http://www.oyez.org/tags/rehnquist_rights_of_the_accused/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Wed, 20 Feb 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. In the penalty phase of Atkins' trial, the defense relied on one witness, a forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded. The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. During resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified, but this time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded.</p> <p>Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder. In the penalty phase of Atkins' trial, the defense relied on one witness, a forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins was mildly mentally retarded. The jury sentenced Atkins to death, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a misleading verdict form. During resentencing the same forensic psychologist testified, but this time the State rebutted Atkins' intelligence. The jury again sentenced Atkins to death. In affirming, the Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, in rejecting Atkins' contention that he could not be sentenced to death because he is mentally retarded.</p><br/><br/><p>Is the execution of mentally retarded persons "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?</p> 00-8452_20020220-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_8452/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 09 Dec 1998 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places. If a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member loitering in a public place with one or more persons, he shall order them to disperse. A violation of the ordinance arises when anyone does not promptly obey a dispersal order. An officer's discretion was purportedly limited by confining arrest authority to designated officers, establishing detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein, and providing for designated, but publicly undisclosed, enforcement areas. In 1993, Jesus Morales was arrested and found guilty under the ordinance for loitering in a Chicago neighborhood after he ignored police orders to disperse. Ultimately, after Morales challenged his arrest, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated due process of law in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.</p> <p>Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places. If a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member loitering in a public place with one or more persons, he shall order them to disperse. A violation of the ordinance arises when anyone does not promptly obey a dispersal order. An officer's discretion was purportedly limited by confining arrest authority to designated officers, establishing detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein, and providing for designated, but publicly undisclosed, enforcement areas. In 1993, Jesus Morales was arrested and found guilty under the ordinance for loitering in a Chicago neighborhood after he ignored police orders to disperse. Ultimately, after Morales challenged his arrest, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated due process of law in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.</p><br/><br/><p>Does Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?</p> 97-1121_19981209-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_1121/argument/ Lawrence Rosenthal supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 09 Dec 1998 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 97-1121_19981209-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_1121/argument/ Harvey Grossman supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 09 Dec 1998 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 97-1121_19981209-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_1121/argument/ Lawrence Rosenthal supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 10 Nov 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Michael Crawford stabbed a man he claimed tried to rape his wife. During Crawford's trial, prosecutors played for the jury his wife's tape-recorded statement to the police describing the stabbing. The statement contradicted Crawford's argument that he stabbed the man in defense of his wife. Because it was pre-recorded, Crawford could not cross-examine the statement. The jury convicted Crawford for assault.</p> <p>Crawford claimed the playing of his wife's statement, with no chance for cross-examination, violated the Sixth Amendment guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The state supreme court upheld the conviction, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts (1980). That decision allowed the admission of out-of-court testimony against a defendant if that testimony was reliable.</p> <p>Michael Crawford stabbed a man he claimed tried to rape his wife. During Crawford's trial, prosecutors played for the jury his wife's tape-recorded statement to the police describing the stabbing. The statement contradicted Crawford's argument that he stabbed the man in defense of his wife. Because it was pre-recorded, Crawford could not cross-examine the statement. The jury convicted Crawford for assault.</p> <p>Crawford claimed the playing of his wife's statement, with no chance for cross-examination, violated the Sixth Amendment guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The state supreme court upheld the conviction, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts (1980). That decision allowed the admission of out-of-court testimony against a defendant if that testimony was reliable.</p><br/><br/><p>Does playing out-of-court testimony to a jury, with no chance for cross-examination, violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to be confronted with the witnesses against him?"</p> 02-9410_20031110-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_9410/argument/ Jeffrey L. Fisher supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 10 Nov 2003 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 02-9410_20031110-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_9410/argument/ Michael R. Dreeben supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 10 Nov 2003 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 02-9410_20031110-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_9410/argument/ Steven C. Sherman supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 10 Nov 2003 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 02-9410_20031110-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_9410/argument/ Jeffrey L. Fisher supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 28 Apr 2004 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In the fall of 2001, Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was arrested by the United States military in Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against the U.S., declared an "enemy combatant," and transfered to a military prison in Virginia. Frank Dunham, Jr., a defense attorney in Virginia, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in federal district court there, first on his own and then for Hamdi's father, in an attempt to have Hamdi's detention declared unconstitutional. He argued that the government had violated Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely and not giving him access to an attorney or a trial. The government countered that the Executive Branch had the right, during wartime, to declare people who fight against the United States "enemy combatants" and thus restrict their access to the court system.</p> <p>The district court ruled for Hamdi, telling the government to release him. On appeal, a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the separation of powers required federal courts to practice restraint during wartime because "the executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the conduct of overseas conflict in a way that the judiciary simply is not." The panel therefore found that it should defer to the Executive Branch's "enemy combatant" determination.</p> <p>In the fall of 2001, Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was arrested by the United States military in Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against the U.S., declared an "enemy combatant," and transfered to a military prison in Virginia. Frank Dunham, Jr., a defense attorney in Virginia, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in federal district court there, first on his own and then for Hamdi's father, in an attempt to have Hamdi's detention declared unconstitutional. He argued that the government had violated Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely and not giving him access to an attorney or a trial. The government countered that the Executive Branch had the right, during wartime, to declare people who fight against the United States "enemy combatants" and thus restrict their access to the court system.</p> <p>The district court ruled for Hamdi, telling the government to release him. On appeal, a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the separation of powers required federal courts to practice restraint during wartime because "the executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the conduct of overseas conflict in a way that the judiciary simply is not." The panel therefore found that it should defer to the Executive Branch's "enemy combatant" determination.</p><br/><br/><p>Did the government violate Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him indefinitely, without access to an attorney, based solely on an Executive Branch declaration that he was an "enemy combatant" who fought against the United States? Does the separation of powers doctrine require federal courts to defer to Executive Branch determinations that an American citizen is an "enemy combatant"?</p> 03-6696_20040428-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_03_6696/argument/ Frank W. Dunham Jr. supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 28 Apr 2004 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 03-6696_20040428-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_03_6696/argument/ Paul D. Clement supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 28 Apr 2004 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 03-6696_20040428-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_03_6696/argument/ Frank W. Dunham Jr. supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 28 Apr 2004 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 03-6696_20040428-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_03_6696/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 28 Apr 2004 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 03-6696_20040428-argument-part05 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_03_6696/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 15 Oct 1986 12:00:00 -0500 <p>McCleskey, a black man, was convicted of murdering a police officer in Georgia and sentenced to death. In a writ of habeas corpus, McCleskey argued that a statistical study proved that the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia depended to some extent on the race of the victim and the accused. The study found that black defendants who kill white victims are the most likely to receive death sentences in the state.</p> <p>McCleskey, a black man, was convicted of murdering a police officer in Georgia and sentenced to death. In a writ of habeas corpus, McCleskey argued that a statistical study proved that the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia depended to some extent on the race of the victim and the accused. The study found that black defendants who kill white victims are the most likely to receive death sentences in the state.</p><br/><br/><p>Did the statistical study prove that McCleskey's sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?</p> 84-6811_19861015-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_84_6811/argument/ John Charles Boger supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 15 Oct 1986 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 84-6811_19861015-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_84_6811/argument/ Mary Beth Westmoreland supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 11 Jan 1989 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Penry, a retarded man with the mental age of barely seven years, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During the trial's proceedings, the jury was not instructed that it could consider the mitigating circumstances of Penry's mental retardation in imposing its sentence.</p> <p>Penry, a retarded man with the mental age of barely seven years, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During the trial's proceedings, the jury was not instructed that it could consider the mitigating circumstances of Penry's mental retardation in imposing its sentence.</p><br/><br/><p>Was Penry's sentence cruel and unusual punishment?</p> 87-6177_19890111-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_6177/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Apr 2004 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Four British and Australian citizens were captured by the American military in Pakistan or Afghanistan during the United States' War on Terror. The four men were transported to the American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When their families learned of the arrests, they filed suit in federal district court seeking a writ of habeas corpus that would declare the detention unconstitutional. They claimed that the government's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them indefinitely without access to a court violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause. The government countered that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the prisoners were not American citizens and were being held in territory over which the United States did not have sovereignty (the Guantanamo Bay base was leased from Cuba indefinitely in 1903, and Cuba retains "ultimate sovereignty").</p> <p>The district court agreed with the government, dismissing the case because it found that it did not have jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision.</p> <p>Four British and Australian citizens were captured by the American military in Pakistan or Afghanistan during the United States' War on Terror. The four men were transported to the American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When their families learned of the arrests, they filed suit in federal district court seeking a writ of habeas corpus that would declare the detention unconstitutional. They claimed that the government's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them indefinitely without access to a court violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause. The government countered that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the prisoners were not American citizens and were being held in territory over which the United States did not have sovereignty (the Guantanamo Bay base was leased from Cuba indefinitely in 1903, and Cuba retains "ultimate sovereignty").</p> <p>The district court agreed with the government, dismissing the case because it found that it did not have jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision.</p><br/><br/><p>Do United States courts have jurisdiction to consider legal appeals filed on behalf of foreign citizens held by the United States military in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba?</p> 03-334_20040420-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_03_334/argument/ John J. Gibbons supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 20 Apr 2004 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 03-334_20040420-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_03_334/argument/ Theodore B. Olson supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 13 Oct 2004 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court stayed Simmon's execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally ill. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally ill violated the Eighth and 14th Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case.</p> <p>Using the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided, 6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional.</p> <p>On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at "evolving standards" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people.</p> <p>Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court stayed Simmon's execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally ill. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally ill violated the Eighth and 14th Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case.</p> <p>Using the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided, 6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional.</p> <p>On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at "evolving standards" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people.</p><br/><br/><p>Does the execution of minors violate the prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" found in the Eighth Amendment and applied to the states through the incorporation doctrine of the 14th Amendment?</p> 03-633_20041013-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_633/argument/ James R. Layton supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 13 Oct 2004 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 03-633_20041013-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_633/argument/ Seth P. Waxman supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 13 Oct 2004 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 03-633_20041013-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_633/argument/ James R. Layton supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Mar 1989 12:00:00 -0500 <p>At 17 years old, Stanford was convicted by a Kentucky jury of murder, sodomy, robbery, and the receipt of stolen property. Stanford was sentenced to death under a state statute which permitted juvenile offenders to receive the death penalty for Class A felonies or capital crimes. Stanford appealed his sentence and his case was consolidated with that of Wilkins v. Missouri, involving a 16 year old's appeal of his death sentence following a conviction for murder in Missouri. Both Stanford and Wilkins alleged that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders as young as themselves violated their constitutional rights.</p> <p>At 17 years old, Stanford was convicted by a Kentucky jury of murder, sodomy, robbery, and the receipt of stolen property. Stanford was sentenced to death under a state statute which permitted juvenile offenders to receive the death penalty for Class A felonies or capital crimes. Stanford appealed his sentence and his case was consolidated with that of Wilkins v. Missouri, involving a 16 year old's appeal of his death sentence following a conviction for murder in Missouri. Both Stanford and Wilkins alleged that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders as young as themselves violated their constitutional rights.</p><br/><br/><p>Does the imposition of the death sentence on convicted capital offenders below the age of 18 years old, violate the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment?</p> 87-5765_19890327-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_5765/argument/ Frank W. Heft Jr. supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Mar 1989 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 87-5765_19890327-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_5765/argument/ Frederic J. Cowan supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 27 Mar 1989 12:00:00 -0500 <p>At 17 years old, Stanford was convicted by a Kentucky jury of murder, sodomy, robbery, and the receipt of stolen property. Stanford was sentenced to death under a state statute which permitted juvenile offenders to receive the death penalty for Class A felonies or capital crimes. Stanford appealed his sentence and his case was consolidated with that of Wilkins v. Missouri, involving a 16 year old's appeal of his death sentence following a conviction for murder in Missouri. Both Stanford and Wilkins alleged that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders as young as themselves violated their constitutional rights.</p> <p>At 17 years old, Stanford was convicted by a Kentucky jury of murder, sodomy, robbery, and the receipt of stolen property. Stanford was sentenced to death under a state statute which permitted juvenile offenders to receive the death penalty for Class A felonies or capital crimes. Stanford appealed his sentence and his case was consolidated with that of Wilkins v. Missouri, involving a 16 year old's appeal of his death sentence following a conviction for murder in Missouri. Both Stanford and Wilkins alleged that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders as young as themselves violated their constitutional rights.</p><br/><br/><p>Does the imposition of the death sentence on convicted capital offenders below the age of 18 years old, violate the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment?</p> 87-6026_19890327-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_5765/argument_87-6026/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 21 Jan 1987 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The 1984 Bail Reform Act allowed the federal courts to detain an arrestee prior to trial if the government could prove that the individual was potentially dangerous to other people in the community. Prosecutors alleged that Salerno and another person in this case were prominent figures in the La Cosa Nostra crime family.</p> <p>The 1984 Bail Reform Act allowed the federal courts to detain an arrestee prior to trial if the government could prove that the individual was potentially dangerous to other people in the community. Prosecutors alleged that Salerno and another person in this case were prominent figures in the La Cosa Nostra crime family.</p><br/><br/><p>Did the Bail Reform Act violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause?</p> 86-87_19870121-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_87/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist