Cases by Issue - Civil Rights

Hill v. McDonough

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-8794

Petitioner

Clarence E. Hill

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James R. McDonough, Interim Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, April 24, 2006

Argued

Wednesday, April 26, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 12, 2006

Advocates

Carolyn M. Snurkowski (argued the cause for Respondents)

Kannon K. Shanmugam (argued the cause for Respondents)

D. Todd Doss (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Clarence Hill was sentenced to death in Florida, which ordinarily uses a three-drug combination for executions. Hill claimed that this particular form of lethal injection was unnecessarily and gratuitously painful, and that it therefore violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. However, Hill had previously filed for a federal writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction, and the federal district court ruled that his new challenge was the practical equivalent of a second habeas corpus appeal. Successive habeas corpus appeals are not allowed under 28 U.S.C. 2244, and so the district court rejected Hill's petition. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Question

Is a prisoner's challenge to a particular form of execution - but not to the execution sentence itself - the practical equivalent of a federal habeas corpus petition and therefore barred if the prisoner has already sought habeas review?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Hill, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that challenging the form of execution was fundamentally different from challenging the lawfulness of a conviction or sentence, the traditional purposes of a habeas corpus appeal. This finding was supported by the fact that Hill conceded other forms of execution would be constitutional, and that Florida state law does not require the particular form of execution at issue in this case. "Under these circumstances," Justice Kennedy wrote, "a grant of injunctive relief could not be seen as barring the execution of Hill's sentence."

Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:31 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-259

Petitioner

Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sheila White

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, December 5, 2005

Argued

Monday, April 17, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 22, 2006

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Donald A. Donati (argued the cause for Respondent)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of Untied States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Sheila White was the only woman working in the Maintenance of Way Department of the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad's Tennessee Yard. After she complained of harassment by her supervisor, White was moved from duties as a forklift operator to less desirable duties as a track laborer, though her job classification remained the same. She was also suspended for 37 days without pay, but was eventually reinstated and given full back pay.

White filed suit in federal court, where a jury rejected her claims of sex discrimination but awarded her damages of $43,000 after finding that she had been retaliated against for her complaints, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On appeal, Burlington Northern argued that White had not suffered "adverse employment action," and therefore could not bring the suit, because she had not been fired, demoted, denied a promotion, or denied wages. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, finding that the suspension without pay - even if back pay was eventually awarded - was an "adverse employment action," as was the change of responsibilities within the same job category.

Question

Did Sheila White suffer retaliatory discrimination for which her employer may be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for White, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

Yes. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that White suffered retaliatory discrimination when she was reassigned to less desirable duties and suspended without pay. Though the duties were within the same classification and the pay was eventually reinstated, the action was nevertheless sufficiently harsh to constitute retaliatory discrimination. In a decision authored by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and six other justices, the Court held that in order to prevail on a claim of retaliatory discrimination, "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." (internal citations omitted) Justice Samuel Alito wrote separately, agreeing with the result but arguing that the test adopted by the other members of the Court would eventually prove problematic.

Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1376

Petitioner

Humberto Fernandez-Vargas

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, October 31, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, March 22, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 22, 2006

Advocates

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for Respondent)

David M. Gossett (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Humberto Fernandez-Vargas entered the United States illegally and was deported in 1981. He illegally re-entered in 1982 and lived in the U.S. until 2001, when he married a U.S. citizen and applied to adjust his status to permanent resident. While applying, Fernandez-Vargas was arrested and eventually deported pursuant to Section 241(a)(5) (the "reinstatement statute") of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The reinstatement statute, which became effective in 1997, allows prior deportation orders to be reinstated against aliens who re-enter the country illegally, and denies those aliens any form of relief under the INA. Fernandez-Vargas petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review, arguing that Section 421(a)(5) was not intended to reinstate deportation orders that were issued prior to its enactment. The Circuit Court denied the petition. It held that Fernandez-Vargas' application for permanent resident status was a form of relief not allowd by the reinstatement statute. It also held that Congress did intend the reinstatement statute to apply to deportation orders, such as Fernandez-Vargas', that were issued before the statute went into effect. Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that this application of the law was not impermissibly retroactive, because Fernandez-Vargas had no "protectable expectation of being able to adjust his status."

Question

(1) Does the reinstatement statute of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allows a prior deportation order against an illegal alien to be reinstated, apply to aliens who re-entered the U.S. before the statute went into effect? (2) If so, is this application impermissibly retroactive?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Gonzales, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

Yes and no. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that the reinstatement statute does apply to illegal aliens who re- entered the U.S. before the effective date of the statute, and that the application to such aliens was not impermissibly retroactive. The Court held that the purpose of Section 421(a)(5) was most consistent with a broad application, and "Common principles of statutory interpretation fail to unsettle the apparent application [...] to any reentrant present in the country, whatever the date of return." The majority opinion affirmed the presumption against retroactive statutes, but found the reinstatement statute permissible under a test set out in Landgraf v. USI Film Products. The main weakness in Fernandez-Vargas's argument was that his offense was not a "past act that he is helpless to undo," but rather the "continuing violation" of remaining in the country illegally.

In a lone dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens disagreed with both of the Court's conclusions. He wrote that Fernandez-Vargas "legitimately complains that the Government has changed the rules midgame."

League of Latin American Citizens v. Perry

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-204

Petitioner

Rick Perry, Governor of Texas, et al.

Respondent

League of United Latin American Citizens, et al.

Consolidation

Travis County, Texas v. Perry, No. 05-254

Jackson v. Perry, No. 05-276

GI Forum v. Perry, No. 05-439

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, December 12, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, March 1, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, June 28, 2006

Advocates

R. Ted Cruz (argued the cause for Appellees)

Nina Perales (argued the cause for Appellants in No. 05-439)

Paul M. Smith (argued the cause for Appellants in No. 05-276)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Appellees)

Facts of the Case

In 2003, the Texas State Legislature passed a redistricting plan that replaced the one created by a federal judge following the 2000 census. Critics of the plan charged that it was unconstitutional and violated section 2 the Voting Rights Act because it diluted racial minority voting strength and was designed to maximize partisan advantage. A three-judge district court panel disagreed, finding that the plan was constitutional and that the legislature had the right to redistrict in 2003 using census data from 2000.

The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but while it was pending the Court decided Vieth v. Jubelirer, another redistricting case from Pennsylvania. Justice Anthony Kennedy, the deciding vote in that case, wrote that the Court could hear claims of partisan discrimination in redistricting cases, but left open the question of the test those claims would be subjected to.

The three-district panel in this case then affirmed its earlier decision, finding that the Texas redistricting plan was not substantively unfair.

Question

Did the Texas legislature violate the Constitution and and the Voting Rights Act when it used 2000 census data to redistrict in 2003 for partisan advantage, resulting in districts that (by 2003 numbers) did not conform to the one person, one vote standard?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for League of Latin American Citizens, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

The Supreme Court held that the Texas Legislature's redistricting plan did not violate the Constitution, but that part of the plan violated the Voting Rights Act. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a majority of the justices, stated that District 23 had been redrawn in such a way as to deny Latino voters as a group the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choosing, thereby violating the Voting Rights Act. Justice Kennedy also wrote, however, that nothing in the Constitution prevented the state from redrawing its electoral boundaries as many times as it wanted, so long as it did so at least once every ten years.

Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Ahlborn

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1506

Petitioner

Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, et al.

Respondent

Heidi Ahlborn

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Monday, February 27, 2006

Decided

Monday, May 1, 2006

Advocates

Herbert David Blair (argued the cause for Respondent)

Patricia A. Millett (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Heidi Ahlborn was injured and permanently disabled in a car accident. She received Medicaid payments totaling $215,645 through the Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) to pay for her medical treatment. In order to be eligible for the Medicaid payments, Arkansas law required Ahlborn to give the ADHS the "right to any settlement, judgment, or award" she might receive because of the accident, up to the amount Medicaid had paid for her treatment.

Several years after the accident, Ahlborn received $550,000 in a settlement with the parties liable for her injuries. The sum covered her medical treatment as well as pain and suffering, lost earnings, and her lost earning potential in the future. Only $35,581 of the settlement was earmarked for her medical treatment, however. When the ADHS demanded that she repay the full $215,645, therefore, Ahlborn refused, and the issue went to a federal district court in Arkansas. The judge sided with the ADHS, ruling that it was not unreasonable for Arkansas to require Ahlborn to agree to repay them fully from any settlement she might receive in order to be eligible, even if the portion specifically allocated for medical treatment was less than the amount demanded by Medicaid.

An 8th Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, however, finding that seizing money from her settlement that had not been earmarked for medical treatment would violate federal Medicaid regulations, which forbid state governments from seizing the property of Medicaid recipients in order to recover money spent on treatment. The panel therefore ordered that Ahlborn repay just $35,581 to the ADHS.

Question

Do federal Medicaid statutes limit the amount a state can recover in reimbursement from a third-party payment to the portion earmarked for medical treatment?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Ahlborn, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Medicaid--provisions of the Social Security Act

Yes. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that federal Medicaid statutes only allow a state to recover the part of a third-party settlement earmarked for medical expenses. The Justices agreed with the Circuit Court that the statutes do not permit Arkansas to require Ahlborn to repay Medicare expenses from the non-medical portions of the settlement. The Court found Arkansas's arguments to the contrary unconvincing due to "internal inconsistency with a conscious disregard for the statutory text."

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-944

Petitioner

Jenifer Arbaugh

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Y & H Corporation, dba The Moonlight Cafe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, May 16, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, January 11, 2006

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 2006

Advocates

Brett John Prendergast (argued the cause for Respondent)

Jeffrey A. Schwartz (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Daryl Joseffer (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Jennifer Arbaugh, a waitress at the Moonlight Cafe in Louisiana, sued her employer, the Y&H; Corporation, for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The federal district court jury ruled for Arbaugh. Filing a motion to dismiss, Y&H; claimed it did not qualify as an employer under Title VII, because it did not employ 15 or more employees for 20 or more calendar weeks during the relevant time period. The district court then reversed the jury judgment, holding that the number of employees determines a court's subject matter jurisdiction in a Title VII suit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act applied the prohibition of employment discrimination to employers with fifteen or more employees. Did this limit federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction, or did it only raise an issue going to the merits of a Title VII claim?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Arbaugh, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

The Court held that the number-of-employees requirement is an element of the merits of a Title VII claim, not a jurisdictional limitation. The 8-0 opinion (Justice Alito not participating) by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg reversed the Circuit Court, noting the "unfair[ness]" and "waste of judicial resources" that could result from a jurisdictional interpretation of the number-of- employees requirement as well as the lack of any specific jurisdictional language that would require such an interpretation. The Court relied on a "readily administrable bright line" rule that statutory limitations should be treated as non-jurisdictional unless specified as jurisdictional by Congress.

Domino's Pizza v. McDonald

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-593

Petitioner

Domino's Pizza, Inc., et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John McDonald

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, April 25, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, December 6, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, February 22, 2006

Advocates

Maureen E. Mahoney (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Allen Lichtenstein (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

John McDonald was the president and sole shareholder of JWM Investments. After Domino's terminated its contract with JWM, McDonald brought suit under a section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. Section 1981). McDonald claimed that Domino's had ended its contract because he was black, and that he therefore had a right to sue under the Civil Rights Act, which gives all citizens, regardless of race, the right to make and enforce contracts. Domino's moved to dismiss the case, arguing that McDonald had not been a party to the contract (it had been between Domino's and JWM) and therefore did not have standing to sue. The district court sided with Domino's, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that McDonald had suffered injuries separate from those of JWM and therefore had standing to sue.

Question

May a person who is not a party to a contract but suffers personal injuries from its termination sue under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, claiming that the contract was terminated because of race?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Domino's Pizza, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1981)

No. The Court ruled in a unanimous decision (Justice Alito not participating) that only an actual or would-be party to a contract may sue under Section 1981. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, explained that if Section 1981 were not limited to the party to the contract, it "would become a strange remedial provision designed to fight racial animus in all of its noxious forms, but only if the animus and the hurt it produced were somehow connected to somebody's contract. We have never read the statute in this unbounded--or rather, peculiarly bounded--way."

United States v. Georgia

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:30 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1203

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Georgia, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Goodman v. Georgia et al., No. 04-1236

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, May 16, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, November 9, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, January 10, 2006

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioner in No. 04-1203)

Gregory A. Castanias (argued the cause for Respondents)

Gregory Andrew Castanias (argued the cause for Respondents)

Samuel R. Bagenstos (argued the cause for Petitioner in No. 04-1236)

Gene C. Schaerr (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Goodman, a paraplegic held in a Georgia state prison, sued Georgia in federal court for maintaining prison conditions that allegedly discriminated against disabled people and violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Georgia claimed the 11th Amendment provided the state immunity from such suits. The district court ruled for Georgia, but the 11th Circuit reversed.

Before the 11th Circuit ruled in the case, the United States sued Georgia, arguing that the ADA's Title II abolished state sovereign immunity from monetary suits. Congress could do this, the U.S. argued, by exercising its 14th Amendment power to enforce equal protection.

Question

Did Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 validly abrogate state sovereign immunity for suits by prisoners with disabilities challenging discrimination by state prisons? Was Title II a proper exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to the administration of prison systems?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Yes and yes. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that Title II abrogates sovereign immunity in cases where violations of the 8th Amendment are alleged. The 14th Amendment incorporates the 8th Amendment (that is, applies it to the states). Congress can enforce the 14th Amendment against the states "by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations" of its provisions, which can involve abrogating state sovereign immunity. However, the Court did not address the question of whether Title II validly abrogates sovereign immunity when the 8th Amendment is not involved.

Schaffer v. Weast

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-698

Petitioner

Brian Schaffer, a Minor, By His Parents and Next Friends, Jocelyn and Martin Schaffer, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jerry Weast, Superintendent, Montgomery County Public Schools, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, February 22, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, October 5, 2005

Decided

Monday, November 14, 2005

Advocates

David B. Salmons (argued the cause for Respondents)

William H. Hurd (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The parents of Brian Schaffer, a disabled child, sued their public school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Schaffer's parents claimed the Individualized Education Program that the school system devised for their son, and which IDEA required for each disabled student, was inadequate. The district court ruled for the Schaffers, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the lower court incorrectly assigned the burden of proof to the school system. Because IDEA was silent on whether the parents or the school system bear the burden of proof, the Fourth Circuit held, the general rule that the party initiating the suit bears that burden should be applied.

Question

Do the parents or school system bear the burden of proof in disputes over a child's individualized education program under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Weast, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Education of the Handicapped, Education for All Handicapped Children, or Individuals with Disabilities Education Acts, or related statutes, as amended; also see ADA

In a 6 to 2 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the party bringing the suit bears the burden of proof, whether that party is the parents or the school system. In the majority opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that "absent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise, ... we will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief."

Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-631

Petitioner

Joan Wagnon, Secretary, Kansas Department of Revenue

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, February 28, 2005

Argued

Monday, October 3, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, December 6, 2005

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Ian Heath Gershengorn (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, a sovereign Indian tribe, raises revenue with a tax on the gasoline sold at an on-reservation gas station. The Nation purchases the gas from non-Indian, off-reservation distributors. Kansas imposed a tax on distributors of motor fuels, which the distributors pass on to the gas stations they sell to. The Nation sued Wagnon, the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Revenue, seeking to avoid the tax. The Nation argued that the state's tax interfered with the tribe's sovereignty, and therefore was not allowed by federal law. Wagnon claimed that since the tax was on off- reservation suppliers, the Nation's sovereignty was unaffected. The District Court accepted that argument and ruled for Wagnon. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, applying the interest-balancing test prescribed by White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker. The Circuit Court found that the tribe's interests in economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government out-weighed Kansas's interest in raising revenue.

Question

When a State taxes receipt of fuel by non-tribal, off-reservation distributors, manufacturers, and importers, should the White Mountain Apache v. Bracker interest-balancing test apply if the fuel is later sold by an Indian tribe?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Wagnon, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that the White Mountain Apache v. Bracker balancing test applies only where "a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation." The Court ruled for Wagnon and upheld the tax, agreeing with the District Court that the balancing test should not apply to taxes on off-reservation distributors. Justice Thomas wrote that keeping the scope of the test narrow would maintain the traditional concept of tribal sovereignty, establish a "bright-line standard" in Indian tax-immunity, and still respect tribal authority over on-reservation activities. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, which Justice Kennedy joined.

Halbert v. Michigan

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-10198

Petitioner

Antonio Dwayne Halbert

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michigan

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Monday, April 25, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

David A. Moran (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Bernard E. Restuccia (argued the cause for Respondent)

Gene C. Schaerr (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Halbert pleaded no contest in a Michigan court to two counts of criminal sexual conduct. The day after Halbert's sentence was imposed, Halbert moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion and told Halbert the property remedy for his complaint was the state appellate court. Michigan required a defendant convicted on a guilty or no contest plea to apply for leave of appeal to the state appellate court. Halbert asked the trial court twice to appoint counsel to help him with his application. The trial court refused. Without counsel, Halbert still applied for leave to appeal, which the court of appeals denied. The state supreme court also denied Halbert's application for leave to appeal to that court.

Question

Did the due process and equal protection clauses require the appointment of counsel for defendants, convicted on their pleas, who sought access to a Michigan appellate court?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Halbert, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the due process and equal protection clauses required Michigan to provide counsel for defendants who wanted to appeal to the state appellate court. The Court reasoned that if indigent defendants convicted on their pleas did not have counsel to guide them through Michigan's complex appellate process, their right to appeal would not be meaningful.

Johnson v. California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:52 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-6964

Petitioner

Jay Shawn Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Monday, April 18, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

Stephen B. Bedrick (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Seth K. Schalit (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

NonJay Shawn Johnson, on trial in California for murder, objected to the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate all three black prospective jurors. Johnson argued the eliminations were based on race. The judge denied Johnson's motions and held that Johnson had failed to show a "strong likelihood" that the dismissals were race-based. The judge relied on People v. Wheeler, the 1978 case in which the California Supreme Court ruled that to establish a prima facie case of racial bias in peremptory challenges, the objector had to show "strong likelihood" that the challenges were race- based. The jury found Johnson guilty of second-degree murder.

Johnson appealed and argued that the "strong likelihood" standard in Wheeler was at odds with the 'reasonable inference" standard the U.S. Supreme Court set in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). The appeals court agreed and reversed Johnson's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the two standards were the same. The U.S. Supreme Court at first dismissed Johnson's appeal because the case was not finalized (see Johnson v. California 2004, No. 03-6539). After another round of appeals, however, the Court agreed to decide the case.

Question

In order to establish a prima facie case under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), must the objector show that it is more likely than not that the other party's peremptory challenges were based on impermissible group bias?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Johnson, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. In an 8-1 decision, the Court reversed the California Supreme Court and ruled that California's standard for objections to peremptory challenges was incompatible with the standard set forth in Batson. The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens explained that the Court had not intended that the objector would have to prove that a peremptory challenge was "more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination." The Court ruled that in the first step of the Batson procedure, the objector only needs to "produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred." The objector ultimately has to prove that the peremptory challenge was motivated by purposeful racial discrimination, but not until the third step of the Batson procedure, after the State has offered "permissible race-neutral justifications" for the challenges. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that California's standard was within the procedural leeway provided to States by Batson.

Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1388

Petitioner

Douglas Spector, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, February 28, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 6, 2005

Advocates

David B. Salmons (argued the cause for Petitioners)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for Respondent)

Thomas C. Goldstein (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A group of disabled people who travelled on Norwegian Cruise Line ships sued the company in federal district court and alleged two of its ships did not conform with Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The company argued the ADA did not apply to the two ships because, though the ships sailed out of Texas, they sailed under the Bahamian flag. The district court dismissed the group's claims and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled foreign-flagged cruise ships are not subject to Title III of the ADA.

Question

Does Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act apply to foreign-flagged cruise ships in U.S. waters?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Spector, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Yes. The Court held 6-3 that Title III applied to foreign-flag cruise ships in U.S. waters. Justice Kennedy delivered the Court's controlling opinion, which held that Title III did not apply to foreign ships' internal affairs, because there was no "clear congressional statement" showing an intent to do so. A clear statement was necessary before a general law could interfere with a foreign-vessel's internal affairs. Title III's own limitations, however, prevented the statute from imposing requirements that would have threatened safety on the ship or conflicted with international obligations. If Title III were to impose certain requirements, such as major structural modifications, the clear statement rule could bar such an interference.

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1601

Petitioner

City of Rancho Palos Verdes, California, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mark J. Abrams

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 113 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, January 19, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Advocates

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Petitioners, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Rancho Palos Verdes, a city in California, gave Mark Abrams a permit to construct an antenna on his property for amateur use. But when the city learned Abrams used the antenna for commercial purposes, the city forced Abrams to stop until he got a commercial use permit. Abrams applied and the city refused to give him the permit. Abrams then sued in federal district court, alleging the city violated his rights under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Abrams sought damages under a federal liability law that allowed people to sue for damages for federal rights violations.

The district court agreed with Abrams and ordered the city to give Abrams the permit. But the court refused Abrams' request for damages under the separate federal liability law. The court said Congress intended for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act to include only remedies specifically found in that act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that because the act did not contain a "comprehensive remedial scheme," Abrams could seek damages under other federal laws.

Question

May people whose rights guaranteed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 are violated seek remedies other than those allowed by the act?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Abrams could not enforce the limitations of the Telecommunications Act on local authorities through federal liability law, because the act provides its own judicial remedy. Congress could not have meant the judicial remedy expressly authorized by the Telecommunications Act to co-exist with an alternative remedy.

Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-855

Petitioner

City of Sherrill, New York

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Oneida Indian Nation of New York, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 197 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, January 11, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, March 29, 2005

Advocates

Malcolm L. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondents, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Michael R. Smith (argued the cause for Respondents)

Ira S. Sacks (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Caitlin J. Halligan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In the late 18th century, Congress set aside most of the tribal land of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York as a reservation. The tribe later sold off much of the reservation. In the 1990s members of the tribe began to buy back pieces of the land. The tribe said the reacquired land was part of a reservation and therefore exempt from state and municipal taxes. The City of Sherrill - which encompassed some of the tribe's property - argued the land was not tax-exempt. The Oneidas sued Sherrill in federal district court and alleged the land was recognized by the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua as part of their historic reservation. The Oneidas also pointed to the 1790 Non- Intercourse Act that required federal consent for Indian land to lose its reservation status. Sherrill argued the land lost its reservation status after leaving the Oneidas' ownership originally. The district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for the Oneidas.

Question

Were land parcels once owned by the Oneida Nation, sold in 1807 but repurchased in the 1990s by the Nation's descedant tribe, part of an Indian Reservation and thus exempt from local taxes?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Sherrill, N.Y., 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that standards of federal Indian law and federal equity precluded the Tribe from unilaterally reviving its ancient sovereignty over the land at issue. The Court pointed to the "longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of central New York and its inhabitants"and the fact that regulatory authority over the land had been exercised by state and local government for 200 years. By giving up the land in the early 19th century, the Oneidas had "relinquished governmental reins and could not regain them through open-market purchases from current titleholders."

Miller-El v. Dretke

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:12 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9659

Petitioner

Thomas Joe Miller-El

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, December 6, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

Gena A. Bunn (argued the cause for Respondent)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Miller-El alleged the prosecution in his capital murder trial violated the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause by excluding 10 of 11 blacks from the jury. The jury convicted Miller-El and he was sentenced to death. State courts rejected Miller-El's appeals and ruled Miller-El failed to meet the requirements for proving jury-selection discrimination outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky(1986). Miller-El then appealed to a federal district court. The district court rejected Miller-El's appeal and ruled the court must defer to the state courts' acceptance of prosecutors' race-neutral justifications for striking potential jurors. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and ruled a federal court could only grant an appeal if the applicant made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

Miller-El appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and in Miller-El v. Cockrell(2003) the Court ruled the Fifth Circuit should have accepted Miller- El's appeal to review the district court's ruling. The Supreme Court said an appeal should have been granted if the petitioner could demonstrate reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court's decision. The Court said the district court did not give full consideration to the substantial evidence Miller-El presented. The Fifth Circuit reconsidered Miller-El's appeal and ruled Miller-El failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the state court was wrong to find no purposeful discrimination.

Question

Did the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, by rejecting Miller-El's claim the prosecution purposefully excluded blacks from his jury, violate the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003)? 2. Did the Texas jury selection manual encourage unconstitutional disparate questioning based on race?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Miller-El, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that Miller-El deserved to win his appeal because the jury selection in his case violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. The Court began by noting that the prosecutors used peremptory strikes to exclude 91 percent of the eligible black prospective jurors, "a disparity unlikely to have been produced by happenstance." After comparing two eliminated black prospective jurors with similar white jurors who were not eliminated, the Court concluded that the "selection process was replete with evidence that prosecutors were selecting and rejecting potential jurors because of race." The Court further concluded that Texas' jury selection manual, both in this case and generally, tended to allow prosecutors to read disparate questions to prospective jurors depending on whether they were black or white.

Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:45 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1672

Petitioner

Roderick Jackson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Birmingham Board of Education

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 167 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 14, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 30, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 29, 2005

Advocates

Kenneth L. Thomas (argued the cause for Respondent)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Roderick Jackson, a high school basketball coach, claimed he was fired for complaining that the girls' basketball team he coached was denied equal treatment by the school. Jackson sued the Birmingham Board of Education in federal court, claiming his firing violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Title IX bans sex discrimination in federally-funded schools. Jackson claimed Title IX gave him the right to sue - a "private right of action" - because he suffered for reporting sex discrimination against others, despite the fact the he did not suffer from sex discrimination. The federal district court and appellate court ruled against Jackson.

Question

Does Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 allow suits for retaliation for complaints about unlawful sex discrimination?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Jackson, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Education Amendments of 1972

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Title IX allowed suits alleging retaliation for reporting sex discrimination. Such retaliation, the majority reasoned, constituted intentional discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX. Jackson therefore had the right under Title IX to pursue his claim in court.

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma & Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation v. Leavitt

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1472

Petitioner

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, No. 03-853

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 631 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 22, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 9, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, March 1, 2005

Advocates

Lloyd B. Miller (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) allows tribes to administer health care programs previously run by the federal government. Tribes can opt to do this by entering into contracts with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who is obligated to fund tribe-run health services as if they were still federally run. The Secretary must also fund "contract support costs" associated with carrying out the contract. However, ISDA requires the federal government to fund contract support costs only to the extent money is available. ISDA also does not require the federal government to reduce funding for some tribe programs to make funds available for other tribes. In two separate cases tribes claimed the federal government under-funded contract support costs. The Secretary argued the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations Act made it clear the government lacked the funds to pay the full contract support costs. In one case a federal appellate court ruled that the federal government did not adequately fund contract support costs and that funds were available. In another case a federal appellate court ruled for the federal government.

Question

Did the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to pay "contract support costs," even if the government contends funds were not available?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma & Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 450

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the government was legally bound to pay the contract support costs. Only in a "special" instance could the government break its promise to pay the costs. In this case, the government had access to sufficient unrestricted funds appropriated by Congress. Moreover, nothing in the act's language suggested it was non-binding.

Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:07 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1160

Petitioner

Azel P. Smith, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

City of Jackson, Mississippi, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 228 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 29, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, November 3, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, March 30, 2005

Advocates

Glen D. Nager (argued the cause for Respondents)

Thomas C. Goldstein (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Azel Smith and group of other police department employees over the age of 40 sued Jackson, Mississippi, and the city police department in federal district court. The group alleged the department salary plan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which banned employers from engaging in age discrimination. The department plan gave officers with five or fewer years of tenure with the department larger raises than those with more than five years of tenure. The group made a "disparate impact" claim under the ADEA, arguing the department and city unintentionally engaged in age discrimination. The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled disparate impact claims could not be made under the ADEA. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary.

Question

Can a disparate impact claim - a claim alleging unintentional discrimination - be made under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for City of Jackson, Miss., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that ADEA authorized recovery in disparate-impact cases, but that in this case petitioners failed to set forth a valid claim. The Court relied on its 1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke Power, where the Court first authorized disparate- impact claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court reasoned that the ADEA authorized disparate-impact claims in cases similar to Griggs, because the language of Title VII and ADEA was virtually identical. However, ADEA was narrower than Title VII and allowed an otherwise prohibited action where the discrimination was based on reasonable factors other than age. The employees in this case failed to identify any specific practice within the pay plan that had an adverse impact on older workers. Further, the city's plan was based on reasonable factors other than age.

Johnson v. California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-636

Petitioner

Garrison S. Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 499 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 1, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, November 2, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, February 23, 2005

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Bert H. Deixler (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Frances T. Grunder (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

California prisoner Garrison Johnson alleged in federal district court that the California Department of Corrections used race to assign temporary cell mates for new prisoners. Johnson alleged this violated the U.S. Constitution's equal protection clause. The district court and a federal appellate court ruled against Johnson. The appellate court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Turner v. Safley, which said a relaxed standard - as opposed to a "strict scrutiny" standard - should be used to determine whether prison regulations are constitutional. The prison's policies were "reasonably related to the administrators' concern for racial violence and thus must be upheld," the appellate court wrote.

Question

Is a state's practice of temporary racial segregation of state prisoners subject to strict scrutiny?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Johnson, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that prison racial-segregation policies are subject to strict scrutiny. The Court rejected the claim that because the policy was "neutral" - because all prisoners were "equally" segregated - the policy was not subject to strict scrutiny. Racial classifications must receive strict scrutiny even when they may be said to affect the races equally. The Court remanded the case so that the Ninth Circuit could use strict scrutiny to review the policy. Justices John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas, and Antonin Scalia dissented.

Clark v. Martinez

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-878

Petitioner

A. Neil Clark, Field Office Director, Seattle, Washington, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Sergio Martinez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Daniel Benitez v. Michael Rozos, Field Office Director, Miami, No. 03-7434

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 371 (2005)

Granted

Monday, March 1, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, October 13, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2005

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for United States)

John S. Mills (argued the cause for Benitez)

Christine S. Dahl (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The federal government deemed Daniel Benitez and Sergio Martinez inadmissible immigrants and detained them until they could be returned to Cuba.

Benitez and Martinez argued that because deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, they could not be detained longer than the 90 days allowed by federal law. They pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis that said the government can detain beyond 90 days immigrants who were admitted to the United States, but only so long as necessary to deport them. Immigrants must be released if deportation is unforeseeable, the Court said.

While separate district courts agreed deportation to Cuba was unforeseeable, the Ninth Circuit and 11th Circuits disagreed over whether Zadvydas applied to inadmissible immigrants.

The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the two cases.

Question

In Zadvydas v. Davis (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court said admitted immigrants could be detained for deportation for more than 90 days, but no longer than reasonably necessary. Did this ruling apply to inadmissible aliens, such as Benitez and Martinez?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Martinez, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 8 U.S.C. 1231

Yes. In a 7-2 decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court said the requirement that immigrants be detained no longer than reasonably necessary for deportation applied to both admissible and inadmissible immigrants. Because readmission to Cuba was unforeseeable, the detentions of Martinez and Benitez were unreasonable. The Court refused to give the same immigration statute different interpretations based on immigrants' characteristics.

Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-674

Petitioner

Keyse G. Jama

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 335 (2005)

Granted

Monday, February 23, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Decided

Wednesday, January 12, 2005

Advocates

Jeffrey J. Keyes (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Minnesota state court convicted Somalian refugee Keyse Jama of assault. As a result the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) argued in immigration court that Jama should be deported to Somalia. The court agreed and an immigration appeals court also agreed. Jama then appealed to a federal district court and argued the part of the U.S. Code dealing with deporting an alien to his country of birth required that country to first accept the alien. Because Somalia lacked a functioning central government, this was impossible. The district court ruled for Jama. A federal appellate court reversed and said Jama and the district court misinterpreted the law.

Question

May immigration officials deport a person to his country of birth under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(2)(E)(iv), if that country lacks a functioning central government that is able to accept the person's return?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 8 U.S.C. 1231

Yes. Federal immigration law permitted an alien to be removed to a country without the advance consent of that country's government. Of the four removal options federal immigration law listed, an acceptance requirement appeared in only one clause: "...he shall be removed to another country whose government will accept him." That clause only applied after the attorney general attempted the prior deportation option. The grammatical "rule of the last antecedent," prevented "another" from applying to the earlier options. Nor did the law's structure impose an acceptance requirement. Moreover, contrary to Jama's argument, the acceptance requirement was hardly settled judicial interpretation.

Leocal v. Ashcroft

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-583

Petitioner

Josue Leocal

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 1 (2004)

Granted

Monday, February 23, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, November 9, 2004

Advocates

Joseph S. Sollers, III (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

A Florida court convicted Vietnam citizen Duan Le for driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged in federal immigration court that Le should be deported. The INS argued Le committed a crime of violence that was an aggravated felony under federal immigration laws - a deportable crime. The immigration court and an appellate immigration court ruled Le could be deported. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.

Question

Is a conviction of driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury a "crime of violence" under federal immigration law that allows the person to be deported as an aggravated felon?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Leocal, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets, National Firearms, Organized Crime Control, Comprehensive Crime Control, or Gun Control Acts, except for RICO (q.v.) portion

No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Chief Justice William Rhenquist, the Court held that state DUI offenses, except when involving purposeful intent, are accidental and not crimes of violence under federal law. Le therefore did not commit an aggravated felony for which he could be deported.

Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-95

Petitioner

Pennsylvania State Police

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Nancy Drew Suders

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 129 (2004)

Granted

Monday, December 1, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, March 31, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 14, 2004

Advocates

Donald A. Bailey (argued the cause for Respondent)

John George Knorr, III (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

Nancy Drew Suders quit her job as a dispatcher for the Pennsylvania State Police in August 1998. She claimed that she had been sexually harassed by her supervisors since she got the job in March of that year, and that she had finally decided to quit after she was accused of theft, handcuffed, photographed and questioned. Two days before quitting, she had contacted the state police equal opportunity officer about the harassment, but did not file a report because, Suders claimed, the woman was unhelpful and unsympathetic.

Suders then filed suit in federal district court, charging that the harassment had forced her to quit. The district court judge, however, granted summary judgment to the state police before the case went to trial. He found that Suders had failed to use the internal procedures set up by the state police to deal with sexual harassment, and that she therefore could not bring suit unless the police had taken a "tangible employment action" that substantially changed her employment status. On appeal, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel overturned the district judge's decision, ruling that the harassment had been so bad that Suders had no choice but to quit. While the police had not fired Suders, they had been directly responsible for her resignation and therefore could not use her failure to file a report as a defense.

Question

When a supervisor makes a workplace environment so hostile (through sexual harassment) that an employee has no choice but to quit, may the employee bring suit even if she did not use the internal procedures established by the employer to report sexual harassment claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Pennsylvania State Police, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII

Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that an employee faced with a situation in which a "reasonable person ... would have felt compelled to resign" could bring suit even if she had not filed a report with the employer before resigning. Her employer, however, could use her failure to file a report, along with evidence of the safeguards it had in place to prevent harassment, in its defense. If it could prove that she had not attempted to prevent the harassment, and that the safeguards in place would have prevented it if she had, the employer would not be liable.

Nelson v. Campbell

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-6821

Petitioner

David L. Nelson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Donal Campbell, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 637 (2004)

Granted

Monday, December 1, 2003

Argued

Monday, March 29, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 24, 2004

Advocates

Kevin C. Newsom (argued the cause for Respondents)

Bryan A. Stevenson (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

David Nelson was sentenced to death for murder and scheduled for execution in 1997. A series of appeals and habeas petitions in federal court delayed the execution until 2002, when an 11th Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously rejected a claim dealing with the alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. After the final appeal was rejected, Nelson was rescheduled for execution on October 9, 2003.

Nelson filed petition in federal district court alleging that the method of execution proposed by Alabama violated his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Alabama had notified Nelson that, because of damage done to his veins by previous intravenous drug abuse, the execution procedure might require corrections officers to cut through muscles and fat in his arm to get access to a vein that could carry the toxins. He claimed that this was an inhumane method of execution and should therefore be barred. Further, he argued that the petition was not an appeal of his conviction or sentence (appeals of both were prohibited by U.S. Code Title 28, Section 2254, a federal law designed to limit the number of habeas corpus appeals by death row inmates) but rather a freestanding lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the proposed execution procedure. Alabama countered that Nelson's appeal was intended only to prolong his life through procedural delays, exactly what the federal law was designed to prevent, and should therefore be thrown out.

The federal district court agreed with Alabama, holding that Nelson's appeal dealt not just with the procedure but with the sentence itself. It was therefore functionally equivalent to a habeas corpus petition, which was barred by Section 2254. A divided 11th Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the decision. After the 11th Circuit declined to rehear the case as a whole (en banc), the U.S. Supreme Court issued a stay of execution and then accepted the case for appeal.

Question

Is a prisoner's appeal of the proposed procedure for his execution functionally equivalent to a habeas corpus petition and therefore barred by Title 28, Section 2254 of U.S. Code?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Nelson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled unanimously that Nelson's suit dealt only with the proposed method of execution, not with his conviction or sentence, and was therefore different from a habeas corpus appeal. Nelson had a right to challenge the necessity of the procedure for his execution using the same legal approach he would have used to challenge the conditions of his prison. However, the Court declined to rule on whether the execution would be constitutional if the district court found that cutting through was indeed necessary, leaving that question for a case in which necessity had already been determined.

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley and Sons Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1205

Petitioner

Edith Jones, et al., on Behalf of Herself and a Class of Others Similarly Situated

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 369 (2004)

Granted

Monday, May 19, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, February 24, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 3, 2004

Advocates

Kevin C. Newsom (argued the cause for Respondent)

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Respondent)

H. Candace Gorman (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Petitioners, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

In November of 1996, Edith Jones and several other African Americans filed a class action lawsuit in federal district court against R.R. Donnelley and Sons, a commercial printing company. They claimed they had suffered racial discrimination in violation of section 1981 of United States Code (U.S.C.), which had no specified statute of limitations. Donnelley and Sons, however, argued that the section was bound by a two-year statute of limitations established by Illinois for all personal injury claims. The suit fell outside that statute of limitations, and the company argued that it should therefore be dismissed.

Jones, however, argued that a separate section of U.S.C. extended the statute of limitations to four years for any civil suit brought under an act of Congress passed after 1990. Because the 1991 Civil Rights Act had broadened the definition of section 1981, she argued, the four-year statute of limitations should apply to that section and the suit should therefore not be thrown out. Donnelley and Sons countered that the 1991 Civil Rights Act had merely amended the section, not created a new law, and that the four-year statute of limitations therefore did not apply.

A federal district court sided with Jones. A Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed.

Question

Does the United States Code's four-year statute of limitations for suits brought under acts of Congress passed after 1990 apply only to new laws, or does it also apply to amendments of previously existing laws?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jones, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 26 U.S.C. 1658

It also applies to amendments of previously existing laws. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice John Paul Stevens stated "[a]n amendment to an existing statute is no less an 'Act of Congress' than a new, stand-alone statute." The four-year statute of limitations therefore applies to any act or amendment to an act passed by Congress after 1990.

United States v. Lara

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:40 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-107

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Billy Jo Lara

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 193 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, September 30, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, January 21, 2004

Decided

Monday, April 19, 2004

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Alexander F. Reichert (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Bureau of Indian Affairs officials arrested Billy Jo Lara on the Spirit Lake Nation Reservation for public intoxication (though Lara is not a member of the reservation). During the arrest Lara attacked an officer.

A tribal court convicted Lara of assault. The federal government then indicted Lara for assaulting a federal officer. Lara moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the federal charges violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeapordy (being charged twice for the same crime). The district court denied Lara's motion. Lara then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his Fifth Amendment motion.

A panel of the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court ruling. However, the Eight Circuit reversed when it reviewed the case en banc (with the full court), ruling that Lara's federal charges violated the double jeapordy clause. The court reasoned that the only source of authority for Spring Lake Nation to prosecute a nonmember (like Lara) came from the federal Indian Civil Rights Act (1968). Because the federal government delegated this prosecutorial authority to Indian Tribes, charging Lara for the same crime in tribal and federal courts was essentially trying Lara twice under federal authority.

Question

Does the Indian Civil Rights Act (1968) give Indian tribes separate sovereignty to prosecute nonmembers (as opposed to delegating federal power to the tribes for prosecution purposes) such that prosecution in tribal and federal courts for the same crime would not violate the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for United States, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 1: Delegation of Powers

Yes. In an opinion written by Justice Stephen G. Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and three other Justices, the Court found that the right to prosecute nonmember Indians is inherent in the sovereignty of Native American tribes. Congress may constitutionally choose to restrict this right, but its choice not to (or its choice to relax earlier-imposed restrictions) is different from a delegation of federal prosecutorial power. Prosecuting a crime under both federal and tribal law, therefore, does not violate the Constitution.

Tennessee v. Lane

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1667

Petitioner

Tennessee

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

George Lane, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 509 (2004)

Granted

Monday, June 23, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, January 13, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 17, 2004

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondent United States)

William J. Brown (argued the cause for Respondents Lane and Jones)

Michael E. Moore (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

George Lane and Beverly Jones were disabled and could not access upper floors in Tennessee state courthouses. Lane, Jones, and several others sued Tennessee in federal district court, alleging that by denying them public services based on their disabilities, Tennessee was in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990). According to Title II, no person may be denied access to "services, programs, or activities" on the basis of his disability. The act allows alleged victims of discrimination to sue states for damages.

Tennessee asked that the case be dismissed, claiming that it was barred by the 11th Amendment's prohibition of suits against states in federal courts (the sovereign immunity doctrine). The state cited Alabama v. Garrett (2001), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Congress had acted unconstitutionally in granting citizens the right to sue states for disability discrimination (such as the denial of employment) under the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause. In that case the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress did not have enough evidence of disability discrimination by states to justify the waiver of sovereign immunity.

The district court rejected the state's argument and denied the motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed. The courts reasoned that because Title II of the ADA dealt with the Due process Clause of the 14th Amendment, not the equal protection clause, the ruling in Garrett did not apply. The court found that while Congress may not have had enough evidence of disability discrimination to waive sovereign immunity for equal protection claims, it did have enough evidence of Due Process violations (such as non-handicap-accessible courthouses) to waive the sovereign immunity doctrine for Due Process claims.

Question

Did the Americans with Disabilities Act violate the sovereign immunity doctrine of the 11th Amendment when, based on Congress's 14th Amendment enforcement powers of the Due Process clause, it allowed individuals to sue states for denying them services based on their disabilities?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Lane, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

No. In a 5-to-4 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that Congress had sufficiently demonstrated the problems faced by disabled persons who sought to exercise fundamental rights protected by the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment (such as access to a court). The Court also emphasized that the remedies required from the states were not unreasonable - they just had to make reasonable accommodations to allow disabled persons to exercise their fundamental rights. Because Title II was a "reasonable prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate end," and because Congress had the authority under the 14th Amendment to regulate the actions of the states to accomplish that end, the law was constitutional.

Muhammad v. Close

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-9065

Petitioner

Shakur Muhammad, aka John E. Mease

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mark Close

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 749 (2004)

Granted

Monday, June 16, 2003

Argued

Monday, December 1, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, February 25, 2004

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (argued the cause for Respondent)

Corinne A. Beckwith (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Prison officials sentenced Muhammad, a state prisoner, to seven days of special detention and 30 days of restricted privileges for insolence toward Close, a prison guard. Muhammad filed suit with a magistrate judge under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, seeking $10,000 in damages. Muhammad alleged Close had charged him with threatening behavior in retaliation for other proceedings against Close. Muhammad did not challenge his insolence conviction or punishment. The magistrate judge ruled that Muhammad lacked evidence proving Close acted in retaliation. The U.S. District Court agreed.

The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling for a different reason, citing the U.S. Supreme Court decision Heck v. Humphrey (1994). In Heck the Court held that when a prisoner seeks damages in a case that questions his sentence, the prisoner must first have successfully challenged the sentence itself or the conviction itself. The Court of Appeals held that because Muhammad's damages case questioned his sentence, he must first successfully appeal the sentence itself. Going further the Court of Appeals held that Heck applies to all challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings.

Question

Does the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey (1994) require that prisoners who challenge prison disciplinary proceedings - but whose suits do not question their sentences' validity - first successfully challenge their sentences?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Close, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts (42 USC 1983)

No. In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court ruled that prisoners - whose suits do not question their sentences - do not need to successfully challenge those sentences before challenging prison disciplinary proceedings. The Court rejected the argument that Heck necessarily requires successful sentence appeals before any challenges can be made to prison disciplinary proceedings. Muhammad's suit sought damages for prison disciplinary proceedings but in no way challenged his sentence.

General Dynamics Land Systems Inc. v. Cline

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1080

Petitioner

General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dennis Cline, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 581 (2004)

Granted

Monday, April 21, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, November 12, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, February 24, 2004

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Respondent, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Mark W. Biggerman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

General Dynamics Land Systems renegotiated its union contract to provide full health care benefits only to retirees who were more than 50 years old by a July 1, 1997, deadline. Union member Dennis Cline fell two years short of 50 at the time of the deadline and was excluded permanently from receiving health benefits.

Cline - along with 196 other 40-to 49-year-old employees - filed suit against General Dynamics under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). ADEA protects workers over 40 from age discrimination. Since the contract excluded workers between the ages of 40 and 49, Cline alleged that providing benefits only to retirees 50 and up was illegal age discrimination.

A U.S. district court in Ohio rejected Cline's claims. The court ruled that the ADEA does not recognize claims for "reverse discrimination" or preferential treatment for older people within the same over-40 class. Cline appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. The court ruled that General Dynamics was guilty of plain age discrimination, since the ADEA protects all persons over 40 from age discrimination by their employers.

Question

Does the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1967) prohibit "reverse discrimination" against workers over 40 (e.g., providing more favorable employer benefits to workers over 50 than to younger workers who are still over 40)?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for General Dynamics Land Systems Inc., 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Age Discrimination in Employment (ADEA)

No. Justice David H. Souter delivered the Court's 6-3 opinion that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's "text, structure, purpose, history, and relationship to other federal statutes show that the statute does not mean to stop an employer from favoring an older employee over a younger one." The Court cited a long-held understanding of the "ADEA as a remedy for unfair preference based on relative youth, leaving complaints of the relatively young outside the statutory concern." The Court also noted the findings section of the act included no evidence of younger workers being discriminated against in favor of older workers. Further "[i]f Congress had been worrying about protection the younger against the older, it would not likely have ignored everyone under 40."

Barnhart v. Thomas

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:51 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-763

Petitioner

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Pauline Thomas

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 20 (2003)

Granted

Monday, February 24, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, October 14, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, November 12, 2003

Advocates

Jeffrey A. Lamken (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Abraham S. Alter (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

After a heart attack left her unable to continue working as a housekeeper in the late 1980s, Pauline Thomas took a job as an elevator operator. By the mid- 1990s, however, Thomas's job and others like it were eliminated as elevators became automated. Thomas applied for Social Security disability benefits because she could not do other work. The Social Security Administration (SSA), however, rejected her claim because, it said, she was still able to perform the duties of her former position. The fact that it was nearly impossible to find such a position, the SSA held, did not entitle her to benefits under disability law. An administrative judge and a federal district court both upheld the SSA's position, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "a claimant's previous work must be substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy."

Question

Are persons eligible for Social Security disability benefits if they are still able to perform their jobs, but the jobs no longer exists in meaningful numbers in the national economy?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Barnhart, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Social Security, as amended, including Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act, but excluding Medicare, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children

No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the SSA's decision had been a reasonable interpretation of the statute and was therefore entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837. Justice Scalia wrote, "The proper Chevron inquiry is not whether an agency construction can give rise to undesirable results... but whether... the agency construction is reasonable. Here, the SSA's authoritative decision satisfies that test."

Raytheon v. Hernandez

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:47 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-749

Petitioner

Raytheon Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Joel Hernandez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 44 (2003)

Granted

Monday, February 24, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, October 8, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, December 2, 2003

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Petitioner, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Stephen G. Montoya (argued the cause for Respondent)

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1991, Joel Hernandez tested positive for cocaine use in a drug test administered by his employer. As a result of the incident, he was forced to resign. In 1994, he reapplied for a job from the company. His application was rejected. Hernandez claimed that the company was discriminating against him because of his drug and alcohol addiction (though at the time he reapplied he had been sober for two years) in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The district court sided with the company, dismissing the case before it ever went to trial. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed, however, holding that Raytheon's decision not to rehire Hernandez because of an incident related to his past addiction could constitute discrimination under the act.

Question

Does the Americans with Disabilities Act permit employers to refuse to rehire job applicants because of prior workplace rule infractions related to drug or alcohol addiction?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Raytheon, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Yes. The Court unanimously held that an employer may refuse to rehire an employee who was terminated in connection with drug or alcohol-related incidents as long as the refusal is based on a policy of not rehiring employees who previously violated workplace rules rather than on the worker's addiction. That is, an employer may refuse to hire someone who was terminated for coming to work under the influence, but may not refuse to hire someone whose previous addiction did not result in any workplace rule infractions. Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer took no part in this case.

Georgia v. Ashcroft

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-182

Appellee

Ashcroft

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Georgia

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 461 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, April 29, 2003

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 2003

Advocates

E. Marshall Braden (Argued the cause for the private intervenors)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the federal repondent)

David F. Walbert (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Following the 2000 Census, the Democratic-controlled Georgia legislature passed a redistricting plan that was backed by many black leaders because it would have spread black voters and influence across several districts rather than concentrating them in a select few. Georgia's Republican governor objected to the plan because he said it violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which discourages the dilution of minority voting strength. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the legislature's plan.

Question

Did the redistricting plan violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by spreading minority voters across several districts rather than concentrating them in a few heavily minority ones?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Georgia, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that the District Court failed to consider all the relevant factors when it examined whether Georgia's Senate plan resulted in a retrogression of black voters' effective exercise of the electoral franchise. The Court reasoned that Georgia likely met its burden of showing nonretrogression under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because the District Court focused too narrowly on certain districts without examining the increases in the black voting age population that occurred in many of the other districts and improperly rejected evidence that the legislators representing the benchmark majority-minority districts support the plan. In his dissent, Justice David H. Souter argued that Georgia had failed to carry its burden.

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-679

Petitioner

Desert Palace, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Costa

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 90 (2003)

Argued

Monday, April 21, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 9, 2003

Advocates

Mark J. Ricciardi (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Robert N. Peccole (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Irving L. Gornstein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Catharina Costa was fired from her job as a heavy equipment operator at Desert Palace Casino. She filed a sexual discrimination lawsuit, charging that the firing was the culmination of discrimination that had occurred during her employment. Jurors during the trial were instructed by the judge to rule for Costa if they determined that sex was a motivating factor in the firing, even if other (legal) factors were present as well. The jury ruled for Costa. Desert Palace appealed, saying that the instructions incorrectly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in the case. A three judge panel from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling for the casino, but a subsequent review of the case by all 11 judges of the 11th Circuit reversed the panel's decision.

Question

Must a plaintiff present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Costa, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Civil Rights Act of 1964

No. In a unanimous opinion Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that direct evidence is not required. Given that Title VII, on its face, does not mention that a plaintiff must make a heightened showing through direct evidence, the Court reasoned that in order to obtain an instruction a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice." "Because direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury," wrote Justice Thomas. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion.

Grutter v. Bollinger

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

The University of Michigan Law School Graduate Admissions

726 Oakland Avenue Ann Arbor MI 48104

Ann Arbor, MI 48104

United States

42° 16' 22.6524" N, 83° 44' 22.1352" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-241

Petitioner

Grutter

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bollinger

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 306 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, April 1, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 23, 2003

Advocates

Kirk O. Kolbo (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Maureen E. Mahoney (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (as amicus curiae, supporting Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's "critical mass" was the functional equivalent of a quota.

Question

Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bollinger, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. Justice O'Connor wrote, "in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race- conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants."

Gratz v. Bollinger

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

1220 Student Activities Building - Undergraduate Admissions

515 E. Jefferson Ann Arbor MI 48109

Ann Arbor, MI 48109

United States

42° 16' 55.1172" N, 83° 43' 28.4268" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-516

Petitioner

Gratz

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bollinger

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 244 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, April 1, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 23, 2003

Advocates

Kirk O. Kolbo (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

John A. Payton (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1995, Jennifer Gratz applied to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science and the Arts with an adjusted GPA of 3.8 and ACT score of 25. In 1997, Patrick Hamacher applied to the University with an adjusted GPA of 3.0, and an ACT score of 28. Both were denied admission and attended other schools. The University admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." In addition, the University has a policy to admit virtually all qualified applicants who are members of one of three select racial minority groups - African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans - that are considered to be "underrepresented" on the campus. Concluding that diversity was a compelling interest, the District Court held that the admissions policies for years 1995-1998 were not narrowly tailored, but that the policies in effect in 1999 and 2000 were narrowly tailored. After the decision in Grutter, Gratz and Hamacher petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 for a writ of certiorari before judgment, which was granted.

Question

Does the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Gratz, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violates both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI. While rejecting the argument that diversity cannot constitute a compelling state interest, the Court reasoned that the automatic distribution of 20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single "underrepresented minority" applicant solely because of race was not narrowly tailored and did not provide the individualized consideration Justice Powell contemplated in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause."

Clackamas Gastroenterology v. Wells

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:54:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1435

Petitioner

Clackamas Gastroenterology

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Wells

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 440 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, February 25, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, April 22, 2003

Advocates

Craig A. Crispin (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Steven W. Seymour (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Deborah Wells worked for Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. from 1986 until 1997. Wells filed suit, alleging that Clackamas Gastroenterology violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) when it terminated her employment. Clackamas moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not covered by the Act because it did not have 15 or more employees for the 20 weeks required by the ADA. This argument depended on the four physician- shareholders, who own the professional corporation and constitute its board of directors, not being counted as employees. In granting the motion, the District Court concluded that the physicians were more analogous to partners in a partnership than to shareholders in a corporation and therefore were not employees under the ADA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found no reasoned to permit the professional corporation to argue it was a partnership so as to avoid employment discrimination liability.

Question

Should four physicians actively engaged in medical practice as shareholders and directors of a professional corporation be counted as employees under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Clackamas Gastroenterology, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the common-law element of control is the principal guidepost to be followed in deciding whether the four director-shareholder physicians in this case should be counted as employees and listed six factors that are relevant to such a decision. "Because the District Court's findings appear to weigh in favor of concluding that the four physicians are not clinic employees, but evidence in the record may contradict those findings or support a contrary conclusion," the Court remanded the case for a determination under the new standard. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that the physician-shareholders function in several respects as common-law employees in their capacity as doctors performing everyday functions.

City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1269

Petitioner

City of Cuyahoga Falls

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Buckeye Community Hope

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 188 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, January 21, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, March 25, 2003

Advocates

Edward Kramer (Argued on behalf of respondents)

Glen D. Nager (Argued the case for the petitioners)

David B. Salmons (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of petitioners)

Facts of the Case

After the City Council of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio passed an ordinance authorizing construction of a low-income housing complex by the Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, a group of citizens filed a formal petition requesting that the ordinance be repealed or submitted to a popular vote. The voters passed the referendum repealing the ordinance. The Foundation filed suit, claiming that by submitting the site plan to voters, the City violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act. After the Ohio Supreme Court declared the referendum invalid under Ohio's Constitution, the District Court granted the City summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the Foundation had stated a valid Fair Housing Act claim and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the City had engaged in arbitrary and irrational government conduct in violation of substantive due process.

Question

Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that a low-income housing foundation's suit against a city for violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act could proceed to trial?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for City of Cuyahoga Falls, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals with regard to the Foundation's equal protection and substantive due process claims and vacated the appellate court's Fair Housing Act holding. Noting that the Foundation claimed injury from the referendum petitioning process and not from the referendum itself, the Court reasoned that statements made by private individuals during a citizen-driven petition drive do not, in and of themselves, constitute state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined.

Demore v. Kim

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:48 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1491

Petitioner

Demore

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kim

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 510 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, January 15, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, April 29, 2003

Advocates

Judy Rabinovitz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC section 1226(c), the Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who is removable from this country because he has been convicted of one of a specified set of crimes, including an aggravated felony. After Hyung Joon Kim, a lawful permanent resident alien, was convicted in state court of first-degree burglary and petty theft with priors, the Immigration and Naturalization Service charged him with being deportable and detained him pending his removal hearing. Kim filed a habeas corpus action challenging section 1226(c) on the ground that his detention violated due process because the INS had made no determination that he posed either a danger to society or a flight risk. The District Court granted Kim's petition. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the INS had not provided a justification for no-bail civil detention sufficient to overcome a permanent resident alien's liberty interest.

Question

Does the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides for no-bail, civil detention, violate a lawful permanent resident alien's liberty interest?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Demore, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Immigration and Naturalization, Immigration, Nationality, or Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts, as amended

No. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held, 6-3, that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to aliens challenging their detention under section 1226(c) and, 5-4, that detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that Congress, concerned that deportable criminal aliens may fail to appear for their removal hearings, has the authority to require that persons be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, dissented from the first holding, reasoning that the Act deprives federal courts of jurisdiction in such a case. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented from the Court's second holding. The minority argued against the Court's approval of lengthy mandatory detention.

Branch v. Smith

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1437

Appellee

Smith

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Branch

Respondent Type

Appellant

Consolidation

Smith v. Branch, No. 01-1596

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 254 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, December 10, 2002

Decided

Monday, March 31, 2003

Advocates

Robert B. McDuff (Argued the cause for the Appellants/Cross-Appellees Branch, et al)

James A. Feldman (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae)

Michael B. Wallace (Argued the cause for the Appellees/Cross-Appellants Smith, et al)

Facts of the Case

After the 2000 census caused Mississippi to lose one congressional seat, the State legislature failed to pass a new redistricting plan. Subsequently, lawsuits were filed in both the Mississippi State Chancery Court and the Federal District Court, asking that each court issue its own redistricting plan. While the federal court stayed its hand, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that the Chancery Court had jurisdiction to issue a redistricting plan. The Chancery Court adopted such a plan, which was submitted for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Meanwhile, the Federal District Court promulgated a plan that would fix the State's congressional districts for the 2002 elections should the state-court plan not be precleared by the state-law deadline. Ultimately, the District Court enjoined the State from using the state-court plan and ordered that its own plan be used in 2002 until the State produced a precleared, constitutional plan. The State did not appeal and no determination was made on the preclearance submission because the District Court's injunction rendered the state-court plan incapable of administration.

Question

Did the District Court properly enjoin the Mississippi state court's proposed congressional redistricting plan and properly fashion its own congressional reapportionment plan?Did the District Court properly enjoin the Mississippi state court's proposed congressional redistricting plan and properly fashion its own congressional reapportionment plan?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Smith, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Voting Rights Act of 1965

Yes. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held, 9-0, that the District Court properly enjoined enforcement of the state- court plan that lacked the required timely preclearance. The Court also held, 7-2, that the federal court properly fashioned its own congressional reapportionment plan, which drew the requisite single-member districts rather than directing at-large elections, under 2 USC section 2c. Regarding the second holding, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, reasoned that the provision for at-large elections under 2 USC section 2a(c) was subject to the requirement under section 2c that single-member districts must be drawn whenever possible. Justice John Paul Stevens, with whom Justices David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer joined, concluded that section 2c impliedly repealed section 2a(c). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, with whom Justice Clarence Thomas joined, disagreed with the plurality's interpretations of section 2c.

Chavez v. Martinez

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:54:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1444

Petitioner

Chavez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Martinez

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 760 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, December 4, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 2003

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Lawrence S. Robbins (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Richard S. Paz (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Oliverio Martinez was stopped while riding his bicycle home from work by police investigating narcotics violations. When police attempted to handcuff him, a struggle ensued, but it is unclear who started it. During the struggle, Martinez was shot, resulting in permanent paralysis and loss of vision. A year later he sued the officers, saying the search and use of deadly force were unconstitutional. The officers introduced as evidence in their defense a taped confession obtained while Martinez was receiving medical treatment in the hospital, in which he admitted to grabbing the gun of one of the officers during the struggle. Martinez claimed that the tape could not be used as evidence because he had not been read his Miranda rights. The district court ruled with Martinez that the tape was inadmissible. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed.

Question

Are a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be free from coercive questioning violated when he was subjected to coercive questioning while in police custody, even if his coerced statements were never used against him in a criminal case?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Chavez, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Self-Incrimination

No; the Court remanded the substantive due process portion of the question. In a 6-3 judgment delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Chavez did not deprive Martinez of his Fifth Amendment rights. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia, joined Justice Thomas. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, reasoned that Martinez's claim that his questioning alone was a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments could be recognized if a "core guarantee" would be placed at risk; however, Martinez could not make the showing necessary to expand protection of the privilege against self- incrimination. Regarding substantive due process, Justice Souter delivered a 5-4 holding concluding that the issue whether Martinez may pursue a claim of liability for a substantive due process violation should be addressed on remand.

Meyer v. Holley

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:54:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1120

Petitioner

Meyer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Holley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 280 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, December 3, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, January 22, 2003

Advocates

Douglas G. Benedon (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (Department of Justice, argued the cause as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Robert G. Schwemm (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

The Fair Housing Act (FHA) forbids racial discrimination in respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling. The Holleys, an interracial couple, alleged that a Triad real-estate corporation sales representative prevented them from buying a Triad-listed house for racially discriminatory reasons. The Holleys filed suit against the sales representative and David Meyer, Triad's president, sole shareholder, and licensed "officer/broker," claiming that he was vicariously liable for the sales representative's unlawful actions. The District Court dismissed the claims, stating that the FHA did not impose personal vicarious liability upon a corporate officer or a "designated officer/broker." In reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled that the FHA imposes strict liability principles beyond those traditionally associated with agent/principal or employee/employer relationships.

Question

Does the Fair Housing Act impose personal liability without fault upon an officer or owner of a residential real estate corporation for the unlawful activity of the corporation's employee or agent?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Meyer, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Housing

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the FHA does not impose liability without fault upon the employer in accordance with traditional agency principles. In other words, the FHA normally imposes vicarious liability upon the corporation, but not upon its officers or owners. In the absence of a clear indication of congressional intent to abrogate the common law principles of vicarious liability, the Court reasoned that neither the right of the officer to control the salesperson nor the overriding societal priority of the FHA's objectives warranted extending tort-related vicarious liability rules to include the officer. The Court also reasoned that nothing in the FHA supported imposing a non-delegable duty upon the officer to ensure that its salesperson did not discriminate.

Washington Dept. of Social & Health Services v. Guardianship of Keffeler

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:24 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1420

Petitioner

Washington Dept. of Social & Health Services

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Guardianship of Keffeler

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 371 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, December 3, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, February 25, 2003

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Teresa W. Roseborough (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Christine O. Gregoire (argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The State of Washington, through its Department of Social and Health Services, provides foster care to certain children. It also receives and manages Social Security benefits, which it uses to cover its costs, for many of those children. Such beneficiary children filed suit, alleging that the Department's use of their benefits to reimburse itself for the foster care costs violated the "anti-attachment" provision of Title II of the Social Security Act, which protects certain benefits from "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process." The trial court enjoined the Department from continuing to charge its foster care costs against Social Security benefits and ordered restitution of previous reimbursement transfers. The Washington Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the trial court's holding that the Department's practices violated the anti-attachment provision.

Question

Does the State of Washington's use of foster childrens' Social Security benefits to reimburse itself for some of its expenditures violate the provision of the Social Security Act that protects benefits from "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process?"

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Washington Dept. of Social & Health Services, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Social Security, as amended, including Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act, but excluding Medicare, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the state's use of the Social Security benefits to reimburse itself does not violate the Social Security Act's anti-attachment provision. The Court reasoned that the Department's effort to become a representative payee and its use of Social Security benefits did not amount to employing an "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process" within the meaning of the provision. The Court also noted that a ruing adverse to the state could disadvantage children in foster care.

United States v. Navajo Nation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1375

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Navajo Nation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 488 (2003)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, March 4, 2003

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (on behalf of the Petitioner)

Paul E. Frye (on behalf of the Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA) allows Indian tribes, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to lease the mining rights on their tribal lands to private companies. In 1964, Navajo Nation (tribe) entered into a lease with the predecessor of Peabody Coal Company, allowing Peabody to mine on the tribe's land in return for a royalty of 37.5 cents for every ton of coal mined. The agreement was subject to renegotiation after 20 years. By 1984, the tribe's royalty was only worth 2% of Peabody's gross proceeds. In 1977 Congress had required a minimum of 12.5%. The tribe requested that the Secretary set a new rate, and the Director of Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Navajo Area, as the Secretary's representative, made a preliminary decision to set the rate at 20%. Peabody's representatives urged the Secretary to reverse or delay the decision. The Secretary agreed, and urged the parties to resume negotiations. The tribe and Peabody agreed on a rate of 12.5%. In 1993, however, the tribe sued the government in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging a breach of trust and claiming $600 million in damages. The court ruled for the government, explaining that though the government may have betrayed the tribe's trust by acting in Peabody’s interest rather than the tribe’s, it had not violated any specific statutory or regulatory obligation. The tribe was therefore not entitled to monetary relief. On appeal, the tribe argued that the entirety of the IMLA imposes on the government a broad obligation to look after the wellbeing of the tribe. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court, finding that "the Secretary must act in the best interests of the Indian tribes."

Question

Can the U.S. be held liable for a breach of trust with an Indian Tribe in connection with the negotiation of a mining lease, even when the U.S. has violated no specific statutory or regulatory duty established in the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 25 U.S.C. 396

No. In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled that an Indian Tribe must "identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties." The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that the IMLA could not be interpreted to require the Secretary to exercise broad authority to manage the tribe's resources for the tribe's benefit. Instead, the tribe itself controls negotiations and the Secretary has a more limited role in approving the agreements. The Court concluded that no provision of the IMLA entitled the tribe to monetary damages as a result of the government's role in the negotiations. Justice Souter, joined by justices Stevens and O’Connor, wrote a dissent arguing that the Secretary's approval power must be exercised for the tribe's benefit, and monetary damages may be awarded if the power is misused.

United States v. White Mt. Apache Tribe

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1067

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

White Mt. Apache Tribe

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 465 (2003)

Argued

Monday, December 2, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, March 4, 2003

Advocates

Robert C. Brauchli (On behalf of the respondent)

Gregory G. Garre (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Under Public Law 86-392, the former Fort Apache Military Reservation is held in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The Tribe sued the federal government to rehabilitate the property, alleging that the United States had breached a fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair, and preserve it. In its motion to dismiss, the federal government argued that jurisdiction was lacking here because no statute or regulation could be read to impose a legal obligation on it to maintain or restore the trust property, let alone authorize compensation for breach. The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the complaint. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the federal government's property use triggered a common-law trustee's duty to act reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary of the Interior chose to utilize, which also supported a money damages claim.

Question

Does the Court of Federal Claims, under the Indian Tucker Act, have jurisdiction over the White Mountain Apache Tribe's suit against the United States for breach of fiduciary duty to manage land and improvements held in trust for the Tribe but occupied by the federal government?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for White Mt. Apache Tribe, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1505

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Public Law 86-392 gives rise to Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over the Tribe's suit. The Court reasoned that, although the statute providing for the land to be held in trust imposed no duties on the United States to maintain the land, the occupation of such land by the United States raised a duty to preserve trust assets and that it naturally followed that the United States was liable in damages for the breach of such duties. Justice Clarence Thomas, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined, dissented. Justice Thomas argued that the majority's opinion "radically alters the relevant inquiry from one focused on the actual fiduciary duties created by statute or regulation to one divining fiduciary duties out of the use of the word 'trust' and notions of factual control."

Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:04 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-705

Petitioner

Barnhart

Respondent

Peabody Coal Co.

Consolidation

No. 01-715

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 149 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, October 8, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, January 15, 2003

Advocates

John G. Roberts, Jr. (Argued the cause for the respondents Peabody Coal Company et al.)

Peter Buscemi (Argued the cause for the petitioners Holland, et al)

Barbara B. McDowell (Argued the cause for the petitioner Barnhart)

Jeffrey S. Sutton (Argued the cause for the respondents Bellaire Corporation, et al)

Facts of the Case

Under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, the Commissioner of Social Security "shall, before October 1, 1993," assign each coal industry retiree eligible for benefits under the Act to a company, which shall then be responsible for funding the beneficiary's benefits. After October 1, 1993, the Commissioner assigned 600 hundred beneficiaries to various coal companies. The companies challenged the assignments, claiming that the statutory date sets a time limit on the Commissioner's power to assign such that a beneficiary not assigned on October 1, 1993 must be left unassigned for life. Under the companies' argument, the challenged assignments are void and the corresponding benefits must be financed by other pension plans and funds. The companies obtained summary judgments, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Is the assignment of beneficiaries, under Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, valid if the assignment was made after the Act's October 1, 1993 deadline?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Barnhart, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 26 U.S.C. 9701

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the Commissioner's initial assignments made after October 1, 1993, are valid despite their untimeliness. The Court reasoned that a statute directing official action needed more than a mandatory "shall" before the grant of power would be read to expire when the job was supposed to be completed. Moreover, Justice Souter noted that the Act was designed to assign the greatest number of beneficiaries and read the statutory date as a spur to prompt action. Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissenting opinion. Both read the Act has establishing a clear deadline for the expiration of the Commissioner's authority.

Utah v. Evans

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:50 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-714

Appellee

Evans

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Utah

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 452 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, March 27, 2002

Decided

Thursday, June 20, 2002

Advocates

Theodore B. Olson (for the Federal Appellees)

Walter E. Dellinger, III (Argued the cause for the North Carolina Appellees)

Thomas R. Lee (Argued the cause for the appellants)

Facts of the Case

In conducting the 2000 census, the Census Bureau used "hot-deck imputation" to fill in certain gaps in its information and resolved certain conflicts in the data. Under this methodology, the Bureau imputes the relevant information by inferring that the address or unit about which it is uncertain has the same population characteristics as those of its geographically closest neighbor of the same type. Hot-deck Imputation increased North Carolina's population by 0.4% while increasing Utah's population by only 0.2% such that North Carolina will receive one more Representative and Utah one less than if the Bureau had simply filled relevant informational gaps by counting the related number of individuals as zero. Utah brought suit against the officials charged with conducting the census, claiming that the Bureau's use of hot-deck imputation violates 13 USC section 195, which prohibits use of "the statistical method known as 'sampling,'" and is inconsistent with Article 1, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution, which states that an "actual Enumeration be made." Utah sought an injunction compelling a change of the official census results. The District Court found for the Bureau.

Question

Does the Census Bureau's use of "hot-deck imputation," in the 2000 census, violate the statutory provision forbidding use of the statistical method known as sampling? Is this methodology inconsistent with the Constitution's statement that an "actual Enumeration be made?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Evans, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 13 U.S.C. 195

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the use of hot-deck imputation violates neither the statute nor the Constitution. The Court reasoned that, whereas sampling seeks to extrapolate the features of a large population from a small one, the Bureau's imputation process simply sought to fill in missing data as part of an effort to count individuals one by one and that these differences placed imputation outside the scope of the prohibitive statute. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that Article 1's wording that the "actual Enumeration" shall take place "in such Manner as" Congress itself "shall by Law direct," suggested a breadth of congressional methodological authority, rather than a limitation.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:46 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1406

Petitioner

Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Echazabal

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 73 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, February 27, 2002

Decided

Monday, June 10, 2002

Advocates

Samuel R. Bagenstos (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Lisa S. Blatt (Department of Justice, argued the cause, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Stephen M. Shapiro (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Beginning in 1972, Mario Echazabal worked for independent contractors at an oil refinery owned by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. When Echazabal applied for a job directly with Chevron, the company's physical examination revealed he had a liver condition, the cause identified as Hepatitis C. Chevron's doctors said that the condition would be exacerbated by continued exposure to toxins at the refinery. In response to Chevron's request that the refinery reassign Echazabal to a job without exposure to toxins or remove him, the contractor employing him laid him off. Echazabal filed suit, claiming that Chevron's action violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Under an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation that permits the defense that a worker's disability on the job would pose a direct threat to his health, Chevron defended its action. The District Court granted Chevron summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the regulation exceeded the scope of permissible rulemaking under the ADA.

Question

Does the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 permit the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulation that allows the defense that a worker's disability on the job would pose a direct threat to his health?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the ADA did not preclude the EEOC's regulation allowing the harm-to- self defense. The Court reasoned that deference applied to the regulation because it made sense of the statutory defense for qualification standards that are job-related and consistent with business necessity. The Court also found that the risk of violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) was enough to show that the regulation was permissible. "Although there may be an open question whether an employer would actually be liable under OSHA for hiring an individual who knowingly consented to the particular dangers the job would pose to him, there is no denying that the employer would be asking for trouble: his decision to hire would put Congress's policy in the ADA, a disabled individual's right to operate on equal terms within the workplace, at loggerheads with the competing policy of OSHA, to ensure the safety of 'each and 'every worker," wrote Justice Souter.

Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1770

Petitioner

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Rucker

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Oakland Housing Authority v. Pearlie Rucker, No. 00-1781

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 125 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, February 19, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, March 26, 2002

Advocates

Paul A. Renne (Argued the cause for the respondents)

James A. Feldman (Argued the cause for the petitioner in No. 00-1770)

Gary T. LaFayette (Argued the cause for the petitioners in No. 00-1781)

Facts of the Case

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, provides that each "public housing agency shall utilize leases...providing that...any drug-related criminal activity on or off [federally assisted low-income housing] premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy." Paragraph 9(m) of the leases of the tenants of the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) obligates them to "assure that the tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under the tenant's control, shall not engage in?any drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises." After the relations of four tenants were linked to drug activity, OHA instituted state-court eviction proceedings against respondents, alleging violations of lease paragraph 9(m) by a member of each tenant's household or a guest. The tenants filed an action, arguing that the Act does not require lease terms authorizing the eviction of the "innocent" tenants. The District Court's issuance of a preliminary injunction against OHA was affirmed by an en banc Court of Appeals.

Question

Does the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as amended, allow local public housing agencies to evict tenants for drug-related activity of non-tenant relatives or guests regardless of whether tenants knew, or should have known, about the activity?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Department of Housing and Urban Development, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1437

Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "Congress' decision not to impose any qualification in the statute, combined with its use of the term 'any' to modify 'drug- related criminal activity,' precludes any knowledge requirement." The Chief Justice also noted that it was reasonable for Congress to permit no-fault evictions in order to provide public housing that was decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs. Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the case.

Barnhart v. Walton

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

00-1937

Petitioner

Barnhart

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Walton

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

535 U.S. 212 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, January 16, 2002

Decided

Wednesday, March 27, 2002

Advocates

Kathryn L. Pryor (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income to individuals who have an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable...impairment...which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." After developing a serious mental illness, Cleveland Walton lost his job as a teacher in October 1994. Eleven moths later, Walton was working as a cashier. When Walton applied for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income, the Social Security Administration denied him benefits, reasoning that his "inability" to engage in substantial gainful activity lasted only 11 months. The District Court affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the 12-month duration requirement modifies "impairment" not "inability," that no similar duration requirement relates to an "inability," and that, therefore, Walton was entitled to benefits despite regulations restricting them to those unable to work for 12 months. Further, the appellate court concluded that Walton qualified for benefits since, prior to his return to work, his "inability" would have been "expected" to last 12 months.

Question

Does the term "inability," in the Social Security Act, include a 12 month requirement, such that the inability must last, or must be expected to last, for at least 12 months? Is the term "expected to last" applicable only when the "inability" has not yet lasted 12 months?

Conclusion

Yes and yes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Social Security Administration's interpretations of the statute fell within its lawful interpretative authority. Justice Breyer noted that the Administration has determined in both its formal regulations and its interpretation of those regulations that an "inability" must last the same amount of time as an "impairment," or last or be expected to last not less than 12 months. "The statute's complexity, the vast number of claims that it engenders, and the consequent need for agency expertise and administrative experience lead us to read the statute as delegating to the Agency considerable authority to fill in, through interpretation, matters of detail related to its administration," concluded Justice Breyer.