Cases by Issue - Miscellaneous

Beard v. Banks

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1739

Petitioner

Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ronald Banks, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, November 14, 2005

Argued

Monday, March 27, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2006

Advocates

Jere Krakoff (argued the cause for Respondent)

Jonathan L. Marcus (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Louis J. Rovelli (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Pennsylvania houses "incorrigible, recalcitrant" prisoners in the Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU). Ronald Banks was one of about 40 prisoners in level 2 of the LTSU, which is reserved for the most dangerous, worst-behaved inmates. It is the policy of the LTSU to impose severe restrictions on the privileges of level 2 inmates. In particular, level 2 prisoners are the only ones denied newspapers, magazines, and photographs. Beard, the Secretary of the PA Department of Corrections, argued that this policy was necessary to promote rehabilitation and ensure prison safety. Banks brought a suit challenging the policy as a violation of the First Amendment. On the recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court ruled in favor of Beard. On appeal, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Circuit Court found that the prison's policy failed to meet the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley. The Third Circuit held that the First Amendment rights of the prisoners took precedence, because the policy was unrelated to the goal of rehabilitation, and an ineffective method of increasing prison safety.

Question

Does a prison policy that denies newspapers, magazines, and photographs to the worst-behaved prisoners violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Beard, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 6-2 decision, the Court reversed the Third Circuit and upheld the prison's policy. The plurality opinion by Justice Breyer held that Banks had failed to present sufficient evidence that the prison had acted unreasonably in denying newspapers, magazines, and photographs to its most troublesome inmates. The Court found that the policy met the four-part test established in Turner v. Safley: (1) it was rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of motivating good behavior; (2) though prisoners had no alternate means of exercising their rights, they could potentially graduate to the less-restrictive level 1; (3) accommodating prisoners' rights could result in negative consequences (worse behavior); and (4) there was no alternate means of accomplishing the prison's goals without restricting the prisoners' rights. Justice Thomas concurred separately in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, arguing that "This case reveals the shortcomings of the Turner framework." Justices Stevens and Ginsburg both wrote dissents. Justice Stevens called the policy "perilously close to a state-sponsored effort at mind control," while Justice Ginsburg criticized the high evidentiary burden the plurality placed on the prisoners. Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.

Hartman v. Moore

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1495

Petitioner

Michael Hartman, Frank Kormann, Pierce McIntosh, Norman Robbins, and Robert Edwards

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

William G. Moore, Jr.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, January 10, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, April 26, 2006

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Patrick F. McCartan (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

William Moore sued six postal inspectors in federal court, alleging that they had brought criminal charges against him in retaliation for lobbying efforts he undertook on behalf of his company. The inspectors claimed that they had qualified immunity (that is, because they filed the charges in their official capacity on good faith, they could not be sued) and also that the case should be dismissed because they had probable cause to charge Moore. The district court sided with Moore, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed, finding that, even with probable cause, they must show that that the prosecution was not motivated by a desire for retaliation.

Question

Are law enforcement agents liable for retaliatory prosecution in violation of a defendant's First Amendment free speech rights when the prosecution was supported by probable cause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Hartman, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 5-2 decision, the Court ruled in favor of the postal inspectors, overruling the Court of Appeals. The opinion by Justice David Souter held that plaintiffs alleging retaliatory prosecution must prove that the law enforcement agents lacked probable cause. Probable cause, the Court ruled, is a crucial component of the "chain of causation" needed to evaluate retaliatory prosecution charges. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, which Justice Breyer joined. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito took no part in the decision.

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR)

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1152

Petitioner

Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, May 2, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, December 6, 2005

Decided

Monday, March 6, 2006

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

E. Joshua Rosenkranz (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 983(b)(1), withholds some federal funding from colleges and universities that deny U.S. military recruiters the same access to students that other employers are given. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights challenged the law, arguing that it violated the schools' First Amendment rights to expressive association by requiring them to assist in military recruitment. The district court rejected the suit, but a Third Court of Appeals panel reversed. It held that, while the schools still had the right to forfeit funds so as to avoid unwanted endorsement of military policy under the amendment, forcing the schools to make such a decision was unconstitutional. Congress could not require them to forfeit a constitutional right in order to receive federal funds.

Question

Does the Solomon Amendment, which witholds certain federal funds from colleges and universities that restrict the access of military recruiters to students, violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Rumsfeld, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 10 U.S.C. 983

No. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, held that the Solomon Amendment regulated conduct, not speech, and was therefore constitutional. Including military recruiters in receptions and interviews does not necessarily indicate university endorsement of the recruiters, so requiring their inclusion does not constitute compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. This would be true even if Congress had decided to make the requirement direct, rather than making it indirect as a condition for receiving federal funds. Roberts wrote, "Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds."

Garcetti v. Ceballos

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-473

Petitioner

Gil Garcetti, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Richard Ceballos

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, February 28, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, October 12, 2005

Reargued:

Tuesday, March 21, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, May 30, 2006

Advocates

Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer (argued the cause for Respondent)

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Cindy S. Lee (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Richard Ceballos, an employee of the Los Angeles District Attorney's office, found that a sheriff misrepresented facts in a search warrant affidavit. Ceballos notified the attorneys prosecuting the case stemming from that arrest and all agreed that the affidavit was questionable, but the D.A.'s office refused to dismiss the case. Ceballos then told the defense he believed the affidavit contained false statements, and defense counsel subpoenaed him to testify. Seeking damages in federal district court, Ceballos alleged that D.A.s in the office retaliated against him for his cooperation with the defense, which he argued was protected by the First Amendment. The district court ruled that the district attorneys were protected by qualified immunity, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled for Ceballos, holding that qualified immunity was not available to the defendants because Ceballos had been engaged in speech that addressed matters of public concern and was thus protected by the First Amendment.

Question

Should a public employee's purely job-related speech, expressed strictly pursuant to the duties of employment, be protected by the First Amendment simply because it touched on a matter of public concern, or must the speech also be engaged in "as a citizen?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Garcetti, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that speech by a public official is only protected if it is engaged in as a private citizen, not if it is expressed as part of the official's public duties. Ceballos's employers were justified in taking action against him based on his testimony and cooperation with the defense, therefore, because it happened as part of his official duties. "The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or write," Justice Kennedy wrote, "does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance." Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented.

Clingman v. Beaver

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-37

Petitioner

Michael Clingman, Secretary, Oklahoma State Election Board, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Andrea L. Beaver, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 581 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 2005

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

Wellon B. Poe, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners)

James C. Linger (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Oklahoma's election laws created a primary system in which a party could invite only its own members and Independents to vote in its primary. The Libertarian Party and voters registered in other parties argued the laws violated the First Amendment freedoms of expression and association by preventing the Libertarian Party from inviting members of other parties to vote in its primary elections. The district court ruled for Oklahoma. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled Oklahoma's election laws violated the First Amendment.

Question

Do state election laws that restrict the voters a party may invite to vote in its primary election violate the First Amendment rights to freedom of expression and association?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Clingman, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Oklahoma's semiclosed primary system did not violate the right to freedom of association and that any burden it imposed was minor and justified by legitimate state interests. The Court noted that not every electoral law burdening associational rights was subject to strict scrutiny. Requiring voters to register with a party before participating in its primary minimally burdened voters' associational rights. Moreover, Oklahoma's primary advanced a number of state interests, including the preservation of parties as viable and identifiable interest groups.

Virginia v. Hicks

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-371

Petitioner

Virginia

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hicks

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 113 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, April 30, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 16, 2003

Advocates

Steven D. Benjamin (Argued the cause for the respondent)

William H. Hurd (Richmond, Virginia, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA), a political subdivision of Virginia, owns and operates Whitcomb Court, a low-income housing development. In 1997, the Richmond City Council conveyed Whitcomb Court's streets to the RRHA. Subsequently, the RRHA enacted a policy authorizing the Richmond police to serve notice on any person lacking "a legitimate business or social purpose" for being on the premises and to arrest for trespassing any person who remains or returns after having been notified. After the RRHA gave Kevin Hicks, a nonresident, written notice barring him from Whitcomb Court, he trespassed there and was arrested and convicted. At trial, Hicks claimed that RRHA's policy was unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness. The Virginia en banc Court of Appeals vacated his conviction. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found the policy unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.

Question

Is the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority's trespass policy, which provides for arrest after being served notice for being on the premises without "a legitimate business or social purpose," facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Virginia, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the RRHA's trespass policy is not facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine. Noting that he was not in Whitcomb Court to engage in constitutionally protected speech, the Court reasoned that Hicks had not shown that the RRHA policy prohibited a substantial amount of protected speech in relation to its many legitimate applications. Justice Scalia wrote, "both the notice-barment rule and the 'legitimate business or social purpose' rule apply to all persons who enter the streets of Whitcomb Court, not just to those who seek to engage in expression."

Overton v. Bazzetta

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-94

Petitioner

Overton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bazzetta

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 126 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, March 26, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 16, 2003

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (Lansing, Michigan, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting petitioners)

Deborah LaBelle (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, after the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) banned visits to inmates by little brothers and sisters, nieces, nephews and other minors, a group of prisoners sued. They claimed that the ban violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and that it restricted their First Amendment right to association. The district court agreed, ruling against the ban. On appeal, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court's ruling.

Question

Did the Department of Corrections ban on visits by minors violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the freedom of association of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Overton, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Association

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the MDOC's regulations were valid. The Court reasoned that the fact that the regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penological interests suffices to sustain them regardless of whether the prisoners have a constitutional right of association that has survived incarceration. The Court also concluded that the visitation restriction for inmates with two substance- abuse violations is not a cruel and unusual confinement condition violating the Eighth Amendment. The Court reasoned that withdrawing visitation privileges for a limited period is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for confinement conditions. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1806

Petitioner

Madigan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Telemarketing Associates

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 600 (2003)

Argued

Monday, March 3, 2003

Decided

Monday, May 5, 2003

Advocates

M. Errol Copilevitz (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Paul D. Clement (Department of Justice, Washington, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Richard S. Huszagh (Chicago, Illinois, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

VietNow National Headquarters, a charitable nonprofit corporation, retained for-profit fundraising telemarketing corporations to solicit donations to aid Vietnam veterans. The contracts provided that the telemarketers would retain 85 percent of the gross receipts from Illinois donors. The Illinois Attorney General filed a complaint in state court, alleging that the telemarketers represented to donors that a significant amount of each dollar donated would be paid over to VietNow for charitable endeavors and that such representations were knowingly deceptive and materially false and constituted a fraud. The trial court granted the telemarketers' motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. In affirming, the Illinois Supreme Courts relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent that held that certain regulations of charitable solicitation barring fees in excess of a prescribed level effectively imposed prior restraints on fundraising and were therefore incompatible with the First Amendment.

Question

Does the First Amendment permit a State to maintain fraud actions alleging that fundraisers made false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Madigan, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, consistent with the Court's precedent and the First Amendment, States may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used. The Court reasoned that, while bare failure to disclose that information directly to potential donors does not suffice to establish fraud, when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally misleading statements designed to deceive the listener, the First Amendment does not preclude a fraud claim. Because the state's action was on misrepresentations that were not protected by freedom of speech, rather than the high percentage of donations retained, the Court concluded that the allegations against the telemarketers therefore state a claim for relief that can survive a motion to dismiss.

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-521

Petitioner

Republican Party of Minnesota

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

White

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 765 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, March 26, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 2002

Advocates

James Bopp, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Alan I. Gilbert (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Minnesota's Constitution provides for the selection of all state judges by popular election. The announcement clause of the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibits a candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. While running for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Gregory Wersal filed suit, seeking a declaration that the announce clause violates the First Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement. Wersal alleged that he was forced to refrain from announcing his views on disputed issues during the 1998 campaign, to the point where he declined response to questions put to him by the press and public, out of concern that he might run afoul of the announce clause. The District Court found that the announcement clause did not violate the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the First Amendment permit the Minnesota Supreme Court to prohibit candidates for judicial election in that State from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Republican Party of Minnesota, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the announce clause violates the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the announce clause prohibits speech based on its content and burdens a category of speech that is at the core of First Amendment freedoms - speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office. Moreover, the Court concluded that the clause did not serve to preserve the state judiciary's impartiality, its argued compelling state interest. "There is an obvious tension between the article of Minnesota's popularly approved Constitution which provides that judges shall be elected, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's announce clause which places most subjects of interest to the voters off limits," wrote Justice Scalia.

Thomas v. Chicago Park District

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1249

Petitioner

Thomas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chicago Park District

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 316 (2002)

Argued

Monday, December 3, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, January 15, 2002

Advocates

David A. Strauss (Argued the cause for the respondent)

James A. Feldman (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Richard L. Wilson (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Chicago Park District is responsible for operating public parks and other public property in Chicago. Pursuant to its authority, the Park District adopted an ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events in public parks. The ordinance provides that the Park District may deny a permit on any of 13 specified grounds, must process applications within 28 days, and must explain its reasons for a denial. An unsuccessful applicant may appeal, first, to the Park District's general superintendent and then to state court. The Windy City Hemp Development Board applied on several occasions for permits to hold rallies advocating the legalization of marijuana. Some permits were granted and others were denied. Ultimately, the Board filed suit, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face. The District Court granted the Park District summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Must a municipal park ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events must, consistent with the First Amendment, contain certain procedural safeguards?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Chicago Park District, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the First Amendment free speech guarantee does not require the Park District to initiate litigation every time the agency denied a permit for an event or specify a deadline for judicial review of a challenge to the denial of a permit. The Court reasoned that the licensing scheme was not based on subject-matter censorship, but rather content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation of the use of a public forum thus making the ordinance constitutional. "On balance, we think the permissive nature of the ordinance furthers, rather than constricts, free speech," wrote Justice Scalia for the Court.

Good News Club v. Milford Central School

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

Milford Central School

42 West Main Street Milford NY 13807

Milford, NY 13807

United States

42° 35' 27.3948" N, 74° 56' 54.816" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-2036

Petitioner

Good News Club

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Milford Central School

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 98 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, February 28, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 11, 2001

Advocates

Thomas Marcelle (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Frank W. Miller (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under New York law, Milford Central School policy authorizes district residents to use its building after school for certain activities. Stephen and Darleen Fournier were district residents eligible to use the school's facilities. They sought approval of their proposed use and sponsorship of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children. The Fourniers submitted a request to hold the Club's weekly afterschool meetings at the school. Milford denied the request reasoning that the proposed use, including singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture, and praying, was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. The Club filed suit alleging that the denial violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the District Court granted Milford summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the subject matter of the Club's was "quintessentially religious", and the activities "fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character development,'" Milford's policy of excluding the Club's meetings was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.

Question

Did Milford Central School violate the First Amendment free speech rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the Club from meeting after hours at the school? If a violation occurred, was it justified by Milford's concern that permitting the Club's activities would violate the Establishment Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Good News Club, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "Milford's restriction violates the Club's free speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation." "When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment," wrote Justice Thomas.

Shaw v. Murphy

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1613

Petitioner

Shaw

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Murphy

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 223 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, January 16, 2001

Decided

Wednesday, April 18, 2001

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioners)

Jeffrey T. Renz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

David L. Ohler (Helena, Montana, argued the cause for petitioners)

Facts of the Case

While incarcerated in Montana State Prison, Kevin Murphy sent a letter to an inmate to assist him with his defense after he assaulted a correctional officer. In accordance with prison policy, the letter was intercepted. Based on the letter's content, the prison sanctioned Murphy for violating prison rules prohibiting insolence and interfering with due process hearings. Murphy sought relief, alleging that the disciplinary action violated his First Amendment rights, including the right to provide legal assistance to other inmates. Ruling against Murphy, the District Court, based on precedent, found that reasonably related penological interests allowed the prison regulations to impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that an inmate's First Amendment right to give legal assistance to other inmates outweighed the government's interests.

Question

Do prison inmates have a constitutional right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Shaw, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that inmates do not possess a special First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates that enhances the protections otherwise available. "Augmenting First Amendment protection for inmate legal advice would undermine prison officials' ability to address the 'complex and intractable' problems of prison administration," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Thomas added that "[p]risoners have used legal correspondence as a means for passing contraband and communicating instructions on how to manufacture drugs or weapons." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also wrote a concurring opinion.

Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-603

Petitioner

Legal Services Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Velazquez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 99-960

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 533 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, October 4, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, February 28, 2001

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Burt Neuborne (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Alan H. Levine (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Legal Services Corporation Act authorizes the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) to distribute funds, appropriated by Congress, to local grantee organizations, which provide free legal assistance to indigent clients in welfare benefits claims. The Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 prohibited the LSC from funding any organization that represented clients in an effort to amend or challenge existing welfare law, among other things. The prohibition was such that grantees could not continue representation in a welfare matter even where a constitutional or statutory validity challenge became apparent after representation was well under way. LSC grantee lawyers and others filed suit to have the restriction declared unconstitutional. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction. However, the Court of Appeals invalidated the restriction, concluding that it was impermissible viewpoint discrimination that violated the First Amendment.

Question

Does the funding restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, which prevents attorneys from representing clients in an attempt to amend or challenge existing welfare law, violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Velazquez, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the funding provision that limited arguments legal services attorneys were allowed to make on behalf of indigent welfare claimants violated the First Amendment by regulating private speech and insulating federal law from legitimate judicial challenge. Justice Kennedy wrote for that Court that, "the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message." Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas, arguing that the Appropriations Act "does not directly regulate speech, and it neither establishes a public forum nor discriminates on the basis of viewpoint."

United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1682

Appellee

Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 803 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 22, 2000

Advocates

Robert Corn-Revere (Argued the cause for the appellee)

James A. Feldman (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

In 1996, Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act, of which section 505 required that cable operators, providing channels "primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming," either to "fully scramble or otherwise fully block" those channels or to broadcast those channels during the "safe-harbor" hours of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. - times when young children were unlikely to be watching. The purpose of section 505 was to protect non-subscribers, and their children, from "signal bleed," or when audio and visual portions of the scrambled programs might be heard or seen. In February 1996, Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. filed suit challenging section 505's constitutionality. A three-judge District Court panel found that section 505's content-based restriction on speech violated the First Amendment because the Government might further its interests in less restrictive ways. The court also found that the Act provided for a less restrictive alternative than section 505, in that section 504 stated that cable operators had an obligation to block channels at a customer's request.

Question

Is section 505 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 the least restrictive means to block the transmission of cable television channels primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming, such that it does not violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U.S.C. 561

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that because the Federal Government failed to show that section 505 was the least restrictive means to further its interests, requiring cable television operators to fully scramble or limit time when sexually-oriented programming was transmitted violated the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. In finding section 505 a content-based regulation, Justice Kennedy wrote for that Court that "[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative." In dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer maintained that the majority had not made a "realistic assessment of the alternatives."

Board of Regents Univ. Wisc. v. Southworth

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1189

Petitioner

Board of Regents Univ. Wisc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Southworth

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 217 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, March 22, 2000

Advocates

Susan K. Ullman (Madison, Wisconsin, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jordan W. Lorence (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The University of Wisconsin, a public university, requires students to pay an activity fee. The fee supports various campus services and extracurricular student activities including the Future Financial Gurus of America; the International Socialist Organization; the College Democrats and Republicans; and the American Civil Liberties Union Campus Chapter. Scott Harold Southworth filed suit against the University, alleging that the fee violated his rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise under the First Amendment. Southworth argued that the University must grant him the choice not to fund registered student organizations (RSO) that engage in political and ideological expression offensive to his personal beliefs. In granting Southworth judgment, the Federal District Court concluded that the fee program compelled students to support political and ideological activities with which they disagree in violation of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The court declared the fee program invalid and enjoined the University from using the fees to fund any RSO engaging in political or ideological speech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fee program was "not germane to the University's mission, did not further a vital University policy, and imposed too much of a burden on [Southworth's] free speech rights."

Question

May public universities and colleges subsidize campus groups by means of a mandatory student activity fee without violating the First Amendment rights of students who find some campus groups objectionable?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Board of Regents Univ. Wisc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the "First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, "[w]hen a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others." Justice David H. Souter, in an opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in the judgment only.

Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-930

Petitioner

Buckley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 182 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, October 14, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, January 12, 1999

Advocates

Gale Norton (Argued the cause for the petitioner, on behalf of the Petitioner)

Neil D. O'Toole (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Colorado practices an initiative-petition process in which citizens can make laws directly through balloting initiatives. Acting on behalf of ballot petitioners, the American Constitutional Law Foundation (Foundation) challenged the constitutionality of six limitations imposed by Colorado on the petitioning process. After mixed rulings in both trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review three of the six original restrictions. The first required petition circulators to be registered voters. The second required them to wear identification badges with their names, status as "volunteer" or "paid," and if the latter then their employer's phone number. The third required initiative proponents to report names, addresses, and registration voting counties for all paid circulators, as well as salary per petition signature, and each circulator's total salary. Proponents also had to report, on a monthly basis, all proponent names, names and addresses of circulators, circulators' monthly salary and debt totals, and the name of each proposed ballot measure.

Question

Did the State of Colorado's imposition of name, badge, and financial disclosure requirements, on initiative-petition proponents and their circulators, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court found the name, badge, and disclosure requirements to be unconstitutional. Weighing Colorado's need to protect the integrity of the initiative-petition process against the burdens that its guidelines placed on political expression, the Court found that the latter outweighed the former. Noting that the appellate court upheld a requirement that each circulator submit an affidavit setting out, among several particulars, his or her name and address, the Court explained that the vital information sought by the three additional restrictions at issue was already being secured either directly or indirectly.

National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:30 +0000

Location

National Endowment for the Arts

1100 Pennsylvania Ave NW Washington DC 20506

Washington, DC 20506

United States

38° 53' 43.1088" N, 77° 1' 38.406" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-371

Petitioner

National Endowment for the Arts

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Finley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 569 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, March 31, 1998

Decided

Thursday, June 25, 1998

Advocates

David D. Cole (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act entrusts the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) with discretion to award financial grants to the arts. The NEA's broad decision guidelines are: "artistic and cultural significance," with emphasis on "creativity and cultural diversity professional excellence," and the encouragement of "public education and appreciation of the arts." In 1990, Congress amended the criteria by requiring the NEA to consider "artistic excellence and artistic merit taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public." After suffering a funding rejection, Karen Finely, along with three other performance artists and the National Association of Artists' Organizations, challenged the NEA's amended statutory review proceedings as unconstitutionally vague and discriminatory. After consecutive district and appellate court rulings in favor of Finley, the Supreme Court granted the NEA certiorari.

Question

Are the statutory funding guidelines requiring the NEA to consider artistic excellence, merit, and general standards of "decency and respect," overly vague and conducive of viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment's freedom of expression guarantees?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for National Endowment for the Arts, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In an 8-to-1 opinion the Court held that, unlike direct sovereign regulation of speech, Congress enjoys wide latitude when setting spending priorities which may indirectly affect certain forms of expression. The funding of one activity believed to be in the public interest, to the exclusion of another, does not constitute viewpoint discrimination. Moreover, the statutory funding guidelines were not impermissibly vague since they involved selective subsidies rather than criminal or regulatory prohibitions. The Court noted that while the amended regulations may add some measure of imprecision to the existing guidelines, they do so to an already highly subjective selection process, made so by the inevitable nature of the subject matter with which it deals.

Arkansas Ed. Television Comm. v. Forbes

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-779

Petitioner

Arkansas Ed. Television Comm.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Forbes

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 666 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 1997

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1998

Advocates

Richard D. Marks (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kelly J. Shackelford (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Lawrence G. Wallace (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

During the 1992 race for Arkansas' Third Congressional District, the Arkansas Educational Television Commission (AETC) -- a state-owned public television broadcaster -- sponsored a debate between the major party candidates. Running as an independent candidate with little popular support, Ralph Forbes sought to participate in the debate but was denied permission. After unsuccessfully challenging AETC's refusal in district court, Forbes appealed and won a reversal. AETC then appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Is the exclusion of a ballot-qualified candidate from a debate sponsored by a state-owned public television broadcaster a violation of the candidate's First Amendment right to freedom of speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Arkansas Ed. Television Comm., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that public broadcasters could selectively exclude participants from their sponsored debates, so long as these were not designed as "public forums." The Court found that by reserving participation rights only to candidates for a particular congressional district, rather then hosting an open-microphone format, and selecting among those which were eligible to participate, based on objective indications of their popular support rather then their view points, AETC's debate was a "nonpublic forum." As such, AETC could decide who should and should not participate in its sponsored event.

Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-992

Appellee

FCC

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Turner Broadcasting System

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 180 (1997)

Argued

Monday, October 7, 1996

Decided

Monday, March 31, 1997

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the private appellees)

H. Bartow Farr, III (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the federal appellees)

Facts of the Case

The 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act required cable television systems to set aside some of their channels for local broadcast television. In 1994, the Supreme Court held that these must-carry provisions pass constitutional muster. (See Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, decided June 27, 1994). The Court then remanded the case to determine whether Congress had adequate factual support for its conclusion that the must-carry provision is necessary. A special three-judge district court held that there was sufficient evidence that the must-carry provision furthered important governmental objectives and that the provision was narrowly tailored to promote those interests. The broadcasters appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

Question

Is the 1992 "must carry" law an unconstitutional intrusion on cable operators' editorial autonomy, a form of Government-compelled speech that violates the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for FCC, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U.S.C. 534

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Congress "has an independent interest in preserving a multiplicity of broadcasters." The outcome supported Congress's right to judge what approach would best insure a competitive communications marketplace.

O'Hare Truck Service v. Northlake

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-191

Petitioner

O'Hare Truck Service

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Northlake

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

518 U.S. 712 (1996)

Argued

Wednesday, March 20, 1996

Decided

Friday, June 28, 1996

Advocates

Gary M. Feiereisel (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Harvey Grossman (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

O'Hare Truck Service was one among several towing companies employed by the city of Northlake. Northlake kept a list of available towing companies and would only remove a company from its list after a showing of cause. In the present case, however, Northlake removed O'Hare Truck Service from its list because O'Hare's owner did not support Northlake's mayoral candidate in his reelection campaign. Instead, O'Hare's owner supported the opposition candidate. Upon removal from Northlake's employment list, O'Hare Truck Service filed suit alleging that its dismissal was a retaliation for its lack of support for Northlake's mayoral candidate. The dismissal was the cause of substantial loss in income. On appeal from the District Court's dismissal for failure to state a First Amendment violation, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Did O'Hare Truck Service's removal from Northlake's employment list, as a result of its support for an opposition mayoral candidate, violate O'Hare Truck Services freedom of speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for O'Hare Truck Service, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Association

Yes. The Court held, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, that independent contractors, such as O'Hare Truck Service, are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as those afforded to government employees. Accordingly, Northlake could not condition the towing company's employment on its political affiliations or beliefs unless Northlake could demonstrate that O'Hare's political affiliations had a reasonable and appreciable effect on its job performance. The Court held that Northlake neither attempted nor would it have been able to make such a demonstration. Therefore, Northlake's removal of O'Hare Truck Service from its employment list was unconstitutional.

Denver Area Consortium v. FCC

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:28 +0000

Location

Denver Area Consortium

4877 Knox Ct. Denver CO 80221

Denver, CO 80221

United States

39° 47' 6.7272" N, 105° 1' 57.1116" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-124

Petitioner

Denver Area Consortium

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

FCC

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 95-227

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

518 U.S. 727 (1996)

Argued

Wednesday, February 21, 1996

Decided

Friday, June 28, 1996

Advocates

J. Michael Greenberger (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Lawrence G. Wallace (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Sections 10(a) and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act (the Act) empower leased access channel cable operators to control programming that they believe is indecent and obscene. Section 10(b) of the Act requires public access channel cable operators to restrict "patently offensive" programming to a single channel, access to which must be restricted to those subscribers who submit written requests. Petitioners, television access programmers and cable television viewers, filed suit alleging that the Act's empowerments and restrictions violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. This case was consolidated with Alliance for Community Media v. FCC.

Question

Do the Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act's empowerments and restrictions violate the petitioner's First Amendment right to freedom of speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for FCC, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U.S.C. 532

Split Vote

No and yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, The Court held that the Act's grant of authority to leased channel cable operators under 10(a) - allowing them to restrict the transmission of "patently offensive" or indecent programming - is consistent with the First Amendment. The authority's discretionary nature and ultimate objective of protecting young viewers from offensive programming, is a constitutionally permissible method of restoring editorial authority to cable operators. By contrast, the Court found provision 10(c), permitting cable operators to ban offensive or indecent programming on public access channels, to be unconstitutional. Public access channels are already supervised by both private and public elements and have never been edited by cable operators in the past. Furthermore, a "cable operator's veto" is likely to ban many programs that should have been aired, and the volume of "patently offensive" programming on public access channels has never been so high as to warrant severe restrictions on its content. Finally, with respect to Section 10(b), the Court held that its "segregate and block" requirements for public access channels is also unconstitutional. Section 10(b), by enabling cable operators to take as many as 30 days to respond to a consumer's request to unlock their restricted channel, is overly restrictive. Also, by blocking out an entire channel, 10(b) does not permit viewers or operators to discern between offensive and "patently offensive" programming.

Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-1654

Petitioner

Board of County Commissioners

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Umbehr

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

518 U.S. 668 (1996)

Argued

Tuesday, November 28, 1995

Decided

Friday, June 28, 1996

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, argued in support of the respondent)

Robert A. Van Kirk (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Donald R. Patterson (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Umbehr was an independent trash-hauling contractor for Wabaunsee County, Kansas. He frequently criticized the County's Board of Commissioners (the Board). When the Board voted to terminate his contract, supposedly because the Board grew tired of his constant criticisms, Umbehr filed suit against two of the Board's members. Umbehr alleged that his termination resulted from his criticisms of the Board and, therefore, infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. On appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Board, the Tenth Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted Umbehr's petition for certiorari.

Question

Did the Board's termination of Umbehr's contract, presumably as a result of his criticisms, constitute a violation of his First Amendment freedom of speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Umbehr, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech shielded Umbehr, as a government employee, from termination due to things he might have said about the Board. Umbehr successfully proved that his criticisms of the Board preceded his termination and were the primary motivating factor behind its retaliatory termination of his contract. The Court added that, in balancing an employee's interest in commenting on public concerns against an employer's interest in promoting efficient performance by its employees, it could not find any countervailing county interest justifying its infringement of Umbehr's freedom of speech.

United States v. National Treasury Employees Union

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1170

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Treasury Employees Union

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 454 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, November 8, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 1995

Advocates

Paul Bender (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Gregory O'Duden (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, prohibits members of Congress, federal officers, and other government employees from accepting an honorarium for making an appearance, speech, or writing an article. The prohibition applies even when neither the subject of the speech or article nor the person or group paying for it has any connection with the employee's official duties. The National Treasury Employees Union filed suit challenging the honorarium ban as an unconstitutional abridgement of its freedom of speech. A District Court held the ban unconstitutional and enjoined the government from enforcing it against Executive Branch employees. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the honoraria ban abridge freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for National Treasury Employees Union, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 6 to 3 decision delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court declared that a flat ban violated free-speech rights. Concerns about impropriety do not apply if there is no link between a government employee's job and "the subject matter of the expression or the character of the payor."

Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1525

Petitioner

Lebron

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 374 (1995)

Argued

Monday, November 7, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 1995

Advocates

David D. Cole (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Kevin T. Baine (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Lebron, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:27 +0000

Location

Ohio Elections Commission

21 West Broad Street Columbus OH 43215

Columbus, OH 43215

United States

39° 57' 43.092" N, 83° 0' 4.86" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-986

Petitioner

McIntyre

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ohio Elections Commission

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 334 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, October 12, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, April 19, 1995

Advocates

Andrew L. Sutter (Argued the cause for the respondent)

David A. Goldberger (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature.

Question

Does the prohibition of the distribution of anonymous campaign literature abridge freedom of speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for McIntyre, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. The freedom to publish anonymously is protected by the First Amendment and "extends beyond the literary realm to the advocacy of political causes." When a law burdens such anonymous speech, the Court applies "exacting scrutiny," upholding the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.

Ladue v. Gilleo

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:26 +0000

Location

Residence of Margaret Gilleo

Litzinger Road Ladue MO 63131

Ladue, MO 63131

United States

38° 37' 24.8808" N, 90° 23' 1.2012" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1856

Petitioner

Ladue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gilleo

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 43 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 13, 1994

Advocates

Jordan B. Cherrick (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Paul Bender (On behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Gerald P. Greiman (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Margaret Gilleo placed a 24-by-36-inch sign calling for peace in the Persian Gulf on her front lawn. The original sign disappeared and a subsequent sign was knocked down. She reported these incidents to the police who advised her that such signs were prohibited in Ladue. She sued the city and the District Court ordered a preliminary injunction. Ladue repealed the law and replaced it with a new one which also banned window signs. Gilleo then placed another anti-war sign in her second-story window and amended her complaint to challenge the new ordinance.

Question

Does the Ladue ordinance violate Gilleo's right to free speech as protected by the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Gilleo, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. Although acknowledging Ladue's police power to minimize visual clutter associated with signs, the Court ruled that the law "almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important." The Court held a "special respect" for an individual's right to convey messages from her home.

Turner Broadcasting v. FCC

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:27 +0000

Location

FCC

One CNN Center Atlanta GA 30303

Atlanta, GA 30303

United States

33° 45' 28.4436" N, 84° 23' 40.0092" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-44

Appellee

FCC

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Turner Broadcasting

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 622 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 27, 1994

Advocates

H. Bartow Farr, III (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Drew S. Days, III (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. Sections 4 and 5 of this Act required cable systems to allocate a percentage of their channels to local public broadcast stations, the must-carry rules. The rules limit the cannels available for exclusive control by cable programmers and increase competition for the remaining channels.

Question

Are the must-carry rules content-based and thus a violation of the cable companies' First Amendment right to free speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Turner Broadcasting, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U.S.C. 534

No. The Court held that the must-carry provisions were content neutral, thus not a violation of the First Amendment. The rules were not determined by the programming content, but by broadcast method. The rules promote fair competition in television programming. Congress recognized that the public television stations had an intrinsic value to the American public and were in economic peril of disappearing due to the cable television industry's monopoly. The rules do not force the cable companies to alter their message.

Waters v. Churchill

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1450

Petitioner

Waters

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Churchill

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 661 (1994)

Argued

Wednesday, December 1, 1993

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 1994

Advocates

John H. Bisbee (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Lawrence A. Manson (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Richard H. Seamon (As amicus curiae supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

A public hospital fired an obstetrics nurse, Cheryl Churchill, for insubordination after she allegedly complained about her superiors to a nurse trainee during a dinner break in the hospital's obstetrics unit. Churchill claimed that the hospital fired her because she opposed its policy of nurse cross-training and said it was leaving certain units understaffed.

Question

Was Churchill's firing impermissible under the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Waters, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes, but the Court was unable to forge a majority opinion. A four-justice plurality held that government workers cannot be dismissed or otherwise punished for their words unless the employer has a reasonable basis for believing that the speech either was disruptive or involved a matter of purely private concern, outside the scope of the First Amendment's protection. The hospital need not conduct a full-scale investigation, but it must have some reasonable, factual basis for its actions.

Wisconsin v. Mitchell

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:26 +0000

Location

Kenosha County Courthouse

912 56th Street Kenosha WI 53140

Kenosha, WI 53140

United States

42° 35' 6.0468" N, 87° 49' 22.3536" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-515

Petitioner

Wisconsin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mitchell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

508 U.S. 476 (1993)

Argued

Wednesday, April 21, 1993

Decided

Friday, June 11, 1993

Advocates

James E. Doyle (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (as amicus curiae, supporting Petitioner)

Lynn S. Adelman (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

On October 7, 1989, Todd Mitchell, a young black man, instigated an attack against a young white boy. He was subsequently convicted of aggravated battery in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County. According to Wisconsin statute, Mitchell's sentence was increased, because the court found that he had selected his victim based on race. Mitchell challenged the constitutionality of the increase in his penalty, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected his claims. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed.

Question

Did the increase in Mitchell's sentence based on his bigoted motives violate his First Amendment rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wisconsin, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the Wisconsin statute paralleled antidiscrimination laws which had been found to comply with the First Amendment. It also determined that the consequences for the victim and the community tended to be more severe, when the victim of a crime was chosen on account of his or her race. Thus, when the Wisconsin statute increased the sentence for such crimes, it was not punishing the defendant for his or her bigoted beliefs or statements, but rather the predicted ramifications of his or her crime. Finally, the Court concluded that the Wisconsin statute did not violate the right to free speech because the occasion in which an average person's racist comments would be used against him or her in a court of law would arise so rarely that he or she would not feel forced to suppress them.

Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-538

Petitioner

Forsyth County, Georgia

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nationalist Movement

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

505 U.S. 123 (1992)

Argued

Tuesday, March 31, 1992

Decided

Friday, June 19, 1992

Advocates

Richard Barrett (on behalf of the Respondent)

Robert S. Stubbs, III (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Nationalist Movement, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Lee v. Int. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-339

Petitioner

Lee

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Int. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

505 U.S. 830 (1992)

Argued

Wednesday, March 25, 1992

Decided

Friday, June 26, 1992

Advocates

Arthur P. Berg (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Barry A. Fisher (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey banned the distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets and other printed material at its airport terminals. Members of a religious group wanted to perform a ritual involving the distibution of literature at these airports. The group challenged the regulation on free expression and and free exercise grounds of the First Amendment.

Question

Does the regulation banning the distribution of literature at airports violate the free speech and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Int. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

In a short per curiam opinion, the court held 5 to 4 that the ban on literature distribution violated the Free Speech Clause. (A related case, also Int. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, addressed a ban on the solicitation of funds.)

Int. Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:25 +0000

Location

International Society for Krishna Consciousness

305 Schermerhorn Street Brooklyn NY 11217

Brooklyn, NY 11217

United States

40° 41' 15.3024" N, 73° 58' 55.6608" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-155

Petitioner

Int. Society for Krishna Consciousness

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lee

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

505 U.S. 672 (1992)

Argued

Wednesday, March 25, 1992

Decided

Friday, June 26, 1992

Advocates

Arthur P. Berg (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Barry A. Fisher (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

New York City's airport authority banned repetitive solicitation of money within airline terminals. Solicitation was permitted outside the terminals. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness solicits funds in public places. It challenged the regulation. A federal district court granted an injunction against the airport authority. The authority appealed.

Question

Does the regulation violate the First Amendment free speech clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Lee, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. An airport terminal is not a public forum. The regulation banning such activity need only satisfy a reasonableness standard. The regulation is reasonable. Solicitators may slow the path of possible contributors, cause duress or commit fraud. Therefore, the regulation is permissible. In a related case, the Court held invalid the airport authority's ban on literature distribution in airport terminals.

Dawson v. Delaware

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-6704

Petitioner

Dawson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Delaware

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

503 U.S. 159 (1992)

Argued

Tuesday, November 12, 1991

Decided

Monday, March 9, 1992

Advocates

Richard E. Fairbanks, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Bernard J. O'Donnell (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Dawson, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Association

None

Simon & Schuster v. NY Crime Victims Board

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1059

Petitioner

Simon & Schuster

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

NY Crime Victims Board

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

502 U.S. 105 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 15, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, December 10, 1991

Advocates

Howard L. Zwickel (on behalf of the Respondent)

Ronald S. Rauchberg (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

To keep criminals from profiting from crimes by selling their stories, New York State's 1977 "Son of Sam" law ordered that proceeds from such deals be turned over to the New York State Crime Victims Board. The Board was to deposit the money into escrow accounts which victims could later claim through civil suits. In 1987 the Board ordered Henry Hill, a former gangster who sold his story to Simon & Schuster, to turn over his payments from a book deal.

Question

Did the Son of Sam law violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Simon & Schuster, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. The Court concluded that "New York has singled out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other income." This discrimination could only be justified if the state could show "that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end" (Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)). The Board failed to explain why victims' compensation had to come from the criminals' storytelling rather than other assets.

Burson v. Freeman

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1056

Petitioner

Burson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Freeman

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

504 U.S. 191 (1992)

Argued

Tuesday, October 8, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, May 26, 1992

Advocates

Charles W. Burson (Petitioner, argued the cause, pro se)

John E. Herbison (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Freeman, a Tennessee political campaign treasurer, challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Code forbidding the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling facilities. On appeal from a lower court's dismissal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, finding that the 100-foot ban was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Burson certiorari.

Question

Did Tennessee's 100-foot limit violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Burson, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. After subjecting Tennessee's statute to exacting scrutiny, since it constituted a facial content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, the Court held that the statute was narrowly drafted to serve a compelling state interest. By creating a safe zone around polling sites, the statute served the state's interest in protecting its citizen's right to vote freely and effectively. Moreover, the 100-foot zone was acceptable since it was not so large as to completely block out the presence of political messages.

Gentile v. State Bar Of Nevada

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1836

Petitioner

Gentile

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

State Bar Of Nevada

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 1030 (1991)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 1991

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 1991

Advocates

Robert H. Klonoff (on behalf of the Respondent)

Michael E. Tigar (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Gentile, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Split Vote

None

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-634

Petitioner

Cohen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cowles Media Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Opinion

501 U.S. 663 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, March 27, 1991

Decided

Monday, June 24, 1991

Advocates

Elliot C. Rothenberg (on behalf of the Petitioner)

John D. French (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Cohen was a campaign associate in the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race. He gave court records concerning another party's candidate for lieutenant governor to the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune. Though he had received a promise of confidentiality from the reporters, the papers identified Cohen in their stories. He was fired as a result. Cohen sued the papers in state court, alleging a breach of contract. At trial, Cohen won compensatory damages and the state appellate court upheld the award. But the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Cohen's claim relied on state "promissory estoppel" law, a law that essentially prevented a promisor from breaking a promise. The court ruled that the First Amendment's free press guarantee prevented promissory estoppel from applying to the newspapers.

Question

Does the First Amendment bar a plaintiff from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for a newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Cohen, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Byron White, the Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel suit against the press. The Court first affirmed that such a cause of action, though private, triggered the First Amendment's protection. But the Court went on to rule that the state's promissory estoppel law was generally applicable and did not target the press. The law's enforcement against the press thus did not require stricter scrutiny than would its enforcement against other individuals or institutions.

Leathers v. Medlock

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-29

Petitioner

Leathers

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Medlock

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Meddlock v. Leathers, Commissioner of Revenue of Arkansas, No. 90-38

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

499 U.S. 439 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, January 9, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, April 16, 1991

Advocates

William E. Keadle (Argued the cause for petitioner in No. 90-29 and respondents in No. 90-38)

Eugene G. Sayre (Argued the cause for the petitioners in No. 90-38 and the respondents in No. 90-29)

Facts of the Case

In 1987, Arkansas amended its Gross Receipts Act (GRA), imposing a tax on cable television but not on print media. Cable companies and others filed suit in the State Chancery Court, alleging that taxing cable services, but not print and satellite broadcast services, violated their First Amendment expressive rights and 14th Amendment equal protection rights. In 1989, after the Chancery Court upheld the amendment, Arkansas again amended the GRA, extending the tax to satellite broadcast services. On appeal, the State Supreme Court upheld the GRA. However, the court ruled that the First Amendment prohibits differential taxation among members of the same medium. Therefore, because cable and scrambled satellite television services are essentially the same, the tax was unconstitutional when it applied only to cable services.

Question

Does differential taxation of different media violate the First and 14th Amendments? Does differential taxation of members of the same medium violate the First and 14th Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Leathers, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held 7-2 that without the intent or effect of suppressing expression, the First Amendment allows differential taxation of different media and differential taxation of some members of the same medium. Specifically, the Court held that the GRA was a generally applicable sales tax, and that its burden on cable television, while exempting the print media, was content- neutral, not directed at a select few, and not intended to interfere with expression. The Court went on to rule that the First Amendment allows a differential tax burden on some members of pay television services (that is, a tax on cable but not satellite services), if the tax is not intended to suppress expression. The Court ordered the State Supreme Court to address the 14th Amendment claim on remand. Dissenting, Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, argued that the First Amendment non- discrimination principle prohibits a heavier tax burden on one medium and not other media.

Keller v. State Bar of California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1905

Petitioner

Keller

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

State Bar of California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

496 U.S. 1 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, February 27, 1990

Decided

Monday, June 4, 1990

Advocates

Anthony T. Caso (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Seth M. Hufstedler (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Keller, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

United States v. Kokinda

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-2031

Petitioner

United States

Respondent

Kokinda

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

497 U.S. 720 (1990)

Argued

Monday, February 26, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, June 27, 1990

Advocates

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the case for the United States)

Jay A. Sekulow (Argued the case for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Marsha Kokinda and Kevin Pearl were volunteers for the National Democratic Policy Committee. They set up a table on a sidewalk near a post office to solicit contributions and sell political literature. After post office employees received a large number of complaints, Kokinda and Pearl were asked to leave. They refused, at which point postal inspectors arrested them. They were charged and convicted of violating 39 CFR 232.1(h)(1)(1989), which prohibits "soliciting alms and contributions ... on postal premises." They appealed the convictions, arguing that they violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court, ruling that the sidewalk in question (which was entirely on Postal Service property and was intended only for traffic to and from the Post Office) was not a public forum, found that the restrictions were reasonable and therefore did not violate the First Amendment. On appeal, however, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the sidewalk was a traditional public forum and that the government's regulations were therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Because the government had no significant interest in banning solicitation, the convictions were unconstitutional.

Question

Is a sidewalk that is entirely contained by Postal Service property and intended only for traffic to and from Postal Service buildings a public forum? If it is a public forum, does a prohibition of solicitation pass strict scrutiny? If it is not a public forum, does it pass a "reasonableness" test?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

In a divided opinion, the Court ruled that the prohibition was not unconstitutional. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for a four-member plurality, wrote that the sidewalk was not a public forum. "Regulation of speech activity on governmental property that has been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity, such as public streets and parks, is examined under strict scrutiny. ... But regulation of speech activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to First Amendment activity is examined only for reasonableness." The need to prevent solicitors from interrupting postal business satisfied this "reasonableness" test, so the convictions were constitutional. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing separately, held that it was unnecessary to determine whether the sidewalk was a public forum because the regulation met the traditional standard applied to time, place, and manner restrictions of protected expression.

Butterworth v. Smith

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1993

Petitioner

Butterworth

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Smith

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

494 U.S. 624 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, January 16, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, March 21, 1990

Advocates

Gregg Darrow Thomas (on behalf of the Respondent)

George L. Waas (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Smith, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:22 +0000

Location

Illinois Governor's Office

100 W. Randolph Chicago IL 60601

Chicago, IL 60601

United States

41° 53' 5.0604" N, 87° 37' 52.788" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1872

Petitioner

Rutan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Republican Party of Illinois

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 88-2074

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

497 U.S. 62 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, January 16, 1990

Decided

Thursday, June 21, 1990

Advocates

Thomas P. Sullivan (Argued the cause for the respondents in No. 88-1872 and the petitioners in No. 88-2074)

Mary Lee Leahy (Argued the cause for the petitioners in No. 88-1872 and the respondents in No. 88-2074)

Facts of the Case

In November 1980, Governor James Thompson of Illinois issued an order that prohibited state officials from hiring new employees, promoting state employees, or recalling state employees after layoffs without the approval of the Governor's Office of Personnel. The Office of Personnel based hiring and promotion decisions on factors such as the applicant's contributions to the Republican Party, the applicant's record of service to the Republican Party, and the support of local Party officials. In the jointly decided case of Frech v. Rutan, Cynthia B. Rutan and a number of other potential and current state employees challenged this patronage system, alleging that the Governor was violating their First Amendment rights by practicing unfair political patronage and party-based discrimination.

Question

Did Governor Thompson's practices in Illinois infringe upon the First Amendment rights of potential and current state employees?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Rutan, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Governor Thompson's practices amounted to an unconstitutional patronage system. The Court found that employees would feel "a significant obligation to support political positions held by their superiors" in lieu of their true beliefs in order to progress up the career ladder. The Court thus held that "promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political affiliations or support" were impermissible infringements on the right to free expression of public employees. The Court noted that while the First Amendment was not "a tenure provision" protecting employees from "constructive discharge," it nevertheless prevented the government from interfering with its employees' freedom "to believe and associate."

University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-493

Petitioner

University of Pennsylvania

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

EEOC

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

493 U.S. 182 (1990)

Argued

Tuesday, November 7, 1989

Decided

Tuesday, January 9, 1990

Advocates

Kenneth W. Starr (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Rex E. Lee (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Rosalie Tung was an Asian-American professor who believed that she was denied tenure because of her sex and her race. To investigate her claim, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission asked the University for access to Tung's confidential peer review file. Citing the protection of academic freedom, the University refused to cooperate so as to avoid breaching the confidentiality promised to reviewers.

Question

Does requiring a university to disclose confidential peer review materials in an investigation violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for EEOC, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

A unanimous Court held that the need to ferret out invidious discrimination served a compelling government interest which justified inspection of confidential files. Since the EEOC was not interested in forcing the University to accept specific standards for promotion and it did not attempt to control the content of speech on campus, Justice Blackmun dismissed Pennsylvania's argument that the EEOC's actions violated academic freedom.

FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-2012

Petitioner

FW/PBS, Inc.

Respondent

Dallas

Consolidation

No. 87-2051

No. 88-49

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

493 U.S. 215 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, October 4, 1989

Decided

Tuesday, January 9, 1990

Advocates

Analeslie Muncy (on behalf of the Respondent)

John H. Weston (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for FW/PBS, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

None

Dallas v. Stanglin

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1848

Petitioner

Dallas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Stanglin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

490 U.S. 19 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, March 1, 1989

Decided

Monday, April 3, 1989

Advocates

Daniel J. Sheehan, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Craig Lee Hopkins (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Dallas, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Association

None

Ward v. Rock Against Racism

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-226

Petitioner

Ward

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rock Against Racism

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

491 U.S. 781 (1989)

Argued

Monday, February 27, 1989

Decided

Thursday, June 22, 1989

Advocates

Leonard J. Koerner (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

William M. Kunstler (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

New York City, responding to complaints of high-decibel concerts adjoining residential neighborhoods, mandated the use of city-provided sound systems and technicians for concerts in Central Park. Members of rock group claimed that the inability to use their own sound equipment and technicians in a concert in a public forum interfered with their First Amendment rights of expression.

Question

Does the New York ordinance substituting a city-employed technician and mixing board for a performer's mixer and equipment violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Ward, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. The Court upheld the ordinance, giving broad deference to the government's interest in maintaining order. As long as "the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest," a regulation will not be invalidated because a court concludes that the government's interest "could be adequately served by some less-speech- restrictive alternative."

Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Comm.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1269

Appellee

San Francisco Democratic Comm.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

489 U.S. 214 (1989)

Argued

Monday, December 5, 1988

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 1989

Advocates

James G. Brosnahan (on behalf of the Appellees)

Geoffrey Lloyd Graybill (on behalf of the Appellants)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for San Francisco Democratic Comm., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Thornburgh v. Abbott

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1344

Petitioner

Thornburgh

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Abbott

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

490 U.S. 401 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, November 8, 1988

Decided

Monday, May 15, 1989

Advocates

William C. Bryson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Steven Ney (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Thornburgh, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Meyer v. Grant

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-920

Petitioner

Meyer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Grant

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

486 U.S. 414 (1988)

Argued

Monday, April 25, 1988

Decided

Monday, June 6, 1988

Advocates

Maurice G. Knaizer (on behalf of the Appellants)

William C. Danks (on behalf of Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Grant, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Frisby v. Schultz

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:20 +0000

Location

City of Brookfield: City Hall

2000 N Calhoun Road Brookfield WI 53005

Brookfield, WI 53005

United States

43° 3' 22.086" N, 88° 7' 29.6256" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-168

Appellant

Russell Frisby et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Sandra Schultz et al.

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

487 U.S. 474 (1988)

Argued

Wednesday, April 20, 1988

Decided

Monday, June 27, 1988

Advocates

Harold H. Fuhrman (argued the cause for the appellants)

Steven Frederick McDowell (argued the cause for the appellees)

Facts of the Case

Sandra Schultz and Robert Braun both strongly opposed abortion and gathered like-minded citizens together to picket in front of the home of a local doctor who performed abortions. In response, the city of Brookfield, Wisconsin passed a law against all picketing in front of residential homes except for labor disputes. Following the advice of the town attorney, the city amended the law to ban labor picketing as well. The stated purpose of the law was "the protection and preservation of the home." When enacted, Schultz and Braun stopped picketing and filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the law violated the First Amendment. The court declared it would issue a permanent injunction against the law unless it was narrowed in scope. The United States Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the law violated the First Amendment.

Question

Does a city ordinance prohibiting picketing in front of residential homes violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Frisby, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Court held that since the street constituted a traditional public forum, the ban must satisfy strict standards in order to remain. Since the ban is "content neutral," "leaves open ample alternative channels of communication," and serves a "significant government interest," the Court ruled that it passed the strict standards and could remain. The city government had a legitimate purpose in protecting the homes of its residents, and did so without favoring one idea over another or eliminating the ability to communicate an idea.