Cases by Issue - Commercial Speech

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

jgoldman — Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:34 +0000

Location

Citizens United Headquarters

1006 Pennsylvania Ave SE Washington DC 20003

Washington, DC 20003

United States

38° 52' 58.8" N, 76° 59' 31.2" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-205

Appellant

Citizens United

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Federal Election Commission

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009-2010)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010)

Opinion

558 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Friday, November 14, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, March 24, 2009

Reargued:

Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Decided

Thursday, January 21, 2010

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for the appellant)

Floyd Abrams (on behalf of Senator Mitch McConnell, as amicus curiae, in support of the appellant)

Elena Kagan (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellee)

Seth P. Waxman (on behalf of Senators John McCain et al. as amici curiae in support of the appellee)

Facts of the Case

Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to its film Hillary: The Movie. The Movie expressed opinions about whether Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president.

In an attempt to regulate "big money" campaign contributions, the BCRA applies a variety of restrictions to "electioneering communications." Section 203 of the BCRA prevents corporations or labor unions from funding such communication from their general treasuries. Sections 201 and 311 require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer when the communication is not authorized by the candidate it intends to support.

Citizens United argued that: 1) Section 203 violates the First Amendment on its face and when applied to The Movie and its related advertisements, and that 2) Sections 201 and 203 are also unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances.

The United States District Court denied the injunction. Section 203 on its face was not unconstitutional because the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC had already reached that determination. The District Court also held that The Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, as it attempted to inform voters that Senator Clinton was unfit for office, and thus Section 203 was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, it held that Sections 201 and 203 were not unconstitutional as applied to the The Movie or its advertisements. The court reasoned that the McConnell decision recognized that disclosure of donors "might be unconstitutional if it imposed an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular cause," but those circumstances did not exist in Citizen United's claim.

Question

1) Did the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell resolve all constitutional as-applied challenges to the BCRA when it upheld the disclosure requirements of the statute as constitutional?

2) Do the BCRA's disclosure requirements impose an unconstitutional burden when applied to electioneering requirements because they are protected "political speech" and not subject to regulation as "campaign speech"?

3) If a communication lacks a clear plea to vote for or against a particular candidate, is it subject to regulation under the BCRA?

4) Should a feature length documentary about a candidate for political office be treated like the advertisements at issue in McConnell and therefore be subject to regulation under the BCRA?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Citizens United, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. No. Yes. Yes. The Supreme Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and portions of McConnell v. FEC. (In the prior cases, the Court had held that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity.) By a 5-to-4 vote along ideological lines, the majority held that under the First Amendment corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the majority joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Samuel A. Alito, and Clarence Thomas. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotamayor. The majority maintained that political speech is indispensable to a democracy, which is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation. The majority also held that the BCRA's disclosure requirements as applied to The Movie were constitutional, reasoning that disclosure is justified by a "governmental interest" in providing the "electorate with information" about election-related spending resources. The Court also upheld the disclosure requirements for political advertising sponsors and it upheld the ban on direct contributions to candidates from corporations and unions.

In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, emphasized the care with which the Court handles constitutional issues and its attempts to avoid constitutional issues when at all possible. Here, the Court had no narrower grounds upon which to rule, except to handle the First Amendment issues embodied within the case. Justice Scalia also wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justices Alito and Thomas in part, criticizing Justice Stevens' understanding of the Framer's view towards corporations. Justice Stevens argued that corporations are not members of society and that there are compelling governmental interests to curb corporations' ability to spend money during local and national elections.

Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1164

Petitioner

Mike Johanns, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Livestock Marketing Association; Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc. v. Livestock Marketing Association

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc. et al. v. Livestock Marketing Association, et al., No. 03-1165

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 550 (2005)

Granted

Monday, May 24, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, December 8, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioners in 10-1164)

Laurence H. Tribe (argued the cause for Respondents)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1165)

Facts of the Case

The Beef Promotion and Research Act (1985) required cattle producers to pay a fee for generic beef advertisements done on behalf of the cattle industry. Some cattle producers disagreed with the advertisements. The Livestock Marketing Association sued the Department of Agriculture (DEA) in federal district court and alleged a government-required fee for advertising with which some cattle producers disagreed violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The DEA argued the advertising was government speech immune from First Amendment challenge. Another group of cattle producers, the Nebraska Cattlemen, sided with the DEA and sued the Livestock Marketing Association. The two cases were consolidated. The district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the program violated the First Amendment and that the advertising was compelled and not government speech.

Question

Does the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act) violate the First Amendment by requiring cattle producers to pay to fund advertising with which they disagree?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Johanns, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the fund was for government speech and that therefore the government could not be sued under the First Amendment. The Court pointed to the rule that while compelled funding of private speech raises First Amendment concerns, compelled funding of government speech generally does not.

Thompson v. Western States Medical Center

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

Western States Medical Center (Now Kronos Compounding Pharmacy)

3675 S. Rainbow Blvd. Las Vegas NV 89147

Las Vegas, NV 89147

United States

36° 7' 20.8416" N, 115° 14' 35.1384" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-344

Petitioner

Thompson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Western States Medical Center

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 357 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 2002

Decided

Monday, April 29, 2002

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Howard M. Hoffman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) exempts "compounded drugs," or drugs in which a pharmacist or doctor has combined, mixed, or altered ingredients to create a medication tailored to an individual patient's needs, from the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) standard drug approval requirements under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), so long as the providers of the compounded drugs abide by several restrictions. The restrictions included that the prescription be unsolicited and that the providers not advertise or promote the compounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug. A group of licensed pharmacies that specialize in compounding drugs sought to enjoin enforcement of the advertising and solicitation provisions, arguing that they violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Agreeing, the District Court held that the provisions constituted unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech. Affirming in part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Government had not demonstrated that the restrictions would directly advance its interests or that alternatives less restrictive of speech were unavailable.

Question

Do the prohibitions in the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 with regard to soliciting prescriptions for, and advertising, compounded drugs violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Western States Medical Center, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the FDAMA's provisions amounted to unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech. Among other findings, the Court reasoned that, although the speech restrictions allegedly served governmental interests in permitting drug compounding while guaranteeing that compounding was not conducted on such a scale as to undermine the drug approval process, it had not been demonstrated that the speech restrictions were not more extensive than necessary to serve such interests. Justice Thomas Clarence filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, filed a dissenting opinion.

Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:31 +0000

Location

Attorney General's Office of MA

1 Ashburton Pl. Boston MA 02114

Boston, MA 02114

United States

42° 21' 33.6996" N, 71° 3' 44.5428" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-596

Petitioner

Lorillard Tobacco

Respondent

Thomas F. Reilly

Consolidation

No. 00-597

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 525 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, April 25, 2001

Decided

Thursday, June 28, 2001

Advocates

Barbara D. Underwood (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

William W. Porter (Boston, Massachusetts, argued the cause for the respondents)

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Attorney General of Massachusetts promulgated comprehensive regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. Members of the tobacco industry filed suit challenging the regulations. Lorillard Tobacco Company and others asserted that under the Supremacy Clause the cigarette advertising regulations were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), which prescribes mandatory health warnings for cigarette packaging and advertising and that the regulations violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rulings that the cigarette advertising regulations are not pre-empted by the FCLAA and that neither the regulations prohibiting outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground nor the sales practices regulations restricting the location and distribution of tobacco products violated the First Amendment. Reversing the lower court's finding, the appellate court found that the point-of-sale advertising regulations requiring that indoor advertising be placed no lower than five feet from the floor were valid.

Question

Does the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempt portions of the Attorney General of Massachusetts' cigarette advertising regulations? Do portions of the Attorney General's regulations governing the advertising and sale of tobacco products violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lorillard Tobacco, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1334

Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the highly fractured Court held that the FCLAA preempts Massachusetts' regulations governing outdoor and point-of-sale cigarette advertising and that Massachusetts' outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations related to smokeless tobacco and cigars violate the First Amendment, but that the sales practices regulations related to all three tobacco products are constitutional. "We conclude that the Attorney General has failed to show that the outdoor advertising regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars are not more extensive than necessary to advance the State's substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use," wrote Justice O'Connor.

United States v. United Foods

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-276

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United Foods

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 405 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, April 17, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 25, 2001

Advocates

Barbara B. McDowell (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act mandates that fresh mushroom handlers pay assessments used primarily to fund advertisements promoting mushroom sales. United Foods, Inc. refused to pay the assessment, claiming that it violated the First Amendment. Ultimately, United Foods sought review in the District Court. In granting the Government summary judgement, the court relied on Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., which held that the First Amendment was not violated when agricultural marketing orders, as part of a larger regulatory marketing scheme, required producers of California tree fruit to pay assessments for product advertising. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Glickman did not control because the mandated payments in this case were not part of a comprehensive statutory agricultural marketing program.

Question

Do mandatory advertising assessments imposed on mushroom producers and handlers under the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United Foods, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 7 U.S.C. 6101

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the assessment requirement violates the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy wore for the Court that "the mandated support is contrary to the First Amendment principles set forth in cases involving expression by groups which include persons who object to the speech, but who, nevertheless, must remain members of the group by law or necessity." "We have not upheld compelled subsidies for speech in the context of a program where the principal object is speech itself," continued Justice Kennedy.

Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publishing Corp

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-678

Petitioner

Los Angeles Police Dept.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United Reporting Publishing Corp

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 32 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, December 7, 1999

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Edward C. DuMont (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Thomas C. Goldstein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The former version of the California public records statute required a state or local law enforcement agency to make public the name, address, and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency. In 1996, the state amended the statute to require that a person requesting an arrestee's address declare, under penalty of perjury, that the request was being made for journalistic, scholarly, political, governmental, or investigative purposes, and that the address would not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or service. The United Reporting Publishing Corporation publishes the "JAILMAIL" list, which provides the names and addresses of recently arrested individuals for its customers. United received its information from the Los Angeles Police Department and other California law enforcement agencies under the former version of the statute. United sought declaratory and injunctive relief to hold the amendment unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Federal District Court granted United summary judgment, on the ground that the amended statute was an impermissible restriction on commercial speech and thus violated the First Amendment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the amended statute restricted commercial speech, which was entitled to a limited measure of First Amendment protection; and that although an asserted governmental interest in protecting an arrestees' privacy was substantial, the amended statute's numerous exceptions precluded the statute from directly and materially advancing such an interest.

Question

Does California's amended public record statute, under which an arrestee's address disclosed by governmental agency may not be used to sell a product or service, violate the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Los Angeles Police Dept., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the amended statute was not an abridgment of anyone's right to engage in speech, commercial or otherwise, but simply a law regulating access to information in the hands of law enforcement agencies. The Court concluded that United's facial challenge to the statute was not warranted, as there was "'no possibility that protected speech would be muted.'" Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "California could decide not to give out arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment." Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens expressed the view that the amended statute was invalid as applied to the service, because California was denying access to information based on their intended use of the information for a constitutionally protected purpose, and that such discrimination was not justified by state interests.

Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assoc. v. U.S.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-387

Petitioner

Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assoc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

U.S.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 173 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, April 27, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 14, 1999

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Barbara D. Underwood (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association (Association) wanted to run advertisements for lawful private casino gambling in Louisiana and Mississippi. The Association challenged the government's prohibition against such radio- and television-based advertising. After suffering defeat in both trial and appellate courts, the Association appealed and the Supreme Court granted them certiorari.

Question

Does a federal prohibition against advertising lawful privately-held casino- gambling violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assoc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court found the advertising restrictions unconstitutional insofar as they applied to Louisiana-based advertisers - where the gambling activities being promoted are legal. The government failed to demonstrate that its restriction would alleviate harmful gambling practices to any material degree. Instead, the Court noted, the regulations in question provided only ineffective and remote support for the government's concerns, since all sorts of other gambling activities would continue unaffected. Thus, the government restrictions unfairly singled out a specific form of speech for regulation while leaving others untouched.

Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1184

Petitioner

Glickman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wileman Brothers & Elliot

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 457 (1997)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 1996

Decided

Wednesday, June 25, 1997

Advocates

Thomas E. Campagne (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Alan Jenkins (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1937, Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) to promote fair pricing and uniform marketing conditions in the agriculture business. Exempted from antitrust laws, the AMAA mandated uniform prices, product standards, and other conditions; all of which had to be approved by at least two-thirds of the affected producers and implemented by producer committees appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. The AMAA's administrative expenses were to be covered by assessments imposed on activities such as product advertising and promotion. After suffering adverse rulings at the administrative, District, and Circuit Court levels, a group of California tree fruit growers, handlers, and processors appealed their constitutional challenge of the AMAA to the Supreme Court - which granted certiorari.

Question

Did the AMAA's assessments on product advertising and promotion violate of the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Glickman, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. Exempting its financial regulations from the heightened review standard appropriate in most First Amendment issues, the Court's 5-to-4 decision held that just because the AMAA's economic regulations may indirectly result in the reduction of the complaining parties' advertising budgets, they did not violate their free speech. The relevant assessments did not force the growers, handlers, or processors to repeat unsuccessful ads, to respond to negative ads when they preferred to remain silent, or to be publicly identified with messages other than their own. All the AMAA required of these parties were contributions for ad campaigns which were ultimately aimed at promoting their own welfare by encouraging customers to buy their products.

44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:28 +0000

Location

Rhode Island General Assembly

82 Smith St Providence RI 02903

Providence, RI 02903

United States

41° 49' 53.6448" N, 71° 24' 53.3664" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

94-1140

Petitioner

44 Liquormart Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rhode Island

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

517 U.S. 484 (1996)

Argued

Wednesday, November 1, 1995

Decided

Monday, May 13, 1996

Advocates

Rebecca T. Partington (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Evan T. Lawson (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Rhode Island passed a statute banning the advertisement of retail liquor prices in places where liquor is not sold. Petitioners filed suit claiming that the statute violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found the ban unconstitutional, noting that it did not serve any interest Rhode Island might have had in promoting temperance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that open competition for liquor pricing would be harmful insofar at it would increase consumption. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Question

Is Rhode Island's statute an infringement on the First Amendment right to commercial freedom of speech? If it is, can Rhode Island still pass such legislation under the Twenty-first Amendment which limits the dormant Commerce Clause by empowering the states to regulate the sale of alcohol?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for 44 Liquormart Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes and no. In a fractious opinon for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens found Rhode Island's statutory ban on liquor price advertising to be an unconstitutional infringement of the liquor sellers' First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In response to Rhode Island's claim that it passed the statutory ban to protect consumers from "commercial harms," Justice Stevens held that governmental impediments to truthful and accurate commercial messages rarely protect consumers. On the contrary, courts must take "special care" when considering such "protective" measures since they often hinder public choice and obstruct necessary debate over public policy issues. Furthermore, Rhode Island failed to show that its statutory ban would lower market-wide liquor consumption, must less alter alcohol consumption among abusive drinkers who are most in need of assistance. Finally, Justice Stevens held that although the Twenty-first Amendment did empower Rhode Island to regulate the sale of liquor, such regulatory power is not to be exercised to the detriment of its constitutional obligation to protect and abide by the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee.

Rubin, Secretary Of The Treasury v. Coors Brewing Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-1631

Petitioner

Rubin, Secretary Of The Treasury

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Coors Brewing Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

514 U.S. 476 (1995)

Argued

Wednesday, November 30, 1994

Decided

Wednesday, April 19, 1995

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Coors Brewing Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 27 U.S.C. 205

None

United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., T/A Power 94

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:00:52 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-486

Petitioner

United States et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Edge Broadcasting Co., T/A Power 94

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

509 U.S. 418 (1993)

Argued

Wednesday, April 21, 1993

Decided

Friday, June 25, 1993

Advocates

Conrad Moss Shumadine (on behalf of the Respondent)

Paul J. Larkin, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Communication Act of 1934

None

Edenfield v. Fane

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:01:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-1594

Petitioner

Edenfield et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fane

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

507 U.S. 761 (1993)

Argued

Monday, December 7, 1992

Decided

Monday, April 26, 1993

Advocates

David C. Vladeck (on behalf of the Respondent)

Parker D. Thomson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Fane, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

City Of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:01:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-1200

Petitioner

City Of Cincinnati

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Discovery Network, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

507 U.S. 410 (1993)

Argued

Monday, November 9, 1992

Decided

Wednesday, March 24, 1993

Advocates

Marc D. Mezibov (on behalf of the Respondent)

Mark S. Yurick (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Discovery Network, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Board Of Trustees, State Univ. Of N. Y. v. Fox

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:07 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-2013

Petitioner

Board Of Trustees, State Univ. Of N. Y.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fox

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

492 U.S. 469 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, February 22, 1989

Decided

Thursday, June 29, 1989

Advocates

Henry T. Reath (on behalf of the Respondents)

O. Peter Sherwood (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Board Of Trustees, State Univ. Of N. Y., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass. v. Tourism Co. of PR

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1903

Appellee

Tourism Co. of PR

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

478 U.S. 328 (1986)

Argued

Monday, April 28, 1986

Decided

Tuesday, July 1, 1986

Advocates

Maria Milagros Soto (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Lino J. Saldana (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Facts of the Case

A Puerto Rican law restricted advertising by the island's casino gambling establishments. Even though gambling was a legal activity in Puerto Rico, the law only allowed advertising that was targeted at tourists.

Question

Did the law violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Tourism Co. of PR, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. The Court held that the Act passed the constitutional test for restrictions on commercial speech. Justice Rehnquist argued that Puerto Rico's desire to protect the "health, safety, and welfare of its citizens" by attempting to isolate them from casino advertising served a "substantial government interest." The law was clearly drawn and directly related to the government's goal of minimizing the ill effects, such as prostitution and crime, that gambling cultivates in local communities.

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1044

Appellee

Public Util. Comm'n

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

475 U.S. 1 (1986)

Argued

Tuesday, October 8, 1985

Decided

Tuesday, February 25, 1986

Advocates

Robert Q. Harris (on behalf of the Appellant)

Mark Fogelman (on behalf of the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:14 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-1590

Appellee

Youngs Drug Products Corp.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Bolger

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

463 U.S. 60 (1983)

Argued

Wednesday, January 12, 1983

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1983

Advocates

Jerold S. Solovy ()

David A. Strauss ()

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Youngs Drug Products Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 39 U.S.C. 3001

None

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:15 +0000

Location

City of San Diego

202 C Street San Diego CA 92101

San Diego, CA 92101

United States

32° 43' 0.7788" N, 117° 9' 49.1472" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

80-195

Appellee

Metromedia, Inc. et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

City of San Diego et al.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

453 U.S. 490 (1981)

Argued

Wednesday, February 25, 1981

Decided

Thursday, July 2, 1981

Advocates

Floyd Abrams (on behalf of the Appellants)

C. Alan Sumption (on behalf of the Appellees)

Facts of the Case

The city of San Diego banned most outdoor advertising display signs in order to improve the city's appearance and prevent dangerous distractions to motorists. Only "onsite" billboards with a message relating to the property they stood on would be permitted. Upon petition by a coalition of businesses owning advertising signs, a trial court ruled that the ban was an unconstitutional exercise of the city's police powers and hindered First Amendment rights of the businesses. The California Court of Appeals affirmed that the city had exceeded its police powers, but the California Supreme Court reversed this judgment.

Question

Does a city ban on "offsite" outdoor advertising signs violate First and Fourteenth Amendment provisions for free speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Metromedia, Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. Justice Byron White wrote the opinion for a 6-3 court. The ban's exception allowing "onsite" advertising discriminated against noncommercial speech. It allowed businesses in commercial properties to interrupt city motorists so long as it was with their own messages yet barred noncommercial advertisers from causing the same level of interruption. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented and viewed the "onsite" exception to the ban as "essentially negligible" rather than unconstitutional favoritism. However the Court held that affording "a greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech" reversed the long-standing Court precedent to show greater deference to noncommercial speech.

Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:14 +0000

Location

Public Service Commission

Empire State Plaza Albany NY 12223

Albany, NY 12223

United States

42° 39' 1.2492" N, 73° 45' 34.8768" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

79-565

Appellant

Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Public Service Commission of New York

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

447 U.S. 557 (1980)

Argued

Monday, March 17, 1980

Decided

Friday, June 20, 1980

Advocates

Telford Taylor (on behalf of the Appellant)

Peter H. Schiff (on behalf of the Appellee)

Facts of the Case

The Public Service Commission of New York (PSC), in the interest of conserving energy, enacted a regulation that prohibited electric utilities from promoting electricity use. The PSC's regulation distinguished promotional advertising from informational advertising, which was permitted. Central Hudson Gas and Electric challenged the regulation in a New York State Supreme Court, which upheld the regulation. The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court affirmed the decision, as did the New York Court of Appeals.

Question

Did the PSC's ban on advertising violate the freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Ser, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion, the Court overruled the Court of Appeals of New York and held that the New York's ban violated the right to commercial speech. Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell cited the protections for "commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation" set forth in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. The Court recognized New York's interest in promoting energy conservation and accepted that the PSC's regulation would directly further that interest. However, since the regulation restricted all promotional advertising regardless of its effect on electricity use, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment under First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens each wrote opinions concurring in part and in the judgment.

Friedman v. Rogers

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:43 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-1163

Petitioner

Rogers

Respondent

Friedman

Consolidation

No. 77-1164

No. 77-1186

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

440 U.S. 1 (1979)

Argued

Wednesday, November 8, 1978

Decided

Wednesday, February 21, 1979

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Friedman, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

76-357

Petitioner

Linmark Associates, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Willingboro

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

431 U.S. 85 (1977)

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 1977

Decided

Monday, May 2, 1977

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Linmark Associates, Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None

Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:09 +0000

Location

Virginia Citizens Consumer Council

4220 North Fork Road Elliston VA 24087

Elliston, VA 24087

United States

37° 14' 10.32" N, 80° 16' 31.44" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-895

Appellee

Virginia Consumer Council

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Virginia Pharmacy Bd.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

425 U.S. 748 (1976)

Argued

Tuesday, November 11, 1975

Decided

Monday, May 24, 1976

Advocates

Alan B. Morrison (Argued the cause for the appellees)

Anthony F. Troy (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

Acting on behalf of prescription drug consumers, the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council challenged a Virginia statute that declared it unprofessional conduct for licensed pharmacists to advertise their prescription drug prices. On appeal from an adverse ruling by a three-judge District Court panel, the Supreme Court granted the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy review.

Question

Is a statutory ban on advertising prescription drug prices by licensed pharmacists a violation of "commercial speech" under the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Virginia Consumer Council, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 7-to-1 opinion, the Court held that the First Amendment protects willing speakers and willing listeners equally. The Court noted that in cases of commercial speech, such as price advertising, freedom of speech protections apply just as they would to noncommercial speech. Even speech that is sold for profit, or involves financial solicitations, is protected. The Court concluded that although the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy has a legitimate interest in preserving professionalism among its members, it may not do so at the expense of public knowledge about lawful competitive pricing terms.

Bigelow v. Virginia

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:08 +0000

Location

Virginia Weekly Newspaper Charlottesville, VA 22904

United States

38° 1' 45.5016" N, 78° 28' 36.0408" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

73-1309

Appellee

Virginia

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Bigelow

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

421 U.S. 809 (1975)

Argued

Wednesday, December 18, 1974

Decided

Monday, June 16, 1975

Advocates

John C. Lowe (Argued the cause for the appellant)

D. Patrick Lacy, Jr. (Argued the cause for the appellee)

Melvin L. Wulf (Argued the cause for the appellant)

Facts of the Case

A Virginia statute made it a misdemeanor for "any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, [from encouraging] or [prompting] the procuring of abortion or miscarriage." Bigelow, director and managing editor of the Virginia Weekly, was convicted under this law when his newspaper ran an advertisement for an organization which referred women to clinics and hospitals for abortions.

Question

Did the Virginia law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Bigelow, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

The Court held that the Virginia law infringed upon Bigelow's First Amendment rights and violated the Constitution. Citing prior holdings such as New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), Justice Blackmun denied the Supreme Court of Virginia's ruling that commercial speech is not afforded First Amendment protection. Furthermore, the advertisement in question contained important information in the "public interest" which went beyond merely informing readers of a commercial service. Finally, the Court feared that the Virginia statute had the potential to "impair" national and interstate publications which might choose to carry similar advertisements.

Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm'n

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

72-419

Petitioner

Pittsburgh Press Co.

Respondent

Human Rel. Comm'n

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

413 U.S. 376 (1973)

Argued

Tuesday, March 20, 1973

Decided

Thursday, June 21, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Human Rel. Comm'n, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

None