Cases by Issue - Habeas Corpus

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

Fri, 29 Oct 2010 18:40:17 +0000

Location

Guantanamo Prison Guantanamo Bay

United States

20° 1' 16.194" N, 75° 6' 49.2192" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-184

Petitioner

Salim Ahmed Hamdan

Respondent

Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. 557 (2006)

Granted

Monday, November 7, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, March 28, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 2006

Advocates

Neal Kumar Katyal (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden's former chauffeur, was captured by Afghani forces and imprisoned by the U.S. military in Guantanamo Bay. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court to challenge his detention. Before the district court ruled on the petition, he received a hearing from a military tribunal, which designated him an enemy combatant.

A few months later, the district court granted Hamdan's habeas petition, ruling that he must first be given a hearing to determine whether he was a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention before he could be tried by a military commission. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the decision, however, finding that the Geneva Convention could not be enforced in federal court and that the establishment of military tribunals had been authorized by Congress and was therefore not unconstitutional.

Question

May the rights protected by the Geneva Convention be enforced in federal court through habeas corpus petitions? Was the military commission established to try Hamdan and others for alleged war crimes in the War on Terror authorized by the Congress or the inherent powers of the President?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Hamdan, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Uniform Code of Military Justice

Yes and no. The Supreme Court, in a 5-to-3 decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, held that neither an act of Congress nor the inherent powers of the Executive laid out in the Constitution expressly authorized the sort of military commission at issue in this case. Absent that express authorization, the commission had to comply with the ordinary laws of the United States and the laws of war. The Geneva Convention, as a part of the ordinary laws of war, could therefore be enforced by the Supreme Court, along with the statutory Uniform Code of Military Justice. Hamdan's exclusion from certain parts of his trial deemed classified by the military commission violated both of these, and the trial was therefore illegal. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented. Chief Justice John Roberts, who participated in the case while serving on the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, did not take part in the decision.

Day v. McDonough

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1324

Petitioner

Patrick Day

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James R. McDonough, Interim Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Monday, February 27, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, April 26, 2006

Advocates

J. Brett Busby (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Christopher M. Kise (argued the cause for Respondent)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Patrick Day was convicted of murder in state court. After a long delay, he filed a petition for federal review, arguing that his counsel was inadequate. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within a one-year time limit. Day's petition was late, but the state of Florida failed to notice the untimeliness of the petition and instead addressed only the merits of Day's argument. Later a Federal Magistrate Judge did notice Day's failure to meet the deadline, and recommended to the District Court that the petition be dismissed. Day argued that by responding to the petition without disputing the timeliness, the state had forfeited the statute-of-limitations defense. The District Court disagreed and dismissed the petition. Day appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming that the District Court had acted unfairly when it ruled against him based on an argument that the state had not made. The Circuit Court rejected Day's argument and affirmed the District Court, ruling that the state's erroneous concession of the timeliness of the petition did not prevent the court from dismissing it.

Question

May a court dismiss a federal habeas petition as untimely, even after the state concedes the timeliness of the petition and submits other arguments?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for McDonough, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court and ruled that the District Court was within its discretion when it dismissed Day's petition. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that "if a judge does detect a clear computation error, no Rule, statute, or constitutional provision commands the judge to suppress that knowledge." The majority held that federal courts are not obligated to dismiss petitions for untimeliness if the state does not raise the issue, but they may as long as they give the petitioner notice and an opportunity to dispute the timeliness. Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion but dissented from the judgment. Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissent joined by Justices Thomas and Breyer.

House v. Bell

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-8990

Petitioner

Paul Gregory House

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ricky Bell, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, June 28, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, January 11, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 12, 2006

Advocates

Stephen M. Kissinger (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Jennifer L. Smith (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Paul House was sentenced to death for murder based on circumstantial evidence. House then submitted a habeas petition in federal court, claiming that he had new evidence demonstrating his innocence. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied his petition, finding he had failed to show that it was "more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence," the standard of review established for habeas petitions in Schlup v. Delo. Even though the evidence cast some doubt on the original evidence, it was not sufficient to warrant a habeas petition.

Question

Did the federal appeals court err in applying Schlup v. Delo to hold that House's new evidence, though presenting at the very least an arguable claim of innocence, was legally insufficient to excuse his failure to present that evidence in state court? What constitutes a "truly persuasive showing of actual innocence" under Herrera v. Collins, sufficient to warrant freestanding habeas relief?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for House, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes, and unanswered. In a 5-3 decision, the Court ruled that the Court of Appeals was wrong to deny House's habeas petition. The opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy held that though the standard in Schlup v. Delo was "demanding," House's case was so extraordinary that it could be granted review despite his failure to present his new evidence in state court. This was because House's new evidence, while not necessarily proving his innocence, was sufficiently compelling that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court sent the case back to the lower courts with instructions to hear House's new claims.

The Justices declined to clarify the "persuasive demonstration of actual innocence" standard in Herrera v. Collins, except to note that since House's evidence just barely met the high standard in Schlup, it did not meet the "extraordinarily high" threshold in Herrera.

Chief Justice John Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. The dissent argued that under Schlup it was not enough for new evidence to cast doubt on House's conviction; the totality of the evidence had to prove "that House was actually innocent." The dissenters also stressed that the Court should defer to the District Court and not simply take the new evidence "at face value." Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.

Rice v. Collins

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-52

Petitioner

Bertram Rice, Warden, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Steven Martell Collins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, June 28, 2005

Argued

Monday, December 5, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 2006

Advocates

Mark R. Drozdowski (argued the cause for Respondent)

William W. Lockyer (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

At Collins' state-court drug trial, he alleged that the prosecutor had used a peremptory challenge to strike a juror on account of her race. The prosecutor gave several race-neutral explanations for the strike, which the trial court accepted. Upon being convicted, Collins appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which upheld the conviction. According to the Court of Appeal, the juror's youth and demeanor were both valid reasons for striking her. The California Supreme Court denied review. The Federal District Court denied Collins' habeas petition, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts must defer to a state-court finding of fact unless it is an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the trial court's acceptance of the prosecutor's race- neutral explanations was an unreasonable determination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Ninth Circuit had acted correctly.

Question

Does the AEDPA allow a federal court to reject the presumption of correctness for a state-court finding of fact as an "unreasonable determination of the facts," even when a rational fact finder could have determined the facts as the state court did?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Rice, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. The Court ruled that the state court did not act unreasonably when it determined that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations were credible. Although there might have been some evidence that could be interpreted as undermining the prosecutor's credibility, the trial court was in a better position to determine those facts. The Court faulted the Ninth Circuit for substituting "its own debatable interpretation of the record" for the trial courts findings, and for "misapplying settled rules that limit [the Circuit Court's] role and authority."

Evans v. Chavis

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-721

Petitioner

Mike Evans, Acting Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reginald Chavis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, May 2, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, November 9, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, January 10, 2006

Advocates

Catherine Baker Chatman (Attorneys for Petitioner, Counsel of Record)

Catherine Baker Chatman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Reginald Chavis (Attorneys for Respondent, Counsel of Record)

Peter K. Stris (Attorneys for Respondent)

Peter K. Stris (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

After Reginald Chavis was convicted of murder, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in California court. After the California Court of Appeal denied Chavis' petition, he waited more than three years before appealing the decision to the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition without explanation.

Having exhausted his state-court remedies, Chavis then sought to file a habeas petition in federal court. The district court, however, dismissed Chavis' petition. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act there is a one-year period in which a habeas petition must be filed. Chavis' three-year delay, the court ruled, had exceeded that period, and Chavis' petition was therefore untimely. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that Chavis' state-court petition had been "pending" for the entire three years. Because the one-year statute of limitations did not apply to time during which state court petitions were pending, Chavis' petition in federal district court was timely under the AEDPA.

Question

When a state court denies a habeas petition summarily, without explanation, does the time that a defendant spent filing that petition count toward the one-year statute of limitations in federal habeas appeals under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Evans, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the California Supreme Court's summary denial was not necessarily an indication that the petition was timely under state law. The petition was in fact untimely because the three-year delay could not be considered a "reasonable time," which is the timeliness standard for filing a petition under California law. If the state petition was untimely, it could not be considered "pending" between the time of the lower court's denial and the filing of the state habeas petition. Therefore, the Court held that the three- year filing delay did count towards the AEDPA's one-year limitation, meaning the federal habeas petition was also untimely.

Mayle v. Felix

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-563

Petitioner

Deneice A. Mayle, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jacoby Lee Felix

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, April 19, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

Matthew K.M. Chan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Lisa S. Blatt (argued the cause for Petitioner)

David M. Porter (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A California state court sentenced Felix to life in prison for murder. Felix's conviction became final on August 12, 1997. Federal habeas law gave Felix one year to file a habeas petition in federal court. On May 8, 1998, Felix filed a habeas petition and asserted a Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission into his trial of videotaped prosecution witness testimony. On January 28, 1999, more than five months after the one-year habeas time limit, Felix filed an amended petition arguing that the admission into his trial of pretrial statements had violated the Fifth Amendment. Felix argued that the one-year limit did not bar this amended petition, citing the rule under federal habeas law that amended petitions relate back to the filing date of the original petition if both arise out of the original's "conduct, transaction or occurrence." Because his Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims challenged the same criminal conviction, Felix argued, they arose out of the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence." The district court disagreed and ruled the amended petition time barred; the court rejected the Sixth Amendment claim on its merits. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Sixth Amendment ruling, but agreed with Felix that his amended petition was not time barred because they both arose out of the same trial and conviction.

Question

Federal habeas law allowed an amended petition to relate back to the filing date of the original petition if both arose out out of the same "conduct, transaction or occurrence" the original set forth. Did the trial and conviction qualify as a "conduct, transaction or occurrence?"

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Mayle, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court rejected the argument that the trial itself was the "transaction" or "occurrence" under federal habeas law. The Court said that such a definition would have allowed virtually any new claim introduced in an amended petition to relate back, gutting the one-year time limit on petitions. Felix's amended habeas petition thus did not relate back because the issue of his pretrial statements differed in time and type from the videotaped witness testimony.

Dodd v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-5286

Petitioner

Michael Donald Dodd

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, November 29, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Janice L. Bergmann (argued the cause for Petitioner)

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, Dodd was convicted under federal law for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. On April 4, 2001 he filed a motion that the conviction should be set aside because it was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1999 in Richardson v. U.S. In that case, the Court held that a jury must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific violations that constitute the continuing criminal enterprise. The district court rejected Dodd's motion, because it was filed more than a year after the Court decided Richardson. Under federal law, the one-year limitation period in which a prisoner may file a motion to change his sentence, begins "on the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." The 11th Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is the start date for a federal prisoner's one-year limitation period the date on which the Court "initially recongized" the right asserted in an applicant's motion, or the date on which the right is "made retroactive?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the text of the federal law "unequivocally" stated that the one-year limitation period begins to run on the date on which the Court "initially recongized" the right, not the date on which that right was made retroactive. O'Connor wrote that Dodd's reliance on the statute's second clause was misplaced, because that clause merely limited the subsection's applicability to cases where applicants assert rights both "newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made applicable to cases on collateral reviiew." Thus, the date the right was asserted does not apply at all unless the second clause's conditions are met. The Court noted that this would make it difficult for applicants filing second or successive motions to obtain relief, since the Court rarely announces a new rule and makes it retroactive within a year.

Rhines v. Weber

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9046

Petitioner

Charles Russell Rhines

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Douglas Weber, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 269 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, March 30, 2005

Advocates

Roberto A. Lange (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Lawrence E. Long (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A South Dakota court convicted Charles Rhines of murder. Rhines filed a habeas corpus petition with a federal district court, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights in the trial and conviction. The district court ruled Rhines failed to exhaust all of his claims in state court. The court stayed Rhines' habeas petition so that Rhines could finish his claims in state court. The stay prevented the one-year statute of limitations in the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act from barring Rhines from appealing to a federal court once he exhausted state remedies. The state penitentiary warden appealed. The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Lundy (1982) required the dismissal of a habeas petition that included unexhausted claims.

Question

May a federal court stay a habeas petition that included exhausted and unexhausted claims, when the stay was necessary to allow a petitioner to exhaust claims in state court without having the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) bar the right to a federal petition?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Rhines, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that a district court could stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner to present unexhausted claims in state court and then return to federal court. The Court recognized that its decision in Rose, combined with the one-year statute of limitations required by the AEDPA (enacted 14 years after Rose) could have permanently deprived petitioners like Rhines of the opportunity to seek federal review for unexhausted claims. As a result, federal district courts could grant a stay on a mixed petition if (1) there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims in state court, (2) the unexhausted claims had merit, and (3) the petitioner was not engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.

Miller-El v. Dretke

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9659

Petitioner

Thomas Joe Miller-El

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, December 6, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

Gena A. Bunn (argued the cause for Respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Miller-El alleged the prosecution in his capital murder trial violated the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause by excluding 10 of 11 blacks from the jury. The jury convicted Miller-El and he was sentenced to death. State courts rejected Miller-El's appeals and ruled Miller-El failed to meet the requirements for proving jury-selection discrimination outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky(1986). Miller-El then appealed to a federal district court. The district court rejected Miller-El's appeal and ruled the court must defer to the state courts' acceptance of prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking potential jurors. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and ruled a federal court could only grant an appeal if the applicant made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

Miller-El appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and in Miller-El v. Cockrell(2003) the Court ruled the Fifth Circuit should have accepted Miller- El's appeal to review the district court's ruling. The Supreme Court said an appeal should have been granted if the petitioner could demonstrate reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court's decision. The Court said the district court did not give full consideration to the substantial evidence Miller-El presented. The Fifth Circuit reconsidered Miller-El's appeal and ruled Miller-El failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the state court was wrong to find no purposeful discrimination.

Question

Did the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, by rejecting Miller-El's claim the prosecution purposefully excluded blacks from his jury, violate the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003)? 2. Did the Texas jury selection manual encourage unconstitutional disparate questioning based on race?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Miller-El, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that Miller-El deserved to win his appeal because the jury selection in his case violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. The Court began by noting that the prosecutors used peremptory strikes to exclude 91 percent of the eligible black prospective jurors, "a disparity unlikely to have been produced by happenstance." After comparing two eliminated black prospective jurors with similar white jurors who were not eliminated, the Court concluded that the "selection process was replete with evidence that prosecutors were selecting and rejecting potential jurors because of race." The Court further concluded that Texas' jury selection manual, both in this case and generally, tended to allow prosecutors to read disparate questions to prospective jurors depending on whether they were black or white.

Wilkinson v. Dotson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-287

Petitioner

Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

William Dwight Dotson, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 74 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 22, 2004

Argued

Monday, December 6, 2004

Decided

Monday, March 7, 2005

Advocates

Douglas R. Cole (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Alan Edward Untereiner (argued the cause for Respondent Dotson)

John Q. Lewis (argued the cause for Respondent Johnson)

Facts of the Case

Ohio state prisoners Rogerico Johnson and William Dwight Dotson separately alleged their parole proceedings violated due process. Each sued the Ohio prison system under a section of the U.S. Code - section 1983 - which allows prisoners to challenge conditions of confinement. The district courts dismissed the prisoners' claims. The courts ruled their claims challenging parole decisions actually challenged their sentences and that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey (1994) barred prisoners from using section 1983 to do this. The prisoners could make their claims only under the section of the U.S. Code that allows prisoners to petition for habeas corpus. A federal appellate court reversed the district courts' decisions.

Question

(1) May a prisoner bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that his parole proceedings violate due process, even though success on the merits of the claim would result only in a new parole hearing and would not necessarily guarantee earlier release from prison? (2) Does a federal court judgment ordering a new parole hearing "necessarily imply the invalidity of" the decision at the previous parole hearing and therefore challenge the sentence itself?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Dotson, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

Yes and No. In an 8-1 decision, the Court affirmed the appellate court and ruled that prisoners could use Section 1983 to challenge a state's parole procedures. The majority opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that though prisoners cannot use Section 1983 to directly challenge their sentences, they can bring suit under the Section when a successful suit "would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner." Though a successful constitutional challenge to Ohio's parole procedures might make it more likely that the prisoners would be released from prison sooner, the Court called the connection "too tenuous" for the prisoners' suit to be considered a challenge of the sentences themselves. The Court ruled that since the prisoners sought only new parole hearings, not reduced sentences, a favorable ruling would not necessarily imply the invalidity of their sentences. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a lone dissent arguing that challenges to parole proceedings can only be brought by a petition for habeas corpus.

Rumsfeld v. Padilla

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1027

Petitioner

Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jose Padilla and Donna R. Newman, as Next Friend of Jose Padilla

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 426 (2004)

Granted

Friday, February 20, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, April 28, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 28, 2004

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Jennifer Martinez (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Jose Padilla, an American citizen, was arrested in Chicago's O'Hare International Airport after returning from Pakistan in 2002. He was initially detained as a material witness in the government's investigation of the al Qaeda terrorist network, but was later declared an "enemy combatant" by the Department of Defense, meaning that he could be held in prison indefinitely without access to an attorney or to the courts. The FBI claimed that he was returning to the United States to carry out acts of terrorism.

Donna Newman, who had represented him while he was being held as a material witness, filed a petition for habeas corpus on his behalf. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that Newman had standing to file the petition despite the fact that Padilla had been moved to a military brig in South Carolina. However, the court also found that the Department of Defense, under the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief and the statutory authorization provided by Congress's Authorization for Use of Military Force, had the power to detain Padilla as an enemy combatant. The district judge rejected Newman's argument that the detention was prohibited by the federal Non-Detention Act, which states that no "citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."

On appeal, a divided Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the district court's "enemy combatant" ruling. The panel found that the Authorization for Use of Military force did not meet the requirement of the Non-Detention Act and that the President could not, therefore, declare American citizens captured outside a combat zone as enemy combatants.

Question

Does Congress's "Authorization for use of Military Force" authorize the President to detain a United States citizen based on a determination that he is an enemy combatant, or is that power precluded by the Non-Detention Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Rumsfeld, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

The Court did not reach a decision on the merits in this case. Instead, in 5-to-4 opinion written by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the case had been improperly filed. Under federal law, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus can only be filed against the person directly responsible for a prisoner's confinement or, put another way, the person with the power to bring the prisoner to court. In most cases this person is the warden of the petitioner's prison; in this case, it was the commander of the military brig in which Padilla was held. Because Padilla's attorney had listed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as the defendent, instead of the brig commander, and because the suit was filed in New York instead of in South Carolina, where the commander lived and worked, the Court found that the case would have to be re-filed in a federal district court in South Carolina.

Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer dissented, finding that an exception should be made to the jurisdictional rule because the government had moved Padilla to South Carolina without giving his attorney notice to file the habeas writ.

Pliler v. Ford

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-221

Petitioner

Cheryl K. Pliler, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Richard Herman Ford

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 225 (2004)

Granted

Friday, January 9, 2004

Argued

Monday, April 26, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 21, 2004

Advocates

Lisa M. Bassis (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Richard Ford filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court five days before the one-year statute of limitations for his appeal ended under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). He represented himself, and his petition contained some claims that had been decided on by state courts and others that had not. The judge informed him that he could not hear the claims that had not been heard by state courts, and that Ford had several options: the judge could dismiss all the claims, allowing Ford to re- file them after he had presented the unheard claims to a state court, or he could dismiss the unheard claims, but delay proceedings on the other ones so that Ford could re-add the unheard ones after they had been heard. Ford chose the first option, but when he tried to re-file the claims after they were rejected by a state court, the judge refused to let him file them because the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations had ended. Ford appealed the decision to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision, finding that the judge could have heard the claims if Ford had chosen the second option and that he should have warned Ford that the statute of limitations would likely end before he could re-file the claims under the first option.

Question

Is a judge required to warn a habeas corpus petitioner who is representing himself that his claims may be barred by a statute of limitations if he chooses to drop the claims and re-file them at a later date?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Pliler, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that a judge is not required to warn a habeas corpus petitioner who is representing himself of the consequences of his legal decision. Justice Thomas wrote, "District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants." Five justices joined Thomas' opinion, while two others concurred in his judgment.

Rasul v. Bush

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-334

Petitioner

Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad Al Odah, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

George W. Bush, President of the United States, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

al Odah v. United States, No. 03-343

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 466 (2004)

Granted

Monday, November 10, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, April 20, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 28, 2004

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Respondents)

John J. Gibbons (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Four British and Australian citizens were captured by the American military in Pakistan or Afghanistan during the United States' War on Terror. The four men were transported to the American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When their families learned of the arrests, they filed suit in federal district court seeking a writ of habeas corpus that would declare the detention unconstitutional. They claimed that the government's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them indefinitely without access to a court violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause. The government countered that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the prisoners were not American citizens and were being held in territory over which the United States did not have sovereignty (the Guantanamo Bay base was leased from Cuba indefinitely in 1903, and Cuba retains "ultimate sovereignty").

The district court agreed with the government, dismissing the case because it found that it did not have jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision.

Question

Do United States courts have jurisdiction to consider legal appeals filed on behalf of foreign citizens held by the United States military in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Rasul, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court found that the degree of control exercised by the United States over the Guantanamo Bay base was sufficient to trigger the application of habeas corpus rights. Stevens, using a list of precedents stretching back to mid-17th Century English Common Law cases, found that the right to habeas corpus can be exercised in "all ... dominions under the sovereign's control." Because the United States exercised "complete jurisdiction and control" over the base, the fact that ultimate sovereignty remained with Cuba was irrelevant. Further, Stevens wrote that the right to habeas corpus is not dependent on citizenship status. The detainees were therefore free to bring suit challenging their detention as unconstitutional.

Tennard v. Dretke

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-10038

Petitioner

Robert James Tennard

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Robert Smith v. Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, No. 02-11309

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 274 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, October 14, 2003

Argued

Monday, March 22, 2004

Decided

Thursday, June 24, 2004

Advocates

Edward L. Marshall (argued the cause for Respondent)

Robert C. Owen (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Robert Tennard was convicted of murder. During the sentencing phase, he presented evidence that he had an IQ of 67. The instructions given to the jury by the judge when it was considering whether to apply the death penalty, however, did not account for this - they instructed they jury to determine whether the crime was committed deliberately and whether Tennard posed a future risk. Under Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, those instructions are not enough to allow the jury to weigh a defendant's mental retardation in his favor. After he was sentenced to death, Tennard filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, claiming that the sentence, given the shortcomings of the jury instructions, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment. The district court rejected the petition. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that Tennard had no shown that his mental retardation was constitutionally relevant. To be constitutionally relevant, Tennard's retardation would have had to be responsible for his crime, and Tennard had not shown that this was the case.

After the Supreme Court decided, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, that executing the mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered its holding. It affirmed the decision on the grounds that execution was only unconstitutional if the defendant could show that his mental retardation had actually caused the crime; being mentally retarded in and of itself did not exempt someone from the death penalty.

Question

Does the Supreme Court's prohibition of executing mentally retarded people in Atkins v. Virginia apply if the crime cannot be attributed to mental retardation?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Tennard, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

In a fairly narrow ruling 6-to-3 decision written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Tennard's mental retardation could reasonably be understood as relevant to his crime. Especially given the fact that the prosecutor emphasized Tennard's retardation when discussing the likelihood that he would be dangerous in the future, the Court found that the jury instructions did not sufficiently permit the jury to weigh Tennard's mental retardation in his favor.

Dretke v. Haley

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1824

Petitioner

Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael Wayne Haley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 386 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, October 14, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, March 2, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 3, 2004

Advocates

R. Ted Cruz (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Matthew D. Roberts (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Eric M. Albritton (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Haley was convicted in Texas state courts of a felony theft and sentenced as a habitual felony offender (extending his sentence). After a failed appeal to the Texas appellate court, Haley filed a state habeas application in the trial court, arguing that his past crimes did not qualify him as a habitual offender and that his attorney had provided ineffective counsel when he failed to object to the extended sentence. The court dismissed his claims on procedural grounds, because he had not raised the issue during his trial and therefore could not raise it in the habeas petition. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his habeas application based on the trial court's findings.

Haley then filed for habeas corpus relief in federal district court. Pointing to the procedural-default doctrine, Texas argued that Haley's claim was procedurally barred from federal habeas review. Under the procedural-default doctrine, federal courts cannot grant habeas relief if the last state court rejected the appeal for procedural violations of state law; the only exception is if the petitioner is actually innocent.

The district court held that Haley showed he was "actually innocent" of earlier violations on which his sentence enhancement was based. The court ruled that Haley's sentence was therefore improperly extended. It never reached his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, having already found grounds for overturning the extended sentence. The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Texas's argument that the actual-innocence exception applies only to cases involving capital offenses.

Question

Does the actual-innocence exception to the procedural-default doctrine apply to both capital and non-capital cases?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Dretke, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

The Court declined to answer the question presented, ruling instead that the district court should have first considered the ineffective assistance of counsel claim before reaching the question of whether the "actual innocence" exception applies to non-capital cases. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, for a seven-member majority, wrote that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim would accomplish the same thing - the reduction of the sentence - without burdening the state with the need to prove the existence of all prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.

Castro v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:33 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-6683

Petitioner

Hernan O'Ryan Castro

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 375 (2003)

Granted

Monday, January 27, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, October 15, 2003

Decided

Monday, December 15, 2003

Advocates

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Respondent)

Michael G. Frick (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Hernan O'Ryan Castro was sentenced to 20 years in prison for drug related offenses. After the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, Castro alleged that he had discovered evidence that a government witness had testified falsely. Based on this evidence, he requested a new trial without legal representation. The district court, because Castro had no legal representation, attempted to help him by re-characterizing his request for a new trial as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The judge's re- characterization of Castro's appeal was intended to help him, but two years later, in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress limited the number of petitions for writ of habeas corpus that a prisoner could file to one. When Castro attempted to petition for what he thought was his first write of habeas corpus in 1998, he was denied because of the earlier reclassification of his request for a new trial. When he appealed, the 11th Circuit Court of appeals initially sided with Castro, ruling that the reclassification should not count against him. Four months later, however, the 11th Circuit reconsidered, siding with the government.

Question

When a district judge re-classifies a post-conviction motion by a defendant, turning it into a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, does that preclude future petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Castro, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that a federal court can recharacterize a motion as a first habeas corpus petition only if the court: (1) informs the litigant of the court's intent to recharacterize; (2) warns the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent habeas corpus petition will be treated as a second petition; (3) gives the litigant an opportunity to withdraw or amend the motion. The Court held that because the district court failed to give these prescribed warnings, Castro's 1994 motion could not be considered a first habeas corpus petition and his 1997 motion therefore could not be considered a second petition.

Price v. Vincent

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:06 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-524

Petitioner

Price

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Vincent

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 634 (2003)

Argued

Monday, April 21, 2003

Decided

Monday, May 19, 2003

Advocates

Arthur A. Busch (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David A. Moran (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

During Duyonn Vincent's trial, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder. Subsequently, when the prosecution made a statement on first-degree murder, defense counsel objected, arguing that the court had granted its directed verdict motion and that further prosecution on first-degree murder would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judge responded that he had granted the motion but had not directed a verdict. The judge then submitted the first-degree murder charge to the jury, which convicted Vincent on that charge. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. In reversing, the State Supreme Court determined that the trial judge's comments were not sufficiently final to terminate jeopardy. Subsequently, the Federal District Court granted Vincent's federal habeas corpus petition after concluding that continued prosecution for first-degree murder had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is a defendant's right against double jeopardy violated when a trial judge grants a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder, but does not direct such a verdict to the jury that subsequently convicts the defendant of first-degree murder?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Price, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the defendant did not meet the requirements for habeas relief. The Court stated that Vincent was entitled to relief only if he can demonstrate that the state court's adjudication of his claim was "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" the Court's clearly established precedents. Finding that the state court's adjudication of his claim was not, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals because "Even if we agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Double Jeopardy Clause should be read to prevent continued prosecution of a defendant under these circumstances, it was at least reasonable for the state court to conclude otherwise."

Massaro v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1559

Petitioner

Massaro

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 500 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, February 25, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, April 23, 2003

Advocates

Sri Srinivasan (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Herald P. Fahringer (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Joseph Massaro was indicted on federal racketeering charges, including murder in aid of racketeering. Though prosecutors found a bullet before the trial began and did not inform the defense until the trial was underway, defense counsel declined more than once the trial court's offer of a continuance so the bullet could be examined. Subsequently, Massaro was convicted. On direct appeal, Massaro but did not raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Massaro later moved to vacate his conviction, under 28 USC section 2255, based on an ineffective-assistance-of- trial-counsel claim. The District Court found his claim procedurally defaulted because he could have raised it on direct appeal. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that, when the defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the ineffective-assistance claim is based solely on the trial record, the claim must be raised on direct appeal.

Question

Must claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether or not there is new counsel on appeal and whether or not the basis for the claim is apparent from the trial record, be raised on direct appeal?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Massaro, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a collateral proceeding under section 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal. The Court reasoned that requiring a criminal defendant to bring ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal would create a risk that defendants would feel compelled to raise the issue before there has been an opportunity fully to develop it. Moreover, the Court noted its new rule would provide for ineffective-assistance claims to be litigated in the District Court, the forum best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of representation during an entire trial.

Woodford v. Garceau

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1862

Petitioner

Woodford

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Garceau

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 202 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, January 21, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, March 25, 2003

Advocates

Lynne S. Coffin (San Francisco, California, argued the cause for the respondent)

Janis S. McLean (Sacramento, California, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, the U.S. Supreme Court held that amendments to the criminal code made by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) do not apply to cases pending in federal court on the AEDPA's effective date, April 24, 1996. Robert Garceau was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After his petition for state postconviction relief was denied, Garceau moved for the appointment of federal habeas counsel and a stay of execution in Federal District Court on May 12, 1995. He filed a federal habeas application on July 2, 1996. The District Court concluded that Garceau's habeas application was not subject to AEDPA because his motions for counsel and a stay were filed prior to that date. The Court of Appeals agreed.

Question

Is a federal habeas petition, which was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 even though a stay and counsel were sought prior to that date, "pending" for the purposes of Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Woodford, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held, for purposes of Lindh, that a case does not become "pending" until an actual application for habeas corpus relief is filed in federal court. The Court reasoned that, because Garceau's federal habeas application was not filed until after AEDPA's effective date, it was subject to AEDPA's amendments. "If, on [the effective date of the AEDPA], the state prisoner had before a federal court an application for habeas relief seeking an adjudication on the merits of the petitioner's claims, then [the AEDPA] does not apply. Otherwise, an application filed after AEDPA's effective date should be reviewed under AEDPA, even if other filings by that same applicant...were presented to a federal court prior to AEDPA's effective date." Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented.

Clay v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1500

Petitioner

Clay

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 522 (2003)

Argued

Monday, January 13, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, March 4, 2003

Advocates

Matthew D. Roberts (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

David W. DeBruin (Argued the cause as amicus curiae; invited to brief and argue as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below)

Thomas C. Goldstein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Erick Clay was convicted of arson and distribution of cocaine base in federal District Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions on November 23, 1998, the court's mandate issued on December 15, 1998, and Clay did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. One year and 69 days after the Court of Appeals issued its mandate, and exactly one year after the time for seeking certiorari expired, Clay filed a motion for postconviction relief under 28 USC section 2255. Section 2255 provides that such motions are subject to a one- year time limitation that runs from "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." The District Court stated that when a federal prisoner does not seek certiorari, his judgment of conviction becomes final for section 2255 purposes upon issuance of the court of appeals's mandate. Because Clay filed his motion more than one year after that date, the court denied it as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does a judgment become "final" for postconviction relief when the appellate court issues its mandate affirming the conviction where a defendant in a federal prosecution takes an unsuccessful direct appeal from a judgment of conviction but does not next petition for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Clay, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, for the purpose of starting the clock on section 2255's one-year limitation period, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the conviction. Under this rule, Clay's section 2255 motion was timely filed. After comparing the understanding of finality for collateral review purposes to the meaning of the phrase "becomes final" in 28 USC section 2255, the Court rejected the standard that the issuance of the appellate court mandate is the triggering date.

Abdur'Rahman v. Bell

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-9094

Petitioner

Abdur'Rahman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 88 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, November 6, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, December 10, 2002

Advocates

Paul J. Zidlicky (Argued the cause for the amici curiae, State of Alabama, et al)

Paul G. Summers (Nashville, Tennessee, argued the cause for the respondent)

James S. Liebman (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1987, Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman was convicted of first-degree murder and related charges. In state post-conviction proceedings, Abdur'Rahman presented claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Presenting all of his claims to the Tennessee Supreme Court, Abdur'Rahman was denied leave to appeal, and then he only presented some of his claims, on which he ultimately lost, to the federal District Court. While Abdur'Rahman's certiorari petition was pending, the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted Rule 39, which expressly states that Tennessee litigants do not need to seek discretionary review from the court in order to exhaust their claims. Abdur'Rahman then filed a federal motion for relief of judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, re-presenting claims that the district court had previously determined to be unexhausted and procedurally barred. The District Court construed the Rule 60(b) motion as a second, or successive, habeas corpus petition and denied relief. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals denied all of Abdur'Rahman's motions.

Question

Does a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion, filed in a habeas corpus proceeding to inform the federal courts of a state court's interpretation of state procedural laws, constitute a "successive" habeas corpus petition?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Bell, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

In a per curiam opinion, the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. Justice Stevens argued that the Court of Appeals plainly erred when it characterized Abdur'Rahman's Rule 60(b) motion as an application for a second or successive habeas petition and denied relief for that reason.

Lockyer v. Andrade

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1127

Petitioner

Lockyer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Andrade

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 63 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, November 5, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, March 5, 2003

Advocates

Erwin Chemerinsky (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Douglas P. Danzig (San Diego, California, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Leandro Andrade was found guilty of two felony counts of petty theft with a prior conviction after he stole approximately $150 worth of videotapes. Under California's three strikes regime, a judge sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life. In affirming, the California Court of Appeal rejected his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. After the Supreme Court of California denied discretionary review, Andrade filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The District Court denied his petition. In reversing, the Court of Appeals granted Andrade a certificate of appealability as to his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.

Question

Did the Federal Court of Appeals err in holding that California Court of Appeal's affirmation of a sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison for a "third strike" conviction was "grossly disproportionate" to the crime and thus violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment"?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lockyer, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the California Court of Appeal's decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Court's clearly established law within the meaning of 28 USC section 2254(d)(1). The Court reasoned that, because the "precise contours" of the proportionality principle were unclear, it was not objectively unreasonable for the state appellate court to conclude that the "contours" permitted an affirmance of the sentence. The gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case, wrote Justice O'Connor. "This is the rare sentence of demonstrable gross disproportionality," argued Justice David H. Souter in his dissent, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined.

Miller-El v. Cockrell

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-7662

Petitioner

Miller-El

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cockrell

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 322 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, February 25, 2003

Advocates

Gena A. Bunn (Capital Litigation Division, Assistant Attorney General, Austin, Texas, argued the cause for the respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

When Dallas County prosecutors used peremptory strikes to exclude 10 of the 11 African-Americans eligible to serve on the jury at Thomas Miller-El's capital murder trial, he moved to strike the jury on the ground that the exclusions violated equal protection. The trial judge denied relief, finding no evidence indicating a systematic exclusion of African-Americans. Subsequently, the jury found Miller-El guilty, and he was sentenced to death. After Miller-El's direct appeal and state habeas corpus petitions were denied, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The Federal District Court denied Miller-El's application for a certificate of appealability (COA) in deference to the state courts' acceptance of the prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking the potential jurors. The Court of Appeals also denied the COA, finding that Miller-El failed to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Question

Must an inmate demonstrate that a state court's finding of the absence of purposeful discrimination was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence in order for a court of appeals to issue a certificate of appealability?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Miller-El, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Court of Appeals should have issued a COA to review the District Court's denial of habeas corpus relief. The Court reasoned, "when a habeas applicant seeks permission to initiate appellate review of the dismissal of his petition, the court of appeals should limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of his claims." Thus, a prisoner seeking a COA need only demonstrate "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" and satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to proceed further. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.

Bell v. Cone

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:31 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-400

Petitioner

Bell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cone

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 685 (2002)

Argued

Monday, March 25, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, May 28, 2002

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Michael E. Moore (Nashville, Tennessee, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Robert L. Hutton (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Gary Cone was tried in a Tennessee court for a 2-day crime spree that ended with the killing of an elderly couple. In response to the overwhelming evidence that he perpetrated the crimes, Cone's defense asserted that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury found him guilty. During the sentencing hearing, Cone's counsel cross-examined prosecution witnesses, but called no witnesses. After the prosecutor closed, the defense counsel waived final argument. Ultimately, Cone was sentenced to death. The State Criminal Court denied Cone's petition for post-conviction relief, rejecting his contention that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the sentencing phase by failing to present mitigating evidence and waiving final argument. Subsequently, the Federal District Court denied Cone's federal habeas petition, ruling that he did not meet 28 USC section 2254(d)(1)'s requirement that a state decision be "contrary to" or involve "an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law." In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Cone suffered a Sixth Amendment violation for which prejudice should be presumed because his counsel, by not asking for mercy after the prosecutor's final argument, did not subject the State's death penalty call to meaningful adversarial testing.

Question

Does defense counsel render ineffective assistance during the sentencing phase of a murder trial by failing to present mitigating evidence and waiving final argument?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Bell, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals's decision neither was "contrary to" nor involved "an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law" under the provisions of 28 USC section 2254(d)(1). The Court noted that the defense counsel was defending a client who had committed a brutal and senseless crime against two elderly persons. Rather than closing, defense counsel prevented the lead prosecutor from arguing by waiving his own summation and relying on his opening plea for life. "Neither option, it seems to us, so clearly outweighs the other that it was objectively unreasonable for the Tennessee Court of Appeals to deem counsel's choice to waive argument a tactical decision about which competent lawyers might disagree," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Carey v. Saffold

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-301

Petitioner

Carey

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Saffold

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 214 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, February 27, 2002

Decided

Monday, June 17, 2002

Advocates

Stanley A. Cross (Sacramento, California, argued the cause for the petitioner)

David W. Ogden (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief to file his petition within one year after his state conviction becomes final, but excludes from that period the time during which an application for state collateral review is pending. In 1990, Tony Saffold was convicted and sentenced in California state court for murder, assault with a firearm, and robbery. Saffold filed a state habeas petition in California seven days before the federal deadline. Five days after the state trial court denied his petition, Saffold filed a further petition in the State Court of Appeal. Four and one-half months after that petition was denied, Saffold filed a further petition in the State Supreme Court, which denied the petition on the merits and for lack of diligence. The Federal District Court dismissed Saffold's subsequent federal habeas petition as untimely, finding that the federal statute of limitations was not tolled during the intervals between the denial of one state petition and the filing of the next because no application was pending during that time. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Saffold's petition was timely because the State Supreme Court based its decision not only on lack of diligence, but also on the merits.

Question

Does the word "pending," in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, cover the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court? If so, does it apply similarly to California's unique state collateral review system?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Carey, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that, as used in AEDPA, "pending" covers the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court. The Court also held that the same rule applies to California's unique collateral review system, a system that does not involve a notice of appeal, but rather the filing within a reasonable time of a further original state habeas petition in a higher court. The Court reasoned that to rule otherwise would encourage state prisoners to file federal habeas petitions before the state completed collateral review. In remanding the question of whether Saffold's petition was pending, the Court concluded that the California Supreme Court's inclusion of the words "on the merits" could not by themselves indicate that the petition was timely. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy authored a dissent, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas joined.

Tyler v. Cain

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-5961

Petitioner

Tyler

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cain

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 656 (2001)

Argued

Monday, April 16, 2001

Decided

Thursday, June 28, 2001

Advocates

Charles E. F. Heuer (New Orleans, Louisiana, argued the cause for the respondent)

James A. Feldman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Herbert V. Larson, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Melvin Tyler was convicted of second-degree murder. Ultimately, Tyler filed his sixth state habeas petition after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cage v. Louisiana, which held that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood it to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Tyler claimed that that a jury instruction in his trial was similar to the one ruled unconstitutional in Cage. Ultimately, Tyler filed a second federal habeas petition pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The District Court denied relief. In affirming, the Court of Appeals stated the District Court had failed to determine whether Tyler had satisfied the AEDPA's successive habeas standard, which requires a district court to dismiss a claim in a second or successive application unless the applicant "shows" that the "claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." The court concluded that Tyler did not meet this standard because he "could not show that any Supreme Court decision renders the Cage decision retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review."

Question

Was the ruled established under Cage v. Louisiana, that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt, "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court," such that an inmate is entitled to submit successive a habeas petition based on that new rule?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Cain, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Cage rule was not "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that "[b]ecause 'made' means 'held'...it is clear that the Cage rule has not been 'made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.' Cage itself does not hold that it is retroactive. The only holding in Cage is that the particular jury instruction violated the Due Process Clause." Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined.

Duncan v. Walker

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-121

Petitioner

Duncan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Walker

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 167 (2001)

Argued

Monday, March 26, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 18, 2001

Advocates

Preeta D. Bansal (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Deborah W. Loewenberg (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

28 USC section 2244(d)(2) provides that the "time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection." In 1996, Sherman Walker filed a federal habeas petition under section 2254. The District Court dismissed the petition because it concluded that Walker had not exhausted available state remedies. In 1997, without returning to state court, Walker filed another federal habeas petition. Th District Court dismissed the petition because it had not been filed within a reasonable time from the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's effective date. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Walker's first federal habeas petition was an application for "other collateral review" that tolled the limitation period under section 2244(d)(2) and made his current petition timely.

Question

Is a federal habeas corpus petition is an "application for State post- conviction or other collateral review" within the meaning of 28 USC section 2244(d)(2), such that the one-year statute-of-limitations period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act is tolled?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Duncan, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that an federal habeas corpus petition is not an "application for State post- conviction or other collateral review" within the meaning of 28 USC section 2244(d)(2). "Section 2244(d)(2) therefore did not toll the limitation period during the pendency of [Walker's] first federal habeas petition," wrote Justice O'Connor. "[I]f the statute were construed so as to give applications for federal review the same tolling effect as applications for state collateral review, then [section] 2244(d)(2) would furnish little incentive for individuals to seek relief from the state courts before filing federal habeas petitions," concluded Justice O'Connor.

Artuz v. Bennett

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1238

Petitioner

Artuz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bennett

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 4 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, October 10, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, November 7, 2000

Advocates

John M. Castellano (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Dan Schweitzer (As amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, for petitioner)

Alan S. Futerfas (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1984, after firing two bullets at police during a car chase, Tony Bruce Bennett was convicted of attempted murder, among other crimes. Bennett moved pro se to vacate his judgment of conviction in 1995. A New York trial court orally denied Bennett's motion. Bennett claimed that he never received a copy of a written order reflecting the denial. In 1998, Bennett filed a federal habeas corpus petition alleging violations of his rights to present witnesses in his defense and to a fair trial, to be present at all material stages of the trial, and to the effective assistance of counsel. The Federal District Court dismissed Bennett's federal habeas corpus petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which set a 1-year period of limitation on federal habeas corpus applications by state prisoners. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Bennett's habeas petition was not time-barred because his 1995 motion was still pending, under the AEDPA's tolling provision, since he had never received notification of the state's decision regarding it. Thus, the time for appealing the denial of that motion had not yet expired. Additionally, the court found that the 1995 motion was a "properly filed" application, even though the claims contained in the motion were procedurally barred under two New York statutory provisions.

Question

Is an application for state postconviction relief containing procedurally barred claims properly filed within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bennett, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 8 U.S.C. 2244

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that an application for state postconviction relief containing procedurally barred claims is properly filed within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Antonin Scalia said that "[o]nly individual claims, and not the application containing those claims, can be procedurally defaulted under state law." "An application is 'filed,' as that term is commonly understood, when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record," noted Justice Scalia. "By construing 'properly filed application' to mean 'application raising claims that are not mandatorily procedurally barred,' [the Federal Government] elides the difference between an 'application' and a 'claim,'" argued Justice Scalia.

Ramdass v. Angelone

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-7000

Petitioner

Ramdass

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Angelone

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 156 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, April 18, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 12, 2000

Advocates

Katherine P. Baldwin (Argued the cause for the respondent)

David I. Bruck (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Virginia jury found Bobby Ramdass guilty of murdering Mohammed Kayani, a clerk in the 7-Eleven he held up, and recommended the death sentence. At the time of the sentencing phase of his trial, final judgment had been entered against Ramdass for an armed robbery and he had been found guilty of a second armed robbery, but no final judgment had been entered. Under Virginia law, a conviction does not become final until the jury returns a verdict and the judge enters a final judgment of conviction and pronounces sentence. The Kayani judge paused and scheduled a future hearing to consider whether to impose the recommended sentence. During the interval between the jury trial and this hearing, final judgment had been entered on the second armed robbery conviction. At the sentencing hearing in the capital murder case, Ramdass, in arguing for a life sentence, claimed that his prior convictions made him ineligible for parole under Virginia's three-strikes law. The court sentenced Ramdass to death, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. On remand from the U.S Supreme Court, the Virginia Supreme Court again affirmed the sentence over Ramdass' argument that he should have been allowed to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility. The court declined to apply a previous U.S Supreme Court holding that a jury considering imposing death should be told if the defendant is parole ineligible under state law. The court concluded that Ramdass was not parole ineligible when the jury was considering his sentence because the second armed robbery, in which no final judgment had been entered, did not count as a conviction for purposes of the three-strikes law. Ultimately, Ramdass sought federal habeas corpus relief. The District Court granted his petition, ruling that the jury should have been advised that he was ineligible for parole. In reversing, the Court of Appeals determined that Ramdass was not, at the time of his sentencing proceedings, legally ineligible for parole.

Question

Must a jury must be instructed in the death penalty phase of sentencing that if the defendant is not given the death sentence, that he will be ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Angelone, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that Ramdass was not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief because he was not entitled to instruction on parole ineligibility at sentencing since conviction had not been entered yet on the earlier jury verdict making him parole ineligible. In a plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that the Virginia Supreme Court's finding that the state's three-strikes law did not cover the defendant until shortly after he was sentenced must be honored because it "was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application" of a decision in which the justices said that defendants have the right to tell jurors about their parole status in such cases.

Edwards v. Carpenter

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-2060

Petitioner

Edwards

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Carpenter

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 446 (2000)

Argued

Monday, February 28, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, April 25, 2000

Advocates

J. Joseph Bodine, Jr. (Columbus, Ohio, argued the cause for the respondent)

Edward B. Foley (Columbus, Ohio, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Robert Carpenter was indicted on charges of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, pleaded guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment, with parole possible after 30 years. On direct appeal, Carpenter unsuccessfully challenged only the length of the minimum sentence. After unsuccessfully pursuing state post-conviction relief and represented by new counsel, Carpenter petitioned the Ohio Court of Appeals to reopen his direct appeal on the ground that his original appellate counsel had been constitutionally ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and sentence. The court dismissed the application as untimely, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Carpenter then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, raising the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, and alleging that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not raising that claim on direct appeal. The District Court determined that, while the sufficiency claim had been procedurally defaulted, the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could excuse that default; concluded that Carpenter's appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective; and granted the writ. The Court of Appeals concluded that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of the sufficiency claim, regardless of whether the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim had been procedurally defaulted; and found prejudice from counsel's failure to raise the sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim on direct appeal.

Question

May a state prisoner's procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel excuse the procedural default of another habeas corpus claim?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Edwards, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a state prisoner's procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can excuse the procedural default of another habeas claim only if the inmate can demonstrate that the poor lawyering rises to a constitutional level, not only that it prejudiced them at trial. The 7-2 decision means that ineffective-assistance claims filed too late in a state appellate court generally cannot be used in federal court to excuse an inmate's default on other claims. Justice Scalia wrote for the court that it is not enough to say such a claim "was presented to the state courts even though it was not presented in the manner that state law requires."

Williams v. Taylor

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-6615

Petitioner

Williams

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Taylor

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 420 (2000)

Argued

Monday, February 28, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, April 18, 2000

Advocates

Donald R. Curry (Richmond, Virginia, argued the cause for the respondent)

John H. Blume (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Michael Wayne Williams was sentenced to death after he was convicted of two capital murders. Ultimately, Williams sought federal habeas relief, in which he requested an evidentiary hearing on three constitutional claims, regarding the fairness of his trial, which he had tried unsuccessfully to develop in the state-court proceedings. The District Court granted Williams' evidentiary hearing. However, before any hearing could be held, the Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth's requests for an emergency stay and for a writ of mandamus and prohibition. The Commonwealth argued that Williams' evidentiary hearing was prohibited by federal law as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). On remand, the District Court dismissed Williams' petition citing the AEDPA statute and finding that Williams failed to show "actual innocence." In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Williams could not satisfy the statute's conditions for excusing his failure to develop the facts of his claims and barred him from receiving an evidentiary hearing.

Question

Does federal law, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, bar an evidentiary hearing, if the petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis of his claims in State court proceedings despite diligent efforts?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Williams, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that under federal law, as amended by the AEDPA, "a 'failure to develop' a claim's factual basis in state court proceedings is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or his counsel." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "comity is not served by saying a prisoner 'has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim' where he was unable to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort. In that circumstance, an evidentiary hearing is not barred."

Slack v. McDaniel

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-6322

Petitioner

Slack

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

McDaniel

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 473 (2000)

Argued

Monday, October 4, 1999

Reargued:

Wednesday, March 29, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, April 26, 2000

Advocates

Matthew D. Roberts (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court)

Michael Pescetta (Las Vegas, Nevada, argued and reargued the cause for the petitioner)

David F. Sarnowski (Carson City, Nevada, argued and reargued the cause for respondents)

Facts of the Case

Antonio Tonton Slack was convicted of second-degree murder in Nevada. In 1991, after an unsuccessful direct appeal, Slack filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. In federal court, Slack attempted to litigate claims he had not yet presented to the Nevada courts and was prevented from doing so. Slack, therefore, filed a motion to hold his federal petition in abeyance while he returned to state court to exhaust his new claims. The Federal District Court ordered the habeas petition dismissed and granted Slack leave to file an application to renew upon his exhaustion of state remedies. In 1995, after unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, Slack filed again in the federal court. The state moved to dismiss, arguing that Slack's petition raised claims that had not been presented to the state courts and that claims not raised in Slack's 1991 federal petition had to be dismissed as an abuse of the writ. The District Court granted the state's motion. Slack then filed a notice of appeal. The court denied Slack leave to appeal, concluding the appeal would raise no substantial issue. The Court of Appeals also denied Slack leave to appeal.

Question

If a person's petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus is dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies and is re-filed after those remedies are exhausted, are any claims not raised in the first petition "second or successive" and abusive of the right?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Slack, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In an 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that a federal habeas corpus petition filed by a state prisoner, after an initial petition was dismissed without adjudication on the merits, does not constitute a "second or successive" petition, subject to dismissal for abuse of writ. That "a vexatious litigant could inject undue delay into the collateral review process," wrote Justice Kennedy, can be countered, "the State remains free to impose proper procedural bars to restrict repeated returns to state court for postconviction proceedings."

Williams v. Taylor

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-8384

Petitioner

Williams

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Taylor

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 362 (2000)

Argued

Monday, October 4, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, April 18, 2000

Advocates

Robert Q. Harris (Richmond, Virginia, argued the cause for respondent)

John J. Gibbons (Argued the cause for petitioner)

Facts of the Case

After Terry Williams was convicted of robbery and capital murder; his punishment was fixed at death. In state habeas corpus proceedings a judge determined that his conviction was valid. However, the judge also found that Williams' counsel's failure to discover and present significant mitigating evidence violated his right to effective counsel and recommended that he be re-sentenced. Rejecting this, the Virginia Supreme Court held that Williams had not suffered sufficient prejudice to warrant relief. In habeas corpus proceedings under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal trial judge also found that the death sentence was constitutionally weak on ineffective-assistance grounds. The court, under the AEDPA, concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." In reversing, the Court of Appeals determined that it could not conclude that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision on prejudice was an unreasonable application of standards established by the Supreme Court.

Question

Was Terry Williams' constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel violated? Was the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court refusing to set aside Williams' death sentence "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States?"

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Williams, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Split Vote

Yes and yes. In a judgment announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court, with different majorities of Justices for each holding, held that Williams had been deprived of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel and that the Virginia Supreme Court's refusal to set aside the Williams death sentence was a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Court. This conclusion followed from "'a reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been different' if competent counsel had presented and explained the significance of all the available evidence.'"

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-2048

Petitioner

O'Sullivan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Boerckel

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 838 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, March 30, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 7, 1999

Advocates

William L. Browers (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

David B. Mote (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After Darren Boerckel's state convictions of rape, burglary, and aggravated battery were affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for leave to appeal, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The petition asked for relief on six grounds: (1) that Boerckel had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights; (2) that his confession was not voluntary; (3) that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain the conviction; (4) that his confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest; (5) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; and (6) that his right to discovery of exculpatory material was violated. In denying the petition, the District Court found that Boerckel had procedurally defaulted his first three claims by failing to include them in his petition to the Illinois Supreme Court. In reversing and remanding, the Court of Appeals concluding that Boerckel had not procedurally defaulted those claims because he was not required to present them in a petition for discretionary review to the Illinois Supreme Court in order to satisfy 28 U. S. C. Sections 2254(b)(1), (c), the exhaustion requirement. Under the exhaustion requirement federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only after they have exhausted their claims in state court.

Question

Must a state prisoner present all of his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary review in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, 28 U. S. C. Sections 2254(b)(1), (c), for federal habeas relief?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for O'Sullivan, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 6-3 decision, delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner must present his claims to a state supreme court in a petition for discretionary review when that review is part of the State's ordinary appellate review procedure. Justice O'Connor wrote for the court that "state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the state's established appellate review process." Inmates can use federal habeas petitions as shortcuts only if their state's highest court does not allow them to raise all claims before it, she said.

Strickler v. Greene

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-5864

Petitioner

Strickler

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Greene

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 263 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, March 3, 1999

Decided

Thursday, June 17, 1999

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Pamela A. Rumpz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Commonwealth of Virginia charged Tommy David Strickler with capital murder and related crimes. Strickler's counsel did not file a pretrial motion for discovery of all possible exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland because an open file policy gave him access to all of the evidence in the prosecutor's files. At Strickler's trial, Anne Stoltzfus gave detailed eyewitness testimony about the crimes and Strickler's role as one of the perpetrators. The prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory materials in the police files, consisting of notes taken by a detective during interviews with Stoltzfus, and letters written by Stoltzfus to the detective, that cast serious doubt on significant portions of her testimony. The jury found Strickler guilty and he was sentenced to death. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. In subsequent state habeas corpus proceedings, Strickler advanced an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to file a motion for disclosure of all exculpatory evidence known to the prosecution or in its possession under Brady. In response, the Commonwealth asserted that such a motion was unnecessary because of the prosecutor's open file policy. The trial court denied relief and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Strickler then filed a federal habeas corpus petition and was granted access to the exculpatory Stoltzfus materials. The District Court vacated Strickler's capital murder conviction and death sentence on the grounds that the Commonwealth had failed to disclose those materials and that he had not, in consequence, received a fair trial. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Strickler had procedurally defaulted his Brady claim by not raising it at his trial or in the state collateral proceedings. Ultimately, the court concluded that the claim was, in any event, without merit.

Question

Did Virginia violate Brady v. Maryland, which provides for the disclosure of all possible exculpatory evidence, when a prosecutor failed to disclose all the exculpatory materials in the police's files? Was there an acceptable reason for Tommy Strickler's failure to raise a Brady claim in state court after such an event? Would the outcome of Strickler's trial been different in presence of the exculpatory evidence?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Greene, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No, yes, and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that although Strickler demonstrated cause for his failure to raise a Brady claim, Virginia did not violate Brady by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to him. Further, the Court held that Strickler received a fair trial in the absence of the exculpatory evidence and did not show a "reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence would have been different had these materials been disclosed," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court.

Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-300

Petitioner

Stewart

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Martinez-Villareal

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 627 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, February 25, 1998

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1998

Advocates

Denise I. Young (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Bruce M. Ferg (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Ramon Martinez-Villareal was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Arizona. His first three federal habeas corpus petitions were denied because he had not exhausted his state remedies. Martinez-Villareal claimed in his fourth habeas petition that he was incompetent to be executed. The District Court dismissed that claim as premature, but granted the writ on other grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed the writ. Martinez-Villareal moved to reopen his petition despite the fact that review of his incompetency claim might be prevented by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, a prisoner must ask the Court of Appeals to direct the District Court to consider such a petition. By now Arizona had obtained a warrant for Martinez-Villareal's execution. Subsequently, he was found fit to be executed. The District Court denied another motion to reopen his incompetency claim, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under AEDPA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the law did not apply to a petition that raises only a competency-to-be-executed claim and that Martinez-Villareal did not, therefore, need authorization to file his petition in the District Court.

Question

May a state prison death row inmate who already has lost on one or more federal habeas corpus petitions file a subsequent petition to claim that he cannot be executed because he is incompetent?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Martinez-Villareal, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled Martinez-Villareal cannot be barred from raising his incompetency claim in a successive petition because his claim was really amended. The ban imposed by the AEDPA only covers truly successive petitions. "To hold otherwise," declared Rehnquist, "would mean that a dismissal of a first habeas petition for technical procedural reasons would bar the prisoner from ever obtaining federal habeas review."

Calderon v. Thompson

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:30 +0000

Location

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

95 7th St San Francisco CA 94103

San Francisco, CA 94103

United States

37° 46' 45.4152" N, 122° 24' 39.5568" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-215

Petitioner

Calderon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Thompson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 538 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, December 9, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, April 29, 1998

Advocates

Gregory A. Long (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Holly D. Wilkens (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1983, Thomas M. Thompson was convicted of the rape and murder of Ginger Fleischli in California state court. The special circumstance found by the jury of murder during the commission of rape made Thompson eligible for the death penalty. In 1995, a federal District Court invalidated Thompson's death sentence by granted relief on his rape conviction and the rape special circumstance. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reinstated Thompson's death sentence, noting that the State presented strong evidence of rape at trial. The Court of Appeals then issued a mandate denying all habeas relief. Two days before Thompson's execution, the Court of Appeals recalled its mandate and granted Thompson relief. The appellate court found that Thompson was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial.

Question

Did the Court of Appeal's order recalling its mandate denying Thomas M. Thompson all habeas relief violate 28 USC section 2244(b) as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996? Was the order an abuse of the appellate court's discretion?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Calderon, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that although it was consistent with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the recall was a grave abuse of discretion. The Court established that "where a federal court of appeals sua sponte recalls its mandate to revisit the merits of an earlier decision denying habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner, the court abuses its discretion unless it acts to avoid a miscarriage of justice as defined by our habeas corpus jurisprudence." Accordingly, Justice Kennedy, noting that Thompson's evidence was not clear and convincing, concluded that California's judgment would not result in a miscarriage of justice. Justice David H. Souter wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer joined.

Trest v. Cain, Warden

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-7901

Petitioner

Trest

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cain, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 87 (1997)

Argued

Monday, November 10, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, December 9, 1997

Advocates

Kathleen E. Petersen (on behalf of the Respondent)

Rebecca L. Hudsmith (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Richard Trest sought a writ of habeas corpus that would cancel the sentence he was serving in Louisiana for armed robbery. The District Court rejected his claim. Trest appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but before hearing the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as a "procedural default." The Court of Appeals ruled that Trent had failed to meet the deadline for filing his federal claims in state court. Though Louisiana had not raised the issue, the Fifth Circuit felt compelled to dismiss the case on its own initiative. Trest appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Fifth Circuit had incorrectly believed that it was required to decide the "procedural default" issue sua sponte - that is, without prompting from one of the parties.

Question

Is a Court of Appeals required to decide issues of procedural default on its own initiative, without prompting from one of the parties ("sua sponte")?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Trest, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. A Court of Appeals is not required to raise an issue of procedural default on its own initiative. In a unanimous opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer observed: "We are not aware of any precedent stating that a habeas court must raise such a matter where the State itself does not do so." The Court held that it was the State's duty to raise issues of procedural default, but did not rule on the question of whether the Court of Appeals retained the option of ruling on the issue sua sponte.

Lindh v. Murphy

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-6298

Petitioner

Lindh

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Murphy

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 320 (1997)

Argued

Monday, April 14, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 23, 1997

Advocates

James S. Liebman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Sally L. Wellman (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Aaron Lindh was convicted on multiple charges of murder and attempted murder in Wisconsin. Arguing that the Confrontation Clause was violated when the trial court barred him from questioning the motives of the State's psychiatrist, Lindh was denied relief on direct appeal. Lindh's subsequent federal habeas corpus application was also denied. After Lindh appealed again, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 amended the federal habeas statute. Following an en banc rehearing to consider the Act's impact, the Court of Appeals held that applying the new version of the law to pending cases would not have a retroactive effect because it would not attach new legal consequences to events preceding the Act's enactment.

Question

Does the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which amended the previous federal habeas statute, govern habeas applications in non-capital cases that were pending when the Act was enacted?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lindh, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the 1996 version of the federal habeas statute, as to standards affecting the entitlement of state prisoners to federal habeas corpus relief, does not to apply to non-capital habeas corpus cases that were pending when the Act was enacted. The Court reasoned that the statute's retroactive application was improper because new legal consequences attached. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined.

Lambrix v. Singletary

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-5658

Petitioner

Lambrix

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Singletary

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 518 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, January 15, 1997

Decided

Monday, May 12, 1997

Advocates

Carol M. Dittmar (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Matthew C. Lawry (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In the sentencing phase of the trial at which Cary Michael Lambrix was convicted on two counts of first degree murder, the Florida state court jury rendered an advisory verdict recommending death sentences on both counts. Finding numerous aggravating circumstances in connection with both murders, and no mitigating circumstances as to either, the trial court sentenced Lambrix to death on both counts. After his conviction and sentence were upheld by the Florida courts, Lambrix filed a habeas corpus petition in the Federal District Court, which rejected all of his claims. While Lambrix's appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, The U.S. Supreme Court handed down a ruling that if the sentencing judge in a "weighing" State (i.e., a State such as Florida that requires specified aggravating circumstances to be weighed against any mitigating circumstances at a capital trial's sentencing phase) is required to give deference to a jury's advisory sentencing recommendation, then neither the jury nor the judge is constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances. Lambrix claimed that his sentencing jury was improperly instructed on the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator. The Court of Appeals held its proceedings in abeyance to permit Lambrix to present his claim to the Florida Supreme Court, which rejected the claim without considering its merits on the ground that the claim was procedurally barred. The Court of Appeals denied relief, ruling that the U.S. Supreme Court had announced a "new rule" which could not be applied retroactively on federal habeas corpus petitions.

Question

Can a Florida killer's death sentence be challenged even though it was based on aggravating factors later ruled to be unconstitutional?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Singletary, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that a prisoner whose conviction became final before the ruling, which held that if the sentencing judge in a "weighing" State is required to give deference to a jury's advisory sentencing recommendation, then neither the jury nor the judge is constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances, is foreclosed from relying on that decision in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Justice Scalia wrote for the court that the later ruling announced a "new rule" that could not be applied to already-finalized convictions challenged in federal habeas corpus petitions.

Felker v. Turpin

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-8836

Petitioner

Felker

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Turpin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

518 U.S. 651 (1996)

Argued

Monday, June 3, 1996

Decided

Friday, June 28, 1996

Advocates

Susan V. Boleyn (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Henry P. Monaghan (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Drew S. Days, III (On behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Ellis Felker filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, appellate or certiorari review, and stay of execution after having his convictions for capital murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and false imprisonment affirmed on appeal. Felker's habeas petition challenged the constitutionality of Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "Act"). Title I of the Act requires that all motions for filing a second or successive habeas appeal from a district court be reviewed by an appellate panel whose decision shall not be appealable by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Question

Do the Act's Title I provisions, preventing the Supreme Court from reviewing an appellate review panel's denial of leave to file a second habeas petition, unconstitutionally "suspend" the habeas writ and restrict the Court's authority to entertain original habeas petitions?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Turpin, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. The unanimous Court held that the Act's creation of an appellate panel, charged with reviewing all second or successive habeas applications, is not unconstitutional. The Act simply transfers the duty of habeas review from the district courts to an appellate panel. While the Act prevents an appeal to the Court from an appellate panel's denial of leave to file a second habeas petition, it does not repeal the Court's authority to entertain original habeas petitions. Thus, the shift in habeas "gatekeeping" duties to an appellate panel is neither an unconstitutional "suspension" of the habeas writ which would violate the Exceptions Clause of Article III, nor a deprivation of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.

Gray v. Netherland, Warden

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-6510

Petitioner

Gray

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Netherland, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

518 U.S. 152 (1996)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 1996

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 1996

Advocates

John H. McLees (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Mark E. Olive (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Coleman Wayne Gray was tried for the murder of Richard McClelland in Virginia. The prosecution acknowledged that if the trial reached the capital penalty phase they would introduce Gray's admissions to other inmates that he had previously murdered 2 other people. Gray's attorney moved to exclude the evidence because Gray had not been officially charged with such crimes. Gray also claimed such evidence was a surprise tactic and that he could not pose the proper defense immediately. The Virginia trial court denied the motion to exclude. Subsequently, Gray was sentenced to death. After exhausting state remedies, Gray sough federal habeas corpus relief. He claimed that inadequate notice of evidence prevented him from a fair defense in the penalty phase of his capital trial in violation of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court initially denied the petition because it found Gray had no constitutional right to notice of individual testimony. Later, the District Court amended its ruling, holding that Gray was denied due process when the state failed to provide notice of what murder evidence would be presented. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It found that to grant the habeas corpus relief would be to recognize a new federal constitutional law regarding notice-of-evidence claims.

Question

Can a defendant sentenced to death argue in his habeas corpus petition that prosecutors deceived him, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, by producing surprise evidence in the sentencing phase of the trial?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Gray, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 5-4 decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled that the notice-of-evidence claim would require the adoption of a new constitutional rule and therefore could not be raised in a habeas petition. In her dissent, Justice Ruth Bader maintained that due process allows Gray the right to a "full, fair, potentially effective opportunity to defend against the State's charges." Gary was not given that right.

Lonchar v. Thomas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-5015

Petitioner

Lonchar

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Thomas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

517 U.S. 314 (1996)

Argued

Monday, December 4, 1995

Decided

Monday, April 1, 1996

Advocates

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Mary Beth Westmoreland (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Larry Grant Lonchar was sentenced to death for murder nine years ago. After the affirmance of Lonchar's conviction and sentence, his sister and brother filed "next friend" state habeas corpus petitions. Lonchar opposed both. Lonchar then filed a state habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed. Shortly before Lonchar's scheduled execution, he filed another state habeas corpus petition. When the petition was denied, Lonchar filed an "eleventh hour" federal petition, his first, on the day of his scheduled execution. The District Court held that Lonchar's conduct in waiting almost nine years to file his federal petition did not constitute an independent basis for rejecting the petition and granted a stay to permit time for consideration of other grounds for dismissal raised by the State. The court had reasoned that federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9, not some generalized equitable authority to dismiss, governed the case. The Court of Appeals vacated the stay. Setting aside the Rules and traditional habeas doctrine, the court held that equitable doctrines independent of Rule 9 applied and it concluded that Lonchar did not merit equitable relief.

Question

May a federal court dismiss a first federal habeas petition for general "equitable" reasons beyond those embodied in the federal Habeas Corpus Rules?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lonchar, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In an opinion authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9, not some general "equitable" power to create exceptions to the Rule, should have determined whether or not a petition's dismissal was appropriate. Justice Breyer wrote for the court that a long delay does not generally constitute an abuse of the system, adding, "[d]ismissal of a first habeas petition is a particularly serious matter for that dismissal denies the petitioner the protections of the Great Writ entirely."

Thompson v. Keohane, Warden

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-6615

Petitioner

Thompson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Keohane, Warden, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

516 U.S. 99 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, October 11, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, November 29, 1995

Advocates

Cynthia M. Hora (on behalf of the Respondents)

Julie R. O'Sullivan (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Thompson, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

None

Garlotte v. Fordice, Governor Of Mississippi

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-6790

Petitioner

Garlotte

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fordice, Governor Of Mississippi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 39 (1995)

Argued

Monday, April 24, 1995

Decided

Tuesday, May 30, 1995

Advocates

Brian D. Boyle (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Marvin L. White, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Garlotte, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

None

O'neal v. Mcaninch, Warden

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-7407

Petitioner

O'neal

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mcaninch, Warden

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 432 (1995)

Argued

Monday, October 31, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 1995

Advocates

Richard A. Cordray (on behalf of the Respondent)

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Thomas R. Wetterer, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for O'neal, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

None

Schlup v. Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-7901

Petitioner

Schlup

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Delo, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

513 U.S. 298 (1995)

Argued

Monday, October 3, 1994

Decided

Monday, January 23, 1995

Advocates

Jeremiah W. Nixon (on behalf of the Respondent)

Sean D. O'Brien (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Schlup, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

None

Mcfarland v. Scott, Director, Texas Department Of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-6497

Petitioner

Mcfarland

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Scott, Director, Texas Department Of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 849 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 1994

Decided

Thursday, June 30, 1994

Advocates

Margaret P. Griffey (on behalf of the Respondent)

Mandy Welch (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Mcfarland, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 848

None

Reed v. Farley, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:52 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-5418

Petitioner

Reed

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Farley, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 339 (1994)

Argued

Monday, March 28, 1994

Decided

Monday, June 20, 1994

Advocates

Jerold S. Solovy (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Arend J. Abel (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Farley, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

None

Caspari, Superintendent, Missouri Eastern Correctional Center v. Bohlen

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-1500

Petitioner

Caspari, Superintendent, Missouri Eastern Correctional Center, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bohlen

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 383 (1994)

Argued

Monday, December 6, 1993

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 1994

Advocates

William K. Kelley (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Richard H. Sindel (on behalf of the Respondent)

Frank A. Jung (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Caspari, Superintendent, Missouri Eastern Correctional Center, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None