http://www.oyez.org/tags/rehnquist_search_and_seizure/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Tue, 03 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office would walk a narcotics-detection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints. They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. The District Court denied a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>In 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office would walk a narcotics-detection dog around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints. They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. The District Court denied a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p><br/><br/><p>Are highway checkpoint programs, whose primary purpose is the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics, consistent with the Fourth Amendment?</p> 99-1030_20001003-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1030/argument/ A. Scott Chinn supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 99-1030_20001003-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1030/argument/ Patricia Millett supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 99-1030_20001003-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1030/argument/ Kenneth Falk supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 99-1030_20001003-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1030/argument/ A. Scott Chinn supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 04 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>After an increase in the use of cocaine by patients receiving prenatal care, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) started to cooperate with Charleston to formulate a policy to prosecute mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth. MUSC obstetrical patients were arrested after testing positive for cocaine. They filed suit challenging the policy's validity on the theory that warrantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory purposes were unconstitutional searches. Among the District Court's actions was an instruction to the jury to find for the patients unless they had consented to such searches. The jury found in favor of the city. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the searches were reasonable, reasoning that special needs may, in certain exceptional circumstances, justify a search policy designed to serve non-law-enforcement ends.</p> <p>After an increase in the use of cocaine by patients receiving prenatal care, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) started to cooperate with Charleston to formulate a policy to prosecute mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth. MUSC obstetrical patients were arrested after testing positive for cocaine. They filed suit challenging the policy's validity on the theory that warrantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory purposes were unconstitutional searches. Among the District Court's actions was an instruction to the jury to find for the patients unless they had consented to such searches. The jury found in favor of the city. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the searches were reasonable, reasoning that special needs may, in certain exceptional circumstances, justify a search policy designed to serve non-law-enforcement ends.</p><br/><br/><p>Is a state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment if the patient has not consented to the procedure?</p> 99-936_20001004-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_936/argument/ Priscilla J. Smith supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 04 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 99-936_20001004-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_936/argument/ Robert H. Hood supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 04 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 99-936_20001004-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_936/argument/ Priscilla J. Smith supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 <p>A Department of the Interior agent, suspicious that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana, used a thermal-imaging device to scan his triplex. The imaging was to be used to determine if the amount of heat emanating from the home was consistent with the high-intensity lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth. Subsequently, the imaging revealed that relatively hot areas existed, compared to the rest of the home. Based on informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a federal magistrate judge issued a warrant to search Kyllo's home. The search unveiled growing marijuana. After Kyllo was indicted on a federal drug charge, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a conditional guilty plea. Ultimately affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home, and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager "did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life," only "amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall."</p> <p>A Department of the Interior agent, suspicious that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana, used a thermal-imaging device to scan his triplex. The imaging was to be used to determine if the amount of heat emanating from the home was consistent with the high-intensity lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth. Subsequently, the imaging revealed that relatively hot areas existed, compared to the rest of the home. Based on informants, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a federal magistrate judge issued a warrant to search Kyllo's home. The search unveiled growing marijuana. After Kyllo was indicted on a federal drug charge, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a conditional guilty plea. Ultimately affirming, the Court of Appeals held that Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home, and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager "did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life," only "amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall."</p><br/><br/><p>Does the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect relative amounts of heat emanating from a private home constitute an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment?</p> 99-8508_20010220-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_8508/argument/ Kenneth Lerner supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 99-8508_20010220-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_8508/argument/ Michael R. Dreeben supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 99-8508_20010220-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_8508/argument/ Kenneth Lerner supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 31 Mar 2004 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Marcus Thornton was stopped after getting out of his vehicle by a police officer who had noticed that the license plate on Thornton's Lincoln Town Car belonged to a Chevy two-door car. During his conversation with Thornton, the officer asked if he could search him. During the search he found two bags of drugs. The officer arrested Thornton, then searched his vehicle (which Thornton had already exited by the time the police officer spoke with him, though the officer had seen him exit it). In the vehicle the officer found a gun.</p> <p>Thornton was convicted of drug and firearms offenses. On appeal, he moved to have the gun dismissed as evidence because, he claimed, it had been found as the result of an unconstitutional search. He argued that the officer had contacted him after he had left the vehicle and that the search therefore did not fall within the "search incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (the exception allows police to search the person being arrested and the area "within his immediate control").</p> <p>A Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel rejected his argument, holding that requiring officers to signal their intent to arrest a person before he exited his vehicle would be dangerous because it would give him a chance to get any weapons in the vehicle or to use the vehicle to get away or run over the officers.</p> <p>Marcus Thornton was stopped after getting out of his vehicle by a police officer who had noticed that the license plate on Thornton's Lincoln Town Car belonged to a Chevy two-door car. During his conversation with Thornton, the officer asked if he could search him. During the search he found two bags of drugs. The officer arrested Thornton, then searched his vehicle (which Thornton had already exited by the time the police officer spoke with him, though the officer had seen him exit it). In the vehicle the officer found a gun.</p> <p>Thornton was convicted of drug and firearms offenses. On appeal, he moved to have the gun dismissed as evidence because, he claimed, it had been found as the result of an unconstitutional search. He argued that the officer had contacted him after he had left the vehicle and that the search therefore did not fall within the "search incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (the exception allows police to search the person being arrested and the area "within his immediate control").</p> <p>A Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel rejected his argument, holding that requiring officers to signal their intent to arrest a person before he exited his vehicle would be dangerous because it would give him a chance to get any weapons in the vehicle or to use the vehicle to get away or run over the officers.</p><br/><br/><p>Under the "search incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment, may police search the vehicle of a person they have arrested if they did not make contact with him until after he left the vehicle?</p> 03-5165_20040331-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_03_5165/argument/ Frank W. Dunham Jr. supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 31 Mar 2004 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 03-5165_20040331-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_03_5165/argument/ Gregory G. Garre supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 31 Mar 2004 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 03-5165_20040331-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_03_5165/argument/ Frank W. Dunham Jr. supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.</p> <p>An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.</p><br/><br/><p>Does random drug testing of high school athletes violate the reasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment?</p> 94-590_19950328-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_590/argument/ Timothy R. Volpert supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 94-590_19950328-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_590/argument/ Richard H. Seamon supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Mar 1995 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 94-590_19950328-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_590/argument/ Thomas M. Christ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist