Cases by Issue - Jury Instructions

Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-368

Petitioner

Arthur Andersen LLP

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 696 (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, April 27, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, May 31, 2005

Advocates

Maureen E. Mahoney (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

As Enron's financial difficulties became public in 2001, Arthur Andersen instructed its employees to destroy Enron-related documents. This was consistent with Andersen's document retention policy. The government later charged Andersen for violating federal law, which made it a crime to "knowingly...corruptly persuade another person" to "withold" or "alter" documents in an "offical proceeding." The federal jury found Andersen guilty. The company appealed, arguing the jury instructions failed to convey the elements of a "corrupt persuasion" conviction - specifically, that a "consciousness of wrongdoing" was required. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.

Question

Did the jury instructions in the Arthur Andersen trial properly convey the elements of a "corrupt persuasion" conviction under federal document-handling law?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Arthur Andersen LLP, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1512

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the jury instructions failed to convey that the federal document law required a "consciousness of wrongdoing" for conviction. There was nothing inherently corrupt in ordering employees to destroy documents, even if the aim was to keep the documents from the government. Thus, contrary to what the jurors had been told, Andersen could be convicted only if the persuaders were shown to be conscious that they were behaving corruptly.

Kelly v. South Carolina

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-9280

Petitioner

Kelly

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

South Carolina

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

534 U.S. 246 (2002)

Argued

Monday, November 26, 2001

Decided

Wednesday, January 9, 2002

Advocates

David I. Bruck (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

S. Creighton Waters (South Carolina, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After convicting William Kelly for murder, a South Carolina jury was asked to determine whether any aggravating factors had been shown and, if so, to recommend a sentence of death or life imprisonment. During sentencing, the prosecutor presented testimony that Kelly had taken part in an escape attempt with plans to hold a female guard hostage; provided evidence of Kelly's sadism and his desires to kill anyone who irritated him; and spoke of Kelly as a "butcher," "bloody," and "dangerous." Relying on the holding of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, that when "a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death...is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant 'to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility,'" Kelly's counsel requested a jury instruction stating that Kelly would be ineligible for parole if he received a life sentence. In refusing, the trial court said that the State's evidence went to Kelly's character and characteristics, not to future dangerousness. The jury recommended a death sentence. In affirming the sentence, the State Supreme Court held Simmons inapposite because state law provided the jury with a third sentencing alternative and future dangerousness was not at issue.

Question

Did the state trial court err in holding Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 inapposite in the death sentence proceeding of William Kelly?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Kelly, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Kelly was entitled to a jury instruction that he would be ineligible for parole under a life sentence. The Court reasoned that the Simons rule was applicable because under South Carolina's sentencing scheme, although a defendant charged with murder carrying the possibility of a death sentence could receive a sentence less than life imprisonment, a jury's only alternatives were to recommend death or life without parole, if the jury found the existence of an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, the Court found that the assertion that the defendant's future dangerousness was not at issue was unsupportable on the record.

Shafer v. S. Carolina

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-5250

Petitioner

Shafer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

S. Carolina

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

532 U.S. 36 (2001)

Argued

Tuesday, January 9, 2001

Decided

Tuesday, March 20, 2001

Advocates

Donald John Zelenka (Argued the case for the respondent)

David I. Bruck (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Wesley Aaron Shafer, Jr., was found guilty of murder, among other things. During the sentencing phase, Shafer's counsel argued that Simmons v. South Carolina required the trial judge to instruct the jury that under South Carolina law a life sentence carries no possibility of parole. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Simmons that where a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process requires that the jury be informed of the defendant's parole ineligibility. The prosecution responded that because the state did not plan to argue to the jury that Shafer would be a danger in the future that no Simmons instruction was required. During deliberations, the jury asked under what conditions someone convicted of murder could become available for parole. The trial judge stated that parole eligibility or ineligibility was not a matter for the jury's consideration. Ultimately, the jury recommended the death penalty and the judge imposed the sentence. In affirming, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that Simmons generally did not apply to the State's sentencing scheme because an alternative to death other than life without the possibility of parole exists.

Question

Did the South Carolina Supreme Court properly hold Simmons v. South Carolina inapplicable to the state's current sentencing regime?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Shafer, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that "whenever future dangerousness is at issue in a capital sentencing proceeding under South Carolina's new scheme, due process requires that the jury be informed that a life sentence carries no possibility of parole." Justice Ginsburg wrote that "[i]t is only when the jury endeavors the moral judgment whether to impose the death penalty that parole eligibility may become critical. Correspondingly, it is only at that stage that Simmons comes into play, a stage at which South Carolina law provides no third choice, no 30-year mandatory minimum, just death or life without parole." Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas filed dissenting opinions.

Weeks v. Angelone

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:14:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

99-5746

Petitioner

Weeks

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Angelone

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

528 U.S. 225 (2000)

Argued

Monday, December 6, 1999

Decided

Wednesday, January 19, 2000

Advocates

Mark E. Olive (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Robert H. Anderson, III (Richmond, Virginia, argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Lonnie Weeks, Jr., was found guilty of capital murder in the death of Virginia State Trooper Jose Cavazos. During the penalty phase of his trial, the prosecution sought to prove two aggravating circumstances. Weeks' defense presented 10 witnesses in mitigation. During deliberations, the jurors sent the trial judge a note asking whether, if they believed Weeks guilty of at least one of the aggravating circumstances, it was their duty to issue the death penalty, or whether they must decide whether to issue the death penalty or a life sentence. In responding, the trial judge only referred the jury to their instructions, which stated: "If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, either of the two [aggravating circumstances], and as to that alternative, you are unanimous, then you may fix the punishment...at death, or if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment...at life imprisonment." The defense counsel objected, arguing for the judge to instruct the jury it could find one or both of the aggravating circumstances and still impose a life sentence. In finding one of the aggravating circumstances and after considering the evidence in mitigation, the jury returned a unanimous verdict fixing Weeks' punishment at death. On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Weeks' presented 47 assignments of error, of which his assignment of error respecting the judge's answering the jury's question about mitigating circumstances was number 44. The court affirmed Weeks' conviction and sentence. Weeks' petition for federal habeas relief was ultimately denied.

Question

Is the Constitution's due process requirement violated when a trial judge directs a capital jury's attention to a specific paragraph of a constitutionally sufficient instruction in response to a question regarding the proper consideration of mitigating circumstances?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Angelone, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Constitution was not violated by the Virginia trial judge who, during a capital trial's penalty phase, directed the jury's attention to the allegedly ambiguous paragraph of the jury's instruction in response to the jury's question as to mitigating evidence. "Given that petitioner's jury was adequately instructed, and given that the trial judge responded to the jury's question by directing its attention to the precise paragraph of the constitutionally adequate instruction that answers its inquiry, the question becomes whether the Constitution requires anything more," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, "[w]e hold that it does not." Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that "[t]he record in this case establishes, not just a 'reasonable likelihood' of jury confusion, but a virtual certainty that the jury did not realize that there were two distinct legal bases for concluding that a death sentence was not 'justified.'"

Neder v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:13 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

97-1985

Petitioner

Neder

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

527 U.S. 1 (1999)

Argued

Tuesday, February 23, 1999

Decided

Thursday, June 10, 1999

Advocates

Roy W. McLeese (Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondent)

Javier H. Rubenstein (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Javier H. Rubinstein (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In the mid-1980's, Ellis E. Neder, Jr., engaged in a number of real estate transactions financed by fraudulently obtained bank loans and schemes involving land development fraud. He was indicted on numerous counts of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud and of filing false federal income tax returns. At trial, the District Court instructed the jury that, to convict on the bank and tax offenses, it did not need to consider the materiality of any false statements, or whether Neder's actions, in fact, caused others to be defrauded. In instructing the jury on mail and wire fraud, the court did not include materiality as an element of either offense. Neder objected. Thereafter, Neder was convicted of filing false federal income tax returns and of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the court erred in failing to submit the materiality element of the tax offense to the jury. However, under harmless-error analysis, the appeals court concluded the error was harmless because the error "'did not contribute to the verdict obtained." The appeals court also determined that materiality is not an element of mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. Thus, the District Court did not err in failing to submit materiality to the jury.

Question

Does the District Court's omission of the element of materiality from a jury instruction on tax fraud constitute harmless error? Is materiality an element of federal mail, wire, and bank fraud?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Yes and Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chef Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held 6-3 that under the harmless-error rule, which applies to a jury instruction that omits an element of an offense, the trial court's error did not render Neder's trial "fundamentally unfair." Thus, the error was harmless. In dissent, Justices Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that depriving a criminal defendant of the right to have a jury determine his commission of every element of the crime charged could not constitute a harmless error. Additionally, the Court unanimously held that materiality is an element of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud.

Shannon v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-8346

Petitioner

Shannon

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 573 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 24, 1994

Advocates

Thomas R. Trout (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Amy L. Wax (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 17

None

Simmons v. South Carolina

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:43 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-9059

Petitioner

Simmons

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

South Carolina

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

512 U.S. 154 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 1994

Decided

Friday, June 17, 1994

Advocates

David I. Bruck (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Richard A. Harpootlian (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Simmons, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Victor v. Nebraska

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:23:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-8894

Petitioner

Victor

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nebraska

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 92-9049

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1993-1994)

Opinion

511 U.S. 1 (1994)

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 1994

Decided

Tuesday, March 22, 1994

Advocates

Eric S. Multhaup (on behalf of the Petitioner Alfred Arthur Sandoval)

Donald B. Stenberg (on behalf of the Respondent Nebraska)

Daniel E. Lungren (on behalf of the Respondent California)

Mark A. Weber (on behalf of the Petitioner Clarence Victor)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Nebraska, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Sullivan v. Louisiana

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 15:52:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

92-5129

Petitioner

Sullivan

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Louisiana

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

508 U.S. 275 (1993)

Argued

Monday, March 29, 1993

Decided

Tuesday, June 1, 1993

Advocates

John Wilson Reed (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Jack Peebles (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Sullivan, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Estelle, Warden v. Mcguire

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:24:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

90-1074

Petitioner

Estelle, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mcguire

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1991-1993)

Opinion

502 U.S. 62 (1991)

Argued

Wednesday, October 9, 1991

Decided

Wednesday, December 4, 1991

Advocates

Ann Hardgrove Voris (on behalf of the Respondent)

Dane R. Gillette (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Estelle, Warden, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Yates v. Evatt

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:16:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

89-7691

Petitioner

Yates

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Evatt

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1990-1991)

Opinion

500 U.S. 391 (1991)

Argued

Tuesday, January 8, 1991

Decided

Tuesday, May 28, 1991

Advocates

David I. Bruck (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Miller W. Shealy, Jr. (on behalf of the Respondents)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Yates, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Carella v. California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:27 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

87-6997

Appellee

California

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Carella

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)

Opinion

491 U.S. 263 (1989)

Argued

Wednesday, April 26, 1989

Decided

Thursday, June 15, 1989

Advocates

Christopher D. Cerf (on behalf of the Appellant)

Arnold T. Guminski (on behalf of the Appellee)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Carella, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

California v. Brown

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:29 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

85-1563

Petitioner

California

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brown

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1986-1987)

Opinion

479 U.S. 538 (1987)

Argued

Tuesday, December 2, 1986

Decided

Tuesday, January 27, 1987

Advocates

Jay M. Bloom (on behalf of the petitioner)

Monica Knox (on behalf of the respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for California, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

None

Rose v. Clark

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:26:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

84-1974

Petitioner

Rose

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Clark

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

478 U.S. 570 (1986)

Argued

Monday, March 24, 1986

Decided

Wednesday, July 2, 1986

Advocates

W. J. Michael Cody (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Scott Daniel (on behalf of the Respondent)

Paul J. Larkin, Jr. (as amicus curiae in support of Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Rose, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: harmless error

None

Francis v. Franklin

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:20:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1590

Petitioner

Francis

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Franklin

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

471 U.S. 307 (1985)

Argued

Wednesday, November 28, 1984

Decided

Monday, April 29, 1985

Advocates

Susan V. Boleyn (on behalf of Petitioner)

Ronald J. Tabak (on behalf of Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Franklin, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Koehler v. Engle

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

83-1

Petitioner

Koehler

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Engle

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

466 U.S. 1 (1984)

Argued

Tuesday, February 28, 1984

Decided

Monday, March 26, 1984

Advocates

Louis J. Caruso (on behalf of the Petitioner)

John Nussbaumer (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 4 votes for Engle, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

James v. Kentucky

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:29:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

82-6840

Petitioner

James

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kentucky

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

466 U.S. 341 (1984)

Argued

Tuesday, February 28, 1984

Decided

Wednesday, April 18, 1984

Advocates

C. Thomas Hectus (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Penny R. Warren (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for James, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Connecticut v. Johnson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:33:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

81-927

Petitioner

Connecticut

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Johnson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Decided By

Burger Court (1981-1986)

Opinion

460 U.S. 73 (1983)

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 1982

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 1983

Advocates

Jerrold H. Barnett (on behalf of the Respondent)

Linda K. Lager (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Johnson, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Sandstrom v. Montana

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

78-5384

Petitioner

Sandstrom

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Montana

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

442 U.S. 510 (1979)

Argued

Wednesday, April 18, 1979

Decided

Monday, June 18, 1979

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Sandstrom, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Kentucky v. Whorton

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:11:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

78-749

Petitioner

Kentucky

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Whorton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

441 U.S. 786 (1979)

Argued

Monday, April 16, 1979

Decided

Monday, May 21, 1979

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kentucky, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Taylor v. Kentucky

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:34:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

77-5549

Petitioner

Taylor

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kentucky

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

436 U.S. 478 (1978)

Argued

Monday, March 27, 1978

Decided

Tuesday, May 30, 1978

Advocates

J. Vincent Aprile, II (argued the cause for the petitioner)

Guy C. Shearer (argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Taylor, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Henderson v. Kibbe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:10:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

75-1906

Petitioner

Henderson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kibbe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Decided By

Burger Court (1975-1981)

Opinion

431 U.S. 145 (1977)

Argued

Tuesday, March 1, 1977

Decided

Monday, May 16, 1977

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Henderson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

United States v. Park

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:33:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

74-215

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Park

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

421 U.S. 658 (1975)

Argued

Tuesday, March 18, 1975

Decided

Monday, June 9, 1975

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic, and related statutes

None

Cupp v. Naughten

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:09:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

72-1148

Petitioner

Cupp

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Naughten

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

414 U.S. 141 (1973)

Argued

Tuesday, October 16, 1973

Decided

Tuesday, December 4, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Cupp, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

United States v. Bishop

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:19:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

71-1698

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bishop

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Decided By

Burger Court (1972-1975)

Opinion

412 U.S. 346 (1973)

Argued

Tuesday, January 16, 1973

Decided

Tuesday, May 29, 1973

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for United States, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

None

Frazier v. Cupp

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:39:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

643

Petitioner

Frazier

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Cupp

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Warren Court (1967-1969)

Decided By

Warren Court (1967-1969)

Opinion

394 U.S. 731 (1969)

Argued

Wednesday, February 26, 1969

Decided

Tuesday, April 22, 1969

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Cupp, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Johnson v. Bennett

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:40:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Johnson

Respondent

Bennett

Heard By

Warren Court (1967-1969)

Decided By

Warren Court (1967-1969)

Opinion

393 U.S. 253 (1968)

Argued

November 13-14, 1968

Decided

Monday, December 16, 1968

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Johnson, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Spencer v. Texas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:42:32 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Texas

Respondent

Spencer

Consolidation

No. 69

No. 70

Heard By

Warren Court (1965-1967)

Decided By

Warren Court (1965-1967)

Opinion

385 U.S. 554 (1967)

Argued

October 17-18, 1966

Decided

Monday, January 23, 1967

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Texas, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

None

Jenkins v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:34:23 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

761

Petitioner

Jenkins

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Decided By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Opinion

380 U.S. 445 (1965)

Argued

Thursday, April 1, 1965

Decided

Monday, April 5, 1965

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Jenkins, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Sansone v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:34:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

365

Petitioner

Sansone

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Decided By

Warren Court (1962-1965)

Opinion

380 U.S. 343 (1965)

Argued

Wednesday, March 10, 1965

Decided

Monday, March 29, 1965

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

None

Killian v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:41:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Killian

Respondent

United States

Heard By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Decided By

Warren Court (1958-1962)

Opinion

368 U.S. 231 (1961)

Argued

Tuesday, October 10, 1961

Decided

Monday, December 11, 1961

Advocates

David B. Rothstein (for the petitioner)

Basil R. Pollitt (for the petitioner)

Kevin T. Maroney (for the United States)

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Killian, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 18 U.S.C. 1001

None

Grunewald v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:28:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

183

Petitioner

Grunewald

Respondent

United States

Consolidation

No. 184

No. 186

Heard By

Warren Court (1957-1958)

Decided By

Warren Court (1957-1958)

Opinion

353 U.S. 391 (1957)

Argued

April 3-4, 1957

Decided

Monday, May 27, 1957

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Grunewald, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Gibson v. Lockheed Aircraft Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:25:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Gibson

Respondent

Lockheed Aircraft Co.

Heard By

Warren Court (1955-1956)

Decided By

Warren Court (1955-1956)

Opinion

350 U.S. 356 (1956)

Argued

December 5-6, 1955

Decided

Monday, February 27, 1956

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Gibson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

None

Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 16:30:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

Petitioner

Theatre Enterprises

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Paramount

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Warren Court (1953-1954)

Decided By

Warren Court (1953-1954)

Opinion

346 U.S. 537 (1954)

Argued

Monday, November 30, 1953

Decided

Monday, January 4, 1954

Facts of the Case

None

Question

None

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Paramount, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Clayton

None

Middleton v. McNeil

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1028

Petitioner

Middleton

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

McNeil

Respondent Type

Respondent

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 433 (2004)

Decided

Monday, May 3, 2004

Facts of the Case

Sally Marie McNeil was convicted of the murder of her husband. She appealed her conviction, claiming that the trial judge had given the jury improper instructions when it was deciding whether to convict her of murder or voluntary manslaughter (the last four words of the instruction, not included in the model jury instruction provided with the criminal statute, might have led the jury to misunderstand the meaning of voluntary manslaughter). The California Court of Appeal acknowledged that the jury instruction had been wrong, but found that, taken as a whole, the instruction did not make it reasonably likely that the jury would misunderstood the meaning of voluntary manslaughter, especially given the closing statements of the prosecutor, which provided the correct definition of the law.

McNeil then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The district court rejected her claim, but a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.

Question

Were the instructions given to the jury in McNeil's trial sufficiently misleading to warrant the reversal of her sentence?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Middleton, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

No. In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court ruled that the judge had provided correct instructions for three other parts of the instruction that were closely related to the error, and that, given the clarity of those instructions, the jury was unlikely to have been mislead by the four words erroneously inserted at the end. "Given three correct instructions and one contrary one, the state court did not unreasonably apply federal law when it found that there was no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled."