Cases by Issue - Judicial Power

Clapper v. Amnesty International USA

mgruhn — Mon, 02 Jul 2012 16:31:51 +0000

Location

District Court for the Southern District of New York

United States

40° 42' 50.0004" N, 74° 0' 7.1712" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

11-1025

Petitioner

James R. Clapper, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Amnesty International USA, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Decided By

Roberts Court (2010- )

Opinion

568 U.S. ___ (2013)

Granted

Monday, May 21, 2012

Argued

Monday, October 29, 2012

Decided

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Advocates

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the petitioners)

Jameel Jaffer (for the respondents)

Facts of the Case

Several groups, including attorneys, journalists, and human rights organizations, brought a facial challenge to a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The provision creates new procedures for authorizing government electronic surveillance of non-U.S. persons outside the U.S. for foreign intelligence purposes. The groups argue that the procedures violate the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment, Article III of the Constitution, and the principle of separation of powers. The new provisions would force these groups to take costly measures to ensure the confidentiality of their international communications. The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the groups did not have standing to bring their challenge. The groups only had an abstract subjective fear of being monitored and provided no proof that they were subject to the FISA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the groups had standing based on a reasonable fear of injury and costs incurred to avoid that injury.

Question

Do respondents have Article III standing to seek prospective relief under the FISA?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Clapper, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article III

No. Justice Samuel A. Alito, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the respondents did not have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because no injury occurred. Claiming a reasonable likelihood that their communications would be intercepted under FISA is not enough to show future injury for standing purposes. The Court also refused to acknowledge a present injury stemming from the respondents’ choice to take costly measures to protect their confidential communications.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the future harm to respondents is not speculative and therefore should be sufficient to establish standing. Since there is a high probability that the government will intercept at least some of the respondents’ communications, the respondents should have standing to bring the suit. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.

Empire HealthChoice Assurance v. McVeigh

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:59 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-200

Petitioner

Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc., dba Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Denise F. McVeigh, as Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph E. McVeigh

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Friday, January 6, 2006

Argued

Tuesday, April 25, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 15, 2006

Advocates

Thomas J. Stock (argued the cause for Respondent)

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Anthony F. Shelley (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In accordance with the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA), the Office of Personnel Management has negotiated a health insurance plan for federal employees with the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association. The plan requires the administrator to make a reasonable effort to recoup amounts paid for medical care from beneficiaries if those beneficiaries receive recoveries from another source (for example, a law suit or settlement against a third party that caused injury). In New York State, the plan is administered by Empire Healthchoice Assurance (Empire).

Empire brought suit in federal district court against the estate of Joseph McVeigh, a former federal employee who was injured in an accident and eventually won a settlement with the third party allegedly responsible for his injuries. Empire sought reimbursement for the money spent on McVeigh's medical care. Denise McVeigh, the administrator of Joseph McVeigh's estate, argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case under FEHBA and that it should be heard instead by the state court. The district court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Question

Under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959, are suits brought by insurers against beneficiaries to recoup medical expenses heard in federal or state court?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for McVeigh, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1331

In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that jurisdiction for this case lay in state court. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that while FEHBA stated that any claims against the United States would be heard in federal district court, it made no provisions for suits brought by insurers seeking to recoup medical expenses from private beneficiaries. Absent that specific provision, a significant conflict with an identifiable federal interest, or the need to resolve a substantial question of federal law in order to establish the insurer's right to recovery, there was no reason to depart from the ordinarily-governing state law. Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Souter and Alito dissented.

Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:41 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-409

Petitioner

Carl Kircher, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Putnam Funds Trust, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Friday, January 6, 2006

Argued

Monday, April 24, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 15, 2006

Advocates

Mark A. Perry (argued the cause for Respondents)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

The Security Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) states that class action lawsuits involving more than 50 plaintiffs alleging untruth or manipulation "in connection with the purchase or sale" of certain securities may be moved from state court to federal district court. In this case, several class action suits, each involving more than 50 investors in covered securities, were brought in various state courts over the devaluation of the plaintiffs' investments by Putnam Funds Trust and other mutual funds. The mutual funds asked to have the cases heard in federal court, and the state courts agreed. The federal district court sent the cases back to the state courts, however, finding that SLUSA does not cover suits over devaluation, only those related to purchases or sales. When the mutual funds appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs objected to the appeal because 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) prohibits appeals court review of federal district court decisions to remand cases to state court for lack of jurisdiction. The appeals court, however, found that the district court's decision had been substantive, not jurisdictional, and was therefore not covered by 1447(d). The appeals court then ruled that the plaintiff's claims could not be brought under SLUSA.

Question

Can a federal district court's decision to send a case back to state court because its removal to federal court was not required by the Security Litigation Uniform Standards Act be reviewed by a circuit court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. 1447(d)?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Kircher, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1447

No. In an opinion by Justice David Souter, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the district court's decision had been jurisdictional and that the appeals court's review was therefore barred by 1447(d). Quoting Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, Justice Souter wrote that "where the order is based on one of the [grounds enumerated in 28 U.S.C. 1447(c)], review is unavailable no matter how plain the legal error in ordering the remand."

Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corporation

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-433

Petitioner

Joseph Anza, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Ideal Steel Supply Corp.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, November 28, 2005

Argued

Monday, March 27, 2006

Decided

Monday, June 5, 2006

Advocates

Kevin P. Roddy (argued the cause for Respondent)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Ideal Steel Supply Corporation filed a civil suit against its competitor, National Steel Supply, Inc. in federal court. Ideal alleged that National had failed to charge sales tax for cash purchases, giving it a competitive (but fraudulent) advantage. Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, "[a]ny person injured in his business or property" by racketeering activity may bring a civil suit. Ideal argued that it had been injured through lost sales because of National's illegal lower prices, and therefore had standing to sue.

The federal district court disagreed, dismissing the suit because Ideal had not had any direct encounters with National or relied on their fraudulent tax records. A Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision, however, finding that a company can sue under RICO when its competitor uses racketeering to gain an advantage.

Question

Can a competitor be "injured in his business or property by reason of a violation" of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when the competitor is not the party defrauded and did not rely on the fraudulent behavior, but claims to have lost a competitive advantage because of the fraud?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Anza, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

No. Eight members of the Supreme Court agreed that Ideal did not have standing to bring the suit because the relationship between its injuries and the fraudulent conduct of National was too remote. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a seven-member majority, wrote that "[w]hen a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff's injuries. In the instance case, the answer is no." Justice Stephen Breyer wrote separately to say that the decisive factor in this case was not just the indirectness of the injury but also the fact that legitimate business practices (the lowering of prices) had actually caused it, even though those practices were made possible by the fraud. The ninth member - Justice Clarence Thomas - wrote that while he disagreed with the other justices' concern about directness, he too would have ruled in National's favor because the case had nothing to do with organized crime, RICO's original target.

Woodford v. Ngo

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:58 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

05-416

Petitioner

Jeanne S. Woodford, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Viet Mike Ngo

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

548 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, November 14, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, March 22, 2006

Decided

Thursday, June 22, 2006

Advocates

Jennifer G. Perkell (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Meir Feder (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), prisoners must exhaust any available administrative remedies for resolving disputes within the prison system before they can bring suit in federal court. Viet Mike Ngo filed a grievance with the California prison system, but it was dismissed because he had waited too long to file it. He then brought suit in federal district court. California objected, arguing that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies, and that the fact those remedies were no longer available to him because of his delay in filing was immaterial. The district court agreed, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that all of Ngo's administrative remedies were "exhausted" because they were no longer available to him.

Question

Does a prisoner satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995's requirement that he exhaust all administrative remedies available to him before bringing suit in federal court by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance which is rejected?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Woodford, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 42 U.S.C. 1997

No. In a 6-to-3 decision authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner must properly exhaust any available administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court. This understanding of the PLRA's exhaustion provision mirrors that of the traditional exhaustion provision in administrative law and is "substantively similar" to that of habeas corpus law. An alternative ruling, Justice Alito wrote, would allow prisoners to circumvent the obvious purpose of the act (channeling initial appeals through the administrative system rather than the courts) by simply waiting until their administrative appeals were no longer timely.

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:16 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1704

Petitioner

William W. Wilkins, Tax Commissioner for the State of Ohio, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Charlotte Cuno, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Wilkins v. Cuno, No. 04-1724

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, March 1, 2006

Decided

Monday, May 15, 2006

Advocates

Peter Enrich (argued the cause for Respondents)

Douglas R. Cole (argued the cause for Petitioners in No. 04-1724)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Petitioners in No. 04-1704)

Facts of the Case

As part of Ohio's economic development plan, DaimlerChrysler agreed to expand its operations in Toledo in exchange for tax exemptions and tax credits worth roughly $280 million. Charlotte Cuno and others challenged the deal, however, arguing that Ohio had violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by offering the tax incentives. A federal district court disagreed, ruling for DaimlerChrysler, but on appeal a panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The panel found that the tax incentives coerced businesses to expand in Ohio at the expense of other states, and were therefore unconstitutional manipulations of interstate commerce.

Question

Did Ohio violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution by giving businesses tax incentives to expand their manufacturing operations inside Ohio?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for DaimlerChrysler Corp., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

The Supreme Court did not reach the central question presented, finding instead that Cuno and the other plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the suit. Chief Justice John Roberts, for the unanimous Court, wrote that simply alleging standing based on their status as taxpayers in Ohio and Michigan did not give them a sufficiently strong interest in the case. The citizens from Ohio could not definitively show that the tax incentives had decreased the amount of money available to the state treasury (and thus increased their tax burden or decreased the services available to them) because the point of the incentive was to increase long-term tax revenue. The citizens from Michigan, meanwhile, could not show that any tax revenue increase in Michigan that could have resulted from DaimlerChrysler expanding there instead of in Ohio would have actually benefited them directly, because it might have been used for programs that they did not benefit from. Without any clear injury, they had no standing to sue.

Marshall v. Marshall

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:39 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1544

Petitioner

Vickie Lynn Marshall

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

E. Pierce Marshall

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2006-2009)

Opinion

547 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Tuesday, September 27, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, February 28, 2006

Decided

Monday, May 1, 2006

Advocates

G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. (argued the cause for Respondent)

Deanne E. Maynard (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Kent L. Richland (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Vickie Lynn Marshall (a.k.a. Anna Nicole Smith) was involved in a dispute in Texas Probate Court over the estate of her late husband, J. Howard Marshall. While the state-court proceedings were ongoing, Ms. Marshall filed for bankruptcy in federal court. E. Pierce Marshall, J. Howard's son, filed a claim alleging that Ms. Marshall had defamed him, and she filed a counterclaim alleging that E. Pierce had interfered with a gift she expected from her late husband's estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Ms. Marshall and awarded her a large monetary award. Later, the probate court found J. Howard's will valid and ruled for his son. Under the judicially-created "probate exception" to federal jurisdiction, federal courts do not interfere with state-court judgments concerning wills and estates. E. Pierce Marshall appealed the bankruptcy court decision (awarding Ms. Marshall a large monetary award) to federal district court, invoking the probate exception to argue that the court had no jurisdiction. The district court disagreed and ruled for Ms. Marshall, holding that since her claim did not require invalidating the will, the probate exception did not apply. The Ninth Circuit reversed, broadly interpreting the probate exception as covering any question that would normally be handled in probate court.

Question

(1) What is the scope of the "probate exception" to federal jurisdiction? (2) Does the exception apply to cases that do not directly involve the administration of a will or estate?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Marshall, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1334

In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the probate exception did not apply. The Court's opinion stressed the "distinctly limited scope" of the exception. The Justices explained that while the probate exception was intended to preserve state-court control over wills and estates, it does not remove from federal jurisdiction every suit arising out of probate matters. In Ms. Marshall's case, her claim did not directly involve the validation of J. Howard Marshall's will or the administration of his estate, so the exception did not apply and the federal courts had jurisdiction.

Will v. Hallock

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:10 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1332

Petitioner

Richard Will, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Susan Hallock, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, June 6, 2005

Argued

Monday, November 28, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, January 18, 2006

Advocates

Allison M. Zieve (argued the cause for Respondents)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

U.S. Customs Service agents investigating a child pornography website raided Susan and Richard Hallock's residence and seized several computers. The Hallocks were cleared of any guilt, but the computers were damaged beyond repair. Susan Hallock originally sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which waives the government's sovereign immunity in certain cases. The District Court dismissed that case for lack of jurisdiction, because the FTCA's waiver has an exception for claims arising from the detention of goods by customs. Hallock then sued Will and the other customs agents as individuals. The agents made a motion for dismissal under a provision of the FTCA that bars suits where a judgment on the claim has already been entered. The District Court denied the motion, accepting Hallock's argument that the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction did not constitute a final judgment. Although the trial had not yet concluded, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted the agents' appeal of the District Court's ruling on the motion and affirmed the District Court, ruling that since Hallock had not properly brought a claim in the original suit, no judgment had been entered. The Circuit Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the collateral order doctrine, under which some decisions of lower courts other than final judgments can be appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of the motion to dismiss, but instructed the parties to argue the question of the Circuit Court's authority to hear the appeal.

Question

1) If a claim under the FTCA is dismissed on the grounds that it is covered by one of the Act's exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity, is the dismissal a final judgment that bars a subsequent suit against the individual federal employees who were involved? 2) Did the Circuit Court have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to hear an appeal of the District Court's order?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Will, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1291

Unanswered, and no. In a unanimous opinion, the Court ruled that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Writing for the Court, Justice David Souter stressed the narrow scope of the doctrine. The Court reiterated that only orders that cannot be "effectively" reviewed after a final judgment can be appealed before the close of the trial. Essential to this determination is the importance of the interest at stake. In this case, the Court ruled that the agents' interest in appealing the District Court's order had no "greater importance than the typical defense of claim preclusion" and it therefore warranted "no immediate appeal of right as a collateral order."

Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:01 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-1186

Petitioner

Wachovia Bank, National Association

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Daniel G. Schmidt, III, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, June 13, 2005

Argued

Monday, November 28, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, January 17, 2006

Advocates

Sri Srinivasan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Andrew L. Frey (argued the cause for Petitioner)

James R. Gilreath (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Schmidt, a South Carolina citizen, sued Wachovia Bank in a South Carolina state court for fraudulently inducing him to participate in an illegal tax shelter. Wachovia is a national bank with its main office in North Carolina and branch offices in several other states, including South Carolina. Under federal diversity jurisdiction, federal courts can hear cases in which the parties are citizens of different states. Wachovia filed a petition in Federal District Court, seeking to compel arbitration of the dispute. After the petition was denied on the merits, Wachovia appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1348, national banks are "deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located." The Circuit Court interpreted "located" to mean any state where the bank has a branch location. Noting that the statute uses both "located" and "established" to refer to the presence of a bank, the Circuit Court determined that a national bank is "established" in the state where its main office is located, and "located" in every state where it has a branch office. Therefore, under the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, Wachovia was "located" in, and a citizen of, South Carolina (as well as several other states with branch offices). Since both parties, Schmidt and Wachovia, had South Carolina citizenship, the Circuit Court dismissed the case for lack of diversity jurisdiction.

Question

For the purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, is a national bank "located" in every state in which it maintains a branch office?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Wachovia Bank, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1348

No. In an 8-0 decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that a national bank is "located" in, and therefore a "citizen" of, only the state in which its main office is located. Looking to the history of Congress's diversity jurisdiction statutes, the Court concluded that the word "located" need not be interpreted to mean any state where a bank has a physical presence. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Fourth Circuit had erred in drawing a distinction between the words "located" and "established": "the Congress may well have comprehended the words 'located' and 'established,' as used in [Section] 1348, as synonymous terms." Justice Thomas took no part in the decision of the case.

Lockhart v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:31 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-881

Petitioner

James Lockhart

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, April 25, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, November 2, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, December 7, 2005

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (argued the cause for Respondents)

Brian Wolfman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 2002 the U.S. began withholding a portion of Lockhart's Social Security payments to offset his debt on federally reinsured student loans that were more than 10 years overdue. Lockhart sued, arguing the offset was barred by the 10-year statute of limitations of the Debt Collection Act (1982). The district court dismissed Lockhart's suit, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Question

Could the United States offset Social Security benefits to collect a student loan debt that had been outstanding for over 10 years?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 31 U.S.C. 3716

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Debt Collection Improvement Act made Social Security benefits subject to offset and that the Higher Education Technical Amendments removed the 10-year limit that would otherwise bar the offset.

Unitherm Food Systems v. Swift Eckrich

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:03 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-597

Petitioner

Unitherm Food Systems, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Swift-Eckrich, Inc., dba ConAgra Refrigerated Foods

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2006)

Granted

Monday, February 28, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, November 2, 2005

Decided

Monday, January 23, 2006

Advocates

Burck Bailey (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Malcolm L. Stewart (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Robert A. Schroeder (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

When ConAgra, Swift-Eckrich's parent company, attempted to enforce its patent for a process for browning precooked meats, Unitherm claimed that the patent was invalid because Unitherm's president had invented the process six years before. Unitherm sued, alleging that ConAgra had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by attempting to enforce a patent obtained by fraud. Pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ConAgra moved for judgment as a matter of law, asking the Disrict Court to dismiss the case based on insufficiency of evidence. The court denied the motion and sent the case to the jury, which returned a verdict for Unitherm. ConAgra appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, again arguing that the evidence was insufficent to prove an antitrust violation. However, ConAgra did not renew the motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict, pursuant to Rule 50(b), or move for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59. Normally, parties must file the Rule 50(b) motion after an unfavorable verdict in order to obtain judgment as a matter of law on appeal. Unitherm argued that since ConAgra had failed to renew its motion under Rule 50(b), the Court of Appeals could not consider the insufficiency-of-evidence claim. ConAgra took the position that renewal of the motion is optional. The Federal Circuit considered itself bound to apply the precedent of the relevant regional Circuit Court (the Tenth), under which Rule 50(b) is indeed optional, in contrast to the precedents of the other Circuit Courts. The Federal Circuit found the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdict, so it reversed the District Court and ordered a new trial. Unitherm appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the procedural dispute.

Question

May a court of appeals review the sufficiency of evidence supporting a jury's verdict if the appellant failed to renew the motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) or move for a new trial under Rule 59?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Unitherm Food Systems, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court ruled that a party must renew its motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) if the motion is to be the basis for an appeal. The District Court's denial of the initial Rule 50(a) motion could not itself form the basis of an appeal, because the denial was within the District Court's discretion. "The only error here," Justice Thomas noted, "was counsel's failure to file a postverdict motion pursuant to Rule 50(b)." Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent, joined by Justice Kennedy, arguing that in exceptional cases courts of appeals can consider substantive issues even when procedural oversights by appellants would normally preclude them.

Maryland v. Blake

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:09 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-373

Petitioner

Maryland

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Leeander Jerome Blake

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, April 18, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, November 1, 2005

Decided

Monday, November 14, 2005

Advocates

Kenneth W. Ravenell (argued the cause for Respondent)

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Kathryn Grill Graeff (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

Following his arrest for murder, Leeander Blake invoked his right to speak with a lawyer. Before Blake's attorney arrived, however, an officer and a detective approached Blake to give him a copy of the charges against him. The statement of the charges included "DEATH" as a possible penalty, although Blake was 17 years old and therefore too young to face the death penalty. The officer said to Blake "I bet you want to talk now, huh!" The detective then said "No, he doesn't want to talk to us. He already asked for a lawyer. We cannot talk to him now." A half hour later Blake decided to speak to the police without his lawyer, and he proceeded to make incriminating statements about the murder. At trial, Blake argued that the incriminating statements were the product of an illegal interrogation, and therefore inadmissible. (Under Edwards v. Arizona, police must cease interrogating a suspect after he requests an attorney, unless the suspect waives his previous request.) A county circuit court agreed with Blake, and ruled the statement inadmissible. On appeal, Maryland argued that Blake's interaction with the officer and the detective did not constitute an interrogation, because the officer's statement was a mere rhetorical question, and in any case was quickly corrected by the detective. An intermediate state appeals court agreed and allowed the statement to be admitted as evidence. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that the detective's correction did not reduce the severity of the officer's inappropriate statement. Since the officer's statement was ruled an illegal interrogation in violation of Blake's Miranda rights, the incriminating statement could not be used as evidence at trial.

Question

When a police officer improperly communicates with a suspect after the suspect has invoked his right to an attorney, does Edwards v. Arizona permit consideration of curative measures by the police (such as the detective's quick correction of the officer's improper statement) to conclude that a suspect later initiated communication with the police?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Blake, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Unanswered. Shortly after oral argument, the Court dismissed the case. The anonymous Per Curiam opinion stated simply: "The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted."

Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:00 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-712

Petitioner

Lincoln Property Company, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Christophe Roche, et ux.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Decided By

Roberts Court (2005-2006)

Opinion

546 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, February 28, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, October 11, 2005

Decided

Tuesday, November 29, 2005

Advocates

Gregory P. Joseph (argued the cause for Respondents)

David C. Frederick (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Christophe and Juanita Roche leased an apartment in Virginia managed by Lincoln Property Company. The Roches sued Lincoln, which they identified as a Texas company, and other defendants in state court, alleging a variety of problems that arose from their exposure to toxic mold in their apartment. Lincoln moved the litigation to a federal district court, citing diversity of citizenship, which arises when opposing parties are from different states. The Roches then asked that the case be sent back to state court because there was no diversity of citizenship. Rather, one of the partners in the Lincoln-owned subsidiary partnership resided in Virgina. The court denied the motion and held that Lincoln was a Texas citizen. The Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that Lincoln failed to show complete diversity of citizenship, because it did not disprove the exsistence of an affiliated Virginia entity that was a real party in interest.

Question

Could defendants remove an action on the basis of diversity of citizenship if there was complete diversity between all named plaintiffs and all named defendants, and no defendant was a citizen of the forum state?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Lincoln Property Co., 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1441

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Lincoln did not need to negate the existence of a potential defendant whose presence in the action would destroy diversity. To remove the suit to federal court, Lincoln only needed to show complete diversity between all named plaintiffs and all named defendants.

Bell v. Thompson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-514

Petitioner

Ricky Bell, Warden

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Gregory Thompson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Tuesday, April 26, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Matthew M. Shors (argued the cause for Respondent)

Jennifer L. Smith (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Tennessee trial court sentenced Thompson to death for murder. Thompson made unsuccesful appeals in state court based on the claim that his counsel had failed to adequately investigate his mental health. A federal district court also rejected Thompson's petition based on that claim. However, Thompson's habeas counsel had failed to include in the record the deposition and report of a psychologist who argued Thompson had suffered from serious mental illness. The counsel included the documents when Thompson appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which nevertheless dismissed Thompson's claim. Thompson then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate until the Court decided whether to hear the case. The Court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate again, pending the Supreme Court's decision on Thompson's petition for rehearing, which the Court denied. The Sixth Circuit still did not issue its mandate. Five months later, Tennessee had set Thompson's execution date. The Sixth Circuit suddenly issued an amended opinion on Thompson's habeas petition, overturning the district court's dismissal of his ineffective counsel claim and ordering hearings based on that claim. The Sixth Circuit included in the appeal record the initially ommitted psychologist deposition. The circuit court argued its authority to issue an amended opinion five months after the Supreme Court denied Thompson's petition was based on its inherent power to reconsider an opinion before issuance of the the mandate.

Question

After the U.S. Supreme Court had denied certiorari and a petition for rehearing to a death-row prisoner's case, did the Sixth Circuit abuse its discretion by withholding its mandate in the case for more than five months without entering a formal order?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Bell, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Sixth Circuit abused its discretion by withholding its mandate and not releasing its amended opinion for more than five months after the Supreme Court's final say in the case. The Sixth Circuit cost the state and the parties significant time and resources by not providing notification that it was reconsidering its decision. Further, the Sixth Circuit had the opportunity at the rehearing stage to consider the same mental health arguments it later adopted. Moreover, the evidence and its ommission did not warrant the court's "extraordinary departure from standard procedures." By withholding its mandate for months, the Court said, the Sixth Circuit failed to give the "appropriate level of respect" to Tennessee's judgment that Thompson deserved death. Notably, the Court declined to consider the scope of the appellate courts' Federal Appellate Procedure 41 authority to stay a mandate following a denial of certioarari.

Gonzalez v. Crosby

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:22 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-6432

Petitioner

Aurelio O. Gonzalez

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

James V. Crosby, Jr., Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 14, 2005

Argued

Monday, April 25, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

Christopher M. Kise (argued the cause for Respondent)

Patricia A. Millett (argued the cause for Respondent)

Paul M. Rashkind (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In Artuz v. Bennett (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court held that state petitions for postconviction relief could toll the federal statute of limitations even if those petitions were ultimately dismissed as procedurally barred. Gonzalez, whose federal habeas petition had been dismissed as time barred, filed a new petition (a Rule 60[b] petition) in light of the Artuz ruling. The district court denied Gonzalez's new motion. The 11th Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that Gonzalez's latest motion amounted to a second or succcessive habeas petition which could not be filed without precertification by the court of appeals.

Question

Did Gonzalez's Rule 60(b) motion constitute a second or successive habeas petition?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Crosby, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Appellate Procedure (or relevant rules of a circuit court)

No. In 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Gonzalez's Rule 60(b) motion challenged only the district court's previous ruling on the federal statute of limitations. That motion was therefore not the equivalent of a successive habeas petition and could be ruled on by the district court without the 11th Circuit's precertification.

Graham County Water District v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:11 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-169

Petitioner

Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States, ex rel. Karen T. Wilson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Wednesday, April 20, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Christopher G. Browning, Jr. (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Mark T. Hurt (argued the cause for Respondent)

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The False Claims Act (FCA) allows the government or an individual on the government's behalf to sue any person for "making false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States." A 1986 amendment to the FCA allows individuas to sue their employer if the employer retaliates against them in any way for assisting in an investigation of such false claims. In 2001, Karen Wilson, a secretary for Graham County Water District, sued her employer for various false claims it allegedly made concerning a federal disaster relief program. She also brought a retaliation suit against her employer, alleging that after she had provided information on the false claims to federal officials in December 1995, she had been repeatedly harassed by Graham County District officials until she resigned in March 1997. The District Court dismissed Wilson's suit as untimely. The court accepted Graham County District's argument that the six-year statute of limitations in the 1986 amendment to the FCA was not intended to apply to retaliation suits. Therefore, the court held, the most closely analogous state limitation applies instead. The north Carolina limit for retaliation suits was three years, so Wilson's suit was brought too late. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court and applied the six-year limitation to all retaliation suits under the FCA.

Question

Does the six-year statute of limitations in the False Claims Act apply to suits brought by individuals who were retaliated against by their employers for assisting an investigation of false or fraudulent claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Graham County Water District, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Federal False Claims

No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that the six-year statute of limitations did not apply to suits for retaliation. The majority opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas found the statute of limitations "ambiguous." The ambiguity arose from the fact that the six-year limitation in the FCA starts from the time the false claim was made. Yet in a retaliation suit, no actual false claim needs to be alleged. The plaintiff only has to allege that her employer retaliated against her in connection with a federal investigation. The Court found that the ambiguity could be resolved by interpreting the statute of limitations to apply only to suits for false claims, not to retaliation suits. The Court left to the lower courts the question of which state statute of limitations should apply in place of the six-year limitation. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. The dissent characterized the statute of limitations as "unusual" but "reasonably clear," and argued that it should be read to apply to retaliation actions.

Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:02 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-603

Petitioner

Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Darue Engineering & Manufacturing

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, January 7, 2005

Argued

Monday, April 18, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 13, 2005

Advocates

Eric H. Zagrans (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Irving L. Gornstein (argued the cause for Respondent)

Michael C. Walton (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

The IRS seized property owned by Grable and gave Grable notice by certified mail before selling the property to Darue. Grable sued in state court, claiming Darue's title was invalid because federal law required the IRS to give Grable notice of the sale by personal service, not certified mail. Darue removed the case to federal disctrict court, arguing that the case presented a federal question because Grable's claim depended on an interpretation of federal tax law. The district court agreed and ruled for Darue. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision.

Question

Did a case involving the interpretation of federal tax law belong in federal court and not the state court where it was filed?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Darue Engineering, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that the case involved a federal question and could thus be removed to federal court. Federal-questions jurisdiction, the Court reasoned, lay over some state-law claims that implicated significant federal issues. In this case, the national interest in providing a federal forum for federal tax litigation warranted moving the case to federal court.

National Cable and Telecomm. Assn v. Brand X Internet Services

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:21 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-277

Petitioner

National Cable & Telecommunications Association, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Brand X Internet Services, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Federal Communications Commission and United States v. Brand X Internet Services et al., No. 04-281

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 3, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 29, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 27, 2005

Advocates

Paul T. Cappuccio (argued the cause for Petitioners in 04-277)

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Petitioners in 04-281)

Thomas C. Goldstein (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, which was amended in 1996, subjected providers of "telecommunications service" to mandatory common- carrier regulation. The FCC concluded that this did not include broadband cable companies. The Ninth Circuit reversed and cited its own previous opinion that had held that cable modem service was a "telecommunications service."

Question

Did the FCC lawfully interpret the Communications Act of 1934 by deciding that broadband cable companies did not provide a "telecommunications service?"

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for National Cable and Telecomm. Assn, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Communication Act of 1934

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the FCC lawfully construed the Communications Act to not define cable broadband providers as "telecommunications services." The Court held that the Ninth Circuit should have followed the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. That decision required federal courts to defer to an agency's construction of a statute, if that statute was within the agency's jurisdiction to administer and the agency's interpretation was reasonable, even if it differed from the court's own interpretation. In this case, the Court held that the FCC's construction was reasonable.

Medellin v. Dretke

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:46:54 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-5928

Petitioner

Jose Ernesto Medellin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 660 (2005)

Granted

Friday, December 10, 2004

Argued

Monday, March 28, 2005

Decided

Monday, May 23, 2005

Advocates

R. Ted Cruz (argued the cause for Respondent)

Michael R. Dreeben (argued the cause for Respondent)

Donald Francis Donovan (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A Texas trial court sentenced Medellin, a Mexican citizen, to death for participating in the gang rape and murder of two girls in 1993. A state appeals court affirmed the conviction. Medellin then filed a state habeas corpus action, claiming that Texas failed to notify him of his right to counsel under the Vienna Convention. The state trial court and the appellate court rejected this claim. Medellin then filed a federal habeas petition, raising the Vienna Convention claim. The district court denied the petition. Medellin next appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Before the Fifth Circuit could rule, the International Court of Justice issued its decision in a case where Mexico had alleged the United States violated the Vienna Convention with respect to Medellin and other Mexican citizens facing the death penalty in the United States. The ICJ held that the United States had violated the individually enforceable rights guaranteed by Vienna and must reconsider the convictions. The Fifth Circuit rejected Medellin's appeal, citing its previous holdings that the Vienna Convention did not create an individually enforceable right. More than two months after the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, President George W. Bush issued a memo requiring the United States to follow the ICJ's ruling by having state courts review the Mexicans' cases. Citing the memo and the ICJ ruling, Medellin filed a new appeal in a Texas state court.

Question

Is a federal court bound by the International Court of Justice's ruling that U.S. courts must reconsider a Mexican citizen's claim for relief under the Vienna Convention? 2. Should a federal court enforce an ICJ ruling?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Dretke, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that Medellin had not exhausted his state court appeals and sent the case back to Texas state court.

Dodd v. United States

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-5286

Petitioner

Michael Donald Dodd

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Monday, November 29, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 22, 2005

Decided

Monday, June 20, 2005

Advocates

Janice L. Bergmann (argued the cause for Petitioner)

James A. Feldman (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, Dodd was convicted under federal law for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. On April 4, 2001 he filed a motion that the conviction should be set aside because it was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1999 in Richardson v. U.S. In that case, the Court held that a jury must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific violations that constitute the continuing criminal enterprise. The district court rejected Dodd's motion, because it was filed more than a year after the Court decided Richardson. Under federal law, the one-year limitation period in which a prisoner may file a motion to change his sentence, begins "on the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." The 11th Circuit affirmed.

Question

Is the start date for a federal prisoner's one-year limitation period the date on which the Court "initially recongized" the right asserted in an applicant's motion, or the date on which the right is "made retroactive?"

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the text of the federal law "unequivocally" stated that the one-year limitation period begins to run on the date on which the Court "initially recongized" the right, not the date on which that right was made retroactive. O'Connor wrote that Dodd's reliance on the statute's second clause was misplaced, because that clause merely limited the subsection's applicability to cases where applicants assert rights both "newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made applicable to cases on collateral reviiew." Thus, the date the right was asserted does not apply at all unless the second clause's conditions are met. The Court noted that this would make it difficult for applicants filing second or successive motions to obtain relief, since the Court rarely announces a new rule and makes it retroactive within a year.

Exxon Corp v. Allapattah Services

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:26 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

04-70

Petitioner

Exxon Mobil Corporation

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Allapattah Services, Inc., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Maria del Rosario Ortega, et al. v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., No. 04-79

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

545 U.S. ___ (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, March 1, 2005

Decided

Thursday, June 23, 2005

Advocates

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Petitioner in 04-70)

Eugene E. Stearns (argued the cause for Respondents in 04-70)

Robert A. Long, Jr. (argued the cause for Respondent in 04-79)

Donald B. Ayer (argued the cause for Petitioner in 04-79)

Facts of the Case

In 1991 about 10,000 Exxon dealers sued Exxon Corporation in federal court, alleging that the corporation had engaged in an extensive scheme to overcharge them for fuel. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, but the District Court judge certified the case for review on the question of supplemental jurisdiction. Some of the multiple plaintiffs in the case had claims that did not meet the minimum amount necessary to qualify for federal diversity jurisdiction (currently $75,000). In 1990 Congress had enacted 28 U.S.C. Section 1367, overturning Finley v. United States, which had narrowly interpreted federal courts' power to confer supplementary jurisdiction on related claims. The question for the District Court was whether Section 1367 also overturned Zahn v. International Paper Co., which ruled that each plaintiff had to separately meet the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement. The District Court accepted the plaintiffs' argument that Section 1367 gave federal courts power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs with related claims, even if some plaintiffs' claims did not meet the required amount. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling on supplemental jurisdiction. However, this ruling conflicted with the ruling of another Circuit, which had taken the opposite view of Section 1367's scope (see Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, No. 04-79). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for argument.

Question

In a civil action where one plaintiff's claim satisfies the minimum amount-in- controversy requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction, and another plaintiff's related claim does not, does 28 U.S.C. Section 1367 allow federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim that is less than the required amount?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Allapattah Services, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1367

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that as long one plaintiff meets the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction, Section 1367 authorizes federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related claims even if they do not meet the requirement. The majority opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy held that courts only need to determine whether they have original jurisdiction over one of the claims in a case. If they do, courts can then decide to extend supplemental jurisdiction to the other related claims. The Justices ruled that to require each claim in a civil action to meet the requirement would be "inconsistent with the whole notion of supplemental jurisdiction." The Court based its ruling on the "unambiguous[]" text of the statute, saying "the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material." Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court should have consulted the legislative history of Section 1367. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Breyer, wrote a dissent arguing for a narrower interpretation of Section 1367 that would not overturn Zahn.

Pace v. DiGuglielmo

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:25 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9627

Petitioner

John A. Pace

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

David DiGuglielmo, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Graterford, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 408 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, February 28, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, April 27, 2005

Advocates

Ronald Eisenberg (argued the cause for Respondents)

David Wycoff (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

In 1986 John Pace was convicted for murder in a Pennsylvania court. His post- conviction appeal was rejected by the state courts as untimely. In 1999 he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. While federal law provides a one-year statute of limitations on filing habeas petitions, that period is tolled while "a properly filed" state appeal is pending. The district court found Pace entitled to both statutory and equitable tolling, effectively discounting the period of time when Pace pursued appeals in state courts. Pennsylvania appealed and argued the court had no basis for the extension. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and ruled Pace could not file a federal habeas petition.

Question

If a state court rejected Pace's post-conviction appeal as untimely, could his federal habeas petition still be "properly filed" within the context of the federal law establishing a one-year statute of limitations for such petitions?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for DiGuglielmo, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the federal statute of limitations barred Pace's petition, as it was filed beyond the deadline. Pace was not entitled to statutory tolling because a petition filed after a time limit, which does meet any exceptions to that limit, was no more "properly filed" than a petition filed after a time limit permitting no exception. Moreover, because Pace did not pursue claims in a "diligent" and timely fashion, he was not entitled equitable tolling for any of the time period during which he pursued his state appeals.

Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Industries

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-1696

Petitioner

Exxon Mobil Corporation, Exxon Chemical Arabia, Inc., and Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Saudi Basic Industries Corporation

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 280 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, October 12, 2004

Argued

Wednesday, February 23, 2005

Decided

Wednesday, March 30, 2005

Advocates

Gregory S. Coleman (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Two subsidiaries of ExxonMobil formed joint ventures with Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC) to produce polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. When a dispute arose over the royalties SABIC had charged, SABIC sued the two subsidiaries in a Delaware state court, seeking a ruling that the royalties were proper. ExxonMobil countersued in federal district court, alleging SABIC had overcharged. Before the state-court trial, the district court denied SABIC's motion to dismiss the federal suit. As SABIC appealed, the Delaware court ruled for ExxonMobil. The Third Circuit held that as a result of of the state court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the suit. That doctrine was an offshoot of the federal law giving the U.S. Supreme Court sole authority to modify and prohibiting a federal district court from exercising appellate jurisdiction.

Question

Did the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bar a suit that was filed in federal district court before a state court ruled on the petitioner's related claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Exxon Mobil, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the the Third Circuit "misperceived the narrow ground occupied by Rooker-Feldman." That doctrine was confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of state-court judgments made before the federal district court proceedings began and inviting district court rejection of those judgments. In this case, ExxonMobil's federal suit was filed before any state- court judgment and had not sought the review of any such judgment. Rather, the company had sought to protect itself in the event it lost in state court on grounds that might not have precluded relief in federal court. Moreover, in cases of parallel state and federal litigation, Rooker-Feldman was not triggered simply by the entry of a state court judgment. Properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction did not vanish if a state court reached judgment on the same or a related question while the case remained before a federal district court. Rooker-Feldman did not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or add to the circumscribed doctrines allowing federal courts to dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court actions.

Johnson v. U.S.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:53 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9685

Petitioner

Robert Johnson, Jr.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 295 (2005)

Granted

Tuesday, September 28, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, January 18, 2005

Decided

Monday, April 4, 2005

Advocates

Courtland L. Reichman (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Dan Himmelfarb (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

In 1998 a Georgia court reversed all of Johnson's seven prior convictions. One of these had been the basis for the enhanced federal sentence Johnson had received in 1994. In light of the reversals, Johnson filed a motion to vacate his enhanced federal sentence. Federal law, however, set out a one-year statute of limitations on motions by prisoners seeking to modify their sentences. That one-year period ran from the latest of four dates, the last of which was "the date on which the facts supporting the claim...could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." Johnson argued his motion was timely because the reversals constituted previously undiscoverable "facts supporting the claim" and thus triggered a renewed limitation period. The district court and the 11th Circuit denied Johnson's motion as untimely.

Question

Is the vacating of a state conviction a "fact" as that term is used in the federal law setting out a statute of limitations on federal sentence modification motions, thus commencing the statute's 1-year limitations period?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for U.S., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court that the vacating of a state sentence that underlay a federal sentence enhancement was a "fact" within the meaning of the law, but that fact had to have been discovered with due diligence: that is, the prisoner must have promptly sought to have the state judgment vacated. The Court held that by waiting until more than three years after his federal sentence, Johnson failed to show due diligence in seeking to have his original state convictions vacated.

Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:42 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-184

Petitioner

Estate of Burton W. Kanter, Deceased, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

Estate of Burton W. Kanter, Deceased, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 03-1034

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

544 U.S. 40 (2005)

Granted

Monday, April 26, 2004

Argued

Tuesday, December 7, 2004

Decided

Monday, March 7, 2005

Advocates

Stephen M. Shapiro (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Thomas G. Hungar (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Under federal law, the Tax Court could appoint special trial judges to hear certain cases and to make recommendations to the Tax Court. The Tax Court judge, under Tax Rule 183(b), had to presume the special judge's fact findings to be correct, but could make the ultimate decision in the case. The special trail judge reports were made public and included in the record on appeal. Only after a rule revision in 1983 did the Tax Court stop making such reports public and exclude them from the appellate record. Whether the final Tax Court's decision deviated from the special judge's recommendations was kept secret. Tax Court Judge Howard Dawson ruled that Kanter was guilty of tax fraud and of illegally diverting money to Claude Ballard, a business associate. In his opinion, Dawson claimed to have adopted the opinion of the special trial judge. Ballard and Kanter separately appealed, objecting to the absence of the special trial judge's report from the appellate record. Two federal appellate courts ruled against Kanter and Ballard.

Question

Could the Tax Court exclude from the record on appeal Rule 183(b) reports submitted by special trial judges?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Ballard, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that no statute authorized, and Rule 183's text did not warrant, the concealment of the special report. Rule 183 did not allow the "novel practice" of treating the trial judge's opinion as an "in-house draft to be worked over collaboratively by the regular Tax Court judge and the special trial judge." The rules allowed only one trial judge opinion to be issued and before a separate Tax Court ruling, Ginsburg wrote. It would be impossible for a Tax Court judge to give deference to an opinion he himself collaborated in producing. Moreover, the Tax Court's refusal to disclose the trial judge's original report did not allow fully informed appellate review of the court's decision.

Howell v. Mississippi

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:05 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-9560

Petitioner

Marlon Latodd Howell, aka Marlon Cox

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Mississippi

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 440 (2005)

Granted

Monday, June 28, 2004

Argued

Monday, November 29, 2004

Decided

Monday, January 24, 2005

Advocates

Ronnie M. Mitchell (argued the cause for Petitioner)

James M. Hood, III (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

A Mississippi court convicted Marlon Howell of capital murder - murder committed during a felony - and sentenced him to death. Howell appealed and argued the trial court was wrong to deny the jury the option of finding Howell guilty of the lesser offenses of non-capital murder or manslaughter, for which the death penalty would not have been an option. The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled against Howell and said there was no evidence to support lesser charges.

Question

1.) In death penalty cases can a state court refuse to give a jury the option of finding a defendant guilty of at least one lesser offense if it is recognized by state law and supported by evidence? 2.) Was Howell's federal constitutional claim properly raised before the Mississippi Supreme Court?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Mississippi, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1257

In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the case because Howell had not first raised his federal constitutional claims in state court.

Kowalski v. Tesmer

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:44 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-407

Petitioner

John F. Kowalski, Judge, 26th Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

John C. Tesmer, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 125 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, January 20, 2004

Argued

Monday, October 4, 2004

Decided

Monday, December 13, 2004

Advocates

Thomas L. Casey (argued the cause for Petitioners)

David A. Moran (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

A 1994 amendment to the Michigan constitution said criminal defendants who pled guilty had no right to appeal and could appeal only with the permission of a state appellate court. Michigan then enacted a law that said in most cases judges could not appoint appellate lawyers for indigent defendants who pled guilty. Two criminal attorneys and three indigent defendants who were denied appointed appellate lawyers filed a single suit alleging the state law violated the 14th Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The district court ruled that the indigents had standing to sue and that the lawyers who sued with them had the right to sue as third-party representatives of the rights of indigents. A federal appellate court agreed the statute was unconstitutional, but based this only on the lawyers' claims. The court said the U.S. Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris required it to abstain from hearing the indigents' claims because the indigents were involved in related proceedings in state court.

Question

(1) Does the 14th Amendment guarantee an indigent criminal defendant convicted by a guilty plea the right to an appointed appellate attorney in a discretionary first appeal? (2) Do attorneys have third-party standing on behalf of potential indigent defendants to make a constitutional challenge to a state statute prohibiting appointment of appellate counsel in discretionary first appeals following convictions by guilty pleas?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kowalski, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 3, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Case or Controversy Requirement

In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the attorneys lacked third-party standing to sue on behalf of the Michigan indigent defendants. The attorneys did not have close relationships with the indigent defendants, nor was there a hindrance to these defendants' ability to advance their own constitutional rights against the Michigan scheme. In addition, under Younger, the indigents should have only turned to the federal courts after pursuing their claims in state court.

Kansas v. Colorado

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:15 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

105 ORIG

Petitioner

Kansas

Respondent

Colorado

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

543 U.S. 105 (2004)

Argued

Monday, October 4, 2004

Decided

Tuesday, December 7, 2004

Advocates

David W. Robbins (Argued the cause for the defendant)

James A. Feldman (on behalf of the United States)

John B. Draper (Argued the cause for the plaintiff)

Facts of the Case

Kansas and Colorado disputed ownership of the Arkansas River. In 1949 Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact, which set out to resolve the states' dispute. In 1986 Kansas alleged Colorado violated the Compact. The U.S. Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to investigate the dispute and in 1994 the Special Master said Colorado violated the Compact. The Court agreed with the Special Master. Kansas later took issue with the Special Master's fourth set of recommendations. Kansas said it was entitled to interest from 1985 onward - before the Court's ruling against Colorado - for damages from Colorado's violations of the Compact from 1950 to 1985. Kansas also requested a "river master" to resolve a dispute over computer modeling of the river.

Question

1.) Should the U.S. Supreme Court appoint a "river master" to resolve disputes over computer modeling of the Arkansas River? 2.) Is Kansas entitled to interest, from 1985 forward, for damages resulting from Compact violations from 1950 to 1985?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Colorado, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 63 Stat. 145

No and no. In an 8-1 judgment delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court denied Kansas' request to appoint a river master to decide various technical disputes between the states. A river master was inappropriate because the nature of the disputes was legal, not purely technical, and the appointment of a river master would make it easier to continue litigation. The Court also rejected Kansas' claim to all interest from 1985 forward for damages, because that would contradict the Court's ruling in an earlier dispute between the states (Kansas III). In that ruling, the Court had endorsed an equitable approach that yielded a post-1985 interest calculation based on late damages only.

Johnson v. California

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-6539

Petitioner

Jay Shawn Johnson

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

California

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 428 (2004)

Granted

Monday, December 1, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, March 30, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 3, 2004

Advocates

Stephen B. Bedrick (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Seth K. Schalit (argued the cause for Respondent)

Facts of the Case

Jay Shawn Johnson, on trial in California for murder, objected to the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate all three black prospective jurors. Johnson argued the eliminations were based on race. The judge denied Johnson's motions and held that Johnson had failed to show a "strong likelihood" that the dismissals were race-based. The judge relied on People v. Wheeler, the 1978 case in which the California Supreme Court ruled that to establish a prima facie case of racial bias in peremptory challenges, the objector had to show "strong likelihood" that the challenges were race- based. The jury found Johnson guilty of second-degree murder.

Johnson appealed and argued that the "strong likelihood" standard in Wheeler was at odds with the 'reasonable inference" standard the U.S. Supreme Court set in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). The appeals court agreed and reversed Johnson's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the two standards were the same.

Question

In order to establish a prima facie case under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), must the objector show that it is more likely than not that the other party's peremptory challenges were based on impermissible group bias?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for California, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1257

In a per curiam opinion, the Court ruled it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the case.

Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

03-101

Petitioner

Gale Norton, Secretary of the Interior, et al.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 55 (2004)

Granted

Monday, November 3, 2003

Argued

Monday, March 29, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 14, 2004

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Paul M. Smith (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

The federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) designated 2.5 million acres of land in Utah as "Wilderness Study Areas" under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). Under the Act, the BLM is required to manage this land "so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness."

The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) and several other environmentalist groups brought suit in federal district court under section 706 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which allows federal courts to compel government action when an agency has failed to meet its legal duties. SUWA claimed that the BLM had failed to take a "hard look," as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, at the effects of off-road vehicles on the Wilderness Study Areas. It also claimed that the permitted off-road vehicle use was in fact damaging the study areas in violation of the agency's FLPMA obligations.

The district court dismissed the case, holding that SUWA's charge that the bureau had failed to adequately protect the study areas was not specific enough for the court to hear under the Administrative Procedure Act. On appeal, a divided panel of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It held that the bureau's discretion was limited to deciding how to implement the act, not if to implement it, and that SUWA could therefore bring suit to force it at least to take a "hard look" at the effects of the off-road vehicle policy.

Question

Does section 706 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act authorize federal courts to review the management of public lands under statutory standards and the land use plans of the Bureau of Land Management?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Norton, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Administrative Procedure, or Administrative Orders Review

Yes, but only to a limited extent. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the APA only allows courts to examine government agencies' failures to meet specific statutory requirements. A general complaint based on policy differences - like SUWA's view that the off- road vehicles made the Wilderness Study Areas unsuitable for preservation as wilderness - could not be heard under the APA. Justice Scalia wrote, "If courts were empowered to enter general orders compelling compliance with broad statutory mandates ... it would ultimately become the task of the supervising court, rather than the agency, to work out compliance with the broad statutory mandate, injecting the judge into day-to-day agency management."

Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

Elk Grove Unified School District

9510 Elk Grove-Florin Blvd Elk Grove CA 95624

Elk Grove, CA 95624

United States

38° 24' 47.5416" N, 121° 22' 20.946" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1624

Petitioner

Elk Grove Unified School District and David W. Gordon, Superintendent

Respondent

Michael A. Newdow, et al.

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

542 U.S. 1 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, October 14, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, March 24, 2004

Decided

Monday, June 14, 2004

Advocates

Terence J. Cassidy (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Michael A. Newdow (argued the cause for Respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Respondent United States, in support of petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Michael Newdow's daughter attended public school in the Elk Grove Unified School District in California. Elk Grove teachers began school days by leading students in a voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including the words "under God" added by a 1954 Congressional act. Newdow sued in federal district court in California, arguing that making students listen - even if they choose not to participate - to the words "under God" violates the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment.

The district court dismissed Newdow's complaint for lack of standing, because he and the mother of his daughter are divorced and he does not have custody. The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Newdow did have standing "to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct the religious education of his daughter." The Ninth Circuit ruled that Congress's 1954 act adding the words "under God" to the Pledge and the school district policy requiring it be recited both violated the First Amendment's establishment clause.

Question

Does Michael Newdow have standing to challenge as unconstitutional a public school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance? Does a public school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes the words "under God," violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Elk Grove Unified School District, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court found that Newdow did not have standing to bring suit because he did not have sufficient custody over his daughter. "When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law," Justice Stevens wrote. Because it found that Newdow did not have standing, the Court failed to reach the constitutional question. Chief Justice Renquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas all wrote seperate concurrences, saying that requiring teachers to lead the Pledge is constitutional.

Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:57 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1689

Petitioner

Grupo Dataflux

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Atlas Global Group, L.P., et al.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 567 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, October 14, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, March 3, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 17, 2004

Advocates

William J. Boyce (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Roger B. Greenberg (argued the cause for Respondents)

Facts of the Case

Atlas Global Group was a limited partnership company created under Texas law. They filed a suit in federal court against Grupo Dataflux, a Mexican corporation. The suit dealt with a state law, but Atlas filed the case in federal court because, it claimed, the court had "diversity jurisdiction" (when a case involves citizens of two different states, or an American citizen and a foreign citizen, it is heard in federal court). However, at the time the case was filed, two of Atlas's partners were Mexican citizens (they left the partnership before the trial began). After the case was decided, but before the judgment was announced, Grupo Dataflux filed a motion to dismiss the case because the court did not have diversity jurisdiction. The judge granted the motion, finding that Atlas was a Mexican "citizen" at the time of filing because of the citizenship of its partners, and that the federal courts therefore did not have jurisdiction. On appeal, Atlas argued that even if the necessary diversity had not been present at the time of filing, it was present before the trial began and the court should therefore ignore the error under an exception for cases that have already been decided. A Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals panel agreed, reversing the decision.

Question

If a suit is filed in federal court without the diversity necessary to establish jurisdiction, but the citizenship of one of the parties changes before the case begins so that diversity is present, should the court ignore the filing error?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Grupo Dataflux, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1332

No. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that allowing diversity jurisdiction to change after a case is filed would create uncertainty and expensive litigation that dealt with jurisdiction rather than the merits of the case. "Uncertainty regarding the question of jurisdiction is particularly undesirable, and collateral litigation on the point particularly wasteful," wrote Justice Scalia. "The stability provided by our time tested rule (of requiring diversity at the time of filing) weighs heavily against the approval of any new deviation."

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley and Sons Co.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1205

Petitioner

Edith Jones, et al., on Behalf of Herself and a Class of Others Similarly Situated

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 369 (2004)

Granted

Monday, May 19, 2003

Argued

Tuesday, February 24, 2004

Decided

Monday, May 3, 2004

Advocates

Kevin C. Newsom (argued the cause for Respondent)

Carter G. Phillips (argued the cause for Respondent)

H. Candace Gorman (argued the cause for Petitioners)

Gregory G. Garre (argued the cause for Petitioners, on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae)

Facts of the Case

In November of 1996, Edith Jones and several other African Americans filed a class action lawsuit in federal district court against R.R. Donnelley and Sons, a commercial printing company. They claimed they had suffered racial discrimination in violation of section 1981 of United States Code (U.S.C.), which had no specified statute of limitations. Donnelley and Sons, however, argued that the section was bound by a two-year statute of limitations established by Illinois for all personal injury claims. The suit fell outside that statute of limitations, and the company argued that it should therefore be dismissed.

Jones, however, argued that a separate section of U.S.C. extended the statute of limitations to four years for any civil suit brought under an act of Congress passed after 1990. Because the 1991 Civil Rights Act had broadened the definition of section 1981, she argued, the four-year statute of limitations should apply to that section and the suit should therefore not be thrown out. Donnelley and Sons countered that the 1991 Civil Rights Act had merely amended the section, not created a new law, and that the four-year statute of limitations therefore did not apply.

A federal district court sided with Jones. A Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed.

Question

Does the United States Code's four-year statute of limitations for suits brought under acts of Congress passed after 1990 apply only to new laws, or does it also apply to amendments of previously existing laws?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jones, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 26 U.S.C. 1658

It also applies to amendments of previously existing laws. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice John Paul Stevens stated "[a]n amendment to an existing statute is no less an 'Act of Congress' than a new, stand-alone statute." The four-year statute of limitations therefore applies to any act or amendment to an act passed by Congress after 1990.

Vieth v. Jubelirer

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

Pennsylvania General Assembly

225 N Capitol Building Harrisburg PA 17101

Harrisburg, PA 17101

United States

40° 15' 52.8156" N, 76° 53' 6.1296" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1580

Appellee

Robert C. Jubelirer, President of the Pennsylvania Senate, et al.

Petitioner Type

Appellee

Appellant

Richard Vieth, Norma Jean Vieth, and Susan Furey

Respondent Type

Appellant

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 267 (2004)

Granted

Friday, June 27, 2003

Argued

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, April 28, 2004

Advocates

John P. Krill, Jr. (argued the cause for Appellees Jubelirer and Perzel)

Paul M. Smith (argued the cause for Appellants)

J. Bart DeLone (argued the cause for Appellees Cortes and Accurti)

Facts of the Case

After the 2000 census reduced the size of the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation by two members, the Republican-controlled state legislature passed a redistricting plan that clearly benefitted Republican candidates. Several members of the Democratic party sued in federal court, claiming that the plan was unconstitutional because it violated the one-person, one-vote principle of Article I, Section 2 of Constitution, the Equal Protection clause, the Privileges and Immunities clause, and the freedom of association.

The district court dismissed all but the Article I, Section 2 claim. It held that the voters bringing the suit had not proved that they would be denied representation, only that they would be represented by Republican officials. Because the plaintiffs (those bringing the suit) were not denied the right to vote, to be placed on the ballot box, to associate as a party, or to express their political opinions, their political discrimination claims failed.

However, the court found the act unconstitutional because it created districts with different numbers of voters, thereby violating the one-person, one-vote principle. Because the plaintiffs had shown that it was possible to create districts with smaller differences, and because the defendants had failed to justify the disparities resulting under their plan, it was therefore unconstitutional.

Question

Can voters affiliated with a political party sue to block implementation of a Congressional redistricting plan by claiming that it was manipulated for purely political reasons? Does a state violate the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment when it disregards neutral redistricting principles (such as trying to avoid splitting municipalities into different Congressional districts) in order to achieve an advantage for one political party? Does a state exceed its power under Article I of the Constitution when it draws Congressional districts to ensure that a minority party will consistently win a super-majority of the state's Congressional seats?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Jubelirer, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Article 1, Section 2, Paragraph 1: Composition of the House of Representatives

In a split decision that had no majority opinion, the Court decided not to intervene in this case because no appropriate judicial solution could be found. Justice Antonin Scalia, for a four-member plurality, wrote that the Court should declare all claims related to political (but not racial) gerrymandering nonjusticiable, meaning that courts could not hear them. Because no court had been able to find an appropriate remedy to political gerrymandering claims in the 18 years since the Court decided Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, which had held that such a remedy had not been found yet but might exist, Scalia wrote that it was time to recognize that the solution simply did not exist.

Justice Anthony Kennedy, however, wrote in his concurring opinion (which provided the deciding fifth vote for the judgment) that the Court should rule narrowly in this case that no appropriate judicial solution could be found, but not give up on finding one eventually.

Baldwin v. Reese

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:36 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-964

Petitioner

George H. Baldwin

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Michael Reese

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

541 U.S. 27 (2004)

Granted

Tuesday, May 27, 2003

Argued

Monday, December 8, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, March 2, 2004

Advocates

Dennis Balske (argued the cause for Respondent)

Hardy Myers (argued the cause for Petitioner)

Facts of the Case

A state trial court sentenced Reese to 33 years in prison. An appellate court lowered the sentence to 24 years. In another appeal to a state appellate court, Reese argued his federal Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated at trial and on appeal. The appellate court refused to reverse Reese's sentence. Reese appealed to the state supreme court and failed.

Reese appealed to a U.S. District Court. Ruling against Reese, the Court held that Reese did clearly say to the state supreme court his claims were federal. Federal law requires state prisoners to "fairly present" federal constitutional claims in each state court before appealing to federal courts. A federal appellate court reversed, ruling that the state supreme court had had the opportunity to read the state appellate court decision - had the court done this, it would have understood Reese's claims were federal.

Question

Federal law requires state prisoners to "fairly present" their allegations of federal constitutional violations to state courts before turning to federal courts. To meet this requirement, do prisoners need to specifically say their claims are federal constitutional claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Baldwin, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 USC 2241-2255 (habeas corpus)

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that Reese did not "fairly present" his Sixth Amendment ineffective counsel claim to state courts. Federal law thus barred Reese from turning to federal courts. The state court could have understood Reese's claims were federal if the court had read the lower court opinion. However, a state prisoner does not "fairly present" a federal claim to a state court if that court must read beyond what the prisoner files. There is no federal requirement that courts read lower court opinions.

McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:44:33 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-1674

Petitioner

Federal Election Commission

Respondent

Mitch McConnell, United States Senator, et al.

Consolidation

National Rifle Association (NRA), et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1675

Federal Election Commission (FEC), et al. v. Mitch McConnell, United States Senator, et al., No. 02-1676

John McCain, United States Senator, et al. v. Mitch McConnell, United States Senator, et al., No. 02-1702

Republican National Committee, et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1727

National Right to Life Committee, Inc., et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1733

American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1734

Victoria Jackson Gray Adams, et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1740

Ron Paul, United States Congressman, et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1747

California Democratic Party, et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1753

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), et al. v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1755

Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), No. 02-1756

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

540 U.S. 93 (2003)

Granted

Thursday, June 5, 2003

Argued

Monday, September 8, 2003

Decided

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (argued the cause for Defendant FEC)

Bobby R. Burchfield (argued the cause for Plaintiffs Political Party)

Kenneth W. Starr (argued the cause for Plaintiffs McConnell, et al.)

Jay A. Sekulow (argued the cause for Plaintiffs Echols, et al.)

Theodore B. Olson (argued the cause for Defendant FEC)

Laurence E. Gold (argued the cause for Plaintiffs AFL-CIO)

Seth P. Waxman (argued the cause for Defendant Intervenor)

Floyd Abrams (argued the cause for Plaintiffs McConnell, et al.)

Facts of the Case

In early 2002, a many years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for--and spent during-- political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill). Its key provisions were a) a ban on unrestricted ("soft money") donations made directly to political parties (often by corporations, unions, or well-healed individuals) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials; b) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election; and c) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of "issue ads" or "coordinated expenditures").

The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by-passing the typical federal judicial process. In May a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals.

Question

Does the "soft money" ban of the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 exceed Congress's authority to regulate elections under Article 1, Section 4 of the United States Constitution and/or violate the First Amendment's protection of the freedom to speak?
Do regulations of the source, content, or timing of political advertising in the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 violate the First Amendment's free speech clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for McConnell, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly

Split Vote

With a few exceptions, the Court answered "no" to both questions in a 5-to-4 decision written by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens. Because the regulations dealt mostly with soft-money contributions that were used to register voters and increase attendance at the polls, not with campaign expenditures (which are more explicitly a statement of political values and therefore deserve more protection), the Court held that the restriction on free speech was minimal. It then found that the restriction was justified by the government's legitimate interest in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and... the appearance of corruption" that might result from those contributions.

In response to challenges that the law was too broad and unnecessarily regulated conduct that had not been shown to cause corruption (such as advertisements paid for by corporations or unions), the Court found that such regulation was necessary to prevent the groups from circumventing the law. Justices O'Connor and Stevens wrote that "money, like water, will always find an outlet" and that the government was therefore justified in taking steps to prevent schemes developed to get around the contribution limits.

The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. The Court found that the law only affected state elections in which federal candidates were involved and also that it did not prevent states from creating separate election laws for state and local elections.

Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-306

Petitioner

Beneficial National Bank

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Anderson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 1 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, April 30, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 2, 2003

Advocates

Brian M. Clark (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Matthew D. Roberts (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Several H&R; Block customers, who took out loans from Beneficial National Bank in anticipation of their tax refunds, sued the bank in state court. The customers alleged that the bank charged excessive interest in violation of Alabama law. The bank asked that the case be heard in federal, rather than state, court, because the issues were covered under the National Bank Act (NBA), a federal law. The district court ruled in favor of the bank; the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the NBA did not completely preempt state laws governing lending rates and that the case could therefore be heard in state court.

Question

Does the NBA require that any suits involving charges of excessive interest be heard in federal rather than state court?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Beneficial National Bank, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1441

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the National Bank Act preempted the state-law claim and provided the exclusive cause of action for usury claims against national banks. Thus, the claim arose under federal law. The Court reasoned that the provisions of the Act create a federal remedy for overcharges that is exclusive, even when a state complainant relies entirely on state law. "Because [sections of the Act] provide the exclusive cause of action for such claims, there is, in short, no such thing as a state-law claim of usury against a national bank," wrote Justice Stevens. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.

Nike, Inc. v. Kasky

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:54:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-575

Petitioner

Nike, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Kasky

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 654 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, April 23, 2003

Decided

Thursday, June 26, 2003

Advocates

Laurence H. Tribe (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Paul R. Hoeber (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Theodore B. Olson (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Beginning in 1996, a number of allegations arose that Nike was mistreating and underpaying workers at foreign facilities. Nike responded to the charges in numerous ways, such as by issuing press releases. In 1998, Marc Kasky, a California resident, sued Nike for unfair and deceptive practices under California's Unfair Competition Law. Kasky alleged that Nike made "false statements and/or material omissions of fact" concerning the working conditions under which its products are manufactured. Nike filed a demurrer, contending that Kasky's suit was absolutely barred by the First Amendment. The trial court dismissed the case and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. In reversing, the California Supreme Court found that Nike's messages were commercial speech, but that the suit was at such a preliminary stage that the issue whether any false representations had been made had yet to be resolved.

Question

May a corporation participating in a public debate be subjected to liability for factual inaccuracies on the theory that its statements are commercial speech because they might affect consumers' opinions about the business as a good corporate citizen and thereby affect their purchasing decisions?

Conclusion

Decision: 6 votes for Kasky, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

The Court did not answer the question dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy dissented. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, dissented. Justice Breyer argued that no jurisdictional rule prevented the Court from decided the case and that "delay itself may inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights of free speech without making the issue significantly easier to decide later on."

Breuer v. Jim's Concrete

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:07 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-337

Petitioner

Breuer

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Jim's Concrete

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 691 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, April 2, 2003

Decided

Monday, May 19, 2003

Advocates

Lisa S. Blatt (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent)

Donald E. Pinaud, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Andrew S. Hament (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Philip Breuer sued in state court to resolve an overtime dispute under the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Attorneys for Breuer's employer, Jim's Concrete of Brevard, had the case moved to federal court by citing the federal removal statute. According to the statute, defendants in state court cases dealing with federal laws may have the case moved to federal court "unless otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress." Breuer's attorney argued that Congress had provided for suits under the FLSA to be heard in state court and that the case should therefore be returned to state court; attorneys for Jim's Concrete disagreed. The district court refused to send the case back to state court. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

In providing for suits under the FLSA, did Congress bar removal of such actions from state to federal court?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jim's Concrete, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Fair Labor Standards

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered David H. Souter, the Court held that the FLSA does not bar removal of a suit from state to federal court, thus Breuer's case was properly removed under section 1441. The Court reasoned that nothing on the face of the FLSA looked like an express prohibition of removal, there being no mention of removal, let alone of prohibition, given that word "maintain" and its bearing on removal was ambiguous at best. Rejecting all of Breuer's arguments, the Court noted that numerous other statutes provided indisputable prohibitions of removal, which demonstrated Congress's intent to give plaintiffs an absolute choice of forum in unmistakable terms.

Nguyen v. United States

Mon, 20 Jun 2011 04:06:33 +0000

Location

Dr. Nguyen's Office

308 North Main Street Trenton FL 32693

Trenton, FL 32693

United States

29° 36' 53.8488" N, 82° 49' 6.042" W

See map: Google Maps

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-10873

Petitioner

Nguyen

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

United States

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 02-5034

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 69 (2003)

Argued

Monday, March 24, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 9, 2003

Advocates

Patricia A. Millett (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Jeffrey T. Green (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Khanh Phuong Nguyen and Tuyet Mai Thi Phan were tried, convicted, and sentenced on federal narcotics charges in the District Court of Guam, a territorial court with subject-matter jurisdiction over both federal-law and local-law causes. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit panel that convened to hear their appeals included two judges from that court, both of whom are life-tenured Article III judges, and the Chief Judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, an Article IV territorial-court judge appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a 10-year term. Neither Nguyen nor Phan objected to the panel's composition before the cases were submitted for decision and neither sought rehearing to challenge the panel's authority to decide their appeals immediately after it affirmed their convictions.

Question

Did a panel of the Court of Appeals consisting of two Article III judges and one Article IV judge have the authority to decide the appeals of two defendants convicted on federal narcotics charges in the District Court of Guam?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Nguyen, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 292

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Court of Appeals panel did not have the authority to decide Nguyen and Phan's appeals. The Court reasoned that the territorial judge was precluded from designation to the panel and thus the defendants' appeals required reconsideration by a properly constituted panel. The Court found that the statutory and constitutional provisions governing the creation and tenure of territorial judges were distinct from those for district court judges and that the territorial district court was not constituted pursuant to the chapter required to meet the definition of a district court. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that neither Nguyen nor Phan showed that the error seriously affected the judicial proceedings.

Jinks v. Richland County

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:28 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-258

Petitioner

Jinks

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Richland County

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 456 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, March 5, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, April 22, 2003

Advocates

Robert S. Peck (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Jeffrey A. Lamken (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as Intervenor)

Andrew F. Lindemann (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

If a federal court with jurisdiction over a civil action declines to exercise supplement jurisdiction over other related claims, the claims will be dismissed and must be refiled in state court. To prevent the limitations period on those claims from expiring, 28 USC section 1367(d) requires state courts to toll the period while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court. In 1994, Susan Jinks filed a federal-court action against Richland County, South Carolina. The District Court granted the county summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over Jinks's state-law claims. Jinks then filed the supplemental claims in state court and won. In reversing, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found the state-law claims time-barred. Although they would not have been barred under section 1367(d)'s tolling rule, the court held section 1367(d) unconstitutional as applied to claims brought in state court against a State's political subdivisions.

Question

Is 28 USC section 1367(d), which requires state statute of limitations to be tolled for the period during which a plaintiff's cause of action had previously been pending in federal court, constitutional as applied to lawsuits brought against a State's political subdivisions?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Jinks, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1367

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that section 1367(d)'s application to claims brought against a State's political subdivisions is constitutional. The Court reasoned that section 1367(d) is necessary and proper for carrying into execution Congress's power "to constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, as it provides a straightforward tolling rule, which promotes fair and efficient operation of the federal courts and is therefore conducive to the administration of justice. The Court also reiterated that, while Congress lacks Article I authority to override a State's immunity from suit in its own courts, it may subject a municipality to suit in state court if that is done pursuant to a valid exercise of its enumerated powers. Justice David H. Souter filed a concurring opinion, noting that he did not shift from his dissent in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706.

National Park Hospitality Assn. v. Dept. of the Interior

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:19 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-196

Petitioner

National Park Hospitality Assn.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Dept. of the Interior

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 803 (2003)

Argued

Tuesday, March 4, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, May 27, 2003

Advocates

John P. Elwood (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the respondent)

Kenneth S. Geller (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) established rules governing disputes arising out of certain federal government contracts. After Congress enacted the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, which established a comprehensive concession management program for national parks, the National Park Service (NPS) issued 36 CFR section 51.3, which purported to render the CDA inapplicable to concession contracts. The National Park Hospitality Association challenged 51.3's validity. Upholding the regulation, the District Court concluded that the CDA is ambiguous as to whether it applies to concession contracts and found the NPS's interpretation reasonable. In affirming, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the NPS's reading of the CDA consistent with both the CDA and the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998.

Question

Does the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 apply to contracts between the National Park Service and concessioners in the national parks?

Conclusion

Decision: 7 votes for Dept. of the Interior, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

The Court did not answer the question. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the controversy was not yet ripe for judicial resolution. The Court reasoned that, because the NPS has no delegated rulemaking authority under the CDA, 51.3 is nothing more than a general policy statement designed to inform the public of NPS's views on the CDA's proper application and thus the National Park Hospitality Association's challenge was a facial one. Given the absence of a concrete dispute, the Court asked the parties provide supplemental briefing on whether the case was ripe for judicial action. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, dissented.

Dow Chemical Company v. Stephenson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:54:37 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-271

Petitioner

Dow Chemical Company

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Stephenson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

539 U.S. 111 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, February 26, 2003

Decided

Monday, June 9, 2003

Advocates

Gerson H. Smoger (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1984 Dow Chemical Co. negotiated a settlement in a class action lawsuit filed by Vietnam War veterans who had been exposed to Agent Orange and subsequently developed various injuries and illnesses. The settlement created a fund that would pay those who developed illnesses up until 1994. Daniel Stephenson, a Vietnam veteran, developed cancer in 1998 and could therefore not collect money from the fund. He sued, saying that he was not adequately represented in the original settlement, which made no provision for injuries that developed after 1994. Therefore, he claimed, he had the right to file a suit of his own. The district court ruled for Dow Chemical; the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, ruling for Stephenson.

Question

Does the 1984 Agent Orange settlement preclude plaintiffs, who allege that they were inadequately represented in the prior litigation, from asserting claims?

Conclusion

Decision: 8 votes for Dow Chemical Company, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

Split Vote

An equally divided Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. In a per curiam opinion, the Court affirmed the judgment of Court of Appeals with respect to Stephenson and vacated and remanded the judgment of Court of Appeals with respect to Isaacson for further consideration in light of Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002). Justice John Paul Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Roell v. Withrow

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:17 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

02-69

Petitioner

Roell

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Withrow

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 580 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, February 26, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, April 29, 2003

Advocates

Lisa R. Eskow (Austin, Texas, argued the cause for the petitioners)

Amanda Frost (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 authorizes magistrate judges to conduct "any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case" with "the consent of the parties." When Jon Withrow, a state prisoner, brought suit against members of the prison's medical staff, he gave written consent for the magistrate judge to preside over the entire case. Only one of the three staff members gave written consent. The other two members voluntarily participated. When the medical staff won, Withrow appealed and the Court of Appeals sua sponte remanded the case to determine whether the parties had consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. Ultimately, the magistrate judge reported that she had lacked jurisdiction because such consent had to be expressly given. The District Court adopted the report and recommendation. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that consent must be express and that the staffs' postjudgment consent was inadequate.

Question

Can consent, under the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, be inferred from a party's conduct during litigation?

Conclusion

Decision: 5 votes for Roell, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 636

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that consent to a magistrate judge's designation can be inferred from a party's conduct during litigation. Distinguishing between full and part-time magistrate judges, the Court reasoned that the "unadorned references" regarding the consent of the parties and full-time magistrate judges provided for jurisdiction as long as the parties voluntarily consented. "[The two staff members'] general appearances before the Magistrate Judge, after they had been told of their right to be tried by a district judge, supply the consent necessary for the Magistrate Judge's 'civil jurisdiction,'" wrote Justice Souter.

Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:18 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-593

Petitioner

Dole Food Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Patrickson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Consolidation

No. 01-594

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

538 U.S. 468 (2003)

Argued

Wednesday, January 22, 2003

Decided

Tuesday, April 22, 2003

Advocates

Jonathan S. Massey (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Jeffrey P. Minear (Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents)

Peter R. Paden (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

In 1997, a group of farm workers from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama, who alleged injury from chemical exposure, filed a state-court action against Dole Food Company and others. Subsequently, Dole impleaded Dead Sea Bromine Co. and Bromine Compounds, Ltd., or the Dead Sea Companies. Dole successfully removed the action to federal court, arguing that the federal common law of foreign relations provided federal-question jurisdiction. The District Court rejected the argument that the Dead Sea Companies were instrumentalities of a foreign state, Israel, as defined by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) and thus entitled to removal. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Dole could not base removal on the federal common law of foreign relations and that the Dead Sea Companies were not instrumentalities of Israel because they did not meet the FSIA's instrumentality definition.

Question

May a corporate subsidiary claim instrumentality status where the foreign state does not own a majority of its shares but does own a majority of the shares of a corporate parent one or more tiers above the subsidiary? Is a corporation's instrumentality status defined as of the time an alleged tort or other actionable wrong occurred?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Patrickson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1603

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held, 7-2, that a foreign state must itself own a majority of the shares of a corporation if the corporation is to be deemed an instrumentality of the state under the provisions of the FSIA and, 9-0, that instrumentality status is determined at the time of the filing of the complaint. The Court reasoned that, as indirect subsidiaries of Israel, the Dead Sea Companies cannot come within the statutory language granting instrumentality status and that only direct ownership satisfies the statutory requirement. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, argued that the language "other ownership interest...owned by a foreign state," covers a foreign state's legal interest in a corporate subsidiary, where that interest consists of the foreign state's ownership of a corporate parent that owns the shares of the subsidiary. As Dole did not seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision, the writ of certiorari in 01-593 was dismissed.

Pierce County v. Guillen

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:34 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-1229

Petitioner

Pierce County

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Guillen

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 129 (2003)

Argued

Monday, November 4, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, January 14, 2003

Advocates

Paul D. Clement (Department of Justice, argued the cause as intervenor)

Salvador A. Mungia (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Daniel R. Hamilton (Tacoma, Washington, argued the cause for the petitioner)

Facts of the Case

The Hazard Elimination Program provides state governments with funding to improve the most dangerous sections of their roads. To be eligible for funding, a state must undertake a thorough evaluation of its public roads. This led to concerns that the absence of confidentiality would increase the liability risk for accidents that took place at hazardous locations before improvements could be made. Ultimately, Congress provided that materials "compiled or collected" for purposes of the program "shall not be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court proceeding." In 1996, Ignacio Guillen's wife died in an automobile accident in a Pierce County, Washington intersection. While Washington had previously been denied funding for the intersection where the accident occurred, its second request was granted after the accident. Guillen first sought information on the intersection and then asserted that the state had been negligent in failing to install proper traffic controls. Washington sought to protect itself under the Program. The Washington Supreme Court held that the Program exceeded Congress's power under the Constitution.

Question

Does the Hazard Elimination Program exceed Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Pierce County, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 23 U.S.C. 409

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Clarence Thomas, the Court held that both the original program and its subsequent amendments fall within Congress's Commerce Clause power to "'regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce'" and "'to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.'" The Court concluded that, because Congress could reasonably believe that adopting a measure eliminating an unforeseen side effect of the Program's information-gathering requirement would result in greater safety on the nation's roads, the legislation was aimed at improving safety in the channels of commerce and increasing protections for the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.

United States v. Bean

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:54:35 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-704

Petitioner

United States

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Bean

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 71 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, October 16, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, December 10, 2002

Advocates

Edwin S. Kneedler (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Thomas C. Goldstein (Argued the case for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

After attending a gun show in Texas, Thomas Bean drove to Mexico. When Mexican officials stopped his vehicle at the border, they found ammunition, and Bean was subsequently convicted in a Mexican court of importing ammunition. Because of his felony conviction, 18 USC section 922(g)(1) prohibited Bean from possessing, distributing, or receiving firearms or ammunition. Bean applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) for relief from his firearms disabilities, but the ATF returned the application unprocessed, explaining that its annual appropriations law forbade it from expending any funds to investigate or act upon applications such as Bean's. Bean then filed suit, asking the District Court to conduct its own inquiry into his fitness to possess a gun and grant relief from his inability to possess, distribute, or receive firearms or ammunition. The court granted the requested relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Question

Does a federal district court, despite appropriation provisions barring the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms from acting on applications for relief from firearms disabilities from persons convicted of a felony, have the authority to grant such relief?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets, National Firearms, Organized Crime Control, Comprehensive Crime Control, or Gun Control Acts, except for RICO (q.v.) portion

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the absence of an actual denial of Bean's petition by ATF precludes judicial review. Because Bean's application for relief from the firearms disabilities was not considered due to appropriation provisions, Justice Thomas reasoned that the court could not grant relief since the statute only permitted judicial review of an affirmative denial of an application. "The text of [section 925(c)] and the procedure it lays out for seeking relief make clear that an actual decision by ATF on an application is a prerequisite for judicial review, and that mere inaction by ATF does not invest a district court with independent jurisdiction to act on an application," wrote Justice Thomas.

Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:47:55 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-757

Petitioner

Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Henson

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 28 (2002)

Argued

Tuesday, October 15, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, November 5, 2002

Advocates

David J. Bederman (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Henry B. Alsobrook, Jr. (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

Hurley Henson filed suit in Louisiana state court against Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., asserting various tort claims related to the manufacture and sale of a chlordimeform-based insecticide. When Henson successfully intervened in a similar action, Price v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., in federal district court, the Louisiana court stayed his state court claim. Although the ensuing settlement in Price stipulated that his state-court action be dismissed with prejudice, the Louisiana state court allowed Henson to proceed. Syngenta then removed the action to the federal District Court under the All Writs Act. The District Court dismissed the former state-court action as barred by the Price settlement. Vacating the dismissal, the Court of Appeals wrote that the All Writs Act could not properly support removal of the state-court action.

Question

Does the All Writs Act give a federal district court the authority to remove a state-court case in order to prevent the frustration of orders the federal court has previously issued?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for Henson, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1651

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the All Writs Act does not provide removal jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that, because the general removal statute requires that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be removed from a state court, the All Writs Act, alone or in combination with the existence of ancillary jurisdiction in a federal court, is not a substitute for that requirement. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred.

Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:48:08 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-896

Petitioner

Ford Motor Co.

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

McCauley

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

537 U.S. 1 (2002)

Argued

Monday, October 7, 2002

Decided

Tuesday, October 15, 2002

Advocates

Steve W. Berman (Argued the cause for the respondents)

Seth P. Waxman (Argued the cause for the petitioners)

Facts of the Case

When Ford Motor Company and Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. canceled a credit card rebate program that enabled cardholders to accrue and redeem rebates towards the purchase of a new Ford, cardholders filed multiple state-based class actions. Ford and Citibank removed the cases to federal court. The cardholder plaintiffs consolidated their actions, seeking reinstitution of the program. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that each class member was asserting a separate and distinct claim and that the individual claims did not satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. The appellate court also concluded that premising jurisdiction on the cost of complying with an injunction in favor of a single plaintiff would conflict with the principle of the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Question

Is the amount-in-controversy requirement of the federal diversity statute satisfied where a class representative seeks an injunction that would cost the defendant more than $75,000 to implement whether the injunction applies to one plaintiff or all class members?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for McCauley, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision:

In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd.

Mon, 05 Jan 2009 17:45:56 +0000

Case Basics

Docket No.

01-651

Petitioner

JPMorgan Chase Bank

Petitioner Type

Petitioner

Respondent

Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd.

Respondent Type

Respondent

Heard By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Decided By

Rehnquist Court (1994-2005)

Opinion

536 U.S. 88 (2002)

Argued

Wednesday, April 17, 2002

Decided

Monday, June 10, 2002

Advocates

Jeffrey P. Minear (Argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner)

Sarah L. Reid (Argued the cause for the petitioner)

Craig J. Albert (Argued the cause for the respondent)

Facts of the Case

Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd. is a corporation organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands (BVI), an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom. In 1998, Chase Manhattan Bank, now JPMorgan Chase Bank, agreed to finance certain Traffic Stream ventures, with the contract to be governed by New York law and with Traffic Stream agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction of federal courts in Manhattan. Subsequently, Chase sued Traffic Stream for defaulting on its obligations. The District Court found subject-matter jurisdiction under the alienage diversity statute, 28 USC section 1332(a)(2), which gives district courts jurisdiction over civil actions where the controversy is "between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state," and granted Chase summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that, because Traffic Stream was a citizen of an Overseas Territory and not an independent foreign state, jurisdiction was lacking.

Question

Is a corporation organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands a "citizen or subject of a foreign state" for the purposes of alienage diversity jurisdiction?

Conclusion

Decision: 9 votes for JPMorgan Chase Bank, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: 28 U.S.C. 1332

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a corporation organized under the laws of the BVI is a "citizen or subject of a foreign state" for the purposes of alienage diversity jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that, because of the United Kingdom's retention and exercise of authority over the BVI, statutes permitting incorporation in the BVI are enacted in the exercise of the United Kingdom's political authority. "It is enough to hold that the United Kingdom's retention and exercise of authority over the BVI renders BVI citizens, both natural and juridic, 'citizens or subjects' of the United Kingdom," wrote Justice Souter. Thus, Traffic Stream was a citizen or subject of a foreign state for the purposes of alienage diversity jurisdiction.