Cases by Issue - Civil Rights Acts

Hill v. McDonough

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-8794

Petitioner

Clarence E. Hill

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James R. McDonough, Interim Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, April 24, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, April 26, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 12, 2006

Advocates

Carolyn M. Snurkowski (argued the cause for Respondents)

Kannon K. Shanmugam (argued the cause for Respondents)

D. Todd Doss (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Clarence Hill was sentenced to death in Florida, which ordinarily uses a three-drug combination for executions. Hill claimed that this particular form of lethal injection was unnecessarily and gratuitously painful, and that it therefore violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. However, Hill had previously filed for a federal writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction, and the federal district court ruled that his new challenge was the practical equivalent of a second habeas corpus appeal. Successive habeas corpus appeals are not allowed under 28 U.S.C. 2244, and so the district court rejected Hill's petition. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Question

Is a prisoner's challenge to a particular form of execution - but not to the execution sentence itself - the practical equivalent of a federal habeas corpus petition and therefore barred if the prisoner has already sought habeas review?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hill, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that challenging the form of execution was fundamentally different from challenging the lawfulness of a conviction or sentence, the traditional purposes of a habeas corpus appeal. This finding was supported by the fact that Hill conceded other forms of execution would be constitutional, and that Florida state law does not require the particular form of execution at issue in this case. "Under these circumstances," Justice Kennedy wrote, "a grant of injunctive relief could not be seen as barring the execution of Hill's sentence."

Domino's Pizza v. McDonald

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-593

Petitioner

Domino's Pizza, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John McDonald

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, April 25, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, December 6, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 2006

Advocates

Maureen E. Mahoney (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Allen Lichtenstein (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

John McDonald was the president and sole shareholder of JWM Investments. After Domino's terminated its contract with JWM, McDonald brought suit under a section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. Section 1981). McDonald claimed that Domino's had ended its contract because he was black, and that he therefore had a right to sue under the Civil Rights Act, which gives all citizens, regardless of race, the right to make and enforce contracts. Domino's moved to dismiss the case, arguing that McDonald had not been a party to the contract (it had been between Domino's and JWM) and therefore did not have standing to sue. The district court sided with Domino's, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that McDonald had suffered injuries separate from those of JWM and therefore had standing to sue.

Question

May a person who is not a party to a contract but suffers personal injuries from its termination sue under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, claiming that the contract was terminated because of race?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Domino's Pizza, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1981)

No. The Court ruled in a unanimous decision (Justice Alito not participating) that only an actual or would-be party to a contract may sue under Section 1981. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, explained that if Section 1981 were not limited to the party to the contract, it "would become a strange remedial provision designed to fight racial animus in all of its noxious forms, but only if the animus and the hurt it produced were somehow connected to somebody's contract. We have never read the statute in this unbounded--or rather, peculiarly bounded--way."

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1601

Petitioner

City of Rancho Palos Verdes, California, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mark J. Abrams

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 113 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Advocates

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Petitioners, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Rancho Palos Verdes, a city in California, gave Mark Abrams a permit to construct an antenna on his property for amateur use. But when the city learned Abrams used the antenna for commercial purposes, the city forced Abrams to stop until he got a commercial use permit. Abrams applied and the city refused to give him the permit. Abrams then sued in federal district court, alleging the city violated his rights under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Abrams sought damages under a federal liability law that allowed people to sue for damages for federal rights violations.

The district court agreed with Abrams and ordered the city to give Abrams the permit. But the court refused Abrams' request for damages under the separate federal liability law. The court said Congress intended for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act to include only remedies specifically found in that act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that because the act did not contain a "comprehensive remedial scheme," Abrams could seek damages under other federal laws.

Question

May people whose rights guaranteed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 are violated seek remedies other than those allowed by the act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Abrams could not enforce the limitations of the Telecommunications Act on local authorities through federal liability law, because the act provides its own judicial remedy. Congress could not have meant the judicial remedy expressly authorized by the Telecommunications Act to co-exist with an alternative remedy.

Nelson v. Campbell

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-6821

Petitioner

David L. Nelson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Donal Campbell, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 637 (2004)

Granted

Monday, December 1, 2003

Argued

Monday, March 29, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 24, 2004

Advocates

Kevin C. Newsom (argued the cause for Respondents)

Bryan A. Stevenson (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

David Nelson was sentenced to death for murder and scheduled for execution in 1997. A series of appeals and habeas petitions in federal court delayed the execution until 2002, when an 11th Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously rejected a claim dealing with the alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. After the final appeal was rejected, Nelson was rescheduled for execution on October 9, 2003.

Nelson filed petition in federal district court alleging that the method of execution proposed by Alabama violated his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Alabama had notified Nelson that, because of damage done to his veins by previous intravenous drug abuse, the execution procedure might require corrections officers to cut through muscles and fat in his arm to get access to a vein that could carry the toxins. He claimed that this was an inhumane method of execution and should therefore be barred. Further, he argued that the petition was not an appeal of his conviction or sentence (appeals of both were prohibited by U.S. Code Title 28, Section 2254, a federal law designed to limit the number of habeas corpus appeals by death row inmates) but rather a freestanding lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the proposed execution procedure. Alabama countered that Nelson's appeal was intended only to prolong his life through procedural delays, exactly what the federal law was designed to prevent, and should therefore be thrown out.

The federal district court agreed with Alabama, holding that Nelson's appeal dealt not just with the procedure but with the sentence itself. It was therefore functionally equivalent to a habeas corpus petition, which was barred by Section 2254. A divided 11th Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the decision. After the 11th Circuit declined to rehear the case as a whole (en banc), the U.S. Supreme Court issued a stay of execution and then accepted the case for appeal.

Question

Is a prisoner's appeal of the proposed procedure for his execution functionally equivalent to a habeas corpus petition and therefore barred by Title 28, Section 2254 of U.S. Code?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Nelson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled unanimously that Nelson's suit dealt only with the proposed method of execution, not with his conviction or sentence, and was therefore different from a habeas corpus appeal. Nelson had a right to challenge the necessity of the procedure for his execution using the same legal approach he would have used to challenge the conditions of his prison. However, the Court declined to rule on whether the execution would be constitutional if the district court found that cutting through was indeed necessary, leaving that question for a case in which necessity had already been determined.

Muhammad v. Close

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-9065

Petitioner

Shakur Muhammad, aka John E. Mease

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mark Close

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 749 (2004)

Granted

Monday, June 16, 2003

Argued

Monday, December 1, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 2004

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (argued the cause for Respondent)

Corinne A. Beckwith (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Prison officials sentenced Muhammad, a state prisoner, to seven days of special detention and 30 days of restricted privileges for insolence toward Close, a prison guard. Muhammad filed suit with a magistrate judge under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, seeking $10,000 in damages. Muhammad alleged Close had charged him with threatening behavior in retaliation for other proceedings against Close. Muhammad did not challenge his insolence conviction or punishment. The magistrate judge ruled that Muhammad lacked evidence proving Close acted in retaliation. The U.S. District Court agreed.

The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling for a different reason, citing the U.S. Supreme Court decision Heck v. Humphrey (1994). In Heck the Court held that when a prisoner seeks damages in a case that questions his sentence, the prisoner must first have successfully challenged the sentence itself or the conviction itself. The Court of Appeals held that because Muhammad's damages case questioned his sentence, he must first successfully appeal the sentence itself. Going further the Court of Appeals held that Heck applies to all challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings.

Question

Does the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey (1994) require that prisoners who challenge prison disciplinary proceedings - but whose suits do not question their sentences' validity - first successfully challenge their sentences?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Close, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court ruled that prisoners - whose suits do not question their sentences - do not need to successfully challenge those sentences before challenging prison disciplinary proceedings. The Court rejected the argument that Heck necessarily requires successful sentence appeals before any challenges can be made to prison disciplinary proceedings. Muhammad's suit sought damages for prison disciplinary proceedings but in no way challenged his sentence.

Chavez v. Martinez

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:54:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1444

Petitioner

Chavez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Martinez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 760 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, December 4, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 2003

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Lawrence S. Robbins (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Richard S. Paz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Oliverio Martinez was stopped while riding his bicycle home from work by police investigating narcotics violations. When police attempted to handcuff him, a struggle ensued, but it is unclear who started it. During the struggle, Martinez was shot, resulting in permanent paralysis and loss of vision. A year later he sued the officers, saying the search and use of deadly force were unconstitutional. The officers introduced as evidence in their defense a taped confession obtained while Martinez was receiving medical treatment in the hospital, in which he admitted to grabbing the gun of one of the officers during the struggle. Martinez claimed that the tape could not be used as evidence because he had not been read his Miranda rights. The district court ruled with Martinez that the tape was inadmissible. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed.

Question

Are a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be free from coercive questioning violated when he was subjected to coercive questioning while in police custody, even if his coerced statements were never used against him in a criminal case?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Chavez, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Self-Incrimination

No; the Court remanded the substantive due process portion of the question. In a 6-3 judgment delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Chavez did not deprive Martinez of his Fifth Amendment rights. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, joined Justice Thomas. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, reasoned that Martinez's claim that his questioning alone was a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments could be recognized if a "core guarantee" would be placed at risk; however, Martinez could not make the showing necessary to expand protection of the privilege against self- incrimination. Regarding substantive due process, Justice Souter delivered a 5-4 holding concluding that the issue whether Martinez may pursue a claim of liability for a substantive due process violation should be addressed on remand.

Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-860

Petitioner

Correctional Services Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Malesko

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 61 (2001)

Argued

Monday, October 1, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, November 27, 2001

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Steven Pasternak (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1993, John E. Malesko was assigned to a bedroom on the fifth floor of the Le Marquis Community Correctional Center, a facility that houses federal inmates run by the Correctional Services Corporation (CSC) under contract with the Bureau of Prisons. After CSC instituted a policy requiring inmates residing below the sixth floor to use the stairs rather than the elevator, Malesko, who was afflicted with a heart condition limiting his ability to climb stairs, was exempted form the policy. When a CSC employee did not let Malesko use the elevator, he climbed the stairs, suffered a heart attack, and fell. Subsequently, Malesko filed a suit, alleging that CSC was negligence in refusing him the use of the elevator. Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, in which the U.S. Supreme Court recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights, the District Court dismissed the suit, finding that such an action may only be maintained against individuals. In reversing, the Court of Appeals reasoned that such private entities should be held liable under Bivens to accomplish Bivens' goal of providing a remedy for constitutional violations.

Question

Should the implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights, first recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, be extended to allow recovery against a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Correctional Services Corp., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Bivens' limited holding may not be extended to confer a right of action for damages against private entities acting under color of federal law. The Court reasoned that the threat of suit against an individual's employer was not the kind of deterrence contemplated by the Bivens decision. The Court also noted that the purpose of the Bivens decision was to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations. "In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have extended its holding only twice, to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officer's unconstitutional conduct. Where such circumstances are not present, we have consistently rejected invitations to extend Bivens,"wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.

United States v. Morrison

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:31 +0000

Location

US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

601 Market St Philadelphia PA 19106

Philadelphia, PA 19106

United States

39° 57' 2.7504" N, 75° 9' 1.3464" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Morrison

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 99-29

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

529 U.S. 598 (2000)

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 2000

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2000

Advocates

Michael E. Rosman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Julie Goldscheid (Argued the cause for the petitioner in No. 99-29, Brzonkala v. Morrison)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States in No. 99-5)

Facts of the Case

In 1994, while enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), Christy Brzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both students and varsity football players at Virginia Tech, raped her. In 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. After a hearing, Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to immediate suspension for two semesters. Crawford was not punished. A second hearing again found Morrison guilty. After an appeal through the university's administrative system, Morrison's punishment was set aside, as it was found to be "excessive." Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university. Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does Congress have the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 under either the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Morrison, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1398

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment since the statute did not regulate an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce nor did it redress harm caused by the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that [i]f the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of...Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States." Dissenting, Justice Stephen G. Breyer argued that the majority opinion "illustrates the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone." Additionally, Justice David H. Souter, dissenting, noted that VAWA contained a "mountain of data assembled by Congress...showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce."

West v. Gibson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-238

Petitioner

West

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gibson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 212 (1999)

Argued

Monday, April 26, 1999

Decided

Monday, June 14, 1999

Advocates

Timothy M. Kelly (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Barbara B. McDowell (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1991, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to permit victims of intentional employment discrimination, whether within the private sector or the federal government, to recover compensatory damages. Thereafter, Michael Gibson filed a complaint with the Department of Veterans Affairs, alleging that the Department had discriminated against him by denying him a promotion on the basis of his gender. The Department found against Gibson. Afterwards, however, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) awarded Gibson the promotion plus backpay. Later Gibson filed suit, in the District Court, seeking compensatory damages and a court order for the Department to comply with the EEOC's order. Subsequently, the Department voluntarily complied with the EEOC's order, but it opposed Gibson's claim for compensatory damages. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Gibson's complaint. On appeal, the Department supported the District Court's dismissal with the argument that Gibson had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in respect to his compensatory damages claim; therefore, he could not bring that claim in court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals rejected the Department's argument. The court viewed the EEOC as lacking the legal power necessary to award compensatory damages. Consequently, there was no administrative remedy to exhaust.

Question

Does the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission possess the legal authority to require federal agencies to pay compensatory damages when they discriminate in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for West, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission possess the legal authority to require federal agencies to pay compensatory damages when they discriminate in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the dissenting minority, expressed the view that that the EEOC could not have awarded compensatory damages against the United States under Title VII because the statute did not authorize such awards in explicit terms. Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy, it did not provide the required waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity.

Kolstad v. American Dental Association

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

98-208

Petitioner

Kolstad

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

American Dental Association

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 526 (1999)

Argued

Monday, March 1, 1999

Decided

Tuesday, June 22, 1999

Advocates

Eric Schnapper (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Raymond C. Fay (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Carole Kolstad sued the American Dental Association (ADA) for gender discrimination, under Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title II), when it promoted a man instead of her. At trial, the District Court denied Kolstad's request for punitive damages based on a showing that the ADA acted with "malice" and "reckless indifference" to her federally protected rights. When the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, Kolstad appealed and the Supreme Court granted he certiorari.

Question

Does an employer's conduct have to be "egregious" or "outrageous," independent of its state of mind, in order to sustain an award of punitive damages under Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for American Dental Association, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1991

Split Vote

No. In a complicated split opinion, the Court held that if an employee can show their employer knowingly acted in violation of federal law then punitive damages may be sustained. The Court explained that the "malice" or "reckless indifference" standard applied to the relationship between employers and federal law, and is not a characterization of the severity threshold that the discrimination itself must meet. In other words, if an employer maliciously or recklessly violates a federal anti-discrimination law, regardless of the severity of their discriminatory acts, them punitive damages may be imposed. The Court remanded Kolstad's case for renewed consideration of her employer's state of mind during the alleged violations.

Haddle v. Garrison

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:20 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1472

Petitioner

Haddle

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Garrison

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

525 U.S. 121 (1998)

Argued

Tuesday, November 10, 1998

Decided

Monday, December 14, 1998

Advocates

Phillip A. Bradley (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Matthew D. Roberts (Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Charles C. Stebbins (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Michael A. Haddle, an at-will employee for Healthmaster, Inc., filed suit in federal court alleging his employer, along with 2 previous Healthmaster, Inc. officers, Jeanette Garrison and Dennis Kelly, conspired to have him fired in retaliation for obeying a federal grand jury subpoena and later testifying in a criminal trial against Healthmaster, Inc. for Medicare fraud. Haddle claimed his employers' acts had had "injured [him] in his person or property" in violation of federal law, specifically the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The District Court, relying on precedent, dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The precedent the court cited held that an at-will employee discharged pursuant to a conspiracy proscribed by the Act has suffered no actual injury because he has no constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

May at-will employees sue their employers over firings allegedly carried out to retaliate for testimony against their employers?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Haddle, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1985)

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled that such interference may give rise to a claim for damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. "The kind of interference with at-will employment relations alleged here is merely a species of the traditional torts of intentional interference with contractual relations and intentional interference with prospective contractual relations," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.

Crawford-El v. Britton

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-827

Petitioner

Crawford-El

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Britton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

523 U.S. 574 (1998)

Argued

Monday, December 1, 1997

Decided

Monday, May 4, 1998

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

Daniel M. Schember (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Walter A. Smith, Jr. (Washington, D.C., argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Leonard Crawford-El, a prisoner in the District of Columbia's correctional system, was ultimately transferred to a federal prison in Florida. Crawford- El's belongings were transferred separately. A correctional officer had Crawford-El's brother-in-law pick his belongs rather than ship them. Crawford- El finally received his belongings months after reaching Florida. Crawford-El filed suit under 42 USC section 1983, which provides that "Every person who... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...." Crawford-El alleged that the diversion of his property was motivated by an intent to retaliate against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed the complaint. In remanding, the en banc Court of Appeals conclude among other things, that in an unconstitutional-motive case, a plaintiff must establish motive by clear and convincing evidence.

Question

May lawsuits invoking 42 USC section 1983 to allege that a public official violated a prisoner's rights because of an unlawful motive be dismissed because the plaintiff fails to produce clear and convincing evidence of the unlawful motive?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Crawford-El, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in fashioning a heightened burden of proof for unconstitutional-motive cases against public officials. "Neither the text of [section 1983] or any other federal statute, nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides any support for imposing the clear and convincing burden of proof on plaintiffs either at the summary judgment stage or in the trial itself," wrote Justice Stevens. In a dissent joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that a government official was entitled to immunity from a motive-based tort suit if the official could proffer a legitimate reason and the plaintiff could not establish that the reason given was a pretext.

Kalina v. Fletcher

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-792

Petitioner

Kalina

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fletcher

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

522 U.S. 118 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, October 7, 1997

Decided

Wednesday, December 10, 1997

Advocates

Norman Maleng (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Patricia A. Millett (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Timothy K. Ford (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Lynne Kalina, a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for King County, Washington, commenced criminal proceedings against Rodney Fletcher, in connection with a school robbery, by filing the appropriate documents. Included in those documents was a "Certification for Determination of Probable Cause." Based on the certification, the trial court found probable cause, and Fletcher was arrested. Kalina's certification contained two inaccurate factual statements: that Fletcher had "never been associated with the school in any manner and did not have permission to enter the school or to take any property," and that Fletcher had been identified asking for an appraisal of a computer stolen from the school. Subsequently, Fletcher sued Kalina for damages, alleging that she had violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The Federal District Court denied her motion for summary judgment, holding that she was not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity and that whether qualified immunity would apply was a question of fact. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity protect a prosecutor for making false statements of fact in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant against a damages remedy under 42 USC section 1983?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Fletcher, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that section 1983 may create a damages remedy against a prosecutor for making false statements of fact in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant, since such conduct is not protected by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Noting that the Fourth Amendment requires that arrest warrants be based "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation," Justice Stevens wrote that," [e]ven when the person who makes the constitutionally required 'Oath or affirmation' is a lawyer, the only function that she performs in giving sworn testimony is that of a witness." Thus, section 1983 may, under some circumstances, provide a damages remedy against such a prosecutor.

Richardson v. McKnight

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-318

Petitioner

Richardson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

McKnight

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

521 U.S. 399 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, March 19, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 23, 1997

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of court, supporting the respondent)

David C. Vladeck (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Charles R. Ray (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Ronnie Lee McKnight, a prisoner at Tennessee's South Central Correctional Center (SCCC), filed suit, under 42 USC section 1983, against two prison guards after he was placed in extremely tight physical restraints. Previously, the SCCC's management had been privatized by the State. Ultimately, the prison guards, Darryl Richardson and John Walker, asserted a qualified immunity and moved to dismiss the action. The District Court denied the motion, finding that, since a private prison management firm employed them, they were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Are prison guards, who are employees of a private prison management firm, entitled to a qualified immunity from suit under 42 USC section 1983?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for McKnight, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that prison guards employed by a private firm are not entitled to a qualified immunity from suit by prisoners charging a section 1983 violation. Emphasizing that a private firm was systematically organized to manage the prison, Justice Breyer wrote that, "[o]ur examination of history and purpose...reveals nothing special enough about the job or about its organizational structure that would warrant providing these private prison guards with a governmental immunity." Dissenting, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the Court had routinely determined section 1983 immunity on the basis of the public function being performed. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas joined Justice Scalia.

McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

96-542

Petitioner

Mcmillian

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Monroe County, Alabama

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 781 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, March 18, 1997

Decided

Monday, June 2, 1997

Advocates

Bryan A. Stevenson (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Paul M. Smith (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Monroe County court sentenced Walter McMillian to death for murder. Later evidence, suppressed by Monroe County Sheriff Tom Tate, exonerated McMillian after six years on Alabama's death row. McMillian sued Monroe County, claiming that Tate's actions were unconstitutional. McMillian argued that under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a county is liable for the actions of its sheriffs that constitute county policy. A District Court decided that Monroe County was not liable for Tate's actions because the county had no authority over law enforcement.

McMillian appealed, claiming that since the county employed Tate, the county should be liable for Tate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor of Monroe County. The Eleventh Circuit held that though Tate was employed by Monroe County, he acted under the authority of the state.

Question

Is a county liable for constitutional violations committed by the county sheriff in matters of law enforcement?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Monroe County, Alabama, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts. The opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist held that because the county had no authority to make law enforcement policy, Sheriff Tate as a policymaker represented the state rather than the county. According to the Alabama Constitution and the Alabama Code, the Court held, Alabama sheriffs "act for the State when exercising their law enforcement functions."

Edwards v. Balisok

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1352

Petitioner

Edwards et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Balisok

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 641 (1997)

Argued

Wednesday, November 13, 1996

Decided

Monday, May 19, 1997

Advocates

Kathleen D. Mix (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Thomas H. Speedy Rice (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Jerry B. Balisok, a Washington state prison inmate, was found guilty of prison rules infractions resulting in the loss of thirty days of good time, credit he had previously earned toward his release. Balisok alleged that the procedures used in his disciplinary hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Balisok also alleged that the proceedings were deceitful and biased. Under federal law Balisok filed for a statement declaring the procedures unconstitutional, compensatory and punitive damages for their use, and an injunction to prevent future violations. The District Court held a state prisoner's claim for damages is not conceivable if a judgement for him would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that claims challenging only the procedures used in a disciplinary hearing are always cognizable.

Question

May prisoners invoke 42 USC Section 1983 to sue for monetary damages over procedures used to deprive them of good time credit toward early release?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Edwards, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Balisok's "claim for declaratory relief and monetary damages, based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable...."

Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:15:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

95-1100

Petitioner

Bryan County, Oklahoma

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brown

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

520 U.S. 397 (1997)

Argued

Tuesday, November 5, 1996

Decided

Monday, April 28, 1997

Advocates

Brian Serr (Texas, argued the cause for the respondents)

Wallace B. Jefferson (Texas, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Jill Brown brought a damages action against Bryan County alleging that that its Deputy Stacy Burns had arrested her with excessive force, and that it was liable for her injuries because its Sheriff B. J. Moore had hired Burns without adequately reviewing his background. Burns had pleaded guilty to various driving infractions and other misdemeanors, including assault and battery. Moore, whom the county stipulated was its Sheriff's Department policymaker, testified that he had obtained Burns' driving and criminal records, but had not closely reviewed either before hiring Burns. The District Court denied the county's motions for judgment as a matter of law, which asserted that a policymaker's single hiring decision could not give rise to municipal liability. Brown prevailed following a jury trial, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the county was properly found liable based on Moore's decision to hire Burns.

Question

May municipalities be held liable for hiring employees who injure someone?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bryan County, Oklahoma, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that municipalities are not liable for hiring employees who violate someone's rights unless a reasonable policymaker would conclude that the "plainly obvious consequence . . . would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected rights. Thus, the county was not financially liable for Sheriff Moore's isolated decision to hire Burns without adequate screening because Brown had not proved that the decision reflected a conscious disregard for a risk that Burns would use excessive force in violation of her federally protected rights.

Heck v. Humphrey

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

93-6188

Petitioner

Heck

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Humphrey et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 477 (1994)

Argued

Monday, April 18, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1994

Advocates

Charles A. Rothfeld (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Matthew R. Gutwein (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Humphrey, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Albright v. Oliver

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-833

Petitioner

Albright

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oliver et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

510 U.S. 266 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 1993

Decided

Monday, January 24, 1994

Advocates

John H. Bisbee (on behalf of the Petitioner)

James G. Sotos (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Illinois police obtained a warrant to arrest Kevin Albright after he was seen selling a substance which look liked an illegal drug. Upon hearing of the warrant, Albright surrendered to police detective Roger Oliver. A trial court dismissed the charge because it did not state an offense under Illinois law.

Albright claimed that Oliver violated his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right by prosecuting him without probable cause. He filed suit against Oliver under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides relief to those deprived of civil rights. The federal District Court dismissed the suit because it did not state a claim under Section 1983. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that relief provided by Section 1983 for prosecution without probable cause is valid only if the prosecution caused a consequence such as loss of employment or incarceration.

Question

Can a citizen prosecuted without probable cause obtain relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for the deprivation of substantive due process rights?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Oliver, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. The Court ruled that Section 1983 relief for prosecution without probable cause is only valid if the prosecuted party claims Fourth Amendment (pretrial rights) violations. In a 7-2 decision authored by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Courtt reaffirmed its commitment not to extend substantive due process indefinitely and held that substantive due process does not guarantee non-interference by criminal investigations.

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:00:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-7849

Petitioner

Buckley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Fitzsimmons et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

509 U.S. 259 (1993)

Argued

Monday, February 22, 1993

Decided

Thursday, June 24, 1993

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

George F. Taylor, Jr. (on behalf of the Petitioner)

James G. Sotos (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Buckley, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence And Coordination Unit

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 15:52:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-1657

Petitioner

Leatherman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence And Coordination Unit

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

507 U.S. 163 (1993)

Argued

Tuesday, January 12, 1993

Decided

Wednesday, March 3, 1993

Advocates

Brett A. Ringle (on behalf of the Respondents)

Richard Gladden (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Leatherman, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

Wyatt v. Cole

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

91-126

Petitioner

Wyatt

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cole et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

504 U.S. 158 (1992)

Argued

Tuesday, January 14, 1992

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1992

Advocates

Joseph L. McNamara (on behalf of the Respondent)

Jim Waide (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Wyatt, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Collins v. City Of Harker Heights, Texas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1279

Petitioner

Collins

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City Of Harker Heights, Texas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

503 U.S. 115 (1992)

Argued

Tuesday, November 5, 1991

Decided

Wednesday, February 26, 1992

Advocates

Sanford Jay Rosen (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Lucas A. Powe, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for City Of Harker Heights, Texas, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Hafer v. Melo

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-681

Petitioner

Hafer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Melo et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

502 U.S. 21 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, October 15, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, November 5, 1991

Advocates

Jerome R. Richter (on behalf of the Petitioner)

William Goldstein (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Melo, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Burns v. Reed

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1715

Petitioner

Burns

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Reed

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 478 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 1990

Decided

Thursday, May 30, 1991

Advocates

Michael K. Sutherlin (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Robert S. Spear (on behalf of the Respondent)

Michael R. Lazerwitz (on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Burns, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Dennis v. Higgins

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-1555

Petitioner

Dennis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Higgins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

498 U.S. 439 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, October 31, 1990

Decided

Wednesday, February 20, 1991

Advocates

L. Jay Bartel (on behalf of the Respondents)

Richard A. Allen (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Dennis, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Ngiraingas v. Sanchez

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:30:13 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-1281

Petitioner

Ngiraingas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sanchez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

495 U.S. 182 (1990)

Argued

Monday, January 8, 1990

Decided

Tuesday, April 24, 1990

Advocates

John Patrick Mason (on behalf of the Respondents)

Jeffrey R. Siegel (on behalf of the Petitioners)

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Sanchez, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Zinermon v. Burch

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1965

Petitioner

Zinermon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Burch

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

494 U.S. 113 (1990)

Argued

Wednesday, October 11, 1989

Decided

Tuesday, February 27, 1990

Advocates

Richard M. Powers (on behalf of Respondent)

Louis F. Hubener, III (on behalf of Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Burch, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

88-840

Petitioner

Golden State Transit Corp.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Los Angeles

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

493 U.S. 103 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, October 3, 1989

Decided

Tuesday, December 5, 1989

Advocates

John Haggerty (on behalf of the Respondent)

Zachary D. Fasman (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Golden State Transit Corp., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-2084

Petitioner

Jett

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dallas Independent School Dist.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Dallas Independent School District v. Jett, No. 88-214

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

491 U.S. 701 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, March 28, 1989

Decided

Thursday, June 22, 1989

Advocates

Leonard J. Schwartz (on behalf of the respondent/petitioner Dallas Independent School District)

Frank M. Gilstrap (on behalf of the petitioner/respondent Jett)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Dallas Independent School Dist., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1981)

None

Hardin v. Straub

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:33 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-7023

Petitioner

Hardin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Straub

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

490 U.S. 536 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, March 22, 1989

Decided

Monday, May 22, 1989

Advocates

Louis J. Caruso (on behalf of the Respondent)

Douglas Ryan Mullkoff (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hardin, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Graham v. Connor

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-6571

Petitioner

Graham

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Connor

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

490 U.S. 386 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, February 21, 1989

Decided

Monday, May 15, 1989

Advocates

H. Gerald Beaver (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Mark I. Levy (on behalf of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Graham, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Will v. Michigan Dept. Of State Police

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1207

Petitioner

Will

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan Dept. Of State Police

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

491 U.S. 58 (1989)

Argued

Monday, December 5, 1988

Decided

Thursday, June 15, 1989

Advocates

William Burnham (on behalf of the Petitioner)

George H. Weller (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Michigan Dept. Of State Police, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Canton v. Harris

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-1088

Petitioner

Canton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Harris

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

489 U.S. 378 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, November 8, 1988

Decided

Tuesday, February 28, 1989

Advocates

David Rudovsky (on behalf of the Respondents)

Carter G. Phillips (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Canton, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Owens v. Okure

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:07 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-56

Petitioner

Owens

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Okure

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

488 U.S. 235 (1989)

Argued

Tuesday, November 1, 1988

Decided

Tuesday, January 10, 1989

Advocates

Kenneth Kimerling (on behalf of the Respondent)

Peter H. Schiff (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Okure, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Ncaa v. Tarkanian

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-1061

Petitioner

Ncaa

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Tarkanian

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

488 U.S. 179 (1988)

Argued

Wednesday, October 5, 1988

Decided

Monday, December 12, 1988

Advocates

Rex E. Lee (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Samuel S. Lionel (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Ncaa, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

West v. Atkins

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-5096

Petitioner

West

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Atkins

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

487 U.S. 42 (1988)

Argued

Monday, March 28, 1988

Decided

Monday, June 20, 1988

Advocates

Jacob L. Safron (on behalf of the respondent)

Adam Stein (on behalf of the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for West, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Schweiker v. Chilicky

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-1781

Petitioner

Schweiker

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Chilicky

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

487 U.S. 412 (1988)

Argued

Tuesday, March 1, 1988

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1988

Advocates

Laurence H. Tribe (on behalf of the Respondents)

Charles Fried (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Schweiker, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Social Security, as amended, including Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act, but excluding Medicare, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children

None

Loeffler v. Frank

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-1431

Petitioner

Loeffler

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Frank

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

486 U.S. 549 (1988)

Argued

Monday, January 11, 1988

Decided

Monday, June 13, 1988

Advocates

Lisa S. Van Amburg (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Charles A. Rothfeld (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Loeffler, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

None

Forrester v. White

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-761

Petitioner

Forrester

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

White

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Opinion

484 U.S. 219 (1988)

Argued

Monday, November 2, 1987

Decided

Tuesday, January 12, 1988

Advocates

Rosalyn B. Kaplan (on behalf of the Respondent)

Mary Anne Sedey (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Forrester, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

St. Louis v. Praprotnik

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:25:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

86-772

Petitioner

St. Louis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Praprotnik

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1987-1988)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

485 U.S. 112 (1988)

Argued

Wednesday, October 7, 1987

Decided

Wednesday, March 2, 1988

Advocates

Charles R. Oldham (on behalf of Respondent)

James J. Wilson (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for St. Louis, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

None

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1626

Petitioner

Goodman

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Lukens Steel Co.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 85-2010

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

482 U.S. 656 (1987)

Argued

Wednesday, April 1, 1987

Decided

Friday, June 19, 1987

Advocates

William H. Ewing (on behalf of respondents Goodman, et al., in No. 85-2010 and petitioners No. 85-1626)

Robert M. Weinberg (on behalf of the Petitioners in No. 85-2010 and respondent Union in No. 85-1626)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Lukens Steel Co., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

None

Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-2156

Petitioner

Shaare Tefila Congregation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cobb

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

481 U.S. 615 (1987)

Argued

Wednesday, February 25, 1987

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1987

Advocates

Patricia A. Brannan (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Deborah T. Garren (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

After its Maryland synagogue was painted with anti-Semitic slogans and symbols, the Shaare Tefila Congregation brought a suit charging the white defendants with racially discriminatory interference with property rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1982. The Maryland District Court dismissed the claims, maintaining that white-on-white violence was not racially discriminatory.

Question

Did the white defendants exhibit racially motivated discrimination in violation of the federal statute?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Shaare Tefila Congregation, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1982)

Yes. The Court unanimously ruled that Jews can state a claim of racial discrimination since they were among the peoples considered to be distinct races and hence within the protection of U.S.C. Section 1982. The statute "was intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics." The Jewish people most certainly suffered such discrimination and so were not barred from their claim simply because both they, like the defendants, were Caucasian.

Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:34:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-2169

Petitioner

Saint Francis College

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Al-Khazraji

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

481 U.S. 604 (1987)

Argued

Wednesday, February 25, 1987

Decided

Monday, May 18, 1987

Advocates

Caroline Mitchell (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Nick S. Fisfis (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Al-Khazraji, a professor and U.S. citizen born in Iraq, filed suit against his former employer and its tenure committee for denying him tenure on the basis of his Arabian race in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The District Court held that while Al-Kharzraji had properly alleged racial discrimination, the record was insufficient to determine whether he had been subjected to prejudice.

Question

Did 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 apply to Arab minorities?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Al-Khazraji, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1981)

Yes. The Court held that persons of Arabian ancestry were protected from racial discrimination under Section 1981. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Byron R. White maintained that section 1981 encompassed discrimination even among Caucasians. Justice White noted that history did not support the claim that Arabs and other present-day "Caucasians" were considered to be a single race for the purposes of section 1981. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in a separate concurrence, added that "Pernicious distinctions among individuals based solely on their ancestry are antithetical to the doctrine of equality upon which this nation is founded."

Newton v. Rumery

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1449

Petitioner

Newton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rumery

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

480 U.S. 386 (1987)

Argued

Monday, December 8, 1986

Decided

Monday, March 9, 1987

Advocates

Charles P. Bauer (on behalf of the respondent)

Donald E. Gardner (on behalf of the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Newton, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Springfield v. Kibbe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1217

Petitioner

Springfield

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kibbe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

480 U.S. 257 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, November 4, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 1987

Advocates

Terry Scott Nagel ()

Edward M. Pikula ()

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kibbe, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Writ Improvidently Granted

None

Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-410

Petitioner

Memphis Community School Dist.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Stachura

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

477 U.S. 299 (1986)

Argued

Wednesday, April 2, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, June 25, 1986

Advocates

Patrick J. Berardo (on behalf of the Petitioners)

Jeffrey A. Heldt (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Memphis Community School Dist., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Pembaur v. Cincinnati

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1160

Petitioner

Pembaur

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cincinnati

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

475 U.S. 469 (1986)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 1985

Decided

Tuesday, March 25, 1986

Advocates

Robert E. Manley (on behalf of the petitioner)

Roger E. Friedmann (on behalf of the respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Pembaur, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Malley v. Briggs

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1586

Petitioner

Malley

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Briggs

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

475 U.S. 335 (1986)

Argued

Wednesday, November 13, 1985

Decided

Wednesday, March 5, 1986

Advocates

Ann M. Sheadel (on behalf of Petitioners)

Leonard Decof (on behalf of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Briggs, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

None

Davidson v. Cannon

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:27:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-6470

Petitioner

Davidson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cannon

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

474 U.S. 344 (1986)

Argued

Wednesday, November 6, 1985

Decided

Tuesday, January 21, 1986

Advocates

James D. Crawford (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Madeleine W. Mansier (on behalf of Respondents)

Charles Fried (as amicus curiae, in support of Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Cannon, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None