Cases by Issue - Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Washington v. Recuenco

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-83

Petitioner

Washington

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Arturo R. Recuenco

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, October 17, 2005

Argued

Monday, April 17, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 26, 2006

Advocates

Gregory C. Link (argued the cause for Respondent)

James M. Whisman (Attorneys for Petitioner, Counsel of Record)

Facts of the Case

Arturo Recuenco was convicted of second degree assault in Washington state court after the jury found that he had attacked his wife "with a deadly weapon." The trial court then applied a 3-year enhancement to his sentence based on its own finding that a firearm had been involved, even though the jury never specifically found that a gun was used. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that the enhancement was unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington,542 U.S. 296, a 2004 U.S. Supreme Court decision that held that only those factors found by a jury, not a judge, may be considered for sentencing enhancements. The court disagreed with Washington state's argument that, while a Sixth Amendment violation under Blakely had indeed occurred, that violation could be found legally harmless.

Question

Can a violation of Blakely v. Washington's rule that all factors used in sentencing enhancements must be found by a jury, not a judge, be found legally harmless?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Washington, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: harmless error

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court held that Blakely violations do not "necessarily render[] a criminal trial unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence." (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1) As such, the defendant is not entitled to an automatic reversal and the prosecution may attempt to argue that the jury would have returned the same result if the error had not occurred.

Whitfield v. U.S.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1293

Petitioner

David Whitfield

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Haywood Eudon Hall, aka Don Hall v. United States, No. 03-1294

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 209 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 21, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, January 11, 2005

Advocates

Jonathan L. Marcus (argued the cause for Respondent)

Sharon C. Samek (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Federal district courts convicted David Whitfield and Haywood Hall of conspiracy to commit money laundering. They appealed and argued the federal money laundering law required the jury to have found proof of an "overt act" furthering the conspiracy. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that the law lacked any language requiring proof of an overt act. Other federal appeals courts had ruled the law did require an overt act.

Question

Did a conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), require proof of an overt act furthering the conspiracy?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for U.S., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1956

No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the Court's unanimous ruling that because the federal money laundering law's text did not expressly make committing an overt act an element of the conspiracy offense, the government did not need to prove such an act.

Pasquantino v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:14 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-725

Petitioner

David B. Pasquantino, Carl J. Pasquantino, and Arthur Hilts

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 349 (2005)

Granted

Monday, April 5, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, April 26, 2005

Advocates

Laura W. Brill (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Carl J. Pasquantino, David B. Pasquantino and Arthur Hilts smuggled large quantities of liquor from the United States into Canada to evade that country's heavy alcohol import taxes. A federal district court convicted them for violating the federal wire fraud statute, which prohibited the use of interstate wires for "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses." The Fourth Circuit affirmed their convictions, rejecting the petitioners' argument that they could not be prosecuted because of the common-law revenue, which rule barred courts from enforcing foreign tax laws.

Question

Did a plot to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violate the federal wire fraud statute?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1343

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the law's plain language criminalized the smuggling scheme in this case. The common-law revenue rule did not bar the prosecution of the scheme, because no common-law case as of 1952 clearly established that the rule barred the U.S. from prosecuting a fraudulent scheme to evade foreign taxes.

Shepard v. U.S.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9168

Petitioner

Reginald Shepard

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 13 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 21, 2004

Argued

Monday, November 8, 2004

Decided

Monday, March 7, 2005

Advocates

John P. Elwood (argued the cause for Respondent)

Linda J. Thompson (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Reginald Shepard pled guilty to violating the federal statute prohibiting a felon from possessing a gun. The government argued Shepard's sentence should be enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The act added at least a 15-year sentence for any felon with three or more "violent felony" convictions who then possessed a gun. The government argued at least five of the 11 breaking and entering convictions on Shepard's record were violent felonies. The ACCA listed "burglary" as a violent felony and in Taylor v. U.S.(1990) the U.S. Supreme Court said the act meant "generic burglary" of a "building or other structure." However the Massachusetts burglary law Shepard pled guilty to breaking gave burglary a nongeneric definition - including entry into non-structures like cars. Shepard argued he had not pled guilty to generic robbery. The federal district court refused to sentence Shepard under the ACCA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and said the district court must consider evidence that showed it was obvious to Shepard that he pled guilty to generic robbery. The district court refused. The First Circuit reversed and sentenced Shepard under the ACCA.

Question

May a court sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act look to police reports or complaint applications to determine whether an earlier guilty plea necessarily admitted, and supported a conviction for, generic burglary?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Shepard, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

No. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that while a guilty plea could qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA, courts may only look to the following when determining if that plea admitted to generic burglary: the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement, or a judicial record in which the defendant confirmed the factual basis for the plea (such as conversation between defendant and judge).

Small v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-750

Petitioner

Gary Sherwood Small

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 385 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 29, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, November 3, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, April 26, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Boas (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Patricia A. Millett (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person "convicted in any court" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. A Japanese court convicted Gary Sherwood Small for crimes punishable by a prison term longer than one year. Years later a U.S. District Court convicted Small, because of his prior conviction, of illegally possessing a gun. Small appealed and argued the term "convicted in any court" did not include convictions in foreign courts. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Small.

Question

Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person "convicted in any court" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. Does "convicted in any court" include convictions in foreign courts?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Small, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 922

No. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the federal law's phrase, "convicted in any court," encompassed only domestic, not foreign, convictions. The majority reasoned that in determining the scope of the phrase, it was appropriate to assume Congress had domestic concerns in mind. Moreover, the statute's overall language suggested no intent to reach beyond domestic convictions.

United States v. Booker

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-104

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Freddie J. Booker

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

United States v. Ducan Fanfan, No. 04-105

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 220 (2005)

Argued

Monday, October 4, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

T. Christopher Kelly (argued the cause for Respondent Booker)

Rosemary Curran Scapicchio (argued the cause for Respondent Fanfan)

Facts of the Case

In Blakely v. Washington (2004) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury required judges to use only facts proved to a jury to increase a sentence beyond the standard range.

Following U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge enhanced Freddie Booker's sentence based on facts the judge determined. Booker appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found by a judge.

In another case, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed a judge to sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188-235 months in prison based on facts the judge determined. The judge decided Blakely v. Washington prevented him from enhancing the sentence and sentenced Fanfan to 78 months. The federal government appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan cases.

Question

1.) Does an enhanced sentence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines based on the judge's determination of a fact violate the Sixth Amendment? 2.) If so, are the Sentencing Guidelines altogether unconstitutional?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Booker, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. App.

Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines, where they allow judges to enhance sentences using facts not reviewed by juries, violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. The sentences of Booker and Fanfan, based partly on facts determined only by judges, were therefore unconstitutional. In a separate 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court said the guidelines would now be advisory and invalidated the provisions that made them mandatory.

Blakely v. Washington

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1632

Petitioner

Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Washington

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 296 (2004)

Granted

Monday, October 20, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, March 23, 2004

Decided

Thursday, June 24, 2004

Advocates

John Knodell, III (argued the cause for Respondent)

Jeffrey L. Fisher (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Respondent, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Blakely pleaded guilty to the kidnapping of his estranged wife and the facts admitted in his plea supported a maximum sentence of 53 months. Washington state law allows a judge to impose a sentence above the standard range if he finds "substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so that were not computed into the standard range sentence. The judge in this case imposed an "exceptional" sentence of 90 months after determining Blakely had acted with "deliberate cruelty."

Blakely appealed, arguing that this sentencing procedure deprived him of his federal Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to his sentence. A state appellate court affirmed the sentence and the state supreme court denied review.

Question

Does a fact (other than a prior conviction) necessary to increase a sentence beyond the statutory standard range need to be proved by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Blakely, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Right to Trial By Jury

In a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that an exceptional sentence increase based on the judge's determination that Blakely had acted with "deliberate cruelty" violated Blakely's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Citing its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court ruled that facts increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Dissents by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy and Justice Stephen Breyer argued the ruling will diminish legislatures' ability to set uniform sentencing guidelines.

United States v. Cotton

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-687

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cotton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 625 (2002)

Argued

Monday, April 15, 2002

Decided

Monday, May 20, 2002

Advocates

Timothy J. Sullivan (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Michael R. Dreeben (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Leonard Cotton and others with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a detectable amount of cocaine and cocaine base. After a jury convicted them, Cotton and the others received a sentence based on the District Court's finding of drug quantity of at least 50 grams of cocaine base, which implicated certain enhanced penalties. They did not object in the District Court to the fact that the sentences were based on a quantity not alleged in the indictment. While their appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." In federal prosecutions, such facts must also be charged in the indictment. Cotton and others then argued before the Court of Appeals that their sentences were invalid under Apprendi, because the drug quantity issue was neither alleged in the indictment nor submitted to the petit jury. The appellate court vacated the sentences on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to impose a sentence for an offense not charged in the indictment.

Question

Does the omission from a federal indictment of a fact that enhances the statutory maximum sentence justify a Court of Appeals' vacating the enhanced sentence, even though the defendant did not object in the trial court?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the omission from a federal indictment of a fact that enhances the statutory maximum sentence does not justify a Court of Appeals' vacating the enhanced sentence, even though the defendant did not object in the trial court. The Court reasoned that, even if the error affected the defendants' substantive rights, it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The Court noted that the evidence that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted.

United States v. Vonn

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-973

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Vonn

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 55 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, November 6, 2001

Decided

Monday, March 4, 2002

Advocates

Monica Knox (Los Angeles, California, argued the cause for the respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 lays out steps that a judge must take to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. Rule 11(h)'s requirement that any variance from those procedures "which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded" is similar to the general harmless-error rule in Rule 52(a). On February 28, 1997, Alphonso Vonn was charged with federal bank robbery and firearm crimes. That day a Magistrate Judge twice advised him of his constitutional rights. Vonn also signed a statement saying that he had read and understood his rights and he answered yes to the court's questions whether he had understood the court's explanation of his rights and whether he had read and signed the statement. When Vonn later pleaded guilty to robbery, the court advised him of the constitutional rights he was relinquishing, but skipped the advice required by Rule (11)(c)(3) that he would have the right to assistance of counsel at trial. Subsequently, Vonn pleaded guilty to the firearm charge and to a later-charged conspiracy count. Again, the court advised him of the rights he was waiving, but did not mention the right to counsel. Appealing his convictions, Vonn raised Rule 11 for the first time. The Court of Appeals agreed that there had been error and vacated the convictions.

Question

Does a criminal defendant who lets a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 error pass without objection in the trial court bear the burden of showing plain error under Rule 52? May a court reviewing Rule 11 error examine the entire record begun at the defendant's first appearance in the matter leading to his eventual plea when considering the effect of any error on the defendant's substantial rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held 8-1 that silent defendant has the burden to satisfy the plain-error rule and unanimously that a reviewing court may consult the whole record when considering the effect of any error on substantial rights. The Court reasoned that to hold that Rule 11(h)'s terms imply that the latter half of Rule 52 has no application to Rule 11 errors would amount to finding a partial repeal of Rule 52(b) by implication, a disfavored result that Vonn had not establish enough support for. "The value of finality requires defense counsel to be on his toes, not just the judge, and the defendant who just sits there when a mistake can be fixed cannot just sit there when he speaks up later on," wrote Justice Souter.

Cedric Kushner Promotions v. King

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-549

Petitioner

Cedric Kushner Promotions

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

King

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 158 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, April 18, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 11, 2001

Advocates

Richard A. Edlin (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Austin C. Schlick (Department of Justice, for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting petitioner)

Peter Fleming, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd., a corporate promoter of boxing matches, sued Don King, the president and sole shareholder of a rival corporation, alleging that King had conducted his corporation's affairs in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise...to conduct or participate...in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." The District Court dismissed the complaint. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that RICO applies only where a plaintiff shows the existence of two separate entities, a "person" and a distinct "enterprise," the affairs of which that "person" improperly conducts. The court concluded that King was part of the corporation, not a "person," distinct from the "enterprise," who allegedly improperly conducted the "enterprise's affairs."

Question

Are Don King and his corporation a distinct "person" and "enterprise," such that RICO applies?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for King, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "the need for two distinct entities is satisfied; hence, the RICO provision...applies when a corporate employee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole owner -- whether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority." "The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally different entity," wrote Justice Breyer. "A corporate employee who conducts the corporation's affairs through an unlawful RICO 'pattern...of activity,' uses that corporation as a 'vehicle' whether he is, or is not, its sole owner."

Alabama v. Bozeman

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-492

Petitioner

Alabama

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bozeman

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 146 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, April 17, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 11, 2001

Advocates

Mark John Christensen (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Sandra Jean Stewart (Montgomery, Alabama, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer, a legal order that requires a state to hold a currently imprisoned individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime. In 1997, Michael Bozeman was serving a federal prison sentence at a federal prison in Florida. In January, the district attorney of Covington County, Alabama sought temporary custody of Bozeman to arraign him on state firearm charges for which an earlier detainer had been filed. The Agreement provides that a state that obtains a prisoner for purposes of trial must try him within 120 days of his arrival, and if it returns him to his "original place of imprisonment" prior to that trial, charges shall be dismissed. After appearing in Alabama court, Bozeman was returned to federal prison in Florida. When Bozeman returned to Alabama court, his local counsel filed a motion to dismiss the state charges on the ground that Bozeman had been "returned to the original place of imprisonment" (the federal prison) "prior to" "trial" on state charges being "had." Ultimately, Bozeman was convicted and an appellate court affirmed. In reversing, the Alabama State Supreme Court held that the literal language of the Agreement required dismissal of the state charges.

Question

Does the Interstate Agreement on Detainers require the dismissal of criminal charges when a prisoner serving a federal sentence is transferred for a day to be arraigned on state charges and then returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bozeman, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 19 U.S.C. App.

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the literal language of Article IV(e) of the Agreement bars any further criminal proceedings when a defendant is returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial. The Court rejected the argument that the one-day breach did not interrupt rehabilitation significantly for two reasons. First, "the language of the Agreement militates against an implicit exception, for it is absolute," wrote Justice Breyer. Second, continued Justice Breyer, "even were we to assume for argument's sake that the Agreement exempts violations that...are de minimis...we could not say that the violation at issue here qualifies as trivial."

United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:13 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-151

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 483 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, March 28, 2001

Decided

Monday, May 14, 2001

Advocates

Barbara D. Underwood (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Gerald F. Uelmen (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Under California's Compassionate Use Act of 1996, the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative was organized to distribute marijuana to qualified patients for medical purposes. In 1998, the United States sued to enjoin the Cooperative and its executive director. The government argued that the Cooperative's activities violated the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on distributing, manufacturing, and possessing with the intent to distribute or manufacture a controlled substance. Although the District Court enjoined it, the Cooperative continued to distribute marijuana. Rejecting the Cooperative's medical necessity defense, the court found the Cooperative in contempt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the medical necessity defense was a legally cognizable defense. On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court modified its injunction to incorporate a medical necessity defense, under which medically necessary distributions were to be permitted.

Question

Does a medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act's prohibition on the manufacture and distribution of various drugs, including marijuana, exist?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 801

No. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that there is no medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing marijuana. "The statute reflects a determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception, " wrote Justice Thomas, therefore, "medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and distributing marijuana." Justice John Paul Stevens' concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, argued that "[b]ecause necessity was raised in this case as a defense to distribution, the Court need not venture an opinion on whether the defense is available to anyone other than distributors." Justice Stephen G. Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1884

Petitioner

Lackawanna County District Attorney

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Coss

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 394 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, February 20, 2001

Decided

Wednesday, April 25, 2001

Advocates

Robert M. Russel (Denver, Colorado, on behalf of Colorado, et al., as amici curiae, supporting the petitioners)

William P. O'Malley (Scranton, Pennsylvania, argued the cause for the petitioners)

James V. Wade (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1986, after being convicted for simple assault, institutional vandalism, and criminal mischief, Edward R. Coss, Jr., filed a petition for relief, but the Pennsylvania courts never ruled on the petition. In 1990, after he had served the full sentences for his 1986 convictions, Coss was convicted of aggravated assault. Ultimately, the sentencing court did not consider Coss' 1986 convictions in determining his eligible sentencing range. In choosing a sentence within the applicable range, the court considered several factors including Coss' extensive criminal record, making reference to his 1986 convictions. Coss then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his 1986 convictions were constitutionally invalid. The Federal District Court denied the petition reasoning that Coss had not been prejudiced by his 1986 counsel's ineffectiveness. The Court of Appeals found that Coss would not have been convicted in 1986 but for the ineffective assistance. The court remanded the case ordering a retrial or resentencing without consideration of the 1986 conviction.

Question

May a state prisoner use a federal habeas petition to challenge a current sentence on the ground that it was enhanced based on an unconstitutional prior conviction for which the sentence has fully expired?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lackawanna County District Attorney, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that "once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. If that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a [federal habeas petition] on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained." Justice David H. Souter filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion.

Daniels v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-9136

Petitioner

Daniels

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 374 (2001)

Argued

Monday, January 8, 2001

Decided

Wednesday, April 25, 2001

Advocates

G. Michael Tanaka (Los Angeles, California, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, Earthy D. Daniels, Jr., was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), which imposes a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence on anyone convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and who has three previous convictions for a violent felony, Daniels' sentence was enhanced. After an unsuccessful appeal, Daniels filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. Daniels argued that his sentence violated the Constitution because it was based in part on two prior convictions that were themselves unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

May a federal defendant, who has been sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, challenge his federal sentence through a motion on the ground that his prior convictions were unconstitutionally obtained?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the nonexistent or unsuccessful pursuit of available challenges to the constitutionality of prior state convictions, which were used to enhance a federal sentence, precluded such challenge to collaterally attack a federal sentence. "[Daniels] could have pursued his claims while he was in custody on those convictions," wrote Justice O'Connor for the majority. "As his counsel conceded at oral argument, there is no indication that [Daniels] did so or that he was prevented from doing so by some external force."

Buford v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-9073

Petitioner

Buford

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 59 (2001)

Argued

Monday, January 8, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, March 20, 2001

Advocates

Dean A. Strang (Milwaukee, Wisconsin, argued the cause for petitioner)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Argued the cause for respondent)

Facts of the Case

The United States Sentencing Guidelines define a career offender as one with at least two prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes and provides that a sentencing judge must count as a single prior conviction all "related" convictions. Convictions may also be functionally related, if they were factually or logically related and sentencing was joint. After Paula Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, the sentencing judge had to determine whether her five prior state convictions were "related" or whether they should count as more than one. At sentencing, the government conceded that her four prior robbery convictions were related. The government did not concede that her prior drug conviction was related to the robberies. The District Court concluded that Buford's drug and robbery cases had not been either formally or functionally consolidated. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision deferentially rather than de novo, giving deference to the District Court.

Question

Does a de novo standard of review apply when a court of appeals reviews a trial court's sentencing guideline determination as to whether an offender's prior convictions were consolidated, and thus related, for sentencing purposes?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. App.

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Court of Appeals properly reviewed the District Court's "''functional consolidation'" decision deferentially "[i]n light of the fact- bound nature of the legal decision, the comparatively greater expertise of the District Court, and the limited value of uniform court of appeals precedent." Rejecting Buford's arguments for de novo review, Justice Breyer wrote that "the district court is in a better position than the appellate court to decide whether a particular set of individual circumstances demonstrates 'functional consolidation.'"

Lopez v. Davis

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-7504

Petitioner

Lopez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Davis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 230 (2001)

Argued

Monday, October 30, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, January 10, 2001

Advocates

Beth S. Brinkmann (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondents)

Mark V. Meierhenry (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Congress has provided the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) with the statutory authority to reduce the prison term of an inmate convicted of a nonviolent felony by up to one year, if the prisoner successfully completes a substance abuse program. The BOP's implementing regulation categorically denies early release to prisoners whose offense is a felony attended by "the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm." In 1997, Christopher A. Lopez was convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Additionally, the court found that Lopez possessed a firearm in connection with his offense. While incarcerated, Lopez requested substance abuse treatment. The BOP found Lopez qualified for its residential drug abuse program, but was found him categorically ineligible for early release. The District Court, in ordering the BOP to reconsider Lopez for early release, held that the BOP may not, based on weapons possession, categorically count out inmates, whose underlying conviction was for a nonviolent crime. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Does the Bureau of Prisons have the authority to categorically deny consideration for eligibility for early release to inmates convicted of non- violent offenses after they have completed substance abuse programs?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Davis, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3621

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the categorically denial of early release to a prisoner who committed felony using firearm is a permissible exercise of the BOP's discretion, even if the prisoner has successfully completed a substance abuse program. "The Bureau reasonably concluded that an inmate's prior involvement with firearms, in connection with the commission of a felony, suggests his readiness to resort to life-endangering violence and therefore appropriately determines the early release decision," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the majority. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, dissented.

Cleveland v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-804

Petitioner

Cleveland

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 12 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, October 10, 2000

Decided

Tuesday, November 7, 2000

Advocates

Paul Mogin (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Louisiana law authorizes the State to award nontransferable, annually renewable licenses to operate video poker machines. In 1992, Fred Goodson and his family formed Truck Stop Gaming, Ltd. (TSG), a video poker business. Carl Cleveland, a lawyer, assisted Goodson in preparing TSG's video poker license applications, each of which identified Goodson's children as the sole beneficial owners of the partnership. From 1992 through 1995, TSG successfully renewed its license. In 1996, Cleveland and Goodson were charged with money laundering under federal law, along with racketeering and conspiracy in connection with a scheme to bribe state legislators to vote in a manner favorable to the video poker industry. Acts supporting these charges came from federal mail fraud charges, defined as "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining...property by means of...fraudulent...representations." The indictment alleged that Cleveland and Goodson fraudulently concealed that they were the true owners of TSG in the license applications they had mailed to the State because they had tax and financial problems that could have undermined their ability to receive a video poker license. Before trial, Cleveland moved to dismiss the mail fraud counts on the ground that the alleged fraud did not deprive the State of "property." The District Court denied the motion, concluding that licenses constitute property even before they are issued. A jury found Cleveland guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Do state video poker licenses qualify as property for purposes of the federal mail fraud statute?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cleveland, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1341

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that State and municipal licenses in general, and Louisiana's video poker licenses in particular, do not rank as "property," for purposes of federal law, in the hands of the official licensor. Thus, Cleveland's conviction for making false statements to obtain state video poker license was vacated. "Equating issuance of licenses or permits with deprivation of property would subject to federal mail fraud prosecution a wide range of conduct traditionally regulated by state and local authorities," wrote Justice Ginsburg for the Court.

Castillo v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-658

Petitioner

Castillo

Respondent

United States

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 120 (2000)

Argued

Monday, April 24, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 5, 2000

Advocates

James K. Robinson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Stephen P. Halbrook (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, Jaime Castillo and other Branch-Davidians were involved in a violent confrontation with federal agents near Waco, Texas. Castillo was indicted for conspiring to murder federal officers. A jury determined that Castillo, by using firearms in connection with the alleged conspiracy, had violated 18 USC Section 924(c)(1), which read in relevant part: "Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years... and if the firearm is a machinegun... to imprisonment for thirty years." During sentencing, the District Court found that Castillo had possessed machineguns and imposed the mandatory 30-year prison sentence. On appeal, the Courts of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of whether Castillo had used, rather than merely possessed, machineguns. The court also concluded that statutory terms such as "machinegun" did not state elements of a crime separate from that of using a firearm, but instead established factors enhancing a sentence and that the District Court could reimpose the 30-year sentence if it found that machineguns had been actively used. The District Court then reimposed the 30-year sentence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the provision of USC Section 924(c)(1), which imposes a stiffer penalty for using a "machinegun" in a crime of violence, state factors enhancing a sentence rather than elements of a separate offense?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Castillo, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "Section 924(c)(1) uses the word "machinegun" (and similar words) to state an element of a separate, aggravated crime." Therefore, the federal law that subjects anyone who carries a machine gun during a violent crime to an additional 30 years in prison states an element of an offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury rather than determined by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence as are sentencing factors. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "our consideration of Section 924(c)(1)'s language, structure, context, history and such factors that typically help courts determine a statute's objectives leads us to conclude that the relevant words create a separate substantive crime."

Carter v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5716

Petitioner

Carter

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 255 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, April 19, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 12, 2000

Advocates

Donald J. McCauley (on behalf of the Petitioner)

David C. Frederick (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, Floyd J. Carter donned a ski mask and entered the Collective Federal Savings Bank unarmed. In the process, Carter pushed an exiting customer back into the bank and startled customers already inside. Carter removed almost $16,000 from the bank and fled. After his apprehension, Carter was charged with federal bank robbery, 18 USC Section 2113(a), which punishes "[w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes... any... thing of value [from a] bank." Carter pleaded not guilty, claiming that he had not taken the bank's money by force, violence, or intimidation as required of robbery. Carter moved that the District Court instruct the jury that they could consider whether he committed federal bank larceny, USC Section 2113(b), as a lesser included offense in the broader crime of robbery, in which case, Carter could be guilty of larceny without being guilty of robbery. The larceny law punishes "[w]hoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any... thing of value exceeding $1,000 [from a]... bank," with a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison, as opposed to robbery's 20-year maximum. The District Court denied the motion. The jury, instructed on robbery alone, returned a guilty verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

May defendants charged with federal bank robbery have the jury consider whether they committed the lesser crime of federal bank larceny?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2113

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that federal bank larceny is not a "lesser included offense" of federal bank robbery. The "[p]etitioner is accordingly prohibited as a matter of law from obtaining a lesser included offense instruction," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Thomas concluded that the larceny law requires proof of three elements not included in robbery: the intent to steal, property worth more than $ 1,000, and proof that the defendant "takes and carries away" the property. Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer, expressed the view that the Court's decision gave "short shrift to the common-law origin and statutory evolution of [18 USC Section 2113]."

Jones v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5739

Petitioner

Jones

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 848 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, March 21, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 22, 2000

Advocates

Donald M. Falk (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1998, Dewey Jones, of Detroit, tossed a Molotov cocktail into the home of his cousin, James Walker, Jr., in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Walker's home was severely damaged. Subsequently, Jones was convicted in U.S. District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. section 844(i), which makes it a federal crime to "maliciously damage or destroy, ...by means of fire or an explosive, any building... used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." The Court of Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction. Before both courts, Jones unsuccessfully argued that section 844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.

Question

Does the federal arson statute apply to the arson of a private residence?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jones, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets, National Firearms, Organized Crime Control, Comprehensive Crime Control, or Gun Control Acts, except for RICO (q.v.) portion

No. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerce-affecting activity, such that arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution under section 844(i). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "[w]ere we to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation of section 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain."

Ohler v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-9828

Petitioner

Ohler

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 753 (2000)

Argued

Monday, March 20, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 22, 2000

Advocates

Benjamin L. Coleman (Argued the cause for petitioner)

Barbara B. McDowell (Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, Maria Ohler was arrested and charged with importation of marijuana and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, after a customs inspector noticed that someone had tampered with one of Ohler's van interior panels and discovered approximately 81 pounds of marijuana. Before the trial, the government filed in limine motions to admit Ohler's prior felony conviction as character evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and as impeachment evidence under Rule 609(a)(1). Also before the trial, the District Court denied the motion to admit the conviction as character evidence. After the beginning of the trail, the court ruled that if Ohler testified, evidence of her prior conviction would be admissible under Rule 609(a)(1). While testifying, Ohler admitted on direct examination that she had been convicted of possession of methamphetamine in 1993. Subsequently, Ohler was found guilty. On appeal, Ohler challenged the District Court's in limine ruling, allowing the government to use her prior conviction for impeachment purposes. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Ohler waived her objection by introducing evidence of the conviction during her direct examination.

Question

Does a defendant waive her right to appeal a ruling granting the government's motion to introduce evidence of a prior conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1), if she introduces the prior conviction while testifying on direct examination?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Evidence

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error." Thus, federal defendants, who choose to acknowledge their prior convictions, waive the right to appeal the evidence's admissibility. Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice David H. Souter argued, [t]here is no reason to discourage the defendant from introducing the conviction herself, as the majority's waiver rule necessarily does."

Johnson v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:43 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5153

Petitioner

Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 694 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, February 22, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2000

Advocates

Rita La Lumia (Chattanooga, Tennessee, argued the cause for petitioner)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 replaced most forms of parole with supervised release. If release conditions are violated, the sentencing court may revoke the release and order the violator to serve part or all of the release term in prison without credit for time previously served on release. In 1994, Cornell Johnson was convicted of conspiring to produce and use counterfeit credit cards. Johnson was sentenced to imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release. While on supervised release, Johnson violated its terms. Subsequently, the District Court revoked Johnson's release and ordered him to serve an 18-month prison term to be followed by an additional 12 months of supervised release. The court cited no authority for ordering the new supervised release. The court could have cited a subsection added to the Act in 1994, 18 USC section 3583(h), which explicitly gave it the authority to add the new term; however, Congress made the amendment after Johnson's conviction. On appeal, Johnson argued that the application of the federal law established after his conviction violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision.

Question

May a district court, under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, impose an additional term of supervised release following the reimprisonment of those who violate the conditions of an initial term of supervised release, without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3583

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that 18 USC section 3583(h) is not retroactively applicable; however, its prior version, 18 USC section 3583(e)(3), authorizes a Federal District Court to impose additional term of supervised release after revocation of initial term and reimprisonment. Thus, Johnson's judgment was affirmed because the federal sentencing statute, which was in effect at the time of his original offense, permitted the imposition of supervised release following recommitment. Justice Souter wrote for the Court that "[p]re-Guidelines practice, linguistic continuity from the old scheme to the current one, and the obvious thrust of congressional sentencing policy confirm that, in applying the law as before the enactment of subsection (h), district courts have the authority to order terms of supervised release following reimprisonment." Justice Antonin Scalia dissented.

United States v. Johnson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1696

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Johnson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 53 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, December 8, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, March 1, 2000

Advocates

Barbara B. McDowell (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Kevin M. Schad (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Roy Lee Johnson had been serving time in federal prison for multiple drug and firearms felonies when two of his convictions were declared invalid. The District Court ordered his immediate release. Johnson's 3-year term of supervised release that was yet to be served on the remaining convictions then went into effect. As a result of serving time for the two invalid convictions, Johnson had served 2.5 years' too much prison time. After his release, Johnson filed a motion to credit the excess two and one-half years he was erroneously incarcerated toward his three-year supervised release sentence. The District Court denied relief, explaining that the supervised release commenced upon Johnson's actual release from incarceration, not before. In reversing, the Court of Appeals accepted Johnson's argument that his supervised release term commenced not on the day he left prison, but when his lawful term of imprisonment expired.

Question

May a federal criminal defendant's excess prison time be credited towards this supervised release term, reducing its length?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3624

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the length of a supervised release term cannot be reduced by reason of excess time served in prison. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, "[t]he objectives of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release." The Court found that Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to community life and that supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.

Beck v. Prupis

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1480

Petitioner

Beck

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Prupis

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 494 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, November 3, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, April 26, 2000

Advocates

Michael M. Rosenbaum (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Jay Starkman (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Robert A. Beck, II, of Southeastern Insurance Group (SIG), alleged that after he discovered former senior officer and director Ronald M. Prupis' unlawful conduct and contacted regulators, Prupis enacted a scheme to remove him from SIG. Beck sued Prupis under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Beck alleged that his injury, the loss of his employment, served to further Prupis' conspiracy and therefore provided a cause of action under RICO. The District Court dismissed Beck's RICO conspiracy claim. The court agreed with Prupis that employees who are terminated for refusing to participate in RICO activities, or who threaten to report RICO activities, do not have standing to sue under RICO for damages from their loss of employment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the act causing Beck's injury was not an act of racketeering, it could not support a RICO cause of action.

Question

May a person injured by an action furthering a conspiracy sue under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act even if the action itself was not an act of racketeering?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Prupis, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that an injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering or otherwise wrongful under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not give rise to a cause of action under RICO. Thus, because Prupis' scheme to remove Beck from SIG was not an act of racketeering itself, Beck had no ground to sue him under RICO. Although Prupis did engage in acts of racketeering, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "the alleged overt act (terminating) in the present case was not independently wrongful under any substantive provision of RICO."

Richardson v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-8629

Petitioner

Richardson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 813 (1999)

Argued

Monday, February 22, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, June 1, 1999

Advocates

William A. Barnett, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A federal criminal statute, 21 U.S.C. section 848(a), proscribes any person from engaging in "continuing criminal enterprise (CCE)," which is defined as involving a violation of federal drug statutes where such a violation was part of a "continuing series of violations." Eddie Richardson, who had organized and managed the Chicago street gang called the Undertaker Vice Lords in order to sell drugs, was charge with a CCE violation. At trial, Richardson proposed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree not only that he committed some "continuing series of violations" but also that the he committed each of the individual "violations" necessary to make up that "continuing series." In other words, the proposed instruction would have required the jury to unanimously agree on which three acts constituted the alleged series of violations. The judge rejected Richardson's proposal and, instead, instructed the jurors that they must unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least three federal narcotics offenses, but did not have to agree as to the particular offenses. Subsequently, the jury convicted Richardson. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's jury instruction.

Question

Does the "continuing criminal enterprise" statute require juror unanimity as to each specific violation of federal law for conviction?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Richardson, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 848

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a jury in a "continuing criminal enterprise" case is required to agree unanimously not only that accused committed continuing series of violations, but also which specific violations made up the continuing series. Looking to the language of the statute, Justice Breyer concluded that in the law "each 'violation' amounts to a separate element" and that combined with a "tradition of requiring juror unanimity where the issue is whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that violates the law," calls for juror unanimity. In dissent, Justice Anthony Kennedy expressed the view that the Court's decision "rewards those drug kingpins whose operations are so vast that the individual violations cannot be recalled or charged with specificity."

Peguero v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-9217

Petitioner

Peguero

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 23 (1999)

Argued

Monday, January 11, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, March 2, 1999

Advocates

Roy W. McLeese (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Daniel I. Siegel (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1992, the District Court sentenced Manuel D. Peguero to 274 months of imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to federal drug charges. During sentencing, the court did not inform Peguero of his right to appeal the sentence. In 1996, in a later motion for habeas relief, Peguero claimed that the court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(2) by failing to advise him of his right to appeal. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court found that, although it failed to advise Peguero of his right, he knew of his right when the sentencing hearing occurred. Thus the court, rejecting Peguero's claim that any violation of Rule 32 is enough to vacate a sentence, held that he was not entitled to relief because he was aware of his right to appeal at the time of sentencing. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that a Rule 32 violation was subject to harmless-error review and concluded that the rule's purpose had been served since Peguero was aware of his right to appeal.

Question

Does a District Court's failure to advise a defendant of his right to appeal, as required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provide ground for habeas relief when the defendant was aware of his right and elected not to appeal?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that "a district court's failure to advise the defendant of his right to appeal does not entitle him to habeas relief if he knew of his right and hence suffered no prejudice from the omission." Noting the importance of the rule and acknowledging that the omission was an error, Justice Kennedy stated "[t]rial judges must be meticulous and precise in following each of the requirements of Rule 32 in every case." The Court concluded that Rule 32 violations do not entitle defendants to relief in all circumstances, rather only when the defendant is prejudiced by the court's error.

Holloway v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-7164

Petitioner

Holloway

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 1 (1999)

Argued

Monday, November 9, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, March 2, 1999

Advocates

Kevin J. Keating (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Barbara D. Underwood (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Franois Holloway, a.k.a. Abdu Ali, was charged with several federal offenses, including carjacking. Federal law defines carjacking as "tak[ing] a motor vehicle ... from ... another by force and violence or by intimidation" "with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." Holloway's accomplice testified that there was no intent to harm the drivers of the cars, just steal their vehicles. However, he said he would have used his gun if he had been given a "hard time." The District Court judge instructed the jury that the requisite intend under law may be conditional. Moreover, the government would satisfy this condition if it had proved to them that the defendant intended to cause death or bodily harm if the drivers refused to turn over their cars. Subsequently, the jury found Holloway guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that a conditional intent to harm was within a reasonable interpretation of the legislative purpose of the carjacking law.

Question

Does the federal carjacking law apply to crimes committed with the "conditional intent" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 2119

Yes. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law applies to carjacking crimes committed with "conditional intent" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands. "The intent requirement...is satisfied when the government proves that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car," wrote Justice Stevens.

Jones v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-6203

Petitioner

Jones

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

526 U.S. 227 (1999)

Argued

Monday, October 5, 1998

Decided

Wednesday, March 24, 1999

Advocates

Edward C. DuMont (Argued the cause for the United States)

Quin Denvir (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Nathaniel Jones was indicted on federal offenses for using a gun during and in relation to a crime of violence and carjacking. Federal law prescribed varying prison terms based on the extent of the carjacking crime. Specifically, it imposed a maximum of 25 years for crimes resulting in serious bodily injury, but not-more-than-fifteen-years and life sentence clauses were included in the law. The Magistrate Judge explained to Jones that he faced a maximum of fifteen years on the carjacking charge. Based on the Magistrate's judgment, the District Court's instructions to the jury rested on the fact that the government only had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a carjacking had occurred to convict Jones for up to fifteen years. Subsequently, the jury found Jones guilty. However, a later report showed one of the carjacking victims had sustained a serious injury to the head as a result of the carjacking. Thus, the District Court imposed a twenty-five year sentence on Jones. The court rejected Jones' arguments that a serious bodily injury had neither been pleaded in the indictment nor proved before the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It held that a serious bodily injury was a sentencing factor, not an element of an offense.

Question

Does the federal carjacking law define a single crime with three penalty options dependent on sentencing factors?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Jones, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2119

No. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law established three separate offenses by the specification of elements, each of which must be charged by indictment, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict.

Caron v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:07 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-6270

Petitioner

Caron

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 308 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, April 21, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 22, 1998

Advocates

Jonathan Nuechterlein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Owen S. Walker (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

18 USC section 922(g)(1) forbids a person convicted of a serious offense to possess any firearm. Section 924(e) requires that a three-time violent felon who violates section 922(g)(1) receive an enhanced sentence. Section 921(a)(20) provides that a previous conviction is not a predicate for the substantive offense or the enhanced sentence if the offender's civil rights have been restored, "unless such... restoration... expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms." In 1993, Gerald Caron was convicted of possessing six rifles and shotguns in violation of section 922(g). The District Court enhanced Caron's sentence based, in part, on three Massachusetts convictions. In vacating his sentence, the Court of Appeals concluded that a Massachusetts law that permitted Caron to possess rifles, but not handguns, had restored his civil rights. On remand, the District Court found that, because Massachusetts law allowed Caron to possess rifles, section 921(a)(20)'s "unless clause" was not activated. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Does 18 USC section 922(g)(1), which forbids felons from possessing firearms and enhances their sentences for a violation, apply to a felon who is allowed under state law to possess rifles and shotguns but not handguns?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 922

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "Massachusetts treats [Caron] as too dangerous to trust with handguns, though it accords this right to law-abiding citizens. Federal law uses this state finding of dangerousness in forbidding [Caron] to have any guns." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that "the unless clause is activated if a restoration of civil rights 'expressly provides that the person may not... possess... firearms.' Either the restorations forbade possession of 'firearms' and the convictions count for all purposes, or they did not and the convictions count not at all. The unless clause looks to the terms of the past restorations alone and does not refer to the weapons at issue in the present case. So if the Massachusetts convictions count for some purposes, they count for all and bar possession of all guns."

Bryan v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-8422

Petitioner

Bryan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 184 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, March 31, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 15, 1998

Advocates

Kent L. Jones (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Roger B. Adler (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) prohibits anyone from "willfully" dealing in firearms without a federal license. The Government presented evidence at Sillasse Bryan's trial to show that he did not have a federal license to deal in firearms, that he was dealing in firearms, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful. No evidence was presented that Bryan was aware of the federal law that prohibits dealing in firearms without a federal license. The trial judge refused to instruct the jury that Bryan could be convicted only if he knew of the federal licensing requirement. The trial judge instructed that a person acts "willfully" if he acts with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law, but that he need not be aware of the specific law that his conduct may be violating. A jury found Bryan guilty. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the instruction was proper and that the Government had shown that Bryan had acted willfully.

Question

Does the term "willfully" in 18 USC section 924(a)(1)(D) require proof that the defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful and that he knew of the federal licensing requirement for dealing in firearms?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets, National Firearms, Organized Crime Control, Comprehensive Crime Control, or Gun Control Acts, except for RICO (q.v.) portion

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the term "willfully" in section 924(a)(1)(D) requires proof only that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful, not that he also knew of the federal licensing requirement. Justice Stevens wrote for that court that "the willfulness requirement of [section 924(a)(1)(D)] does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse; knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required." In a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that ambiguously worded criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of the defendant.

Muscarello v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1654

Petitioner

Muscarello

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 96-8837

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

524 U.S. 125 (1998)

Argued

Monday, March 23, 1998

Decided

Monday, June 8, 1998

Advocates

Norman S. Zalkind (Argued the cause for petitioners Cleveland and Gray-Santana in No. 96-8837)

Robert H. Klonoff (Argued the cause for petitioner Muscarello in No. 96-1654)

James A. Feldman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent in both cases)

Facts of the Case

18 USC section 924(c)(1) subjects a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime" to a 5-year mandatory prison term. In 96-1654, police officers found a handgun locked in Frank J. Muscarello's truck's glove compartment. Muscarello was transporting marijuana for sale in his truck. Muscarello argued that his "carrying" of the gun in the glove compartment did not fall within the scope of the statutory word "carries." In 96-8837, federal agents found drugs and guns in Donald Cleveland and Enrique Gray-Santana's car at a drug-sale point. The Court of Appeals, in both cases, found that the defendants had violated section 924(c)(1).

Question

Does the fact that guns were found in a locked glove compartment, or the trunk, of a car, preclude the application of 18 U section 924(c)(1), which imposes a 5-year mandatory prison term upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime"?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the phrase "carries a firearm" applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies. Exploring the meaning of "carry," Justice Breyer concluded, among other things, that the statute's basic purpose to combat the dangerous combination of drugs and guns does not support limiting "carry" to an "on the person" application. In a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and David H. Souter, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that "carries a firearm" means bearing a firearm in a manner as to be ready to use it as a weapon.

Edwards v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-8732

Petitioner

Edwards

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 511 (1998)

Argued

Monday, February 23, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, April 28, 1998

Advocates

Steven Shobat (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Edward C. DuMont (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

At Vincent Edwards, Reynolds A. Wintersmith, Horace Joiner, Karl V. Fort, and Joseph Tidwell's trial for "conspiring" to "possess with intent to...distribute [mixtures containing two] controlled substances," the jury was instructed that the Government must prove that the conspiracy involved measurable amounts of "cocaine or cocaine base (crack)." After the jury returned guilty verdicts, the District Judge imposed sentences based on his finding that each petitioners' illegal conduct involved both cocaine and crack. On appeal, the petitioners argued that their sentences were unlawful insofar as they were based upon crack, because the word "or" in the jury instruction meant that the judge must assume that the conspiracy involved only cocaine. The United States Sentencing Guidelines treats cocaine more leniently than crack. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the kind and the amount of the drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy.

Question

May federal judges sentence someone convicted of taking part in a drug conspiracy based on a finding that two illegal drugs were involved, even if the jury might have convicted based on one drug?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. App.

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "the judge was authorized to determine for sentencing purposes whether crack, as well as cocaine, was involved in the offense-related activities." Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "[t]he Sentencing Guidelines instruct the judge in a case like this one to determine both the amount and the kind of 'controlled substances' for which a defendant should be held accountable -- and then to impose a sentence that varies depending upon amount and kind. Consequently, regardless of the jury's actual, or assumed, beliefs about the conspiracy, the Guidelines nonetheless require the judge to determine whether the 'controlled substances' at issue -- and how much of those substances -- consisted of cocaine, crack, or both."

Brogan v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-1579

Petitioner

Brogan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 398 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, December 2, 1997

Decided

Monday, January 26, 1998

Advocates

Stuart A. Holtzman (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the United States)

Facts of the Case

When questioned by federal agents as to the receipt of gifts or money from a company whose employees were members of the union in which he was an officer, James Brogan falsely answered "no." Brogan was subsequently indicted on federal bribery charges and the making of false statements within a federal agency's jurisdiction. Brogan challenged his conviction, arguing that false statements which merely deny wrongdoing, and do not impede federal functions, are protected under the Fifth Amendment. On appeal from an appeals court judgment upholding an adverse district court ruling, the Supreme Court granted Brogan certiorari.

Question

Is the so-called "exculpatory no" doctrine, excluding from criminal sanction false statements that merely deny one's wrongdoing, consistent with the Fifth Amendment's protections against self-incrimination?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1001

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the imposition of criminal liability for false statements is not limited only to those falsehoods that pervert governmental functions - it applies to statements "of whatever kind." Moreover, even if the "exculpatory no" doctrine did apply to statements that do not impede federal functions, Brogan would not benefit from it since his falsehoods were intended to prevent federal agents from uncovering the truth. The Court concluded by noting that a literal reading of federal laws which prohibit the "exculpatory no" defense is consistent with the Fifth Amendment, since th Framers never intended to confer a privilege to lie.

Lewis v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:52 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-7151

Petitioner

Lewis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 155 (1998)

Argued

Wednesday, November 12, 1997

Decided

Monday, March 9, 1998

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Frank Granger (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

While living on the federal Army base Fort Polk, Debra Faye Lewis was charged with the murder of her four year-old daughter. Under the federal Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which provides that "whoever within... any [federal enclave], is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable... within the jurisdiction of the State... in which such place is situated, ...shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to like punishment," Lewis' indictment charged a violation of Louisiana's first-degree murder statute. Lewis was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by the District Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the ACA did not apply because Congress made Lewis' acts punishable as federal second-degree murder. The appellate court, however, affirmed Lewis' conviction because the jury had necessarily found all of the requisite elements of federal second-degree murder.

Question

Does the federal Assimilative Crimes Act make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute applicable on a federal Army base located in Louisiana?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Lewis, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 13

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that, because the ACA does not make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute part of federal law, the federal second-degree murder statute governs Lewis' crime. Because the federal second-degree murder statute does not mandate a life sentence, but rather provides for a sentence of "any term of years or life," Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that Lewis was also entitled to resentencing. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion.

Salinas v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-738

Petitioner

Salinas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 52 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, December 2, 1997

Advocates

Francisco J. Enriquez (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Hidalgo County agreed to take federal prisoners into its custody in return for federal money. During this agreement, Brigido Marmolejo, the Sheriff of Hidalgo County, Texas, and Mario Salinas, his deputy, accepted money and two watches and a truck respectively, from Homero Beltran-Aguirr, a federal prisoner housed in the county jail, in exchange for permitting his girlfriend to visit him. Ultimately, Salinas was charged with one count of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 USC section 1962(c), one count of conspiracy to violate RICO, section 1962(d), and two counts of bribery, section 666(a)(1)(B). The jury convicted him on all but the substantive RICO count. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is the federal bribery statute, 18 USC section 666, limited to cases in which the bribe has a demonstrated effect upon federal funds? Does the conspiracy prohibition contained in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act apply only when the conspirator agrees to commit two of the predicate acts that RICO forbids?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 666

No and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that section 666(a)(1)(B) does not require the Government to prove the bribe in question had a demonstrated effect upon federal funds. Additionally, the Court held that, to be convicted of conspiracy to violate RICO under section 1962(d), the conspirator need not himself have committed or agreed to commit the two or more predicate acts, such as bribery, requisite for a substantive RICO offense under section 1962(c). Justice Kennedy reasoned that section 666(a)(1)(B)'s "expansive, unqualified language, both as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered" did not support the position that federal funds must be affected for a violation to occur.

Bates v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-7185

Petitioner

Bates

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 23 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, October 7, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, November 4, 1997

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (on behalf of the Respondent)

C. Richard Oren (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1986, Garrit Bates was appointed to serve as the Acme Institute of Technology's treasurer. In 1987, James Jackson, as Acme's president, signed a program participation agreement with the Department of Education that authorized the school to receive student loan checks through the Title IV Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program. Under the GSL program, governing regulations required Acme to return a portion of a loan if the student withdrew from Acme before the term ended. In 1987, Jackson and Bates began a practice of not making GSL refunds. Ultimately, in 1994, Bates was indicted on of "knowingly and willfully misapplying" federally insured student loan funds, in violation of 20 USC section 1097(a). The District Court dismissed Bates's indictment because it lacked an allegation of his "intent to injure or defraud the United States." Reinstating the prosecution, the Court of Appeals concluded that section 1097(a) required the Government to prove only that Bates knowingly and willfully misapplied Title IV funds.

Question

Does 20 USC section 1097(a), which makes it a felony "knowingly and willfully" to misapply student loan funds insured under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, require an allegation and proof that a defendant specifically intended to injure or defraud either the United States as loan guarantor or another?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 20 U.S.C. 1070

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the specific intent to injure or defraud someone, whether the United States or another, is not an element of the misapplication of funds proscribed by section 1097(a). Justice Ginsburg wore for the Court that, "the text of [section 1097(a)] does not include an 'intent to defraud' state of mind requirement, and we ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face." In contrast, Justice Ginsburg noted that 20 USC section 1097(d), which makes it a felony "knowingly and willfully" to "destroy or conceal any record relating to the provision of assistance under [Title IV] with intent to defraud the United States" contained an "intent to defraud" element.

United States v. Hyde

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-667

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hyde

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 670 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, April 15, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 1997

Advocates

Jonathan D. Soglin (on behalf of the Respondent)

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

Johnson v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-203

Petitioner

Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 461 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, February 25, 1997

Decided

Monday, May 12, 1997

Advocates

Wm. J. Sheppard (on behalf of the Petitioner)

William J. Sheppard (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

While testifying before a federal grand jury, which was investigating the disposition of proceeds from the alleged drug trafficking of her boyfriend Earl James Fields, Joyce B. Johnson testified that she had received a box of cash that she had used to fund home improvements. Subsequently, Johnson was indicted for perjury under federal law, which proscribes "knowingly mak[ing] any false material declaration" under oath before a grand jury. Johnson did not object when the District Court judge instructed the jury that materiality was a question for him to decide, and that he had determined that her statements were material. Afterwards, Johnson was convicted of perjury. However, before her appeal, the Supreme Court handed down a precedent that a jury, rather than a trial judge, must decide the materiality of a false statement. The Court of Appeals concluded the District Court judge had erred, but that any such error did not affect "substantial rights" because its independent review of the record showed that there was overwhelming evidence of materiality and that no reasonable juror could conclude that Johnson's false statements about the money's source were not material to the grand jury's investigation.

Question

Must criminal convictions for perjury be reversed when a trial judge fails to let the jury rule on whether the underlying statements were material?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William J. Rehnquist, the Court held that the trial court's action in this case was not "plain error" of the sort which an appellate court may notice under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). The Court reasoned that there was no basis, on the record, for concluding that the materiality error had seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, in that the evidence supporting materiality was overwhelming. "No 'miscarriage of justice' will result here if we do not notice the error and we decline to do so," concluded Chief Justice Rehnquist.

United States v. LaBonte

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1726

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

LaBonte

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 751 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, January 7, 1997

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 1997

Advocates

David N. Yellen (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

28 USC section 994(h) directs the United States Sentencing Commission to "assure" that its Sentencing Guidelines specify a prison sentence "at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of" adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime. Initially, the Guidelines failed to delineate whether the basic statutory maximum persons convicted of a particular offense or the enhanced penalty for career offenders convicted of that same offense should be applied. After the District Court used and the Court of Appeals affirmed the enhanced sentence for sentencing George LaBonte, Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell, and Stephen Dyer, who qualified as career criminals, the Commission adopted Amendment 506, which precludes the consideration of statutory sentence enhancements. When the District Court split over whether reduce LaBonte, Hunnewell, and Dyer's sentences, the Court of Appeals found that Amendment 506 was a reasonable implementation of section 994(h)'s directive.

Question

Did Congress intend by "maximum term authorized" in 28 USC section 994(h) the maximum term available for the offense of conviction including any applicable statutory sentencing enhancements?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 994

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Commission's interpretation was inconsistent with section 994(h)'s plain language, and therefore "maximum term authorized" must be read to include all applicable statutory sentencing enhancements. "Congress surely did not establish enhanced penalties for repeat offenders only to have the Commission render them a virtual nullity," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Stephen G. Breyer in a dissent, in which Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, argued that the words "maximum term authorized" in section 994(h) were ambiguous, thus the Court should defer to the Sentencing Commission's interpretation.

United States v. Lanier

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1717

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lanier

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 259 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, January 7, 1997

Decided

Monday, March 31, 1997

Advocates

Alfred H. Knight (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

David W. Lanier was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 242 of criminally violating the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them sexually while he served as a state judge. The jury had been instructed that the Government had to prove, as an element of the offense, that Lanier had deprived the victims of their Fourteenth Amendment due process right to liberty, which included the right to be free from sexually motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual battery. The District Court denied Lanier's motion, which sought to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the law is void for vagueness. The en banc Court of Appeals vacated Lanier's convictions for "lack of any notice to the public that this ambiguous criminal statute includes simple or sexual assault crimes within its coverage." The Court of Appeals held that the law may be imposed only if the constitutional right, said to have been violated, is first identified in a decision of the U.S Supreme Court, and only when the right has been held to apply in a factual situation "fundamentally similar." The court regarded these combined requirements as substantially higher than the "clearly established" standard used to judge qualified immunity in civil cases.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals use a too demanding standard when it ruled that freedom from sexual assault, as included under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process right to liberty, has never been recognized as a federally protected constitutional right and therefore cannot be the basis for a federal prosecution?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 242

es. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that the standard of notice that the Court of Appeals employed was higher than the Constitution requires and too demanding. Justice Souter wrote that the Court of Appeals mistakenly concluded that it takes a Supreme Court decision in a "fundamentally similar" case to make a constitutional right specific enough that its violation can be prosecuted. Law makes it a crime to deprive anyone of rights "secured . . . by the Constitution."

United States v. Gonzales

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1605

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gonzales

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 1 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, December 11, 1996

Decided

Monday, March 3, 1997

Advocates

Miguel A. Estrada (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Edward O. Bustamante (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Miguel Gonzales, Orlenis Hernandez Diaz, and Mario Perez were convicted in New Mexico state court on charges arising from their use of guns to holdup undercover officers during a drug sting. After they began to serve their state sentences, they were convicted by a District Court on federal drug and firearm charges related to the sting. Federal law requires a five-year prison sentence for carrying a gun while committing a crime. A Court of Appeals vacated the additional firearms sentences on the ground that they should have run concurrently with the state prison terms.

Question

Can the federal mandatory five-year prison term for carrying a gun while committing a crime be served concurrently with a separate state sentence?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

No. In a 7-to-2 decision delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court announced "[t]he plain language of (the law) forbids a district court to direct that a term of imprisonment under the statute run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment, whether state or federal."

United States v. Wells

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1228

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wells

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

519 U.S. 482 (1997)

Argued

Monday, November 4, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, February 26, 1997

Advocates

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

James R. Wyrsch (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Jerry E. Wells and Kenneth R. Steele were charged with knowingly making false and "material" statements to a federally insured bank in violation of federal law. At the trial's end, the District Court instructed the jury, at the Government's request, that withholding a "material fact" made a statement or representation false and that materiality of an allegedly false statement was for the judge, not the jury, to determine. Subsequently, the jury treated Wells and Steele's statements as material and convicted them. The U.S. Supreme Court then decided that materiality was a question for the jury to decide. On appeal, Wells and Steele argued that materiality was an element of knowingly making false and "material" statements to a federally insured bank in violation of federal law and it was a question for the jury to decide. The Government then argued materiality was not an element of the crime, so that no harm had been done when the trial judge had dealt with the issue. The Court of Appeals agreed with Wells and Steele, vacated their convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Question

Is the materiality of falsehood an element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally insured bank?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1014

No. In an 8-1 decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that the materiality of falsehood is not an element of the crime of knowingly making a false statement to a federally insured bank. Justice Souter wrote for the court that prosecutors need not prove that a lie was relevant enough to affect the outcome of a bank's decision because the law does not require such materiality.

Melendez v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-5661

Petitioner

Melendez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

518 U.S. 120 (1996)

Argued

Tuesday, February 27, 1996

Decided

Monday, June 17, 1996

Advocates

Patrick A. Mullin (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After purchasing cocaine, Juan Melendez was charged with violating federal drug laws. The law carried a minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment. Melendez signed a plea agreement stating he would be cooperative. In turn the government agreed to give him a short sentence. The District Court thus sentenced Melendez to ten years in prison, the mandatory minimum. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does a federal prosecutor's plea agreement that a cooperating defendant be given the minimum sentence authorize a judge to depart below a statutory minimum?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 3553

No. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, in the absence of a Government motion requesting or authorizing the district court to "impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence," a prison sentence must not violate the statutory sentencing minimum.

Koon v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-1664

Petitioner

Koon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Powell v. United States, No. 94-8842

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

518 U.S. 81 (1996)

Argued

Tuesday, February 20, 1996

Decided

Thursday, June 13, 1996

Advocates

William J. Kopeny (Argued the cause for petitioner Powell)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for petitioner Koon)

Michael R. Dreeben (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Petitioners Stacey C. Koon and Laurence M. Powell, Los Angeles police officers, were acquitted on state charges of assault and excessive use of force in the beating of Rodney King during an arrest. They were convicted under 18 U. S. C. Section 242 of violating the victim's constitutional rights under color of law. Although the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guideline, 1992 USSG Section 2H1.4, indicated that they should be imprisoned for 70 to 87 months, the District Court granted them two downward departures from that range. The first was based on the victim's misconduct, which significantly contributed to provoking the offense. The second was based on a combination of four factors: (1) that the petitioners were unusually susceptible to abuse in prison; (2) that the petitioners would lose their jobs and be precluded from employment in law enforcement; (3) that the petitioners had been subject to successive state and federal prosecutions; and (4) that the petitioners posed a low risk of recidivism. The sentencing range after the departures was 30 to 37 months, and the court sentenced each petitioner to 30 months. The Court of Appeals reviewed the departure decisions utilizing a de novo standard and rejected all of them.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals use the wrong standard in deciding whether a federal trial judge had erred in departing from the federal Sentencing Guidelines and giving lighter sentences to two ex-policemen convicted in the beating of Rodney King?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Koon, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. App.

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Court of Appeals should not review de novo a decision to depart from the Guideline sentencing range, but instead should ask whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. Furthermore, because the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting certain of the downward departure factors relied upon by the District Judge, wrote Justice Kennedy, significant parts of the appellate court's rulings require reversal.

Carlisle v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-9247

Petitioner

Carlisle

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

517 U.S. 416 (1996)

Argued

Tuesday, January 16, 1996

Decided

Monday, April 29, 1996

Advocates

Paul A. Engelmayer (on behalf of the Respondent)

James A. Christopherson (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

At his trial on a federal marijuana charge, Charles Carlisle filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) after the jury returned a guilty verdict. The District Court granted the motion even though it was filed one day outside the time limit prescribed by Rule 29(c), which provides that "[i]f the jury returns a verdict of guilty..., a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period." In reversing and remanding for reinstatement of the verdict and for sentencing, the Court of Appeals held that under Rule 29(c) a district court has no jurisdiction to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, or to enter such a judgment after submission of the case to the jury.

Question

Does a district court have the authority to grant a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal if the motion is filed beyond the seven-day deadline prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the District Court had no authority to grant the petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal filed one day outside the Rule 29(c) time limit. Judges may not stretch the deadline by even one day; Justice Scalia wrote for the court that, "[t]here is simply no room...for the granting of an untimely post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, regardless of whether the motion is accompanied by a claim of actual innocence...."

Neal v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-9088

Petitioner

Neal

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

516 U.S. 284 (1996)

Argued

Monday, December 4, 1995

Decided

Monday, January 22, 1996

Advocates

Donald T. Bergerson (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Paul R. Q. Wolfson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

A federal District Court sentenced Meirl Gilbert Neal on two plea-bargained convictions involving possession of LSD with intent to distribute. The amount of LSD was determined, under both the federal statute directing minimum sentences and the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual, by the whole weight of the blotter paper, or carrier medium, containing the drug. The combined weight of the blotter paper and LSD actually sold by Neal was 109.51 grams. Thus, the court ruled that Neal was subject to 21 U.S.C. 841(b) (1)(A)(v), which imposes a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence on anyone convicted of trafficking in more than 10 grams of "a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of LSD. After the Commission revised the Guidelines' calculation method by instructing courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight, Neal filed a motion to modify his sentence, contending that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guidelines was only 4.58 grams, well short of 841(b)(1)(A)(v)'s 10-gram requirement, and that the Guidelines' presumptive- weight method controlled the mandatory minimum calculation. The District Court held that the actual weight of the blotter paper, with its absorbed LSD, was determinative of whether Neal crossed the 10-gram threshold and that the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence still applied to him notwithstanding the Guidelines. In affirming, an en banc Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights.

Question

Does U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual's revised system for determining LSD amounts take precedence over 21 U.S.C. 841 in determining sentencing?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 841

No. In a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Section 841(b)(1) directs a sentencing court to take into account the actual weight of the blotter paper with its absorbed LSD, even though the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual requires a different method of calculating the weight of an LSD mixture or substance.

Rutledge v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-8769

Petitioner

Rutledge

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

517 U.S. 292 (1996)

Argued

Monday, November 27, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, March 27, 1996

Advocates

James A. Feldman (Argued the cause for the United States)

Barry Levenstam (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Tommy L. Rutledge was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise. The District Court convicted Rutledge on both counts. It sentenced him to life imprisonment without possible release on each count. The sentences were to be served concurrently. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It rejected Rutledge's argument that his convictions and concurrent life sentences punished him twice for the same offense.

Question

Can a criminal be given concurrent life sentences for conspiring to distribute drugs and operating a continuing criminal enterprise?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Rutledge, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 21 U.S.C. 848

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled one of the two sentences must be dropped. Both of the offenses were based on the same criminal act. Justice Stevens wrote, "A guilty verdict on a (continuing criminal enterprise) charge necessarily includes a finding that the defendant also participated in a conspiracy."

Bailey v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:31 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-7448

Petitioner

Bailey

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Robinson v. United States, No. 94-7492

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

516 U.S. 137 (1995)

Argued

Monday, October 30, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, December 6, 1995

Advocates

Alan Edward Untereiner (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Michael R. Dreeben (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Roland Bailey and Candisha Robinson were each convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1), which, in relevant part, imposes a mandatory minimum sentence upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" both "during and in relation to" a predicate offense. Bailey's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on a loaded pistol which the police found inside a bag in the locked trunk of a car he was driving after they arrested him for possession of illegal drugs. Robinson's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on an unloaded, holstered firearm which the police, executing a search warrant, found locked in a trunk in her bedroom closet, along with drugs and money from an earlier controlled buy. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the Section 924(c)(1) convictions, interpreting "use" of a gun in violation of Section 924(c)(1) in accordance with an "accessibility and proximity" test.

Question

Is evidence of the proximity and accessibility of a firearm to drugs or drug proceeds alone sufficient to support a conviction for "use" of a firearm during and in relation to a predicate narcotics offense under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Bailey, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 924

No. The proximity and accessibility test for "use" is so broad that no independent role remains for "carry." "Use" in Section 924(c)(1) requires more than proximity and accessibility that might embolden a defendant. It requires active employment of the firearm by the defendant, making the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.

Libretti v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-7427

Petitioner

Libretti

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

516 U.S. 29 (1995)

Argued

Tuesday, October 3, 1995

Decided

Tuesday, November 7, 1995

Advocates

Sara Sun Beale (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

United States v. Aguilar

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-270

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Aguilar

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

515 U.S. 593 (1995)

Argued

Monday, March 20, 1995

Decided

Wednesday, June 21, 1995

Advocates

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Robert D. Luskin (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1503

None