http://www.oyez.org/tags/rehnquist_miscellaneous/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Wed, 11 Oct 1995 12:00:00 -0500 <p>After purchasing a new vehicle from an authorized Alabama BMW dealership, Ira Gore, Jr. discovered that his new vehicle had been repainted. He sued BMW's American distributor (BMW), alleging that it committed fraud by failing to inform him that his car had been repainted. The Alabama Circuit Court entered judgment, following a jury verdict, awarding Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. On appeal from the trial judge's denial of BMW's post-trial petition to set aside the punitive damages as 'grossly excessive,' the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damages were not so excessive as to violate BMW's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Due to a jury calculation error, however, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced Gore's punitive damage award to $2 million. BMW appealed to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>After purchasing a new vehicle from an authorized Alabama BMW dealership, Ira Gore, Jr. discovered that his new vehicle had been repainted. He sued BMW's American distributor (BMW), alleging that it committed fraud by failing to inform him that his car had been repainted. The Alabama Circuit Court entered judgment, following a jury verdict, awarding Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. On appeal from the trial judge's denial of BMW's post-trial petition to set aside the punitive damages as 'grossly excessive,' the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damages were not so excessive as to violate BMW's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Due to a jury calculation error, however, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced Gore's punitive damage award to $2 million. BMW appealed to the Supreme Court.</p><br/><br/><p>Assuming that Gore's punitive damage award was grossly excessive, does the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause protect BMW from paying the award?</p> 94-896_19951011-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_896/argument/ Andrew L. Frey supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 11 Oct 1995 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 94-896_19951011-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_896/argument/ Michael Gottesman supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 11 Oct 1995 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 94-896_19951011-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_896/argument/ Andrew L. Frey supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 23 Mar 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Florence Dolan wanted a permit from the City of Tigard to expand her store and pave her parking lot. The city agreed to grant her permit on the condition that she dedicate part of her land for (1) a greenway along a nearby creek to help alleviate runoff from the pavement, and (2) a pedestrian/bicycle path to relieve traffic congestion from the city's growing business district.</p> <p>Florence Dolan wanted a permit from the City of Tigard to expand her store and pave her parking lot. The city agreed to grant her permit on the condition that she dedicate part of her land for (1) a greenway along a nearby creek to help alleviate runoff from the pavement, and (2) a pedestrian/bicycle path to relieve traffic congestion from the city's growing business district.</p><br/><br/><p>Did the city's conditions for the permit violate the 5th Amendment's "takings" clause as absorbed by the 14th Amendment's due process clause?</p> 93-518_19940323-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_93_518/argument/ David B. Smith supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 23 Mar 1994 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 93-518_19940323-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_93_518/argument/ Timothy V. Ramis supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 23 Mar 1994 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 93-518_19940323-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_93_518/argument/ Edwin S. Kneedler supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 23 Mar 1994 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 93-518_19940323-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_93_518/argument/ David B. Smith supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 09 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Under the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution, Article 1, section 8, "Congress shall have Power...to promote the Progress of Science...by securing [to Authors] for limited Times...the exclusive Right to their...Writings." In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years, making copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death. Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have entered the public domain, argued that the CTEA violates both the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. They claimed Congress cannot extend the copyright term for published works with existing copyrights. The District Court and the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed.</p> <p>Under the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution, Article 1, section 8, "Congress shall have Power...to promote the Progress of Science...by securing [to Authors] for limited Times...the exclusive Right to their...Writings." In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years, making copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death. Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have entered the public domain, argued that the CTEA violates both the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. They claimed Congress cannot extend the copyright term for published works with existing copyrights. The District Court and the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed.</p><br/><br/><p>Does the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act's extension of existing copyrights exceed Congress's power under the Copyright Clause? Does the CTEA's extension of existing and future copyrights violate the First Amendment?</p> 01-618_20021009-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_618/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 09 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 01-618_20021009-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_618/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 09 Oct 2002 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 01-618_20021009-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_618/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 22 Feb 2005 12:00:00 -0500 <p>New London, a city in Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The city said developing the land would create jobs and increase tax revenues. Kelo Susette and others whose property was seized sued New London in state court. The property owners argued the city violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which guaranteed the government will not take private property for public use without just compensation. Specifically the property owners argued taking private property to sell to private developers was not public use. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled for New London.</p> <p>New London, a city in Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The city said developing the land would create jobs and increase tax revenues. Kelo Susette and others whose property was seized sued New London in state court. The property owners argued the city violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which guaranteed the government will not take private property for public use without just compensation. Specifically the property owners argued taking private property to sell to private developers was not public use. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled for New London.</p><br/><br/><p>Does a city violate the Fifth Amendment's takings clause if the city takes private property and sells it for private development, with the hopes the development will help the city's bad economy?</p> 04-108_20050222-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_108/argument/ Scott G. Bullock supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 22 Feb 2005 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 04-108_20050222-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_108/argument/ Wesley W. Horton supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 22 Feb 2005 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 04-108_20050222-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_108/argument/ Scott G. Bullock supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 02 Mar 1992 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1986, Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island. He intended to build single-family homes as on the adjacent lots. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting permanent habitable structures on his land. The law aimed to protect erosion and destruction of barrier islands. Lucas sued and won a large monetary judgment. The state appealed.</p> <p>In 1986, Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island. He intended to build single-family homes as on the adjacent lots. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting permanent habitable structures on his land. The law aimed to protect erosion and destruction of barrier islands. Lucas sued and won a large monetary judgment. The state appealed.</p><br/><br/><p>Does the construction ban depriving Lucas of all economically viable use of his property amount to a "taking" calling for "just compensation" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?</p> 91-453_19920302-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_453/argument/ A. Camden Lewis supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 02 Mar 1992 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 91-453_19920302-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_453/argument/ C. C. Harness III supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 02 Mar 1992 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 91-453_19920302-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_453/argument/ A. Camden Lewis supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 29 Mar 2005 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Grokster and other companies distributed free software that allowed computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks. In such networks, users can share digital files directly between their computers, without the use of a central server. Users employed the software primarily to download copyrighted files, file-sharing which the software companies knew about and encouraged. The companies profited from advertising revenue, since they streamed ads to the software users. A group of movie studios and other copyright holders sued and alleged that Grokster and the other companies violated the Copyright Act by intentionally distributing software to enable users to infringe copyrighted works. The district court ruled for Grokster, reasoning that the software distribution companies were not liable for copyright violations stemming from their software, which could have been used lawfully. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p> <p>Grokster and other companies distributed free software that allowed computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks. In such networks, users can share digital files directly between their computers, without the use of a central server. Users employed the software primarily to download copyrighted files, file-sharing which the software companies knew about and encouraged. The companies profited from advertising revenue, since they streamed ads to the software users. A group of movie studios and other copyright holders sued and alleged that Grokster and the other companies violated the Copyright Act by intentionally distributing software to enable users to infringe copyrighted works. The district court ruled for Grokster, reasoning that the software distribution companies were not liable for copyright violations stemming from their software, which could have been used lawfully. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p><br/><br/><p>Were companies that distributed file-sharing software, and encouraged and profited from direct copyright infringement using such software, liable for the infringement?</p> 04-480_20050329-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_480/argument/ Donald B. Verrilli Jr. supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 29 Mar 2005 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 04-480_20050329-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_480/argument/ Paul D. Clement supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 29 Mar 2005 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 04-480_20050329-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_480/argument/ Richard G. Taranto supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 29 Mar 2005 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 04-480_20050329-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_480/argument/ Donald B. Verrilli Jr. supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 30 Mar 1987 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property wishing to obtain a building permit to maintain a pathway on their property open to the public.</p> <p>The California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property wishing to obtain a building permit to maintain a pathway on their property open to the public.</p><br/><br/><p>Did the requirement constitute a property taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?</p> 86-133_19870330-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_133/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 13 Jan 1999 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), states receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) can pay the benefit amount of another State's TANF program to residents who have lived in the State for less than 12 months. When California announced it would enforce this option, Brenda Roe brought this class action, on behalf of other first year residents, challenging the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement. On appeal from successive adverse rulings in the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Rita Saenz, the Director of California's Department of Social Services, certiorari.</p> <p>Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), states receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) can pay the benefit amount of another State's TANF program to residents who have lived in the State for less than 12 months. When California announced it would enforce this option, Brenda Roe brought this class action, on behalf of other first year residents, challenging the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement. On appeal from successive adverse rulings in the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Rita Saenz, the Director of California's Department of Social Services, certiorari.</p><br/><br/><p>Does a state statute, authorizing states receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families to pay the benefit amount of another State's TANF to its first year residents, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's right-to-travel protections?</p> 98-97_19990113-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_97/argument/ Theodore Garelis supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 13 Jan 1999 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 98-97_19990113-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_97/argument/ Seth P. Waxman supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 13 Jan 1999 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 98-97_19990113-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_97/argument/ Mark D. Rosenbaum supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist