Cases by Issue - First Amendment

Golan v. Holder

mgruhn — Thu, 10 Mar 2011 15:32:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

10-545

Petitioner

Lawrence Golan, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Granted

Monday, March 7, 2011

Argued

Wednesday, October 5, 2011

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

Advocates

Anthony T. Falzone (for the petitioners)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Section 514 of the act restored U.S. copyright protection to foreign parties whose works had entered the public domain. A group of artists, including musician Lawrence Golan, who made use of the works while they were in the public domain filed a lawsuit in Colorado's federal court to challenge the restoration of copyright, arguing that doing so violated their First Amendment rights.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado held that Section 514 of the URAA does not violate the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment. The district court also rejected Golan's First Amendment challenge, seeing "no need to expand upon the settled rule that private censorship via copyright enforcement does not implicate First Amendment concerns." The United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed that Section 514 of the URAA does not exceed Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause, but it vacated the district court's First Amendment ruling and remanded for further proceedings.

Question

(1) Does the Progress Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibit Congress from taking works out of the public domain?

(2) Does Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Holder, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No and no. In a 6-2 decision, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Court held that congress did have the power to enact Section 514 and the Uruguay Round Agreement. An exhaustive recount of the history of copyright law showed that the public domain is not untouchable, and congress may grant protection to previously unprotected works. The Court soundly rejected Golan's argument that taking works out of the public domain violated the constitutional "limited times" requirement, following the reasoning from Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The Court also held that there were sufficient First Amendment protections built into the current copyright law in the form of the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.

Justice Steven G. Breyer wrote a dissent, stating that the statutes in question violated the Constitution because they did not promote the production of new works. Justice Beyer also expressed concerns about the difficulty of finding authors of orphaned works in order to gain a copyright license.

Snyder v. Phelps

jgoldman — Sun, 03 Oct 2010 20:27:14 +0000

Location

United States

39° 34' 31.3644" N, 76° 59' 44.934" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-751

Petitioner

Albert Snyder

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fred W. Phelps, Sr., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

562 U.S. ___ (2011)

Granted

Monday, March 8, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, October 6, 2010

Decided

Wednesday, March 2, 2011

Advocates

Sean E. Summers (for the petitioner)

Margie J. Phelps (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The family of deceased Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder filed a lawsuit against members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral. The family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that said, "Thank God for dead soldiers" and "Fag troops" at Snyder's funeral. U.S. District Judge Richard Bennett awarded the family $5 million in damages, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment violated the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. The church members' speech is protected, "notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the words."

Question

Does the First Amendment protect protesters at a funeral from liability for intentionally inflicting emotional distress on the family of the deceased?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Phelps, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: First Amendment

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. The Court held that the First Amendment shields those who stage a protest at the funeral of a military service member from liability. Justice Stephen J. Breyer filed a concurring opinion in which he wrote that while he agreed with the majority's conclusion in the case, "I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point." Justice Samuel Alito filed a lone dissent, in which he argued: "Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case."

Doe #1 v. Reed

jgoldman — Sat, 20 Feb 2010 01:52:16 +0000

Location

United States

47° 2' 16.3464" N, 122° 54' 2.502" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

09-559

Petitioner

John Doe #1, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sam Reed, Washington Secretary of State, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010)

Opinion

561 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Friday, January 15, 2010

Argued

Wednesday, April 28, 2010

Decided

Monday, June 21, 2010

Advocates

James Bopp, Jr. (for the petitioners)

Robert M. McKenna (Attorney General of Washington, for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction in a Washington federal district court to prevent the state of Washington from making referendum petitions available under the state's Public Records Act ("PRA"). In response to a petition titled "Preserve Marriage, Protect Children," plaintiffs attempted to prevent the release of the names and contact information of individuals who signed the petition. The plaintiffs argued that, as applied to referendum petitions, the PRA violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The district court granted the injunction.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the PRA does not violate the First Amendment when applied to require public disclosure of petitions calling for a referendum. The court reasoned that even assuming that signing a petition qualifies as expressive conduct, and that application of the PRA's public access provision has an incidental effect on a referendum signer's speech by deterring some would-be signers, the appropriate level of constitutional inquiry is intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, the interests asserted by the state are sufficiently important to justify the law's incidental limitations of referendum petition signers' First Amendment freedoms.

Question

1) Does the First Amendment protection of political speech, association, and belief require strict scrutiny when a state compels the public release of identifying information about petition signers?

2) Is compelling public disclosure of identifying information about petition signers narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, and did the petitioners meet all the elements required for a preliminary injunction?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Reed, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: First Amendment

No. Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the disclosure of referendum petitions does not as a general matter violate the First Amendment. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that an "exacting scrutiny standard" is the appropriate standard for determining First Amendment challenges in the electoral context. The standard requires a "substantial relation" between the disclosure requirement and a "sufficiently important" governmental interest. Here, the state met its burden in establishing that its disclosure requirement was constitutional.

Justice Samuel A. Alito concurred. He noted that the Court's opinion did not bar "as applied" exemptions from the PRA's disclosure requirements. To obtain an exemption, a speaker must show "a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, also concurred. She agreed that in this case, given the relative weight of the interests at stake and the traditionally public nature of the referendum process, the Court correctly rejected the constitutional challenge to the PRA. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He opined that this was "not a hard case" as it merely dealt with a neutral, nondiscriminatory policy of disclosing information already in the state's possession that might one day indirectly burden signatories. He did not view the burden imposed by the PRA as substantial. Justice Antonin Scalia also concurred in the judgment. He noted that a history indicates that the First Amendment does not prohibit public disclosure. He also doubted whether signing a petition fits within the definition of "freedom of speech" at all. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented. He argued that the PRA severely burdens the First Amendment right to free speech and "chills participation in the referendum process."

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

jgoldman — Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:34 +0000

Location

Citizens United Headquarters

1006 Pennsylvania Ave SE Washington DC 20003

Washington, DC 20003

United States

38° 52' 58.8" N, 76° 59' 31.2" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

08-205

Appellant

Citizens United

Petitioner Type

Appellant

Appellee

Federal Election Commission

Respondent Type

Appellee

Heard By

Roberts Court (2009-2010)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2009-2010)

Opinion

558 U.S. ___ (2010)

Granted

Friday, November 14, 2008

Argued

Tuesday, March 24, 2009

Reargued:

Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Decided

Thursday, January 21, 2010

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for the appellant)

Floyd Abrams (on behalf of Senator Mitch McConnell, as amicus curiae, in support of the appellant)

Elena Kagan (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellee)

Seth P. Waxman (on behalf of Senators John McCain et al. as amici curiae in support of the appellee)

Facts of the Case

Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to its film Hillary: The Movie. The Movie expressed opinions about whether Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president.

In an attempt to regulate "big money" campaign contributions, the BCRA applies a variety of restrictions to "electioneering communications." Section 203 of the BCRA prevents corporations or labor unions from funding such communication from their general treasuries. Sections 201 and 311 require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer when the communication is not authorized by the candidate it intends to support.

Citizens United argued that: 1) Section 203 violates the First Amendment on its face and when applied to The Movie and its related advertisements, and that 2) Sections 201 and 203 are also unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances.

The United States District Court denied the injunction. Section 203 on its face was not unconstitutional because the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC had already reached that determination. The District Court also held that The Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, as it attempted to inform voters that Senator Clinton was unfit for office, and thus Section 203 was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, it held that Sections 201 and 203 were not unconstitutional as applied to the The Movie or its advertisements. The court reasoned that the McConnell decision recognized that disclosure of donors "might be unconstitutional if it imposed an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular cause," but those circumstances did not exist in Citizen United's claim.

Question

1) Did the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell resolve all constitutional as-applied challenges to the BCRA when it upheld the disclosure requirements of the statute as constitutional?

2) Do the BCRA's disclosure requirements impose an unconstitutional burden when applied to electioneering requirements because they are protected "political speech" and not subject to regulation as "campaign speech"?

3) If a communication lacks a clear plea to vote for or against a particular candidate, is it subject to regulation under the BCRA?

4) Should a feature length documentary about a candidate for political office be treated like the advertisements at issue in McConnell and therefore be subject to regulation under the BCRA?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Citizens United, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. No. Yes. Yes. The Supreme Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and portions of McConnell v. FEC. (In the prior cases, the Court had held that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity.) By a 5-to-4 vote along ideological lines, the majority held that under the First Amendment corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the majority joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Samuel A. Alito, and Clarence Thomas. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotamayor. The majority maintained that political speech is indispensable to a democracy, which is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation. The majority also held that the BCRA's disclosure requirements as applied to The Movie were constitutional, reasoning that disclosure is justified by a "governmental interest" in providing the "electorate with information" about election-related spending resources. The Court also upheld the disclosure requirements for political advertising sponsors and it upheld the ban on direct contributions to candidates from corporations and unions.

In a separate concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, emphasized the care with which the Court handles constitutional issues and its attempts to avoid constitutional issues when at all possible. Here, the Court had no narrower grounds upon which to rule, except to handle the First Amendment issues embodied within the case. Justice Scalia also wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justices Alito and Thomas in part, criticizing Justice Stevens' understanding of the Framer's view towards corporations. Justice Stevens argued that corporations are not members of society and that there are compelling governmental interests to curb corporations' ability to spend money during local and national elections.

Beard v. Banks

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1739

Petitioner

Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ronald Banks, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, November 14, 2005

Argued

Monday, March 27, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2006

Advocates

Jere Krakoff (argued the cause for Respondent)

Jonathan L. Marcus (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Louis J. Rovelli (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Pennsylvania houses "incorrigible, recalcitrant" prisoners in the Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU). Ronald Banks was one of about 40 prisoners in level 2 of the LTSU, which is reserved for the most dangerous, worst-behaved inmates. It is the policy of the LTSU to impose severe restrictions on the privileges of level 2 inmates. In particular, level 2 prisoners are the only ones denied newspapers, magazines, and photographs. Beard, the Secretary of the PA Department of Corrections, argued that this policy was necessary to promote rehabilitation and ensure prison safety. Banks brought a suit challenging the policy as a violation of the First Amendment. On the recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court ruled in favor of Beard. On appeal, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Circuit Court found that the prison's policy failed to meet the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley. The Third Circuit held that the First Amendment rights of the prisoners took precedence, because the policy was unrelated to the goal of rehabilitation, and an ineffective method of increasing prison safety.

Question

Does a prison policy that denies newspapers, magazines, and photographs to the worst-behaved prisoners violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Beard, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 6-2 decision, the Court reversed the Third Circuit and upheld the prison's policy. The plurality opinion by Justice Breyer held that Banks had failed to present sufficient evidence that the prison had acted unreasonably in denying newspapers, magazines, and photographs to its most troublesome inmates. The Court found that the policy met the four-part test established in Turner v. Safley: (1) it was rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of motivating good behavior; (2) though prisoners had no alternate means of exercising their rights, they could potentially graduate to the less-restrictive level 1; (3) accommodating prisoners' rights could result in negative consequences (worse behavior); and (4) there was no alternate means of accomplishing the prison's goals without restricting the prisoners' rights. Justice Thomas concurred separately in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, arguing that "This case reveals the shortcomings of the Turner framework." Justices Stevens and Ginsburg both wrote dissents. Justice Stevens called the policy "perilously close to a state-sponsored effort at mind control," while Justice Ginsburg criticized the high evidentiary burden the plurality placed on the prisoners. Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.

Randall v. Sorrell

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1528

Petitioner

Vermont Republican State Committee, et al.

Respondent

William H. Sorrell, et al.

Consolidation

Vermont Republican State Comm. v. Sorrell, No. 04-1530

Sorrell v. Randall, No. 04-1697

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, February 28, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 26, 2006

Advocates

James Bopp, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners)

William H. Sorrell (argued the cause for Respondents, Sorrell, et al)

Brenda Wright (argued the cause for Respondent, Vermont Public Interest Research Group)

Facts of the Case

In 1997 Vermont passed a campaign finance law, Act 64, which imposed strict limits both on expenditures by candidates for office during the election cycle and on the contributions of individuals, political groups, and parties. Neil Randall, a state legislator, sued Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell, arguing that the limits were unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedom of speech. In Randall's view, the Supreme Court had declared all expenditure limits unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo, and Act 64's contribution limits were unconstitutionally low. Sorrell countered that Buckley was outmoded because that Court had not considered one of Vermont's justifications, namely that expenditure limits prevent candidates from spending too much time trying to raise money. Sorrell also argued that Vermont's interests in combating corruption and ensuring fair elections justified the contribution limits. The District Court struck down the expenditure limits, but upheld most of the contribution limits. Only the limits on contributions by political parties - under which national, state, and local parties together could give only $400 to a statewide candidate - were unconstitutionally low. Both parties appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court reversed, ruling that all of Vermont's contribution limits were constitutional. The Second Circuit also found that the expenditure limits would be constitutional as long as they were "narrowly tailored" to the state's interests.

Question

(1) Do expenditure limits for political candidates violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech? (2) Are Vermont's contribution limits of $200-$400 per candidate for individuals, political groups, and political parties unconstitutionally low under the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Randall, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes and yes. The Court reversed the Circuit Court and invalidated Vermont's Act 64 by a 6-3 vote. The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer held that the Court should let stand the Buckley decision and its invalidation of expenditure limits. Vermont's argument that such limits prevent candidates from spending too much time fund-raising was deemed irrelevant because it was "perfectly obvious" and would not have changed the result in Buckley. The Court affirmed that some limits on political contributions are constitutional, but perceived "danger signs" indicating that Vermont's exceptionally low limits could prevent candidates from campaigning effectively. Applying a 5-part test, the Court held that Vermont's contribution limits were "disproportionate to the public purposes they were enacted to advance." Justice Souter wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, in which he argued that the contribution limits should be upheld and the expenditure limits should be referred to the lower courts for a determination of whether they were the "least restrictive means" of accomplishing Vermont's goals. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent arguing that Buckley should be overruled as it pertains to expenditure limits.

Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission (FEC)

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1581

Appellee

Federal Election Commission

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, January 17, 2006

Decided

Monday, January 23, 2006

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondent)

James Bopp, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate funds from being used for certain political advertisements in the 60-day period prior to an election. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL) ran a series of television advertisements encouraging viewers to contact two U.S. Senators and tell them to oppose judicial filibusters. WRTL anticipated that the ads would probably run afoul of BCRA and sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC), seeking an order barring the FEC from enforcing BCRA against the ads. WRTL's suit alleged that BCRA is unconstitutional as it applies to the ads, which it claimed are "grassroots lobbying advertisements" unrelated to electoral campaigning. The FEC argued that the Supreme Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) had ruled out all "as-applied" challenges to BCRA. The U.S. District Court for D.C. agreed and denied WRTL's motion.

Question

Does McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) allow "as-applied" challenges to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's prohibitions on corporate funding of political advertisements?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Wisconsin Right to Life, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 2 U.S.C. 441

Yes. The unanimous per curiam opinion reversed the District Court's judgment, allowing WRTL to proceed with its as-applied challenge. The opinion explained that the District Court had misinterpreted a footnote in McConnell that seemed to foreclose such challenges. The Justices instructed the lower court to consider the larger question of whether the BCRA is constitutional as applied to WRTL's ads.

Hartman v. Moore

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1495

Petitioner

Michael Hartman, Frank Kormann, Pierce McIntosh, Norman Robbins, and Robert Edwards

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

William G. Moore, Jr.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, June 27, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, January 10, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, April 26, 2006

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Patrick F. McCartan (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

William Moore sued six postal inspectors in federal court, alleging that they had brought criminal charges against him in retaliation for lobbying efforts he undertook on behalf of his company. The inspectors claimed that they had qualified immunity (that is, because they filed the charges in their official capacity on good faith, they could not be sued) and also that the case should be dismissed because they had probable cause to charge Moore. The district court sided with Moore, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed, finding that, even with probable cause, they must show that that the prosecution was not motivated by a desire for retaliation.

Question

Are law enforcement agents liable for retaliatory prosecution in violation of a defendant's First Amendment free speech rights when the prosecution was supported by probable cause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Hartman, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 5-2 decision, the Court ruled in favor of the postal inspectors, overruling the Court of Appeals. The opinion by Justice David Souter held that plaintiffs alleging retaliatory prosecution must prove that the law enforcement agents lacked probable cause. Probable cause, the Court ruled, is a crucial component of the "chain of causation" needed to evaluate retaliatory prosecution charges. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, which Justice Breyer joined. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito took no part in the decision.

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR)

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1152

Petitioner

Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, May 2, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, December 6, 2005

Decided

Monday, March 6, 2006

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

E. Joshua Rosenkranz (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 983(b)(1), withholds some federal funding from colleges and universities that deny U.S. military recruiters the same access to students that other employers are given. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights challenged the law, arguing that it violated the schools' First Amendment rights to expressive association by requiring them to assist in military recruitment. The district court rejected the suit, but a Third Court of Appeals panel reversed. It held that, while the schools still had the right to forfeit funds so as to avoid unwanted endorsement of military policy under the amendment, forcing the schools to make such a decision was unconstitutional. Congress could not require them to forfeit a constitutional right in order to receive federal funds.

Question

Does the Solomon Amendment, which witholds certain federal funds from colleges and universities that restrict the access of military recruiters to students, violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Rumsfeld, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 10 U.S.C. 983

No. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, held that the Solomon Amendment regulated conduct, not speech, and was therefore constitutional. Including military recruiters in receptions and interviews does not necessarily indicate university endorsement of the recruiters, so requiring their inclusion does not constitute compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. This would be true even if Congress had decided to make the requirement direct, rather than making it indirect as a condition for receiving federal funds. Roberts wrote, "Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds."

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1084

Petitioner

Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, April 18, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, November 1, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, February 21, 2006

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Nancy Hollander (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

O Centro Espirita Benficiente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV), a religious organization, brought suit in federal court to prevent the government from interfering with UDV's use of hoasca, a substance used during religious ceremonies that contains a drug prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act. UDV argued that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which prohibits substantial imposition on religious practices in the absence of a compelling government interest, established their right to use hoasca.

The district court sided with UDV and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the government had not sufficiently proved the alleged health risks posed by hoasca and could not show a substantial risk that the drug would be abuse recreationally. In response to the Attorney General's argument that prohibiting the drug was required by an international treaty, the court ruled that the government had failed to "narrowly tailor" its prohibition of the drug.

Question

Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 require the government to permit the importation, distribution, possession and use of an otherwise illegal drug by a religious organization when Congress has found that the drug has a high potential for abuse, is unsafe for use even under medical supervision, and violates an international treaty when imported or distributed?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes. In a unanimous 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court held that the government had failed to prove a compelling interest in regulating the UDV's use of drugs for religious purposes. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the government's argument that the Controlled Substances Act could accommodate no exceptions. On the contrary, Justice Roberts wrote, the Court is required by the RFRA to examine individual religious freedom claims and grant exceptions to generally-applicable laws where no compelling government interest can be shown.

The Court also rejected the argument that an exception for UDV was precluded by international treaty. The government failed to submit "evidence addressing the international consequences of granting an exemption for the UDV," instead citing "the general importance of honoring international obligations and of maintaining the leadership position of the United States in the international war on drugs." The Court held that such general government interests were not sufficient to satisfy the compelling interest standard.

Garcetti v. Ceballos

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-473

Petitioner

Gil Garcetti, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Richard Ceballos

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, February 28, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, October 12, 2005

Reargued:

Tuesday, March 21, 2006

Decided

Tuesday, May 30, 2006

Advocates

Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer (argued the cause for Respondent)

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Cindy S. Lee (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Richard Ceballos, an employee of the Los Angeles District Attorney's office, found that a sheriff misrepresented facts in a search warrant affidavit. Ceballos notified the attorneys prosecuting the case stemming from that arrest and all agreed that the affidavit was questionable, but the D.A.'s office refused to dismiss the case. Ceballos then told the defense he believed the affidavit contained false statements, and defense counsel subpoenaed him to testify. Seeking damages in federal district court, Ceballos alleged that D.A.s in the office retaliated against him for his cooperation with the defense, which he argued was protected by the First Amendment. The district court ruled that the district attorneys were protected by qualified immunity, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled for Ceballos, holding that qualified immunity was not available to the defendants because Ceballos had been engaged in speech that addressed matters of public concern and was thus protected by the First Amendment.

Question

Should a public employee's purely job-related speech, expressed strictly pursuant to the duties of employment, be protected by the First Amendment simply because it touched on a matter of public concern, or must the speech also be engaged in "as a citizen?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Garcetti, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that speech by a public official is only protected if it is engaged in as a private citizen, not if it is expressed as part of the official's public duties. Ceballos's employers were justified in taking action against him based on his testimony and cooperation with the defense, therefore, because it happened as part of his official duties. "The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or write," Justice Kennedy wrote, "does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance." Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented.

Tory v. Cochran

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1488

Petitioner

Ulysses Tory, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 734 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 2005

Advocates

Erwin Chemerinsky (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Jonathan B. Cole (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Johnnie Cochran sued his former client Ulysses Tory in a California court for making defaming statements. Tory had tried to force Cochran to pay him money in exchange for desisting, Cochran argued. A judge agreed and ordered Tory to never talk about Cochran again. Tory appealed unsuccessfully in state court, arguing the order violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Cochran died one week after oral argument.

Question

Did a judge's order that someone stop making defaming statements about a public figure, even after that figure's death, violate the First Amendment right to free speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Tory, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that Cochran's death diminished the grounds for the judge's order and that the order therefore amounted to an overly broad prior restraint on speech. Tory could no longer try to force Cochran to pay him in exchange for desisting, the Court reasoned, ending the order's underlying justification.

Cutter v. Wilkinson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9877

Petitioner

Jon B. Cutter, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reginald Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 709 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Monday, March 21, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondent United States, supporting petitioners)

Douglas R. Cole (argued the cause for Respondent Wilkinson)

David A. Goldberger (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA) prohibited government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a "compelling government interest." Prisoners in Ohio alleged in federal district court that prison officials violated RLUIPA by failing to accomodate the inmates' exercise of their "nonmainstream" religions. The prison officials argued that the act improperly advanced religion and thus violated the First Amendment's establishment clause (which prohibited government from making laws "respecting an establishment of religion"). The district court rejected that argument and ruled for the inmates. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

Question

Did a federal law prohibiting government from burdening prisoners' religious exercise violate the First Amendment's establishment clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Cutter, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 2000

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, on its face, RLUIPA made an accommodation allowed by the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the law was an effort to alleviate the "government-created burden" on religious exercise that prisoners faced. Nor did section three discriminate between mainstream and non-mainstream religions. The Court did point out that constitutional problems could arise if RLUIPA were enforced improperly and religious prisoners received favored treatment, or if religious exercise and security concerns were not properly balanced.

McCreary County v. ACLU

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1693

Petitioner

McCreary County, Kentucky, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Mathew D. Staver (argued the cause for Petitioners)

David A. Friedman (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause.

Question

Do Ten Commandments displays in public schools and in courthouses violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" 2. Was a determination that the displays' purpose had been to advance religion sufficient for the displays' invalidation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for ACLU, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance religion. In the case of each of the displays, the Court held, an observer would have concluded that the government was endorsing religion. The first display for presenting the Ten Commandments in isolation; the second for showing the Commandments along with other religious passages; the third for presenting the Commandments in a presentation of the "Foundations of American Law," an exhibit in which the county reached "for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses."

Van Orden v. Perry

Fri, 29 Oct 2010 18:40:17 +0000

Location

Texas State Capitol

1100 Congress Avenue Austin TX 78701

Austin, TX 78701

United States

30° 16' 21.882" N, 97° 44' 28.0752" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1500

Petitioner

Thomas Van Orden

Respondent

Rick Perry, in his Official Capacity as Governor of Texas and Chairman, State Preservation Board, et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. 677 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, March 2, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Erwin Chemerinsky (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondents, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting respondents)

Greg Abbott (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion.

Question

Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Perry, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

No. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause."

Clingman v. Beaver

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-37

Petitioner

Michael Clingman, Secretary, Oklahoma State Election Board, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Andrea L. Beaver, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 581 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 2005

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

Wellon B. Poe, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners)

James C. Linger (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Oklahoma's election laws created a primary system in which a party could invite only its own members and Independents to vote in its primary. The Libertarian Party and voters registered in other parties argued the laws violated the First Amendment freedoms of expression and association by preventing the Libertarian Party from inviting members of other parties to vote in its primary elections. The district court ruled for Oklahoma. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled Oklahoma's election laws violated the First Amendment.

Question

Do state election laws that restrict the voters a party may invite to vote in its primary election violate the First Amendment rights to freedom of expression and association?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Clingman, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Oklahoma's semiclosed primary system did not violate the right to freedom of association and that any burden it imposed was minor and justified by legitimate state interests. The Court noted that not every electoral law burdening associational rights was subject to strict scrutiny. Requiring voters to register with a party before participating in its primary minimally burdened voters' associational rights. Moreover, Oklahoma's primary advanced a number of state interests, including the preservation of parties as viable and identifiable interest groups.

Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1164

Petitioner

Mike Johanns, Secretary of Agriculture, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Livestock Marketing Association; Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc. v. Livestock Marketing Association

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc. et al. v. Livestock Marketing Association, et al., No. 03-1165

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 550 (2005)

Granted

Monday, May 24, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, December 8, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioners in 10-1164)

Laurence H. Tribe (argued the cause for Respondents)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Petitioners in 03-1165)

Facts of the Case

The Beef Promotion and Research Act (1985) required cattle producers to pay a fee for generic beef advertisements done on behalf of the cattle industry. Some cattle producers disagreed with the advertisements. The Livestock Marketing Association sued the Department of Agriculture (DEA) in federal district court and alleged a government-required fee for advertising with which some cattle producers disagreed violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The DEA argued the advertising was government speech immune from First Amendment challenge. Another group of cattle producers, the Nebraska Cattlemen, sided with the DEA and sued the Livestock Marketing Association. The two cases were consolidated. The district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the program violated the First Amendment and that the advertising was compelled and not government speech.

Question

Does the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act) violate the First Amendment by requiring cattle producers to pay to fund advertising with which they disagree?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Johanns, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the fund was for government speech and that therefore the government could not be sued under the First Amendment. The Court pointed to the rule that while compelled funding of private speech raises First Amendment concerns, compelled funding of government speech generally does not.

City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1609

Petitioner

City of Littleton, Colorado

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., a Limited Liability Company, dba Christal's

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 774 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, October 14, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, March 24, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 7, 2004

Advocates

Douglas R. Cole (argued the cause for Petitioner)

J. Andrew Nathan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Michael W. Gross (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Littleton required adult businesses to apply for a permit to operate from the city. If the city denied the license, the business could appeal to a state district court under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Z.J. Gifts, an adult bookstore, wanted to operate in a place not zoned for adult businesses. Rather than apply for a license, they challenged the licensing law itself as unconstitutional, claiming that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provide merely for prompt judicial review of city denial, not for a prompt judicial decision. Because stores denied a license cannot operate until the court has made its decision, they could potentially be forced to wait indefinitely for a license based solely on the content of the material they intend to sell. This, Z.J. argued, violated the Supreme Court's holding in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, that censorship laws must provide for "prompt judicial determination."

The federal district court sided with Littleton. A Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.

Question

Did Littleton's adult business licensing ordinance violate the First Amendment protection of Free Speech because it did not guarantee a prompt judicial decision when a business appeals the denial of a license?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for City of Littleton, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In an opinion by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Colorado did not have to explicitly provide for a "prompt judicial determination" to make the law constitutional. As long as Colorado courts did not unnecessarily delay such claims, the normal judicial review process could be expected to provide a decision quickly enough to satisfy the constitutional demands. If the courts failed to make a prompt decision in a specific case, the business in that particular case could sue, but the absence of explicit "prompt judicial determination" language in the statute did not make it unconstitutional.

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-218

Petitioner

John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Civil Liberties Union, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 656 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, October 14, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, March 2, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, June 29, 2004

Advocates

Ann E. Beeson (argued the cause for Respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) to prevent minors from accessing pornography online. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and online publishers sued in federal court to prevent enforcement of the act, arguing that it violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court agreed. On appeal, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed, holding that because the act used "community standards" to decide which material was harmful to minors, it would prohibit material that was felt offensive in the most "puritanical" communities from being displayed in more "tolerant" ones.

On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the "community standards" provision alone did not make the act unconstitutional and sent the case back to the Third Circuit for further evaluation.

The Third Circuit again prohibited implementation of the act, holding that it was likely to fail the "strict scrutiny" test because it was not narrowly tailored - that is, it prevented online publishers from publishing some material that adults had a right to access - and because it did not use the least restrictive means possible to protect children (the court found that blocking software installed on home computers by parents would do as good a job without preventing free speech). For similar reasons, the panel found that the act was unconstitutionally "overbroad" - that is, it applied to too much protected material.

Question

Is the Child Online Protection Act's requirement that online publishers prevent children from accessing "material that is harmful to minors" likely to violate the First Amendment by restricting too much protected speech and using a method that is not the least restrictive one available?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for American Civil Liberties Union, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In an interesting 5-to-4 vote, with Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg on one side and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Breyer and O'Connor on the other, the Court found that Congress had not yet met its burden to show that the COPA requirements were more effective than other methods of preventing minors. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in the majority opinion, wrote that the district court's injunction "was not an abuse of discretion, because on this record there are a number of plausible, less restrictive alternatives to the statute." The majority also emphasized that barring the statute's enforcement during the trial would be less harmful than allowing it, because allowing it would be likely to prevent online publishers from publishing certain material.

Locke v. Davey

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1315

Petitioner

Gary Locke, Governor of Washington, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Joshua Davey

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 712 (2004)

Granted

Monday, May 19, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, December 2, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 2004

Advocates

Narda Pierce (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Jay A. Sekulow (argued the cause for Respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Respondent, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

The Washington State Promise Scholarship, created by the state legislature in 1999, gives college scholarship money to talented students. However, this money cannot be used to obtain a degree in theology if the program is taught to cause belief. Washington's constitution prohibits funding religious instruction. The 1969 state code applied this ban to college financial aid.

Joshua Davey forfeited his Promise Scholarship money in order to major in pastoral ministries at a private Christian college. Davey filed suit in U.S. district court, claiming the state constitution's ban on funding religious instruction violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion (in the U.S. Constitution). The district court rejected Davey's claim. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Davey's free exercise rights were violated.

Question

If a state provides college scholarships for secular instruction, does the First Amendment's free exercise clause require a state to fund religious instruction?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Locke, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Free Exercise of Religion

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court ruled that a state does not violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause when it funds secular college majors but excludes devotional theology majors. The Court rejected Davey's argument that the state scholarship program is unconstitutional because it is not neutral toward religion. "The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction," the Court wrote. Similarly the Washington Constitution - which explicitly prohibits state money from going to religious instruction - does not violate the free exercise clause. Unlike laws and programs the Court has struck down under the free exercise clause, nothing in either the scholarship program or the state constitution "suggests animus towards religion." States have a "historic and substantial interest" in excluding religious activity from public funding.

McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:33 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1674

Petitioner

Federal Election Commission

Respondent

Mitch McConnell, United States Senator, et al.

Consolidation

National Rifle Association (NRA), et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1675

Federal Election Commission (FEC), et al. v. Mitch McConnell, United States Senator, et al., No. 02-1676

John McCain, United States Senator, et al. v. Mitch McConnell, United States Senator, et al., No. 02-1702

Republican National Committee, et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1727

National Right to Life Committee, Inc., et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1733

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1734

Victoria Jackson Gray Adams, et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1740

Ron Paul, United States Congressman, et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1747

California Democratic Party, et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1753

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1755

Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1756

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 93 (2003)

Granted

Thursday, June 5, 2003

Argued

Monday, September 8, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Defendant FEC)

Bobby R. Burchfield (argued the cause for Plaintiffs Political Party)

Kenneth W. Starr (argued the cause for Plaintiffs McConnell, et al.)

Jay A. Sekulow (argued the cause for Plaintiffs Echols, et al.)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Defendant FEC)

Laurence E. Gold (argued the cause for Plaintiffs AFL-CIO)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Defendant Intervenor)

Floyd Abrams (argued the cause for Plaintiffs McConnell, et al.)

Facts of the Case

In early 2002, a many years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for--and spent during-- political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill). Its key provisions were a) a ban on unrestricted ("soft money") donations made directly to political parties (often by corporations, unions, or well-healed individuals) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials; b) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election; and c) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of "issue ads" or "coordinated expenditures").

The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by-passing the typical federal judicial process. In May a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals.

Question

Does the "soft money" ban of the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 exceed Congress's authority to regulate elections under Article 1, Section 4 of the United States Constitution and/or violate the First Amendment's protection of the freedom to speak?
Do regulations of the source, content, or timing of political advertising in the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 violate the First Amendment's free speech clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for McConnell, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Split Vote

With a few exceptions, the Court answered "no" to both questions in a 5-to-4 decision written by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens. Because the regulations dealt mostly with soft-money contributions that were used to register voters and increase attendance at the polls, not with campaign expenditures (which are more explicitly a statement of political values and therefore deserve more protection), the Court held that the restriction on free speech was minimal. It then found that the restriction was justified by the government's legitimate interest in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and... the appearance of corruption" that might result from those contributions.

In response to challenges that the law was too broad and unnecessarily regulated conduct that had not been shown to cause corruption (such as advertisements paid for by corporations or unions), the Court found that such regulation was necessary to prevent the groups from circumventing the law. Justices O'Connor and Stevens wrote that "money, like water, will always find an outlet" and that the government was therefore justified in taking steps to prevent schemes developed to get around the contribution limits.

The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. The Court found that the law only affected state elections in which federal candidates were involved and also that it did not prevent states from creating separate election laws for state and local elections.

Virginia v. Hicks

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-371

Petitioner

Virginia

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Hicks

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 113 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, April 30, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 16, 2003

Advocates

Steven D. Benjamin (Argued the cause for the respondent)

William H. Hurd (Richmond, Virginia, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (RRHA), a political subdivision of Virginia, owns and operates Whitcomb Court, a low-income housing development. In 1997, the Richmond City Council conveyed Whitcomb Court's streets to the RRHA. Subsequently, the RRHA enacted a policy authorizing the Richmond police to serve notice on any person lacking "a legitimate business or social purpose" for being on the premises and to arrest for trespassing any person who remains or returns after having been notified. After the RRHA gave Kevin Hicks, a nonresident, written notice barring him from Whitcomb Court, he trespassed there and was arrested and convicted. At trial, Hicks claimed that RRHA's policy was unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness. The Virginia en banc Court of Appeals vacated his conviction. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court found the policy unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.

Question

Is the Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority's trespass policy, which provides for arrest after being served notice for being on the premises without "a legitimate business or social purpose," facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Virginia, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the RRHA's trespass policy is not facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine. Noting that he was not in Whitcomb Court to engage in constitutionally protected speech, the Court reasoned that Hicks had not shown that the RRHA policy prohibited a substantial amount of protected speech in relation to its many legitimate applications. Justice Scalia wrote, "both the notice-barment rule and the 'legitimate business or social purpose' rule apply to all persons who enter the streets of Whitcomb Court, not just to those who seek to engage in expression."

Overton v. Bazzetta

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-94

Petitioner

Overton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bazzetta

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 126 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, March 26, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 16, 2003

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (Lansing, Michigan, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting petitioners)

Deborah LaBelle (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, after the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) banned visits to inmates by little brothers and sisters, nieces, nephews and other minors, a group of prisoners sued. They claimed that the ban violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and that it restricted their First Amendment right to association. The district court agreed, ruling against the ban. On appeal, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court's ruling.

Question

Did the Department of Corrections ban on visits by minors violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the freedom of association of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Overton, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Association

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the MDOC's regulations were valid. The Court reasoned that the fact that the regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penological interests suffices to sustain them regardless of whether the prisoners have a constitutional right of association that has survived incarceration. The Court also concluded that the visitation restriction for inmates with two substance- abuse violations is not a cruel and unusual confinement condition violating the Eighth Amendment. The Court reasoned that withdrawing visitation privileges for a limited period is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for confinement conditions. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:38 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-403

Petitioner

Federal Election Commission

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Beaumont

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 146 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, March 25, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 16, 2003

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

James Bopp, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

In 1971 Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act, banning direct corporate donations to federal election campaigns. In 2000, Christine Beaumont and the North Carolina Right to Life (NCRL), an anti-abortion advocacy group, challenged the act, saying it violated their right to free speech. The group is an incorporated non-profit that lobbies and backs political candidates friendly to its cause, but under the act it cannot make political donations. The district court ruled in favor of NCRL. The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the Federal Election Campaign Act's ban on corporate political donations violate the freedom of speech for incorporated, non-profit advocacy groups?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Federal Election Commission, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Election Campaign

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that applying the direct contribution prohibition to nonprofit advocacy corporations is consistent with the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that it could not hold for NCRL "without recasting our understanding of the risks of harm posed by corporate political contributions, of the expressive significance of contributions, and of the consequent deference owed to legislative judgments on what to do about them." Justice Anthony M. Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissented, arguing that section 441b should have been subject to strict scrutiny and, under this standard, it could not stand.

United States v. American Library Association

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington D.C. 20500

Washington 20500

United States

38° 53' 55.4928" N, 77° 2' 11.8536" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-361

Appellee

American Library Association

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 194 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, March 5, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 23, 2003

Advocates

Paul M. Smith (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Congress passed the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) in 2000, requiring public libraries to install internet filtering software on their computers in order to qualify for federal funding. The American Library Association and others challenged the law, claiming that it improperly required them to restrict the First Amendment rights of their patrons. As stipulated by the law, a three judge panel heard the case, and ruled unanimously that the CIPA violated the First Amendment.

Question

Does Congress have the authority to require libraries to censor internet content in order to receive federal funding?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 6-3 judgment delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that, because public libraries' use of Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons' First Amendment rights, CIPA does not induce libraries to violate the Constitution and is a valid exercise of Congress's spending power. Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas joined the Chief Justice's opinion. Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Stephen G. Breyer filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Both noted that CIPA imposed a comparatively small burden on library Internet users that was not disproportionate to any potential speech-related harm, especially in light of the libraries' ability to unblock sites. Justices John Paul Stevens and David H. Souter dissented. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent.

Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1806

Petitioner

Madigan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Telemarketing Associates

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 600 (2003)

Argued

Monday, March 3, 2003

Decided

Monday, May 5, 2003

Advocates

M. Errol Copilevitz (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Paul D. Clement (Department of Justice, Washington, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Richard S. Huszagh (Chicago, Illinois, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

VietNow National Headquarters, a charitable nonprofit corporation, retained for-profit fundraising telemarketing corporations to solicit donations to aid Vietnam veterans. The contracts provided that the telemarketers would retain 85 percent of the gross receipts from Illinois donors. The Illinois Attorney General filed a complaint in state court, alleging that the telemarketers represented to donors that a significant amount of each dollar donated would be paid over to VietNow for charitable endeavors and that such representations were knowingly deceptive and materially false and constituted a fraud. The trial court granted the telemarketers' motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. In affirming, the Illinois Supreme Courts relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent that held that certain regulations of charitable solicitation barring fees in excess of a prescribed level effectively imposed prior restraints on fundraising and were therefore incompatible with the First Amendment.

Question

Does the First Amendment permit a State to maintain fraud actions alleging that fundraisers made false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Madigan, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, consistent with the Court's precedent and the First Amendment, States may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used. The Court reasoned that, while bare failure to disclose that information directly to potential donors does not suffice to establish fraud, when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally misleading statements designed to deceive the listener, the First Amendment does not preclude a fraud claim. Because the state's action was on misrepresentations that were not protected by freedom of speech, rather than the high percentage of donations retained, the Court concluded that the allegations against the telemarketers therefore state a claim for relief that can survive a motion to dismiss.

Virginia v. Black

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:07 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1107

Petitioner

Virginia

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Black

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 343 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, December 11, 2002

Decided

Monday, April 7, 2003

Advocates

Rodney A. Smolla (Argued the cause for the respondents)

William H. Hurd (Richmond, Virginia, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Barry Black, Richard Elliott, and Jonathan O'Mara were convicted separately of violating a Virginia statute that makes it a felony "for any person..., with the intent of intimidating any person or group..., to burn...a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place," and specifies that "any such burning...shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group." At trial, Black objected on First Amendment grounds to a jury instruction that cross burning by itself is sufficient evidence from which the required "intent to intimidate" could be inferred. He was found guilty. O'Mara pleaded guilty to charges of violating the statute, but reserved the right to challenge its constitutionality. In Elliott's trial, the judge did not give an instruction on the statute's prima facie evidence provision. Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court held, among other things, that the cross-burning statute is unconstitutional on its face and that the prima facie evidence provision renders the statute overbroad because the probability of prosecution under the statute chills the expression of protected speech.

Question

Does the Commonwealth of Virginia's cross-burning statute, which prohibits the burning of a cross with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Virginia, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes, but in a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that while a State, consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate, in which four other justices joined, the provision in the Virginia statute treating any cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate renders the statute unconstitutional in its current form, in which three other justices joined. Justice Antonin Scalia left the latter portion of the Court's conclusion to argue that the Court should vacate and remand the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court with respect to Elliott and O'Mara, so that that court could have an opportunity to construe the cross-burning statute's prima-facie- evidence provision. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concluded that the Virginia statute is unconstitutional and therefore concurred in the Court's judgment insofar as it affirmed the invalidation of Black's conviction. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-521

Petitioner

Republican Party of Minnesota

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

White

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 765 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, March 26, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 2002

Advocates

James Bopp, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Alan I. Gilbert (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Minnesota's Constitution provides for the selection of all state judges by popular election. The announcement clause of the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibits a candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. While running for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Gregory Wersal filed suit, seeking a declaration that the announce clause violates the First Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement. Wersal alleged that he was forced to refrain from announcing his views on disputed issues during the 1998 campaign, to the point where he declined response to questions put to him by the press and public, out of concern that he might run afoul of the announce clause. The District Court found that the announcement clause did not violate the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the First Amendment permit the Minnesota Supreme Court to prohibit candidates for judicial election in that State from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Republican Party of Minnesota, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the announce clause violates the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the announce clause prohibits speech based on its content and burdens a category of speech that is at the core of First Amendment freedoms - speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office. Moreover, the Court concluded that the clause did not serve to preserve the state judiciary's impartiality, its argued compelling state interest. "There is an obvious tension between the article of Minnesota's popularly approved Constitution which provides that judges shall be elected, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's announce clause which places most subjects of interest to the voters off limits," wrote Justice Scalia.

Thompson v. Western States Medical Center

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

Western States Medical Center (Now Kronos Compounding Pharmacy)

3675 S. Rainbow Blvd. Las Vegas NV 89147

Las Vegas, NV 89147

United States

36° 7' 20.8416" N, 115° 14' 35.1384" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-344

Petitioner

Thompson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Western States Medical Center

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 357 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 2002

Decided

Monday, April 29, 2002

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Howard M. Hoffman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) exempts "compounded drugs," or drugs in which a pharmacist or doctor has combined, mixed, or altered ingredients to create a medication tailored to an individual patient's needs, from the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) standard drug approval requirements under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), so long as the providers of the compounded drugs abide by several restrictions. The restrictions included that the prescription be unsolicited and that the providers not advertise or promote the compounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or type of drug. A group of licensed pharmacies that specialize in compounding drugs sought to enjoin enforcement of the advertising and solicitation provisions, arguing that they violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Agreeing, the District Court held that the provisions constituted unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech. Affirming in part, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Government had not demonstrated that the restrictions would directly advance its interests or that alternatives less restrictive of speech were unavailable.

Question

Do the prohibitions in the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 with regard to soliciting prescriptions for, and advertising, compounded drugs violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Western States Medical Center, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the FDAMA's provisions amounted to unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech. Among other findings, the Court reasoned that, although the speech restrictions allegedly served governmental interests in permitting drug compounding while guaranteeing that compounding was not conducted on such a scale as to undermine the drug approval process, it had not been demonstrated that the speech restrictions were not more extensive than necessary to serve such interests. Justice Thomas Clarence filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, filed a dissenting opinion.

Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1737

Petitioner

Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Village of Stratton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 150 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, February 26, 2002

Decided

Monday, June 17, 2002

Advocates

Abraham Cantor (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Paul D. Polidoro (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

David M. Gormley (Columbus, Ohio, argued the cause as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Village of Stratton promulgated an ordinance that prohibits canvassers from entering private residential property to promote any cause without first obtaining a permit from the mayor's office. The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses that publish and distribute religious materials, brought an action for injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press. The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Village's interests in protecting its residents from fraud and its desire to prevent criminals from posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents were sufficient bases on which to justify the regulation.

Question

Does a municipal ordinance that requires a permit prior to engaging in the door-to-door advocacy of a political cause and to display upon demand the permit, which contains one's name, violate the First Amendment protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering or discourse?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the ordinance's provisions making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to- door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violate the First Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills. The Court reasoned that the village's interest in preventing fraud could not support the ordinance's application to the religious organizations, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. Dissenting, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the Court decision deprived Stratton residents of the degree of accountability and safety that the permit requirement provides.

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

The Cleveland Metropolitan School District

1380 E. 6th Street Cleveland OH 44114

Cleveland, OH 44114

United States

41° 30' 8.2224" N, 81° 41' 30.5304" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1751

Petitioner

Zelman

Respondent

Simmons-Harris

Consolidation

No. 00-1777

No. 00-1779

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 639 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, February 20, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 27, 2002

Advocates

Robert H. Chanin (Argued the cause for the respondents Simmons-Harris, et al)

David J. Young (Argued the cause for the private petitioners)

Marvin E. Frankel (Argued the cause for the respondents Gatton, et al)

Judith L. French (Columbus, Ohio, argued the cause for the State petitioners)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides tuition aid in the form of vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District to attend participating public or private schools of their parent's choosing. Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon where parents choose to enroll their children. In the 1999-2000 school year 82 percent of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation and 96 percent of the students participating in the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the students were from families at or below the poverty line. A group of Ohio taxpayers sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does Ohio's school voucher program violate the Establishment Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Zelman, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the program does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned that, because Ohio's program is part of Ohio's general undertaking to provide educational opportunities to children, government aid reaches religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients and the incidental advancement of a religious mission, or any perceived endorsement, is reasonably attributable to the individual aid recipients not the government. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the "Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious. The program is therefore a program of true private choice."

City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

Los Angeles City Hall

200 North Spring Street Los Angeles CA 90012

Los Angeles, CA 90012

United States

34° 3' 12.3264" N, 118° 14' 34.9404" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-799

Petitioner

City of Los Angeles

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alameda Books, Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 425 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, December 4, 2001

Decided

Monday, May 13, 2002

Advocates

Michael L. Klekner (Los Angeles, California argued the cause for the petitioner)

John H. Weston (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Based on its 1977 study concluding that concentrations of adult entertainment establishments are associated with higher crime rates in surrounding communities, the city of Los Angeles enacted Municipal Code section 12.70(C), which prohibited such enterprises within 1,000 feet of each other. The city later amended the ordinance to prohibit more than one adult entertainment business in the same building. Alameda Books, Inc. and Highland Books, Inc., two adult establishments that openly operate combined bookstores/video arcades, sued, alleging that the ordinance violates the First Amendment. Finding that the ordinance was not a content-neutral regulation of speech, the District Court reasoned that the 1977 study did not support a reasonable belief that multiple-use adult establishments produce the secondary effects the city asserted as content-neutral justifications for its prohibition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that, even if the ordinance were content neutral, the city failed to present evidence upon which it could reasonably rely to demonstrate that its regulation of multiple-use establishments was designed to serve its substantial interest in reducing crime.

Question

May a city rely on a study it conducted to demonstrate whether an ordinance serves a substantial government interest?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for City of Los Angeles, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the city of Los Angeles may reasonably rely on a study it conducted some years before enacting the present version of section 12.70(C) to demonstrate that its ban on multiple-use adult establishments serves its interest in reducing crime. Three other Justices joined in this holding. Concurring, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concluded that Los Angeles may impose its regulation in the exercise of the zoning authority, and that the city is not, at least, to be foreclosed by summary judgment. Justice David H. Souter, with whom Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined, dissented. Justice Souter argued that the 1977 study, while pursuing a policy of dispersing adult establishments, evolved to a policy of breaking-up combined bookstores/video arcades, for which the study's evidence was insufficient.

Thomas v. Chicago Park District

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1249

Petitioner

Thomas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chicago Park District

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 316 (2002)

Argued

Monday, December 3, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, January 15, 2002

Advocates

David A. Strauss (Argued the cause for the respondent)

James A. Feldman (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Richard L. Wilson (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Chicago Park District is responsible for operating public parks and other public property in Chicago. Pursuant to its authority, the Park District adopted an ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events in public parks. The ordinance provides that the Park District may deny a permit on any of 13 specified grounds, must process applications within 28 days, and must explain its reasons for a denial. An unsuccessful applicant may appeal, first, to the Park District's general superintendent and then to state court. The Windy City Hemp Development Board applied on several occasions for permits to hold rallies advocating the legalization of marijuana. Some permits were granted and others were denied. Ultimately, the Board filed suit, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face. The District Court granted the Park District summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Must a municipal park ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events must, consistent with the First Amendment, contain certain procedural safeguards?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Chicago Park District, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the First Amendment free speech guarantee does not require the Park District to initiate litigation every time the agency denied a permit for an event or specify a deadline for judicial review of a challenge to the denial of a permit. The Court reasoned that the licensing scheme was not based on subject-matter censorship, but rather content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation of the use of a public forum thus making the ordinance constitutional. "On balance, we think the permissive nature of the ordinance furthers, rather than constricts, free speech," wrote Justice Scalia for the Court.

Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

ACLU Headquarters

125 Broad Street New York NY 10004

New York, NY 10004

United States

40° 42' 8.2548" N, 74° 0' 38.088" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1293

Petitioner

Ashcroft

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Civil Liberties Union

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 564 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 2001

Decided

Monday, May 13, 2002

Advocates

Ann E. Beeson (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Theodore B. Olson (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Unlike the Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) applies only to material displayed on the World Wide Web, covers only communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only "material that is harmful to minors." Moreover, COPA requires jurors to apply "contemporary community standards" in assessing material. Before it was scheduled to go into effect, a number of organizations affected by COPA filed suit, alleging that the statute violated adults' First Amendment rights because it effectively banned constitutionally protected speech, was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental purpose, and was substantially overbroad. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction. In affirming, the Court of Appeals, reasoning that COPA's use of contemporary community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors rendered the statute substantially overbroad.

Question

Does the Child Online Protection Act's use of "community standards" to identify "material that is harmful to minors" violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Ashcroft, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U.S.C. 231

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that COPA's reliance on community standards to identify what material is harmful to minors does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for First Amendment purposes. The Court expressed no view as to whether COPA was overbroad for other reasons or was unconstitutionally vague and did not vacate the preliminary injunction because it could not do so without addressing matters yet to be considered. "In its original form, the community standard provided a shield for communications that are offensive only to the least tolerant members of society," argued Justice John Paul Stevens in his dissent. "In the context of the Internet, however, community standards become a sword, rather than a shield. If a prurient appeal is offensive in a puritan village, it may be a crime to post it on the World Wide Web."

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

Free Speech Coalition

P.O. Box 10480 Canoga Park CA 91309

Canoga Park, CA 91309

United States

34° 12' 4.0176" N, 118° 35' 53.3112" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-795

Petitioner

Ashcroft

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Free Speech Coalition

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 234 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, October 30, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, April 16, 2002

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

H. Louis Sirkin (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) prohibits "any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture" that "is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," and any sexually explicit image that is "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression" it depicts "a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." The Free Speech Coalition, an adult-entertainment trade association, and others filed suit, alleging that the "appears to be" and "conveys the impression" provisions are overbroad and vague and, thus, restrain works otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals held the CPPA invalid on its face, finding it to be substantially overbroad because it bans materials that are neither obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, nor produced by the exploitation of real children as in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747.

Question

Does the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 abridge freedom of speech where it where it proscribes a significant universe of speech that is neither obscene under Miller v. California nor child pornography under New York v. Ferber?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Free Speech Coalition, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 2252

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the two prohibitions described above are overbroad and unconstitutional. The Court found the CPPA to be inconsistent with Miller insofar as the CPPA cannot be read to prohibit obscenity, because it lacks the required link between its prohibitions and the affront to community standards prohibited by the obscenity definition. Moreover, the Court found the CPPA to have no support in Ferber since the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production. Provisions of the CPPA cover "materials beyond the categories recognized in Ferber and Miller, and the reasons the Government offers in support of limiting the freedom of speech have no justification in our precedents or in the law of the First Amendment" and abridge "the freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech," wrote Justice Kennedy.

Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:31 +0000

Location

Attorney General's Office of MA

1 Ashburton Pl. Boston MA 02114

Boston, MA 02114

United States

42° 21' 33.6996" N, 71° 3' 44.5428" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-596

Petitioner

Lorillard Tobacco

Respondent

Thomas F. Reilly

Consolidation

No. 00-597

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 525 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, April 25, 2001

Decided

Thursday, June 28, 2001

Advocates

Barbara D. Underwood (Department of Justice, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

William W. Porter (Boston, Massachusetts, argued the cause for the respondents)

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Attorney General of Massachusetts promulgated comprehensive regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. Members of the tobacco industry filed suit challenging the regulations. Lorillard Tobacco Company and others asserted that under the Supremacy Clause the cigarette advertising regulations were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), which prescribes mandatory health warnings for cigarette packaging and advertising and that the regulations violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rulings that the cigarette advertising regulations are not pre-empted by the FCLAA and that neither the regulations prohibiting outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground nor the sales practices regulations restricting the location and distribution of tobacco products violated the First Amendment. Reversing the lower court's finding, the appellate court found that the point-of-sale advertising regulations requiring that indoor advertising be placed no lower than five feet from the floor were valid.

Question

Does the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempt portions of the Attorney General of Massachusetts' cigarette advertising regulations? Do portions of the Attorney General's regulations governing the advertising and sale of tobacco products violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lorillard Tobacco, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 15 U.S.C. 1334

Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the highly fractured Court held that the FCLAA preempts Massachusetts' regulations governing outdoor and point-of-sale cigarette advertising and that Massachusetts' outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations related to smokeless tobacco and cigars violate the First Amendment, but that the sales practices regulations related to all three tobacco products are constitutional. "We conclude that the Attorney General has failed to show that the outdoor advertising regulations for smokeless tobacco and cigars are not more extensive than necessary to advance the State's substantial interest in preventing underage tobacco use," wrote Justice O'Connor.

United States v. United Foods

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-276

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United Foods

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 405 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, April 17, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 25, 2001

Advocates

Barbara B. McDowell (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act mandates that fresh mushroom handlers pay assessments used primarily to fund advertisements promoting mushroom sales. United Foods, Inc. refused to pay the assessment, claiming that it violated the First Amendment. Ultimately, United Foods sought review in the District Court. In granting the Government summary judgement, the court relied on Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., which held that the First Amendment was not violated when agricultural marketing orders, as part of a larger regulatory marketing scheme, required producers of California tree fruit to pay assessments for product advertising. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Glickman did not control because the mandated payments in this case were not part of a comprehensive statutory agricultural marketing program.

Question

Do mandatory advertising assessments imposed on mushroom producers and handlers under the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United Foods, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 7 U.S.C. 6101

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the assessment requirement violates the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy wore for the Court that "the mandated support is contrary to the First Amendment principles set forth in cases involving expression by groups which include persons who object to the speech, but who, nevertheless, must remain members of the group by law or necessity." "We have not upheld compelled subsidies for speech in the context of a program where the principal object is speech itself," continued Justice Kennedy.

Good News Club v. Milford Central School

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

Milford Central School

42 West Main Street Milford NY 13807

Milford, NY 13807

United States

42° 35' 27.3948" N, 74° 56' 54.816" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-2036

Petitioner

Good News Club

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Milford Central School

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 98 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, February 28, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 11, 2001

Advocates

Thomas Marcelle (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Frank W. Miller (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under New York law, Milford Central School policy authorizes district residents to use its building after school for certain activities. Stephen and Darleen Fournier were district residents eligible to use the school's facilities. They sought approval of their proposed use and sponsorship of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children. The Fourniers submitted a request to hold the Club's weekly afterschool meetings at the school. Milford denied the request reasoning that the proposed use, including singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture, and praying, was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. The Club filed suit alleging that the denial violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the District Court granted Milford summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the subject matter of the Club's was "quintessentially religious", and the activities "fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character development,'" Milford's policy of excluding the Club's meetings was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.

Question

Did Milford Central School violate the First Amendment free speech rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the Club from meeting after hours at the school? If a violation occurred, was it justified by Milford's concern that permitting the Club's activities would violate the Establishment Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Good News Club, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "Milford's restriction violates the Club's free speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation." "When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment," wrote Justice Thomas.

FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Cmte.

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:31 +0000

Location

White House

1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington D.C. 20500

Washington 20500

United States

38° 53' 55.4928" N, 77° 2' 11.8536" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-191

Petitioner

FEC

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Cmte.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

533 U.S. 431 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, February 28, 2001

Decided

Monday, June 25, 2001

Advocates

Jan W. Baran (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Barbara D. Underwood (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971's definition of "contribution" includes "expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents." The U.S. Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, held that the limitations on political campaign contributions in the Act were generally constitutional, but that the Act's limitations on election expenditures infringed political expression in violation of the First Amendment. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the Party Expenditure Provision of the Act to "an expenditure that the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate." In the wake of this decision, the Committee's broader claim remained, that the congressional campaign expenditure limitations on parties themselves are facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate. The District Court ruled in favor of the committee and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Are congressional campaign expenditure limitations on parties facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for FEC, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Election Campaign

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "a party's coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures truly independent, may be restricted to minimize circumvention of contribution limits." Justice Souter noted that "'there is little evidence to suggest that coordinated party spending limits adopted by Congress have frustrated the ability of political parties to exercise their First Amendment rights to support their candidates.'" Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy. Justice Thomas argued that the spending limit "sweeps too broadly, interferes with the party-candidate relationship, and has not been proved necessary to combat corruption."

Shaw v. Murphy

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1613

Petitioner

Shaw

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Murphy

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 223 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, January 16, 2001

Decided

Wednesday, April 18, 2001

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioners)

Jeffrey T. Renz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

David L. Ohler (Helena, Montana, argued the cause for petitioners)

Facts of the Case

While incarcerated in Montana State Prison, Kevin Murphy sent a letter to an inmate to assist him with his defense after he assaulted a correctional officer. In accordance with prison policy, the letter was intercepted. Based on the letter's content, the prison sanctioned Murphy for violating prison rules prohibiting insolence and interfering with due process hearings. Murphy sought relief, alleging that the disciplinary action violated his First Amendment rights, including the right to provide legal assistance to other inmates. Ruling against Murphy, the District Court, based on precedent, found that reasonably related penological interests allowed the prison regulations to impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that an inmate's First Amendment right to give legal assistance to other inmates outweighed the government's interests.

Question

Do prison inmates have a constitutional right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Shaw, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that inmates do not possess a special First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to fellow inmates that enhances the protections otherwise available. "Augmenting First Amendment protection for inmate legal advice would undermine prison officials' ability to address the 'complex and intractable' problems of prison administration," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Thomas added that "[p]risoners have used legal correspondence as a means for passing contraband and communicating instructions on how to manufacture drugs or weapons." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also wrote a concurring opinion.

Bartnicki v. Vopper

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:32 +0000

Location

WILK Radio

305 Route 315 Hwy Pittston PA 18640

Pittston, PA 18640

United States

41° 18' 22.5864" N, 75° 45' 49.3632" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-1687

Petitioner

Bartnicki

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Vopper

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 99-1728

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 514 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, December 5, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 21, 2001

Advocates

Jeremiah A. Collins (Argued the cause for the private petitioners)

Thomas C. Goldstein (Argued the cause for the respondent Yocum)

Lee Levine (Argued the cause for the respondents Vopper, et al)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner United States)

Facts of the Case

An unidentified person intercepted and recorded a phone call between the chief union negotiator and the union president (the petitioners) during collective- bargaining negotiations involving a teachers' union and the local school board. After a teacher-favorable proposal was accepted, a radio commentator played a tape of the intercepted conversation. Petitioners filed suit under both federal and state wiretapping laws, alleging that an unknown person using an electronic device had surreptitiously intercepted their telephone conversation. Rejecting a First Amendment protection defense, the District Court concluded, in part, that the statutes were content-neutral laws of general applicability containing "no indicia of prior restraint or the chilling of free speech." Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found the statutes invalid because they deterred significantly more speech than necessary to protect the private interests at stake.

Question

Does the First Amendment provide protection to speech that discloses the contents of an illegally intercepted communication?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Vopper, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the First Amendment protects the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications by parties who did not participate in the illegal interception. "In this case, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance," wrote Justice Stevens. "[A] stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern." Noting that the negotiations were a matter of public interest, Justice Stevens wrote that the "debate may be more mundane than the Communist rhetoric that inspired Justice Brandeis' classic opinion in Whitney v. California, but it is no less worthy of constitutional protection."

Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-603

Petitioner

Legal Services Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Velazquez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 99-960

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

531 U.S. 533 (2001)

Argued

Wednesday, October 4, 2000

Decided

Wednesday, February 28, 2001

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States)

Burt Neuborne (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Alan H. Levine (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Legal Services Corporation Act authorizes the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) to distribute funds, appropriated by Congress, to local grantee organizations, which provide free legal assistance to indigent clients in welfare benefits claims. The Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 prohibited the LSC from funding any organization that represented clients in an effort to amend or challenge existing welfare law, among other things. The prohibition was such that grantees could not continue representation in a welfare matter even where a constitutional or statutory validity challenge became apparent after representation was well under way. LSC grantee lawyers and others filed suit to have the restriction declared unconstitutional. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction. However, the Court of Appeals invalidated the restriction, concluding that it was impermissible viewpoint discrimination that violated the First Amendment.

Question

Does the funding restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, which prevents attorneys from representing clients in an attempt to amend or challenge existing welfare law, violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Velazquez, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the funding provision that limited arguments legal services attorneys were allowed to make on behalf of indigent welfare claimants violated the First Amendment by regulating private speech and insulating federal law from legitimate judicial challenge. Justice Kennedy wrote for that Court that, "the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message." Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas, arguing that the Appropriations Act "does not directly regulate speech, and it neither establishes a public forum nor discriminates on the basis of viewpoint."

Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:31 +0000

Location

Santa Fe Independent School District

13310 Hwy 6 Santa Fe TX 77510

Santa Fe, TX 77510

United States

29° 22' 40.656" N, 95° 6' 16.38" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-62

Petitioner

Santa Fe Independent School Dist.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 290 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, March 29, 2000

Decided

Monday, June 19, 2000

Advocates

John Cornyn (Argued the cause for Texas, et al., as amici curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Jay A. Sekulow (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Anthony P. Griffin (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a prayer, described as overtly Christian, over the public address system before each home varsity football game. One Mormon and one Catholic family filed suit challenging this practice and others under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court enjoined the public Santa Fe Independent School District (the District) from implementing its policy as it stood. While the suit was pending, the District adopted a new policy, which permitted, but did not require, student-initiated and student- led prayer at all the home games and which authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether "invocations" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students authorized such prayers and selected a spokesperson, the District Court entered an order modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer. The Court of Appeals held that, even as modified by the District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid. The District petitioned for a writ of certiorari, claiming its policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because the football game messages were private student speech, not public speech.

Question

Does the Santa Fe Independent School District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Doe, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded that the football game prayers were public speech authorized by a government policy and taking place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events and that the District's policy involved both perceived and actual government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important school events. Such speech is not properly characterized as "private," wrote Justice Stevens for the majority. In dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, noted the "disturbing" tone of the Court's opinion that "bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life."

Mitchell v. Helms

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:30 +0000

Location

Jefferson Parish Public School System

501 Manhattan Blvd Harvey LA 70058

Harvey, LA 70058

United States

29° 54' 35.3664" N, 90° 4' 12.3564" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1648

Petitioner

Mitchell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Helms

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

530 U.S. 793 (2000)

Argued

Wednesday, December 1, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2000

Advocates

Lee Boothby (Argued the cause for the respondents Mary L. Helms, et al)

Michael W. McConnell (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Barbara D. Underwood (Argued the cause for the respondent United States in support of the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 provides for the allocation of funds for educational materials and equipment, including library materials and computer software and hardware, to public and private elementary and secondary schools to implement "secular, neutral, and nonideological" programs. In Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, about 30% of Chapter 2 funds are allocated for private schools, most of which are Catholic or otherwise religiously affiliated. Mary Helms and other public school parents file suit alleging that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The District Court initially agreed, finding that Chapter 2 had the primary effect of advancing religion because the materials and equipment loaned to the Catholic schools were direct aid and that the schools were pervasively sectarian. However, after the presiding judge who made the initial ruling retired, the case was reviewed by a new judge, who reversed that decision. Thereafter, based on different precedent, the court upheld Chapter 2. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Chapter 2 unconstitutional.

Question

Does Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Mitchell, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion

No. In a 6-3 plurality decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, is not a law respecting an establishment of religion simply because many of the private schools receiving Chapter 2 aid in the parish are religiously affiliated. Turning to neutrality to distinguish between indoctrination attributable to the State and that which is not, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court, "[i]f the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government."

United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1682

Appellee

Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

United States

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 803 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 1999

Decided

Monday, May 22, 2000

Advocates

Robert Corn-Revere (Argued the cause for the appellee)

James A. Feldman (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

In 1996, Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act, of which section 505 required that cable operators, providing channels "primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming," either to "fully scramble or otherwise fully block" those channels or to broadcast those channels during the "safe-harbor" hours of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. - times when young children were unlikely to be watching. The purpose of section 505 was to protect non-subscribers, and their children, from "signal bleed," or when audio and visual portions of the scrambled programs might be heard or seen. In February 1996, Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. filed suit challenging section 505's constitutionality. A three-judge District Court panel found that section 505's content-based restriction on speech violated the First Amendment because the Government might further its interests in less restrictive ways. The court also found that the Act provided for a less restrictive alternative than section 505, in that section 504 stated that cable operators had an obligation to block channels at a customer's request.

Question

Is section 505 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 the least restrictive means to block the transmission of cable television channels primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming, such that it does not violate the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 47 U.S.C. 561

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that because the Federal Government failed to show that section 505 was the least restrictive means to further its interests, requiring cable television operators to fully scramble or limit time when sexually-oriented programming was transmitted violated the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. In finding section 505 a content-based regulation, Justice Kennedy wrote for that Court that "[i]f a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative." In dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer maintained that the majority had not made a "realistic assessment of the alternatives."

Board of Regents Univ. Wisc. v. Southworth

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-1189

Petitioner

Board of Regents Univ. Wisc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Southworth

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 217 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, March 22, 2000

Advocates

Susan K. Ullman (Madison, Wisconsin, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jordan W. Lorence (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The University of Wisconsin, a public university, requires students to pay an activity fee. The fee supports various campus services and extracurricular student activities including the Future Financial Gurus of America; the International Socialist Organization; the College Democrats and Republicans; and the American Civil Liberties Union Campus Chapter. Scott Harold Southworth filed suit against the University, alleging that the fee violated his rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise under the First Amendment. Southworth argued that the University must grant him the choice not to fund registered student organizations (RSO) that engage in political and ideological expression offensive to his personal beliefs. In granting Southworth judgment, the Federal District Court concluded that the fee program compelled students to support political and ideological activities with which they disagree in violation of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The court declared the fee program invalid and enjoined the University from using the fees to fund any RSO engaging in political or ideological speech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fee program was "not germane to the University's mission, did not further a vital University policy, and imposed too much of a burden on [Southworth's] free speech rights."

Question

May public universities and colleges subsidize campus groups by means of a mandatory student activity fee without violating the First Amendment rights of students who find some campus groups objectionable?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Board of Regents Univ. Wisc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the "First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, "[w]hen a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others." Justice David H. Souter, in an opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in the judgment only.

Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publishing Corp

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-678

Petitioner

Los Angeles Police Dept.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United Reporting Publishing Corp

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 32 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, December 7, 1999

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Edward C. DuMont (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Thomas C. Goldstein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The former version of the California public records statute required a state or local law enforcement agency to make public the name, address, and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency. In 1996, the state amended the statute to require that a person requesting an arrestee's address declare, under penalty of perjury, that the request was being made for journalistic, scholarly, political, governmental, or investigative purposes, and that the address would not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or service. The United Reporting Publishing Corporation publishes the "JAILMAIL" list, which provides the names and addresses of recently arrested individuals for its customers. United received its information from the Los Angeles Police Department and other California law enforcement agencies under the former version of the statute. United sought declaratory and injunctive relief to hold the amendment unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Federal District Court granted United summary judgment, on the ground that the amended statute was an impermissible restriction on commercial speech and thus violated the First Amendment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the amended statute restricted commercial speech, which was entitled to a limited measure of First Amendment protection; and that although an asserted governmental interest in protecting an arrestees' privacy was substantial, the amended statute's numerous exceptions precluded the statute from directly and materially advancing such an interest.

Question

Does California's amended public record statute, under which an arrestee's address disclosed by governmental agency may not be used to sell a product or service, violate the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Los Angeles Police Dept., 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the amended statute was not an abridgment of anyone's right to engage in speech, commercial or otherwise, but simply a law regulating access to information in the hands of law enforcement agencies. The Court concluded that United's facial challenge to the statute was not warranted, as there was "'no possibility that protected speech would be muted.'" Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "California could decide not to give out arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment." Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens expressed the view that the amended statute was invalid as applied to the service, because California was denying access to information based on their intended use of the information for a constitutionally protected purpose, and that such discrimination was not justified by state interests.

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-963

Petitioner

Nixon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Shrink Missouri Government PAC

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 377 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, October 5, 1999

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2000

Advocates

Jeremiah W. Nixon (Jefferson City, Missouri, argued the cause for petitioners)

D. Bruce La Pierre (Argued the cause for respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, in support of the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo established a $1,000 cap on individuals' contributions to candidates for federal office. Missouri law imposes campaign contribution limits, ranging from $250 to $1,000, to candidates for state office. The statute allows for periodic adjustments, which increased the 1998 contribution limit to $1,075 for candidates for statewide office, including state auditor. In 1998, Zev David Fredman, a candidate for the Republican nomination for Missouri state auditor, and the Shrink Missouri Government PAC, a political action committee, filed suit, alleging that the Missouri statute imposing limits on contributions to candidates for state office violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The PAC had contributed $1,075 to Fredman and argued, without the limitation, it would contribute more to Fredman's campaign. Additionally, Fredman alleged he could campaign effectively only with more generous contributions. The Federal District Court, applying Buckley v. Valeo, upheld the statute. The court rejected Fredman's and the PAC's contention that inflation since Buckley's approval of a federal $1,000 restriction meant that the state limit of $1,075 for a statewide office could not be constitutional today. In reversing, the Court of Appeals, found that Missouri's interest in avoiding the corruption or the perception of corruption caused by candidates' acceptance of large campaign contributions was insufficient to satisfy Buckley's strict scrutiny standard of review.

Question

Does Buckley v. Valeo govern state regulations on contributions to state political candidates? Do the federal limits approved in Buckley, with or without adjustment for inflation, define the scope of permissible state limitations? Is Missouri's statutory limit on campaign contributions unconstitutional?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Nixon, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes, no, and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Buckley is the authority for comparable state regulation and, but that the federal limits approved in Buckley, with or without adjustment for inflation, do not define the scope of permissible state limitations. The Court held the Missouri statute not to violate the First Amendment. "Even without the authority of Buckley, there would be no serious question about the legitimacy of the interests claimed, wrote Justice Souter for the Court, "the cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance." Justices Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented, voting to overturn Buckley as a violation of First Amendment speech rights.

Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assoc. v. U.S.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-387

Petitioner

Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assoc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

U.S.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 173 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, April 27, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 14, 1999

Advocates

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Barbara D. Underwood (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association (Association) wanted to run advertisements for lawful private casino gambling in Louisiana and Mississippi. The Association challenged the government's prohibition against such radio- and television-based advertising. After suffering defeat in both trial and appellate courts, the Association appealed and the Supreme Court granted them certiorari.

Question

Does a federal prohibition against advertising lawful privately-held casino- gambling violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assoc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court found the advertising restrictions unconstitutional insofar as they applied to Louisiana-based advertisers - where the gambling activities being promoted are legal. The government failed to demonstrate that its restriction would alleviate harmful gambling practices to any material degree. Instead, the Court noted, the regulations in question provided only ineffective and remote support for the government's concerns, since all sorts of other gambling activities would continue unaffected. Thus, the government restrictions unfairly singled out a specific form of speech for regulation while leaving others untouched.

Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-930

Petitioner

Buckley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 182 (1999)

Argued

Wednesday, October 14, 1998

Decided

Tuesday, January 12, 1999

Advocates

Gale Norton (Argued the cause for the petitioner, on behalf of the Petitioner)

Neil D. O'Toole (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Colorado practices an initiative-petition process in which citizens can make laws directly through balloting initiatives. Acting on behalf of ballot petitioners, the American Constitutional Law Foundation (Foundation) challenged the constitutionality of six limitations imposed by Colorado on the petitioning process. After mixed rulings in both trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review three of the six original restrictions. The first required petition circulators to be registered voters. The second required them to wear identification badges with their names, status as "volunteer" or "paid," and if the latter then their employer's phone number. The third required initiative proponents to report names, addresses, and registration voting counties for all paid circulators, as well as salary per petition signature, and each circulator's total salary. Proponents also had to report, on a monthly basis, all proponent names, names and addresses of circulators, circulators' monthly salary and debt totals, and the name of each proposed ballot measure.

Question

Did the State of Colorado's imposition of name, badge, and financial disclosure requirements, on initiative-petition proponents and their circulators, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court found the name, badge, and disclosure requirements to be unconstitutional. Weighing Colorado's need to protect the integrity of the initiative-petition process against the burdens that its guidelines placed on political expression, the Court found that the latter outweighed the former. Noting that the appellate court upheld a requirement that each circulator submit an affidavit setting out, among several particulars, his or her name and address, the Court explained that the vital information sought by the three additional restrictions at issue was already being secured either directly or indirectly.