone had an enforceable individual right to have the State achieve "substantial compliance" with Title IV-D. Additionally, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court that that Congress had foreclosed private Title IV-D enforcement actions by authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to audit and cut off funds to States whose programs do not substantially comply with Title IV-D's requirements.

Question

Can parents sue states under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act to force overall compliance with federal efforts under Title IV-D to collect child- support payments from ex-spouses?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Blessing, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC--provisions of the Social Security Act)

No. In an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act does not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to substantially comply with Title IV-D. Justice O'Connor wrote for the court that parents cannot sue merely because a state fails to be in "substantial compliance" with federal collection standards.

Bennett v. Spear

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-813

Petitioner

Bennett

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Spear

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 154 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, November 13, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, March 19, 1997

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Gregory K. Wilkerson (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Gregory K. Wilkinson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

When the Fish and Wildlife Service was notified that the operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project might affect two endangered species of fish, it concluded that the proposed long-term operation of the project was likely to jeopardize the species and decided to maintain minimum levels of water in certain reservoirs. The petitioners, irrigation districts receiving project water and operators of ranches in those districts, filed suit against the Service's director, regional directors, and the Secretary, claiming the determination and imposition of minimum water levels violated the Endangered Species Act's requirement that the designated area's economic impact be considered. The District Court dismissed the compliant because it lacked standing; economic interests were not enough to constitute a lawsuit in this matter. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Can private parties who claim they have suffered economic harm from enforcement of the Endangered Species Act sue to reverse regulation?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bennett, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

Yes. In the unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the petitioners had standing to ask for judicial review of the minimum water level setting under the Endangered Species Act. The Act explicitly allows "any person" to sue the government over an alleged violation. Justice Scalia asserted this applies to the Secretary's actions over enforcement.

United Food Workers v. Brown Group Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-340

Petitioner

United Food Workers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brown Group Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

517 U.S. 544 (1996)

Argued

Tuesday, February 20, 1996

Decided

Monday, May 13, 1996

Advocates

Lan Jenkins (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Alan Jenkins (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Laurence E. Gold (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Thomas C. Walsh (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 filed suit alleging that Brown Group, Inc. began to lay off workers in connection with the closing of one of its plants, Brown Shoe Company, before giving the union the closing notice required by the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the WARN Act). The union sought backpay for each of its affected members. Under modern associational standing doctrine, an organization may sue to redress its members' injuries when: 1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and 3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The District Court dismissed the compliant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that "[e]ach union member who wishes to recover WARN Act damages from Brown Shoe must participate in the suit so that his or her right to damages can be determined and the quantum of damages can be calculated by the court on the basis of particularized proof." Therefore, the court concluded that the suit was barred because the union failed to meet the third part of the test for asserting associational standing.

Question

May a labor union sue on behalf of its members over alleged violations of the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United Food Workers, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 29 U.S.C. 2101

Yes. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act grants unions authority to sue for damages on behalf of their members. Therefore, the union had standing to bring such an action. Justice Souter wrote that the court's ruling was based on previous decisions that state that "an organization may sue to redress its members' injuries even without a showing of injury to the association itself."

Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-83

Petitioner

Meghrig

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

KFC Western, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

516 U.S. 479 (1996)

Argued

Wednesday, January 10, 1996

Decided

Tuesday, March 19, 1996

Advocates

John P. Zaimes (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Jeffrey P. Minear (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Daniel Romano (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Three years after complying with a county order to clean up petroleum contamination discovered on its property, KFC Western, Inc. brought an action under the citizen suit provision -- Section 6972 -- of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) to recover its cleanup costs from the Meghrigs. KFC claimed that the contamination had previously posed an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to health or the environment and that the Meghrigs were responsible for "equitable restitution" under the Act because, as prior owners of the property, they had contributed to the contaminated site. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that 6972(a) does not permit recovery of past cleanup costs and that 6972 does not authorize a cause of action for the remediation of toxic waste that does not pose an "imminent and substantial endangerment" at the time suit is filed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court on both issues.

Question

May plaintiffs use the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 to sue and recover money they spent to clean up hazardous waste on their property?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Meghrig, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 6972

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor the Court held that section 6972 does not authorize a private cause of action to recover the prior cost of cleaning up toxic waste that does not, at the time of suit, continue to pose an endangerment to health or the environment. Writing for the court, Justice O'Connor said the law only allows private citizens to sue to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment and is not directed at providing compensation for past cleanup efforts.

United States v. Hays

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:31 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-558

Appellee

Hays et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 94-627

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 737 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, April 19, 1995

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 1995

Advocates

Richard I. Ieyoub (on behalf of the State Appellants)

Drew S. Days, III (on behalf of the Federal Appellant)

Edward W. Warren (on behalf of the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Anderson, Director, California Department Of Social Services v. Green

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-197

Petitioner

Anderson, Director, California Department Of Social Services, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Green et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 557 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, January 17, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 1995

Advocates

Kathleen M. Sullivan (on behalf of the Respondents)

Theodore Garelis (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Green, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Director, Office Of Workers' Compensation Programs, Department Of Labor v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1783

Petitioner

Director, Office Of Workers' Compensation Programs, Department Of Labor

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 122 (1995)

Argued

Monday, January 9, 1995

Decided

Tuesday, March 21, 1995

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lawrence P. Postol (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation

None

United States v. California

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:26 +0000

Location

Williams Brothers Engineering Company

One Williams Center Tulsa OK 74172

Tulsa, OK 74172

United States

36° 9' 17.7336" N, 95° 59' 25.7748" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-2003

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California and California State Board of Equalization

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

507 U.S. 746 (1993)

Argued

Tuesday, February 23, 1993

Decided

Monday, April 26, 1993

Advocates

Robert D. Milam (on behalf of the Respondents)

Kent L. Jones (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

From 1975 to 1985, the United States Government contracted with Williams Brothers Engineering Company (WBEC) to conduct the federal oil drilling in Kern County, California. By 1981, WBEC had accrued a state tax deficit of $14 million. After the Board of Equalization rejected WBEC's claim that those taxes were invalid, the company paid its deficit, and, according to WBEC's contract, was subsequently reimbursed by the United States Government. In January of 1988, WBEC continued to challenge the taxes by filing an action in state court. This action concluded with an agreement between the state of California and WBEC that the company receive a $3 million refund. The Federal Government filed a suit in the Eastern District of California in May of 1988, arguing that the remaining state taxes totaling $11 million were also illegitimate. The District Court ruled in favor of the state of California, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

May the United States Government receive compensation for the state of California's allegedly unfounded taxation of a private federal contractor?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for California, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court determined that regardless of the fact that the Federal Government reimburses WBEC for its taxes, the private company is still the taxpayer. And, the taxpayer had its opportunity to go to court and challenge the state taxes imposed upon it, and accepted the result. The Court found that the Federal Government does not have a separate right to do so.

Reno, Attorney General v. Catholic Social Services, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:00:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-1826

Petitioner

Reno, Attorney General, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Catholic Social Services, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

509 U.S. 43 (1993)

Argued

Monday, January 11, 1993

Decided

Friday, June 18, 1993

Advocates

Ronald J. Mann (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Ralph S. Abascal (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Reno, Attorney General, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

None

Nixon v. United States

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:26 +0000

Location

Office of Walter Nixon, Souther District Court of MS

245 East Capitol Street Jacksonville MS 39201

Jacksonville, MS 39201

United States

32° 17' 58.9308" N, 90° 11' 3.9804" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-740

Petitioner

Nixon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

506 U.S. 224 (1993)

Argued

Wednesday, October 14, 1992

Decided

Wednesday, January 13, 1993

Advocates

Kenneth W. Starr (Argued the cause for the respondents)

David Overlock Stewart (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Walter Nixon, a Federal District Judge, was convicted of a felony, making false statements to a grand jury. The House of Representatives voted three articles of impeachment; impeachment in the Senate followed. In accordance with Senate Rule XI, a Senate committee heard the evidence and reported its findings. The full Senate convicted Nixon and sought to remove him from office. Nixon challenged Senate Rule XI in federal court on the ground that the rule violated the impeachment clause of the Constitution, which declares that "the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." The lower courts deemed the issue nonjusticiable and declined to intervene in the dispute.

Question

Is Nixon's claim -- that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause -- justiciable, i.e., appropriate for judicial resolution?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 3, Paragraph 6

No. A unanimous Court held that the question of whether or not the Senate rule violated the U.S. Constitution was nonjusticiable since the Impeachment clause expressly granted that the "Senate shall have sole Power to try any impeachments." The clause laid out specific regulations that were to be followed and as long as those guidelines were observed the courts would not rule upon the validity of other Senate procedures regarding impeachments. Chief Justice William Rehnquist observed that while the Supreme Court was the "ultimate intrepreter of the Constitution," a matter would be deemed nonjusticiable when there was "a constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department."

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:25 +0000

Location

Defenders of Wildlife

1130 17th Street NW Washington DC 20036

Washington, DC 20036

United States

38° 54' 17.8488" N, 77° 2' 19.3128" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1424

Petitioner

Lujan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Defenders of Wildlife

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

504 U.S. 555 (1992)

Argued

Tuesday, December 3, 1991

Decided

Friday, June 12, 1992

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Brian B. O'Neill (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (S7(a)(2)) required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that any authorized actions did not jeopardize endangered or threatened species or critically destroy natural habitats. A 1986 amendment to the act limited it scope to actions in the United States or on the high seas. Defenders of Wildlife and other organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the new amendment erred by providing for a geographic limit on the original law.

Question

Do the respondents have standing to sue?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Lujan, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

No. Even if the Court were to assume that the agency-funded projects at issue threatened listed species, there was no proof that these actions would produce "actual or imminent" injuries to particular respondents who might some day wish to visit the foreign countries in question. The Court disregarded the proposed theory of "ecosystem nexus" which claimed that any person who used any part of of a "contiguous ecosystem" adversed affected by a funded activity had standing to sue.

Suter v. Artist M.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1488

Petitioner

Suter

Respondent

Artist M.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

503 U.S. 347 (1992)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 1991

Decided

Wednesday, March 25, 1992

Advocates

Christina M. Tchen (Argued the case for the petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the case for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Michael G. Dsida (Argued the case for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACW) provides that, in order to be reimbursed for adoption and foster care services, a state must submit a plan for the administration of those services to the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. In order to be approved, the plan must be "in effect in all" a state's political subdivisions and "be mandatory upon them," and must state that "reasonable efforts will be made" to prevent removal of children from their homes and to facilitate reunification of families where removal has occurred. Several children in the Illinois foster care program brought suit against the Director and the Guardianship Administrator of the Illinois program under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides private individuals a right to sue for "deprivation of any rights ... secured by [federal] laws." They charged that Illinois had failed to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunite families, and that it was required to do so by the AACW. The Director and Guardianship Administrator argued that the children had no standing to sue because the AACW did not create substantive rights that had to be reinforced, but merely stated what contents an administrative plan needed to have in order to receive approval. The federal District Court sided with the children, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 create a "right" for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983, allowing children affected by a state's adoption program to bring a private suit against its administrators?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Suter, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Social Security, as amended, including Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act, but excluding Medicare, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 only required that a state have a plan for the administration of adoption and foster care programs in order to receive federal reimbursement, not that the plan be correctly carried out. The language of the statute requiring that the plan be "in effect in all" political subdivisions of the state meant only that the plan had to apply to all of them, not that they were actually required to carry it out. The Secretary of Health and Human Services could reasonably withhold approval of a plan if it was clear that the plan would not be applied, but nothing in the Act suggested that Congress had intended to create a private right to sue for the enforcement of the plan.

Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-727

Petitioner

Holmes

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Securities Investor Protection Corporation et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

503 U.S. 258 (1992)

Argued

Wednesday, November 13, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, March 24, 1992

Advocates

G. Robert Blakey (on behalf of the Respondents)

Jack I. Samet (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Holmes, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

None

Wyoming v. Oklahoma

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

112 ORIG

Plaintiff

Wyoming

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

Oklahoma

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

502 U.S. 437 (1992)

Argued

Monday, November 4, 1991

Decided

Wednesday, January 22, 1992

Advocates

Mary B. Guthrie (on behalf of the Plaintiff)

Neal Leader (on behalf of the Defendant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Oklahoma, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause

None

Renne v. Geary

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-769

Petitioner

Renne

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Geary

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 312 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, April 23, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 17, 1991

Advocates

Cedric C. Chao (on behalf of California Democratic Party, et al., as amici curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Arlo Hale Smith (on behalf of the Respondents)

Dennis Aftergut (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Renne, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Gollust v. Mendell

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:14 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-659

Petitioner

Gollust

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mendell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 115 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 10, 1991

Advocates

Edwin B. Mishkin (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Irving Malchman (on behalf of the Respondents)

James R. Doty (on behalf of SEC, as amicus curiae, in support of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Mendell, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, or the Williams Act

None

Primate Protection League v. Tulane Ed. Fund

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-89

Petitioner

Primate Protection League

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tulane Ed. Fund

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 72 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, March 20, 1991

Decided

Monday, May 20, 1991

Advocates

Richard H. Seamon (on behalf of the Respondents)

Margaret E. Woodward (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Primate Protection League, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1416

Petitioner

Air Courier Conference

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Postal Workers

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 517 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, February 26, 1991

Advocates

Keith E. Secular (on behalf of the Private Respondents)

L. Peter Farkas (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Paul J. Larkin, Jr. (on behalf of the Federal Respondent supporting the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Air Courier Conference, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 702

None

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-640

Petitioner

Lujan

Respondent

National Wildlife Federation

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

497 U.S. 871 (1990)

Argued

Monday, April 16, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, June 27, 1990

Advocates

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the case for the respondents)

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) challenged 1,250 land-use designations made by the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM). NWF filed suit under section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming that the actions were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." NWF argued that it had standing to sue because two of its members used public lands "in the vicinity" of lands affected by the BLM's decisions (four other members submitted affidavits claiming that they, too, used lands close to affected areas, but the District Court ruled that the affidavits had been submitted too late).

The BLM challenged the NWF's right to sue, and the District Court agreed. It found that the two affidavits filed in a timely manner did not show that the members had been sufficiently affected to have standing to sue. Furthermore, the court ruled that even if they had had standing to challenge those specific BLM decisions, they would not have had standing to challenge all 1,250.

On appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the initial two affidavits were enough to give them standing to challenge all 1,250 decisions. Moreover, the Court ruled that the District Court had abused its discretion by refusing to consider the additional four affidavits.

Question

Does an organization representing private citizens who use public land "in the vicinity" of areas affected by Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land-use designations have standing to challenge those designations under section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act? Does standing to challenge several individual BLM decision confer standing to challenge those decisions as a whole, even when the organization's members are not affected by the bulk of the decisions?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lujan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Administrative Procedure, or Administrative Orders Review

No and no. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court held that NWF did not have standing to challenge the land-use designations. The two timely affidavits were not enough to show that the group members had actually been affected by the BLM decisions. Even if they had been, and if the four additional affidavits had been considered (which the Supreme Court ruled had not been necessary), the right to challenge the individual decisions would not have conveyed a right to challenge all of them. The decisions were not a single "agency action" but rather a series of actions which would have to be challenged individually. "The case-by-case approach that this requires is understandably frustrating to an organization such as [NWF], which has as its objective across-the-board protection of our Nation's wildlife and the streams and forests that support it," wrote Justice Scalia. "But this is the traditional, and remains the normal, mode of operation of the courts. ... Until confided to us, ... more sweeping actions are for the other branches."

United States v. Munoz-Flores

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1932

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Munoz-Flores

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

495 U.S. 385 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, February 20, 1990

Decided

Monday, May 21, 1990

Advocates

Judy Clare Clarke (on behalf of the Respondent)

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 7, Paragraph 1: Origination Clause

None

Whitmore v. Arkansas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:14 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-7146

Petitioner

Whitmore

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arkansas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

495 U.S. 149 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, January 10, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, April 24, 1990

Advocates

J. Steven Clark (on behalf of the Respondents)

Arthur L. Allen (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Arkansas, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assoc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-2043

Petitioner

Wilder

Respondent

Virginia Hospital Assoc.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

496 U.S. 498 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, January 9, 1990

Decided

Thursday, June 14, 1990

Advocates

R. Claire Guthrie (Argued the cause for petitioners)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

To qualify for federal funding under the Medicaid Act, states must submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services a plan that establishes a system by which healthcare providers will be reimbursed. Under the Boren Amendment, the reimbursement rates must be "reasonable and adequate" to meet the costs of efficiently operated facilities.

In 1986, a group of hospitals brought sought against the state of Virginia, arguing that its reimbursement rates (which had been approved in 1982 and again in 1986 by the Secretary) were not "reasonable and adequate." The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which allows individuals or organizations to bring suit for the "deprivation of any rights ... secured by [federal] laws." Virginia argued that the Boren Amendment had not been intended to create a an enforceable right, but simply to provide guidelines for the Secretary to follow, and that the hospitals therefore could not bring suit under 1983. The state also argued that Congress had intended to prevent private parties from bringing suit to enforce the provisions of the Amendment. The District Court disagreed, allowing the suit to proceed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Did the Boren Amendment create a "right" under the definition of 42 U.S.C. 1983, therefore allowing private parties to bring suit challenging the state's finding that its Medicaid reimbursement rates are "reasonable and adequate"? If such a right was created, did Congress intend to prevent private suits to enforce the it?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Virginia Hospital Assoc., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Medicaid--provisions of the Social Security Act

Yes and no. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Boren Amendment clearly established a right to reasonable and adequate reimbursement rates for the hospitals. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for the majority, stated that a right exists if "the provision in question was intend[ed] to benefit the ... plaintiff." The requirement of reasonable rates was clearly intended to benefit the hospitals, so it amounted to a right under 1983. Without explicit language within the Amendment preventing private suits under 1983, or an alternative remedial scheme that would make such suits unnecessary, it was not reasonable to conclude that Congress had intended to prevent private suits to enforce the right it had created.

FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-2012

Petitioner

FW/PBS, Inc.

Respondent

Dallas

Consolidation

No. 87-2051

No. 88-49

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

493 U.S. 215 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, October 4, 1989

Decided

Tuesday, January 9, 1990

Advocates

Analeslie Muncy (on behalf of the Respondent)

John H. Weston (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for FW/PBS, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Public Citizen v. Department Of Justice

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-429

Appellee

Department Of Justice

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Public Citizen

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

No. 88-494

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

491 U.S. 440 (1989)

Argued

Monday, April 17, 1989

Decided

Wednesday, June 21, 1989

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Department Of Justice, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 1

None

Asarco Inc. v. Kadish

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1661

Petitioner

Asarco Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kadish

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

490 U.S. 605 (1989)

Argued

Monday, February 27, 1989

Decided

Tuesday, May 30, 1989

Advocates

David S. Baron (on behalf of the Respondents)

Daniel M. Gribbon (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Christopher J. Wright (as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kadish, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Karahalios v. Federal Employees

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-636

Petitioner

Karahalios

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Federal Employees

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

489 U.S. 527 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, January 17, 1989

Decided

Monday, March 6, 1989

Advocates

Richard G. Taranto (as Amicus Curiae supporting the Respondent)

Thomas R. Duffy (on behalf of the Petitioner)

H. Stephan Gordon (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Federal Employees, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 5 U.S.C. 7101

None

Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:21 +0000

Location

Texas State Comptroller

111 E 17th St Austin TX 78711

Austin, TX 78711

United States

30° 16' 42.42" N, 97° 44' 17.8476" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1245

Appellant

Texas Monthly, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Bob Bullock, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas et al.

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

489 U.S. 1 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, November 1, 1988

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 1989

Advocates

Roger J. George, Jr. (argued the cause for the appellant)

Harriet D. Burke (Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for appellees)

Facts of the Case

The state of Texas offered a tax exemption to religious publications during a 3-year period. Texas Monthly, Inc, a nonreligious publisher, claimed that this promoted religion in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Texas Monthly filed suit in a state court seeking to recover the taxes it had paid in 1985. The court ruled that the exemption violated the Establishment Clause by advancing religion and the Free Press Clause by discriminating based on the content of publications. Since the court did not have the authority to rewrite tax statutes, it instead invalidated taxes levied on nonreligious publications and ordered the state to refund Texas Monthly's tax payments. A state appeals court reversed the decision.

Question

Does a state violate the Establishment Clause and the Free Press Clause by exempting religious publications from paying taxes that all nonreligious publications must pay?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Texas Monthly, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the judgment for 6-3 court a wrote a plurality opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Thurgood Marshall. In the Brennan's view, the Texas government "directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations" by providing the exemption. The Court referred to its decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which required legislation affecting religion to have a secular purpose. In this case, the exemption did not have a secular purpose since it could not "reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion." Since taxing religious publications did not inhibit the exercise of religion, a state could not singularly remove taxes for religious publications while still taxing nonreligious publications. This would use state mechanisms to give religious publishers an advantage over nonreligious publishers in violation of the Establishment Clause.

Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-1034

Appellee

American Booksellers Assn.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Virginia

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Opinion

484 U.S. 383 (1988)

Argued

Wednesday, November 4, 1987

Decided

Monday, January 25, 1988

Advocates

Paul M. Bator (on behalf of the appellees)

Richard W. Smith (on behalf of the appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Virginia, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Thompson v. Thompson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-964

Petitioner

Thompson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Thompson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Opinion

484 U.S. 174 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, October 6, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, January 12, 1988

Advocates

Kenneth Rigby (on behalf of Respondent)

Ronand W. Weiss (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Thompson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1738

None

Karcher v. May

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1551

Appellee

May

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Karcher

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Opinion

484 U.S. 72 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, October 6, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, December 1, 1987

Advocates

Norman L. Cantor (on behalf of Respondent)

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for May, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-473

Petitioner

Gwaltney

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chesapeake Bay Foundation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Opinion

484 U.S. 49 (1987)

Argued

Monday, October 5, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, December 1, 1987

Advocates

Louis F. Claiborne (on behalf of the Respondent)

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Gwaltney, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water), plus amendments

None

Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1370

Appellee

Ragland

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

481 U.S. 221 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, January 20, 1987

Decided

Wednesday, April 22, 1987

Advocates

John Steven Clark (on behalf of Appellee)

Anne Owings Wilson (on behalf of Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None