Cases by Issue - Indians

Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-631

Petitioner

Joan Wagnon, Secretary, Kansas Department of Revenue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, February 28, 2005

Argued

Monday, October 3, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, December 6, 2005

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Ian Heath Gershengorn (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, a sovereign Indian tribe, raises revenue with a tax on the gasoline sold at an on-reservation gas station. The Nation purchases the gas from non-Indian, off-reservation distributors. Kansas imposed a tax on distributors of motor fuels, which the distributors pass on to the gas stations they sell to. The Nation sued Wagnon, the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Revenue, seeking to avoid the tax. The Nation argued that the state's tax interfered with the tribe's sovereignty, and therefore was not allowed by federal law. Wagnon claimed that since the tax was on off- reservation suppliers, the Nation's sovereignty was unaffected. The District Court accepted that argument and ruled for Wagnon. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, applying the interest-balancing test prescribed by White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker. The Circuit Court found that the tribe's interests in economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government out-weighed Kansas's interest in raising revenue.

Question

When a State taxes receipt of fuel by non-tribal, off-reservation distributors, manufacturers, and importers, should the White Mountain Apache v. Bracker interest-balancing test apply if the fuel is later sold by an Indian tribe?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Wagnon, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that the White Mountain Apache v. Bracker balancing test applies only where "a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation." The Court ruled for Wagnon and upheld the tax, agreeing with the District Court that the balancing test should not apply to taxes on off-reservation distributors. Justice Thomas wrote that keeping the scope of the test narrow would maintain the traditional concept of tribal sovereignty, establish a "bright-line standard" in Indian tax-immunity, and still respect tribal authority over on-reservation activities. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, which Justice Kennedy joined.

Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-855

Petitioner

City of Sherrill, New York

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oneida Indian Nation of New York, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 197 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, March 29, 2005

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondents, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Michael R. Smith (argued the cause for Respondents)

Ira S. Sacks (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Caitlin J. Halligan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In the late 18th century, Congress set aside most of the tribal land of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York as a reservation. The tribe later sold off much of the reservation. In the 1990s members of the tribe began to buy back pieces of the land. The tribe said the reacquired land was part of a reservation and therefore exempt from state and municipal taxes. The City of Sherrill - which encompassed some of the tribe's property - argued the land was not tax-exempt. The Oneidas sued Sherrill in federal district court and alleged the land was recognized by the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua as part of their historic reservation. The Oneidas also pointed to the 1790 Non- Intercourse Act that required federal consent for Indian land to lose its reservation status. Sherrill argued the land lost its reservation status after leaving the Oneidas' ownership originally. The district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for the Oneidas.

Question

Were land parcels once owned by the Oneida Nation, sold in 1807 but repurchased in the 1990s by the Nation's descedant tribe, part of an Indian Reservation and thus exempt from local taxes?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Sherrill, N.Y., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that standards of federal Indian law and federal equity precluded the Tribe from unilaterally reviving its ancient sovereignty over the land at issue. The Court pointed to the "longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of central New York and its inhabitants"and the fact that regulatory authority over the land had been exercised by state and local government for 200 years. By giving up the land in the early 19th century, the Oneidas had "relinquished governmental reins and could not regain them through open-market purchases from current titleholders."

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma & Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation v. Leavitt

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1472

Petitioner

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, No. 03-853

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 631 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 22, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 1, 2005

Advocates

Lloyd B. Miller (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) allows tribes to administer health care programs previously run by the federal government. Tribes can opt to do this by entering into contracts with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who is obligated to fund tribe-run health services as if they were still federally run. The Secretary must also fund "contract support costs" associated with carrying out the contract. However, ISDA requires the federal government to fund contract support costs only to the extent money is available. ISDA also does not require the federal government to reduce funding for some tribe programs to make funds available for other tribes. In two separate cases tribes claimed the federal government under-funded contract support costs. The Secretary argued the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations Act made it clear the government lacked the funds to pay the full contract support costs. In one case a federal appellate court ruled that the federal government did not adequately fund contract support costs and that funds were available. In another case a federal appellate court ruled for the federal government.

Question

Did the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to pay "contract support costs," even if the government contends funds were not available?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma & Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 450

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the government was legally bound to pay the contract support costs. Only in a "special" instance could the government break its promise to pay the costs. In this case, the government had access to sufficient unrestricted funds appropriated by Congress. Moreover, nothing in the act's language suggested it was non-binding.

United States v. Lara

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-107

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Billy Jo Lara

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 193 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, September 30, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, January 21, 2004

Decided

Monday, April 19, 2004

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Alexander F. Reichert (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Bureau of Indian Affairs officials arrested Billy Jo Lara on the Spirit Lake Nation Reservation for public intoxication (though Lara is not a member of the reservation). During the arrest Lara attacked an officer.

A tribal court convicted Lara of assault. The federal government then indicted Lara for assaulting a federal officer. Lara moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the federal charges violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeapordy (being charged twice for the same crime). The district court denied Lara's motion. Lara then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his Fifth Amendment motion.

A panel of the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court ruling. However, the Eight Circuit reversed when it reviewed the case en banc (with the full court), ruling that Lara's federal charges violated the double jeapordy clause. The court reasoned that the only source of authority for Spring Lake Nation to prosecute a nonmember (like Lara) came from the federal Indian Civil Rights Act (1968). Because the federal government delegated this prosecutorial authority to Indian Tribes, charging Lara for the same crime in tribal and federal courts was essentially trying Lara twice under federal authority.

Question

Does the Indian Civil Rights Act (1968) give Indian tribes separate sovereignty to prosecute nonmembers (as opposed to delegating federal power to the tribes for prosecution purposes) such that prosecution in tribal and federal courts for the same crime would not violate the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 1: Delegation of Powers

Yes. In an opinion written by Justice Stephen G. Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and three other Justices, the Court found that the right to prosecute nonmember Indians is inherent in the sovereignty of Native American tribes. Congress may constitutionally choose to restrict this right, but its choice not to (or its choice to relax earlier-imposed restrictions) is different from a delegation of federal prosecutorial power. Prosecuting a crime under both federal and tribal law, therefore, does not violate the Constitution.

United States v. Navajo Nation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1375

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Navajo Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 488 (2003)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, March 4, 2003

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Paul E. Frye (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA) allows Indian tribes, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to lease the mining rights on their tribal lands to private companies. In 1964, Navajo Nation (tribe) entered into a lease with the predecessor of Peabody Coal Company, allowing Peabody to mine on the tribe's land in return for a royalty of 37.5 cents for every ton of coal mined. The agreement was subject to renegotiation after 20 years. By 1984, the tribe's royalty was only worth 2% of Peabody's gross proceeds. In 1977 Congress had required a minimum of 12.5%. The tribe requested that the Secretary set a new rate, and the Director of Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Navajo Area, as the Secretary's representative, made a preliminary decision to set the rate at 20%. Peabody's representatives urged the Secretary to reverse or delay the decision. The Secretary agreed, and urged the parties to resume negotiations. The tribe and Peabody agreed on a rate of 12.5%. In 1993, however, the tribe sued the government in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging a breach of trust and claiming $600 million in damages. The court ruled for the government, explaining that though the government may have betrayed the tribe's trust by acting in Peabody’s interest rather than the tribe’s, it had not violated any specific statutory or regulatory obligation. The tribe was therefore not entitled to monetary relief. On appeal, the tribe argued that the entirety of the IMLA imposes on the government a broad obligation to look after the wellbeing of the tribe. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court, finding that "the Secretary must act in the best interests of the Indian tribes."

Question

Can the U.S. be held liable for a breach of trust with an Indian Tribe in connection with the negotiation of a mining lease, even when the U.S. has violated no specific statutory or regulatory duty established in the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 396

No. In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled that an Indian Tribe must "identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties." The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that the IMLA could not be interpreted to require the Secretary to exercise broad authority to manage the tribe's resources for the tribe's benefit. Instead, the tribe itself controls negotiations and the Secretary has a more limited role in approving the agreements. The Court concluded that no provision of the IMLA entitled the tribe to monetary damages as a result of the government's role in the negotiations. Justice Souter, joined by justices Stevens and O’Connor, wrote a dissent arguing that the Secretary's approval power must be exercised for the tribe's benefit, and monetary damages may be awarded if the power is misused.

United States v. White Mt. Apache Tribe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1067

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

White Mt. Apache Tribe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 465 (2003)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, March 4, 2003

Advocates

Robert C. Brauchli (On behalf of the respondent)

Gregory G. Garre (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Under Public Law 86-392, the former Fort Apache Military Reservation is held in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The Tribe sued the federal government to rehabilitate the property, alleging that the United States had breached a fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair, and preserve it. In its motion to dismiss, the federal government argued that jurisdiction was lacking here because no statute or regulation could be read to impose a legal obligation on it to maintain or restore the trust property, let alone authorize compensation for breach. The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the complaint. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the federal government's property use triggered a common-law trustee's duty to act reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary of the Interior chose to utilize, which also supported a money damages claim.

Question

Does the Court of Federal Claims, under the Indian Tucker Act, have jurisdiction over the White Mountain Apache Tribe's suit against the United States for breach of fiduciary duty to manage land and improvements held in trust for the Tribe but occupied by the federal government?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for White Mt. Apache Tribe, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1505

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Public Law 86-392 gives rise to Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over the Tribe's suit. The Court reasoned that, although the statute providing for the land to be held in trust imposed no duties on the United States to maintain the land, the occupation of such land by the United States raised a duty to preserve trust assets and that it naturally followed that the United States was liable in damages for the breach of such duties. Justice Clarence Thomas, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined, dissented. Justice Thomas argued that the majority's opinion "radically alters the relevant inquiry from one focused on the actual fiduciary duties created by statute or regulation to one divining fiduciary duties out of the use of the word 'trust' and notions of factual control."

Chickasaw Nation v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-507

Petitioner

Chickasaw Nation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 84 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, October 2, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, November 27, 2001

Advocates

Edward C. DuMont (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Graydon D. Luthey, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Indian Regulatory Gaming Act provides that Internal Revenue Code provisions "(including sections 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and chapter 35() concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes" with respect to gambling operations shall apply to Indian tribes in the same way as they apply to States. Chapter 35 imposes taxes from which it exempts certain state- controlled gambling activities, but says nothing about tax reporting or withholding. The Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, in a lawsuit, claimed that the Gaming Act subsection's explicit parenthetical reference exempts them from paying those chapter 35 taxes from which the States are exempt. Rejecting that claim, the Court of Appeals ultimately held that the subsection applies only to Code provisions concerning tax withholding and reporting.

Question

Does the Indian Regulatory Gaming Act exempt tribes from paying the gambling- related taxes, which State need not pay, imposed by chapter 35 of the Internal Revenue Code?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 2719

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Indian Regulatory Gaming Act does not create such an exemption. The Court reasoned that despite its parenthetical reference, the language outside the parenthetical was unambiguous and the subsection applied only to Internal Revenue Code provisions that concerned the reporting and withholding of taxes. The language inside the parenthetical was meant simply to be illustrative. Moreover, the Court noted that when Congress enacts a tax exemption, it ordinarily does so explicitly. "We can find no comparable instance in which Congress legislated an exemption through an inexplicit numerical cross- reference -- especially a cross-reference that might easily escape notice," wrote Justice Breyer.

Idaho v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-189

Petitioner

Idaho

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 262 (2001)

Argued

Monday, April 23, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 18, 2001

Advocates

Steven W. Strack (Boise, Idaho, argued the cause for the petitioner)

David C. Frederick (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent United States)

Raymond C. Givens (Argued the cause for the respondent Coeur d'Alene Tribe)

Facts of the Case

In 1873, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe agreed to relinquish all claims to its aboriginal lands outside the bounds of a more substantial reservation that U.S. negotiators agreed to set apart for the tribe's exclusive use. The reservation included part of the St. Joe River and virtually all of the Lake Coeur d'Alene. President Grant set the land aside in an 1873 Executive Order. In 1891, Congress ratified agreements in which the Tribe agreed to cede its rights to all land except that within the Executive Order reservation, and the Government promised to compensate the Tribe and agreed to hold the land forever as Indian land and the Tribe agreed to cede the reservation's northern portion, including two-thirds of the lake, for compensation. The United States initiated an action against Idaho to quiet title in the United States, in trust for the Tribe, to the submerged lands within the current reservation. The District Court quieted title in the United States as trustee, and the Tribe as beneficiary, to the bed and banks of the lake and the river within the reservation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the National Government hold title, in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, to lands underlying portions of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the National Government holds title, in trust for the Tribe, to lands underlying portions of Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that "Congress recognized the full extent of the Executive Order reservation lying within the stated boundaries it ultimately confirmed, and intended to bar passage to Idaho of title to the submerged lands at issue here." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, with whom Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas joined, dissented. "Congress' desire to divest an entering State of its sovereign interest in submerged lands must be 'definitely declared or otherwise made very plain,'" argued Chief Justice Rehnquist, "That standard has not been met here."

Atkinson Trading v. Shirley

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-454

Petitioner

Atkinson Trading

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shirley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 645 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, March 27, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, May 29, 2001

Advocates

Charles G. Cole (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Beth S. Brinkmann (Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Marcelino R. Gomez (Navajo Nation, Department of Justice, Window Rock, Arizona; argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Atkinson Trading Company, Inc. owns the Cameron Trading Post, which is located on non-Indian fee land within the Navajo Nation Reservation. The Cameron Trading Post consists of a hotel, restaurant, cafeteria, gallery, curio shop, retail store, and recreational vehicle facility. In 1992, the Navajo Nation enacted a hotel occupancy tax, which imposed an 8 percent tax upon any hotel room located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. Atkinson challenged the tax under Montana v. United States. Under Montana, with two limited exceptions, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation. The District Court upheld that tax. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the tax fell under Montana's first exception because a "consensual relationship exists in that the nonmember guests could refrain from the privilege of lodging within the confines of the Navajo Reservation and therefore remain free from liability for the [tax]."

Question

Does the rule in Montana v. United States, that, with limited exceptions, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non- Indian fee land within a reservation, apply to tribal attempts to tax nonmember activity occurring on non-Indian fee land?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Atkinson Trading, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 261

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Navajo Nation's imposition of a hotel occupancy tax upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within its reservation is invalid. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that "Indian tribes are 'unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,' but their dependent status generally precludes extension of tribal civil authority beyond these limits. The Navajo Nation's imposition of a tax upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within the reservation is, therefore, presumptively invalid. Because respondents have failed to establish that the hotel occupancy tax is commensurately related to any consensual relationship with [Atkinson] or is necessary to vindicate the Navajo Nation's political integrity, the presumption ripens into a holding."

Nevada v. Hicks

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1994

Petitioner

Nevada

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hicks

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 353 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, March 21, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 25, 2001

Advocates

Barbara B. McDowell (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting affirmance)

C. Wayne Howle (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

S. James Anaya (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Floyd Hicks is a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes of western Nevada. After tribal police observed that Hicks was in possession of two California bighorn sheep heads, state game wardens obtained search warrants from state court and from the tribal court. After the warrants were executed, Hicks filed suit in Tribal Court, alleging trespass to land and chattels, abuse of process, and violation of civil rights, specifically denial of equal protection, denial of due process, and unreasonable search and seizure. The Tribal Court held that it had jurisdiction over the claims and the Tribal Appeals Court affirmed. Agreeing, the District Court held that the wardens would have to exhaust their qualified immunity claims in Tribal Court. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fact that Hicks's home is on tribe-owned reservation land is sufficient to support tribal jurisdiction over civil claims against nonmembers arising from their activities on that land.

Question

May a tribal court assert jurisdiction over civil claims against state officials who entered tribal land to execute a search warrant against a tribe member suspected of having violated state law outside the reservation?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Nevada, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, a unanimous Court held that "[b]ecause the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes lacked legislative authority to restrict, condition, or otherwise regulate the ability of state officials to investigate off-reservation violations of state law, they also lacked adjudicative authority to hear respondent's claim that those officials violated tribal law in the performance of their duties. "[S]ince the lack of authority is clear," continued Scalia, "there is no need to exhaust the jurisdictional dispute in tribal court. State officials operating on a reservation to investigate off-reservation violations of state law are properly held accountable for tortious conduct and civil rights violations in either state or federal court, but not in tribal court."

C&L Enterprises v. Citizen Band Potawatomi

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-292

Petitioner

C&L Enterprises

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Citizen Band Potawatomi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 411 (2001)

Argued

Monday, March 19, 2001

Decided

Monday, April 30, 2001

Advocates

Gregory S. Coleman (On behalf of Texas, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Michael Minnis (Argued the cause for the respondent)

John D. Mashburn (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Gregory G. Garre (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, a federally recognized Tribe, entered into a contract with C & L Enterprises, Inc., for the installation of a roof on a Tribe-owned building in Oklahoma. The property rests outside the Tribe's reservation and is not held in trust by the Federal Government for the Tribe. The contract contains clauses requiring disputes arising out of the contract to be decided by arbitration and a choice-of-law clause that reads: "The contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located." Thus, Oklahoma law governed the contract. After the contract was executed, but before performance commenced, the Tribe retained another company to install the roof. C & L then submitted an arbitration demand. The Tribe asserted sovereign immunity. The arbitrator awarded C & L a monetary award. Ultimately, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that the Tribe was immune from suit. The court noted that the contract seemed to indicate the Tribe's willingness to expose itself to suit on the contract, but concluded that the Tribe had not waived its suit immunity with the requisite clarity.

Question

Does a federally recognized tribe waives its immunity from suit in state court when it expressly agrees to arbitrate disputes relating to a contract, to the governance of state law, and to the enforcement of arbitral awards in any court with proper jurisdiction?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for C&L Enterprises, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that "under the agreement the Tribe proposed and signed, the Tribe clearly consented to arbitration and to the enforcement of arbitral awards in Oklahoma state court; the Tribe thereby waived its sovereign immunity from C & L's suit." Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "the Tribe agreed, by express contract, to adhere to certain dispute resolution procedures."

Rice v. Cayetano

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:30 +0000

Location

Hawaii Office of Elections

802 Lehua Ave Pearl City HI 96782

Pearl City, HI 96782

United States

21° 23' 21.9444" N, 157° 58' 22.5156" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-818

Petitioner

Rice

Respondent

Cayetano

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 495 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, October 6, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 2000

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court)

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Hawaiian Constitution limits the right to vote for the nine trustees of the state agency known as the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA). The agency administers programs designed for the benefit of two subclasses of Hawaiian citizenry, "Hawaiians," defined as descendants of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Islands before 1778, and "native Hawaiians," defined as descendants of the peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778. Only "Hawaiians" may vote in the statewide election for the trusties. Harold Rice, born in Hawaii and a Hawaiian citizen, does not have the requisite ancestry to be a "Hawaiian" under state law. However, Rice applied to vote in OHA trustee elections. After Rice's application was denied, he sued Hawaiian Governor Benjamin J. Cayetano, claiming that the voting exclusion was invalid under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Federal District Court granted the state summary judgment. The court examined the voting qualifications with the latitude applied to legislation passed pursuant to Congress' power over Indian affairs, and found that the electoral scheme was rationally related to the state's responsibility to utilize a part of the proceeds from certain public lands for the native Hawaiians' benefit. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Hawaii "may rationally conclude that Hawaiians, being the group to whom trust obligations run and to whom OHA trustees owe a duty of loyalty, should be the group to decide who the trustees ought to be."

Question

Does the Hawaiian Constitutional provision, which limits the right to for the trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs to qualified "Hawaiians," violate the Fifteenth Amendment by creating a race-based voting qualification?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Rice, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 15: Fifteenth Amendment

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "Hawaii's denial of Rice's right to vote in OHA trustee elections violates the Fifteenth Amendment," in creating a race-based voting qualification. "A state may not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, and this law does so," Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court. The court rejected the state's argument that the voting limitation was one based on ancestry, not race. In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for himself and Ruth Bader Ginsburg that the majority's decision "rests largely on the repetition of glittering generalities that have little, if any, application to the compelling history of the state of Hawaii."

El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-6

Petitioner

El Paso Natural Gas Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Neztsosie

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 473 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, March 2, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 3, 1999

Advocates

Jonathan Nuechterlein (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court)

H. Bartow Farr, III (Argued the cause for the respondents)

James R. Atwood (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Laura and Arlinda Neztsosie, and others, filed separate lawsuits in the Navajo Tribal Courts, claiming damages for injuries suffered as a result of El Paso Natural Gas Corporation's and Cyprus Foote Mineral Company's uranium mining operations. El Paso and Cyprus Foote, defendants in those suits, each filed suit in Federal District Court, seeking to enjoin the Neztsosies from pursuing their tribal court claims. The District Court denied preliminary injunctions except to the extent that the Neztsosies sought relief in the Tribal Courts under the Price-Anderson Act. The Price-Anderson Act provides certain federal licensees with limited liability for claims of "public liability" arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident, converts such actions into federal claims, grants federal district courts removal jurisdiction over such actions, and provides the mechanics for consolidating the actions and for managing them once consolidated. The District Court left the determinations whether the Act applied to the Neztsosies' claims to the Tribal Courts. On El Paso's and Cyprus Foote's consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decisions not to enjoin the Neztsosies from pursuing non-Price-Anderson Act claims and to allow the Tribal Courts to decide whether the Neztsosies' claims fell under that Act. Further, although the Neztsosies had not appealed the partial injunctions, the Court of Appeals moved on its own to reverse them.

Question

Do tribal courts have the authority to determine its own jurisdiction over damage actions stemming from nuclear incidents under the Price-Anderson Act, which grants federal district courts removal jurisdiction over such actions?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for El Paso Natural Gas Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 2210

No. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that requiring a district court to stay its hand while a tribal court determines its own jurisdiction, or the doctrine of tribal court exhaustion, does not apply in this case, which if brought in a state court would be subject to removal. "By the Price-Anderson Act's unusual preemption provision Congress expressed an unmistakable preference for a federal forum, at the behest of the defending party," wrote Justice Souter.

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1337

Petitioner

Minnesota

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 172 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, December 2, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, March 24, 1999

Advocates

John L. Kirwin (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Barbara B. McDowell (Argued the cause on behalf of the United States)

Randy V. Thompson (Argued the cause on behalf of the respondents John W. Thompson et al)

Marc D. Slonim (on behalf of the Respondents Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, et al)

Mark D. Slonim (Argued the cause of behalf of the respondents Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, et al)

Facts of the Case

Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians ceded land in present-day Minnesota to the U.S. in an 1837 treaty. In return, the U.S. granted the Mille Lacs Band certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded land. An 1850 Executive Order by President Taylor ordered the removal of the Mille Lacs Band and revoked their usufructuary rights. An 1855 treaty set aside reservation lands for the Mille Lacs Band, but did not mention their rights. The Mille Lacs Band sued, seeking a declaratory judgment stated that they retained their usufructuary rights and an injunction to prevent the state's interference with those rights. The District Court ultimately ruled that the Mille Lacs Band retained their usufructuary rights under the 1837 treaty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The courts rejected arguments that the 1850 Executive Order abrogated the usufructuary rights guaranteed by the 1837 treaty and that Minnesota's entrance into the Union in 1858 extinguished any Indian treaty rights under the "equal footing doctrine."

Question

Does the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians have usufructuary rights on land now part of the state of Minnesota?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 7 Stat. 536

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians does have usufructuary rights that were guaranteed to them by the 1837 treaty. After an examination of the historical record, the Court held that the 1850 Executive Order was ineffective to terminate Mille Lacs Band's usufructuary rights, that the Mille Lacs Band did not relinquish its 1837 treaty rights in the 1855 treaty, and that the Mille Lacs Band's usufructuary rights were not extinguished when Minnesota was admitted to the Union.

Cass County, MN v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-174

Petitioner

Cass County, MN

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 103 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, February 24, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Earl Edwin Maus (Walker, Minnesota, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Barbara B. McDowell (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

James M. Schoessler (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, Cass County, Minnesota began assessing ad valorem taxes on 21 parcels of reservation land that had been alienated from tribal control under the Nelson Act and later reacquired by the Leech Lake Band of Chippewa, a federally recognized Indian tribe. In 1995, the Band filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that Cass County could not tax the 21 parcels. The District Court held that all of the land that had been alienated from tribal ownership under the Nelson Act was taxable. Affirming in part, the Court of Appeals held that 13 parcels that had been allotted to individual Indians could be taxed so long as they had been patented after passage of the Burke Act proviso, because the explicit mention of "taxation" in the proviso expressed "unmistakably clear" intent. Reversing in part, the court held that the eight parcels sold as pine lands or homestead land could not be taxed because those sections did not incorporate the General Allotment Act or include any mention of an intent to tax lands distributed under them which might become reacquired by the Band.

Question

May state and local governments tax reservation land that was made alienable by Congress and sold to non-Indians by the Federal Government but was later repurchased by a tribe?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cass County, MN, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 Stat. 642

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that ad valorem taxes may be imposed upon such land. "When Congress makes Indian reservation land freely alienable, it manifests an unmistakably clear intent to render such land subject to state and local taxation," wrote Justice Thomas. Repurchasing the land by an Indian tribe does not return the land to tax-exempt status. Justice Thomas concluded that "[t]he eight parcels at issue here were therefore taxable unless and until they were restored to federal trust protection."

Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1829

Petitioner

Montana

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Crow Tribe of Indians

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 696 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, February 24, 1998

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1998

Advocates

Robert S. Pelcyger (Argued the cause for the private respondent)

Clay Riggs Smith (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the federal respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1904, the Crow Tribe ceded part of its Montana Reservation to the United States for settlement by non-Indians, with the U.S holding the rights to the minerals underlying the ceded strip in trust for the Tribe. In 1972, pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA), Westmoreland Resources, Inc., a non-Indian company, entered into a mining lease with the Tribe for coal underlying the ceded strip. In 1975, Montana imposed a severance tax and a gross proceeds tax on all coal produced in the State, including coal underlying the reservation and the ceded strip. In 1978, the Tribe brought a federal action for injunctive and declaratory relief against Montana and its counties, alleging that the State's severance and gross proceeds taxes were preempted by the IMLA and infringed on the Tribe's right to govern itself. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded that both taxes were preempted by the IMLA and void for interfering with tribal governance. The U.S. Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Subsequently, the Tribe sough to recover certain taxes paid by Westmoreland. The District Court then concluded that the disgorgement remedy sought by the Tribe was not appropriate. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Is the restitution sought for the Crow Tribe from the State of Montana for the illegal collection of taxes and cola mined on the Tribe's reservation warranted?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Montana, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the restitution sought for the Tribe of all severance and gross proceeds taxes paid by Westmoreland to Montana and certain counties, before the tribe's severance tax became valid, was not warranted. The Court decision was based on findings that Westmoreland had forfeited its entitlement to a refund, that neither the state nor the tribe enjoyed authority to tax to the total exclusion of the other, and that the tribe could not have taxed the company during the periods in question. The Court also concluded that the District Court had ruled properly where the tribe and the U.S. had argued for total disgorgement rather than a different form of relief. In a partial dissent in which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined, Justice David H. Souter argued that nothing disentitled the tribe at least to press for disgorgement of some or all of Montana's tax revenues.

Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1037

Petitioner

Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 751 (1998)

Argued

Monday, January 12, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 1998

Advocates

John E. Patterson, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Edward C. DuMont (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

R. Brown Wallace (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The U.S. holds in trust the Oklahoma land that the federally recognized Kiowa Tribe owns. In 1990, the then-Chairman of the Tribe's Business Committee signed a promissory note in the Tribe's name in order to purchase stock from Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. The note states that it was signed on tribal lands and provides that nothing in it subjects or limits the Tribe's sovereign rights. After the Tribe defaulted, Manufacturing Technologies sued the Tribe in state court, claiming that the note was executed and delivered beyond tribal lands. The Tribe moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Denying the motion, the trial court entered judgment for Manufacturing Technologies. In affirming, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that Indian tribes are subject to suit in state court for breaches of contract involving off- reservation commercial conduct.

Question

May Indian tribes be sued in state courts for breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial conduct?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from civil suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether they were made on or off a reservation. Noting that an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity, Justice Kennedy deferred to Congress, which has not abrogated a tribe's immunity from civil suits on contracts. In a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the Court should consider "whether a tribe is immune from a suit that has no meaningful nexus to the Tribe's land or its sovereign functions."

Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1577

Petitioner

Alaska

Respondent

Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 520 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, December 10, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 1998

Advocates

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Heather R. Kendall (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which completely extinguished all aboriginal claims to Alaska land. ANCSA revoked the Neets'aii Gwich'in Indians' reservation surrounding the Village of Venetie. Subsequently, two Native corporations established for the Neets'aii Gwich'in elected to use an ANCSA provision allowing them to take title to former reservation lands in return for forgoing the statute's monetary payments and transfers of nonreservation land. The title to the reservation was ultimately transferred to the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Tribe). In 1986, Alaska entered into a joint venture with a private contractor to construct a public school in Venetie. Afterwards, the Tribe notified the contractor that it owed the Tribe approximately $161,000 in taxes for conducting business activities on its land. The Federal District Court held that, because the Tribe's ANCSA lands were not "Indian country," the Tribe lacked the power to impose a tax upon nonmembers. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Is the land owned by the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government "Indian country" pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Alaska, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1151

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Tribe's land is not "Indian country." "As noted, only one Indian reservation, the Annette Island Reserve, survived ANCSA," explained Justice Thomas in a footnote, [o]ther Indian country exists in Alaska post-ANCSA only if the land in question meets the requirements of a 'dependent Indian community' under our interpretation of [18 USC section 1151 (b)], or if it constitutes 'allotments' under [18 USC section 1151 (c)]." "The Tribe's ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these requirements," concluded Justice Thomas, "[a]fter the enactment of ANCSA, the Tribe's lands are neither 'validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such,' nor are they under the superintendence of the Federal Government."

South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1581

Petitioner

South Dakota

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Yankton Sioux Tribe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 329 (1998)

Argued

Monday, December 8, 1997

Decided

Monday, January 26, 1998

Advocates

Mark W. Barnett (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Barbara B. McDowell (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondents)

James G. Abourezk (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

An 1858 Treaty between the United States and the Yankton Tribe established the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. The 1887 Dawes Act permitted the Government to allot tracts of tribal land to individual Indians and, with tribal consent, to open the remaining holdings to non-Indian settlement. In 1892, pursuant to the Dawes Act, an agreement between the Tribe and the Government, ratified in 1894, provided that nothing "shall be construed to abrogate the [1858] treaty." In 1992, the Southern Missouri Recycling and Waste Management District acquired land for a solid waste disposal facility that lies on unallotted, non-Indian fee land, but falls within the reservation's original 1858 boundaries. In 1994, the Tribe filed suit to enjoin construction. Ultimately, the District Court declined to enjoin construction of the landfill, but granted a declaratory judgment that the landfill lies within the Yankton Sioux Reservation, where federal environmental regulations apply. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Did Congress diminish the boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota in an 1894 statute that ratified an agreement pursuant to the Dawes Act, which permitted the Government to open reservation land to non-Indian settlement?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for South Dakota, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 11 Stat. 743

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the 1894 statute's operative language and the circumstances surrounding its passage demonstrate that Congress intended to diminish the Yankton Reservation and as a result the unallotted lands ceded did not retain reservation status. Consequently, because the unallotted lands included the landfill site, which no longer constituted Indian country as defined by 18 USCS 1151(a), South Dakota has primary jurisdiction over the lands. Noting the repudiation of allotment philosophy, Justice O'Connor wrote that, "we must give effect to Congress' intent in passing the 1894 Act. Here... we believe that Congress spoke clearly, and although 'some might wish [it] had spoken differently... we cannot remake history.'"

Strate v. A-1 Contractors

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1872

Petitioner

Strate

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

A-1 Contractors

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 438 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, January 7, 1997

Decided

Monday, April 28, 1997

Advocates

Melody L. McCoy (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Jonathan Nuechterlein (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Patrick J. Ward (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Vehicles driven by Gisela Fredericks and Lyle Stockert collided on a portion of a North Dakota state highway that runs through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. The stretch of highway within the reservation is open to the public, affords access to a federal water resource project, and is maintained by North Dakota under a federally granted right of way that lies on land held by the United States in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes and their members. While neither driver was a member of the Tribes or an Indian, Fredericks filed a personal injury action in the Tribal Court of the Three Affliated Tribes against Stockert and A-1 Contractors, who owned the truck Stockert was driving at the time of the collision. The Tribal Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over Fredericks' claim and therefore denied A-1 Contractors and Stockert's motion to dismiss. The Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals affirmed. A-1 contractors and Stockert then filed a action in the District Court against Fredericks, the Tribal Court, and Tribal Judge William Strate, seeking a declaratory judgment that, as a matter of federal law, the Tribal Court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate Fredericks' claims. A-1 Contractors and Stockert also sought an injunction against further Tribal Court proceedings. The District Court dismissed. It held that that the Tribal Court had civil jurisdiction over Fredericks' complaint. In reversing, the en banc Court of Appeals concluded that the Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

Question

Does a tribal court have jurisdiction over a civil action against an allegedly negligent driver and the driver's employer, neither of whom is a member of the tribe, when an accident occurs on a portion of a public highway maintained by the State under a federally granted right of way over Indian reservation land?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for A-1 Contractors, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an unanimous decision, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that when an accident occurs on a public highway maintained by the State pursuant to a federally granted right of way over Indian reservation land, a civil action against allegedly negligent nonmembers falls within state or federal regulatory and adjudicatory governance; absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers driving on the State's highway, tribal courts may not exercise jurisdiction in such cases.

Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:13 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-771

Petitioner

Oklahoma Tax Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chickasaw Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 450 (1995)

Argued

Monday, April 24, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, June 14, 1995

Advocates

Paul A. Engelmayer (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Charles A. Rothfeld (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Dennis W. Arrow (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Oklahoma Tax Commission, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 7 Stat. 333

Split Vote

None

Department Of Taxation And Finance Of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-377

Petitioner

Department Of Taxation And Finance Of New York et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 61 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, March 23, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 13, 1994

Advocates

Joseph E. Zdarsky (on behalf of the Respondents)

Beth S. Brinkmann (on behalf of the United States, supporting the Respondents)

G. Oliver Koppell (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Department Of Taxation And Finance Of New York, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 261

None

Hagen v. Utah

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-6281

Petitioner

Hagen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Utah

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 399 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, November 2, 1993

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

Advocates

Ronald J. Mann (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner)

Martin E. Seneca, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Jan Graham (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Utah, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1151

None

Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac And Fox Nation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:00:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-259

Petitioner

Oklahoma Tax Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sac And Fox Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

508 U.S. 114 (1993)

Argued

Tuesday, March 23, 1993

Decided

Monday, May 17, 1993

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

David Allen Miley (on behalf of the Petitioner)

G. William Rice (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Sac And Fox Nation, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1151

None

South Dakota v. Bourland, Individually And As Chairman Of The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:01:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-2051

Petitioner

South Dakota

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bourland, Individually And As Chairman Of The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

508 U.S. 679 (1993)

Argued

Tuesday, March 2, 1993

Decided

Monday, June 14, 1993

Advocates

Mark W. Barnett (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Brian Stuart Koukoutchos (on behalf of the Respondents)

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for South Dakota, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 58 Stat. 887

None

Negonsott v. Samuels, Warden

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:01:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-5397

Petitioner

Negonsott

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Samuels, Warden, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

507 U.S. 99 (1993)

Argued

Monday, January 11, 1993

Decided

Wednesday, February 24, 1993

Advocates

William K. Kelley (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae supporting the Respondents)

Pamela S. Thompson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Robert T. Stephan (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Samuels, Warden, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3243

None

County Of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes And Bands Of The Yakima Indian Nation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-408

Petitioner

County Of Yakima et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Confederated Tribes And Bands Of The Yakima Indian Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. County of Yakima et al., No. 90-577

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

502 U.S. 251 (1992)

Argued

Tuesday, November 5, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, January 14, 1992

Advocates

Robert Wayne Bjur (on behalf of the Respondent/Cross-Petitioner)

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent/Cross-Petitioner)

Jeffrey C. Sullivan (on behalf of the Petitioners/Cross-Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Confederated Tribes And Bands Of The Yakima Indian Nation, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 331

None

Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Potawatomi Tribe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1322

Petitioner

Oklahoma Tax Comm'n

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Potawatomi Tribe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 505 (1991)

Argued

Monday, January 7, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, February 26, 1991

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae)

Michael Minnis (on behalf of the Respondent)

David Allen Miley (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Duro v. Reina

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:49 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-6546

Petitioner

Duro

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reina

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

495 U.S. 676 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, November 29, 1989

Decided

Tuesday, May 29, 1990

Advocates

John Trebon (on behalf of the Petitioner, (appointed by this Court))

Richard B. Wilks (on behalf of the Respondents)

Lawrence G. Wallace (as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Duro, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. Holyfield

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-980

Petitioner

Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Holyfield

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

490 U.S. 30 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, January 11, 1989

Decided

Monday, April 3, 1989

Advocates

Edward A. Miller (on behalf of the Appellees)

Edwin R. Smith (on behalf of the Appellant)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 1911

None

Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1622

Petitioner

Brendale

Respondent

Confederated Yakima Indian Nation

Consolidation

No. 87-1697

No. 87-1711

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

492 U.S. 408 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, January 10, 1989

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 1989

Advocates

Jeffrey C. Sullivan (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Tim Weaver (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 12 Stat. 951

None

Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1327

Appellee

New Mexico

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Cotton Petroleum Corp.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

490 U.S. 163 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, November 30, 1988

Decided

Tuesday, April 25, 1989

Advocates

Daniel H. Israel (on behalf of the Appellants)

Harold D. Stratton (on behalf of the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for New Mexico, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 396

None

California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:19 +0000

Location

Riverside County CA

United States

33° 40' 57.2124" N, 115° 28' 24.078" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1708

Appellee

Cabazon Band of Mission Indians et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

California et al.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

480 U.S. 202 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, December 9, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 1987

Advocates

Roderick Eugene Walston (Supervising Deputy Attorney General of California, on behalf of the appellants)

Glenn M. Feldman (on behalf of the appellees)

Facts of the Case

Two federally recognized Indian Tribes had reservation land within Riverside County, California where they conducted bingo and card games open to non- Indians. The gambling industry provided employment to many Indians on the reservation, and most clients were non-Indians. The State of California wanted to apply state gambling laws to reservation gaming and Riverside County wanted to apply local ordinances. Together, these laws would ban the card games and put charitable organizations in charge of bingo games. The Tribes claimed that the imposition of gambling laws by the state government violated their sovereignty. They brought suit against the state of California and Riverside County in federal district court. The district court ruled that neither the state nor the county had the authority to regulate gambling on reservation land. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Do state and local governments have the authority to regulate gambling conducted on Indian reservation land?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Cabazon Band Of Mission Indians, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets, National Firearms, Organized Crime Control, Comprehensive Crime Control, or Gun Control Acts, except for RICO (q.v.) portion

No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. State laws require the consent of Congress in order to apply to Indian reservations. While the federal government consented to states enforcing criminal laws on reservation land, gambling regulations are types of civil law and therefore not enforceable. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 did not grant states the authority to regulate gambling either. Although the Act incorporated certain state gambling laws into federal laws regulating gambling on reservations, this did not grant states authority to enforce the new federal laws on reservations. Absent explicit permission for regulation, states can only enforce laws on reservations if their interests in regulation outweigh the interests of the federal government and tribal authorities. In this case, gambling provided revenue critical to the economic self-sufficiency of the reservation. Accordingly, the federal government's interest to ensure Indian self-government outweighed state concerns about organized crime developing because of unregulated reservation gaming.

United States v. Mottaz

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-546

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mottaz

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

476 U.S. 834 (1986)

Argued

Tuesday, April 22, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, June 11, 1986

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of Petitioner)

Derck Amerman (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 2409

None

United States v. Dion

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-246

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dion

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

476 U.S. 734 (1986)

Argued

Tuesday, March 25, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, June 11, 1986

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (on behalf of the petitioner)

Terry L. Pechota (on behalf of the respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 16 U.S.C. 668

None

Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1973

Petitioner

Three Affiliated Tribes

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wold Engineering

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

476 U.S. 877 (1986)

Argued

Monday, March 24, 1986

Decided

Monday, June 16, 1986

Advocates

Raymond Cross (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Gary H. Lee (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Three Affiliated Tribes, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1360

None

South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-782

Petitioner

South Carolina

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

476 U.S. 498 (1986)

Argued

Thursday, December 12, 1985

Decided

Monday, June 2, 1986

Advocates

Don Brantley Miller (on behalf of the Respondents)

James D. St. Clair (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for South Carolina, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 931

None

Oregon Fish & Wildlife Dept. v. Klamath Tribe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:13 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-2148

Petitioner

Oregon Fish & Wildlife Dept.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Klamath Tribe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

473 U.S. 753 (1985)

Argued

Wednesday, February 27, 1985

Decided

Tuesday, July 2, 1985

Advocates

Don Brantley Miller (on behalf of the respondent)

David B. Frohnmayer (on behalf of the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Oregon Fish & Wildlife Dept., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 16 Stat. 707

None

Kerr-Mcgee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-68

Petitioner

Kerr-Mcgee Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Navajo Tribe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

471 U.S. 195 (1985)

Argued

Monday, February 25, 1985

Decided

Tuesday, April 16, 1985

Advocates

Louis F. Claiborne (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae in support of respondents)

Elizabeth Bernstein (on behalf of the respondents)

Alvin H. Shrago (on behalf of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Navajo Tribe, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Santa Ana

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-262

Petitioner

Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Santa Ana

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

472 U.S. 237 (1985)

Argued

Wednesday, February 20, 1985

Decided

Monday, June 10, 1985

Advocates

Scott E. Borg (on behalf of the Respondent)

Kathryn Marie Krause (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 43 Stat. 641

None

Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-2161

Petitioner

Montana

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Blackfeet Tribe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

471 U.S. 759 (1985)

Argued

Tuesday, January 15, 1985

Reargued:

Tuesday, April 23, 1985

Decided

Monday, June 3, 1985

Advocates

Deirdre Boggs (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Edwin S. Kneedler (as amicus curiae supporting the Respondent)

Jeanne S. Whiteing (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Blackfeet Tribe, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 396

None

United States v. Dann

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1476

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dann

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

470 U.S. 39 (1985)

Argued

Monday, November 5, 1984

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 1985

Advocates

Robert A. Mc Connell (on behalf of the petitioner)

John D. O'Connell (on behalf of respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 22

None

County Of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1065

Petitioner

County Of Oneida

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oneida Indian Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 83-1240

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

470 U.S. 226 (1985)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 1984

Decided

Monday, March 4, 1985

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (as amicus curiae)

Peter H. Schiff (on behalf of Petitioner)

Allan van Gestel (on behalf of Petitioners)

Arlinda F. Locklear (on behalf of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Oneida Indian Nation, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Indians

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-2056

Petitioner

Escondido Mut. Water Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

La Jolla Indians

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

466 U.S. 765 (1984)

Argued

Monday, March 26, 1984

Decided

Tuesday, May 15, 1984

Advocates

Paul D. Engstrand (on behalf of the petitioners)

Robert S. Pelcyger (on behalf of the respondent Mission Indian Bands)

Elliott Schulder (on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior)

Jerome M. Feit (on behalf of FERC)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Escondido Mut. Water Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Power

None

Solem v. Bartlett

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:07 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-1253

Petitioner

Solem

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bartlett

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

465 U.S. 463 (1984)

Argued

Wednesday, December 7, 1983

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 1984

Advocates

Mark V. Meierhenry (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Tom D. Tobin (on behalf of the amici curiae)

Arlinda F. Locklear (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bartlett, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 35 Stat. 460

None

Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-629

Petitioner

Three Affiliated Tribes

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wold Engineering

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

467 U.S. 138 (1984)

Argued

Tuesday, November 29, 1983

Decided

Tuesday, May 29, 1984

Advocates

Raymond Cross (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Hugh Mc Cutcheon (on behalf of the Respondent)

Louis F. Claiborne (on behalf of the U.S. as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Three Affiliated Tribes, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1360

None

New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-331

Petitioner

New Mexico

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mescalero Apache Tribe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

462 U.S. 324 (1983)

Argued

Tuesday, April 19, 1983

Decided

Monday, June 13, 1983

Advocates

Louis F. Claiborne (as amicus curiae)

George E. Fettinger (on behalf of the Respondent)

Thomas L. Dunigan (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Mescalero Apache Tribe, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Rice v. Rehner

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-401

Petitioner

Rice

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rehner

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

463 U.S. 713 (1983)

Argued

Monday, March 21, 1983

Decided

Friday, July 1, 1983

Advocates

Alan S. Meth (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Joshua I. Schwartz (on behalf of the U.S. as amicus curiae)

Stephen V. Quesenberry (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Rice, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1161

None

Arizona v. California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

8 ORIG

Plaintiff

Arizona

Petitioner Type

Plaintiff

Defendant

California

Respondent Type

Defendant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

460 U.S. 605 (1983)

Argued

Wednesday, December 8, 1982

Decided

Wednesday, March 30, 1983

Advocates

Louis F. Claiborne (on behalf of the United States)

Carl Boronkay (on behalf of State Parties)

Ralph Hunsaker (on behalf of State Parties)

Lawrence A. Aschenbrenner (on behalf of Indian Tribes)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for California, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 11: Eleventh Amendment

None

Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau Of Revenue

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:32:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-2162

Appellee

Bureau Of Revenue

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Ramah Navajo School Bd.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

458 U.S. 832 (1982)

Argued

Wednesday, April 28, 1982

Decided

Friday, July 2, 1982

Advocates

Louis F. Claiborne (as amicus curiae)

Jan Unna (on behalf of Appellees)

Michael P. Gross (on behalf of Appellants)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Ramah Navajo School Bd., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 450

None