http://www.oyez.org/tags/rehnquist_federalism/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Wed, 31 Mar 1999 12:00:00 -0500 <p>A group of probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in 1992 alleging that the state had violated the overtime provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Following the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996)_which held that States are immune from private suits in federal court and that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate that immunity_the probation officers' suit was dismissed in Federal district court. Alden and the other probation officers then sued Maine again for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time in state court. The state trial court and the state supreme court both held that Maine had sovereign immunity and could not be sued by private parties in their own court.</p> <p>A group of probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in 1992 alleging that the state had violated the overtime provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Following the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996)_which held that States are immune from private suits in federal court and that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate that immunity_the probation officers' suit was dismissed in Federal district court. Alden and the other probation officers then sued Maine again for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time in state court. The state trial court and the state supreme court both held that Maine had sovereign immunity and could not be sued by private parties in their own court.</p><br/><br/><p>May Congress use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from private suits in its own courts?</p> 98-436_19990331-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_436/argument/ Laurence E. Gold supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 31 Mar 1999 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 98-436_19990331-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_436/argument/ Seth P. Waxman supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 31 Mar 1999 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 98-436_19990331-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_436/argument/ Peter J. Brann supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 31 Mar 1999 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 98-436_19990331-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_436/argument/ Laurence E. Gold supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 11 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results, on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all "under-votes" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate, Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the U.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later.</p> <p>Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, and concurrent with Vice President Al Gore's contest of the certification of Florida presidential election results, on December 8, 2000 the Florida Supreme Court ordered that the Circuit Court in Leon County tabulate by hand 9000 contested ballots from Miami-Dade County. It also ordered that every county in Florida must immediately begin manually recounting all "under-votes" (ballots which did not indicate a vote for president) because there were enough contested ballots to place the outcome of the election in doubt. Governor George Bush and his running mate, Richard Cheney, filed a request for review in the U.S. Supreme Court and sought an emergency petition for a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and issued the stay on December 9. It heard oral argument two days later.</p><br/><br/><p>Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution?</p> 00-949_20001211-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_949/argument/ Theodore B. Olson supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 11 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 00-949_20001211-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_949/argument/ Joseph P. Klock Jr. supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 11 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 00-949_20001211-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_949/argument/ David Boies supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 11 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 00-949_20001211-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_949/argument/ Theodore B. Olson supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Fri, 01 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The 2000 presidential election remained in limbo with the outcome dependent on the winner of the popular vote in Florida. Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush held a slim lead in the tally. Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore challenged the decision of Florida's Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, to certify the results of the presidential election on November 14, the deadline provided by Florida's election law. Gore also challenged Harris's decision to ignore the outcome of manual recounts his campaign had requested in four Florida counties, recounts available under another provision of Florida's election code. The Florida Supreme Court heard Gore's challenges and held that Harris could not certify the outcome until November 26. The Florida Supreme Court also held that Harris must include the results of manual recounts in the certified results. Governor Bush intervened. Harris and Bush appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.</p> <p>The 2000 presidential election remained in limbo with the outcome dependent on the winner of the popular vote in Florida. Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush held a slim lead in the tally. Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore challenged the decision of Florida's Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, to certify the results of the presidential election on November 14, the deadline provided by Florida's election law. Gore also challenged Harris's decision to ignore the outcome of manual recounts his campaign had requested in four Florida counties, recounts available under another provision of Florida's election code. The Florida Supreme Court heard Gore's challenges and held that Harris could not certify the outcome until November 26. The Florida Supreme Court also held that Harris must include the results of manual recounts in the certified results. Governor Bush intervened. Harris and Bush appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.</p><br/><br/><p>Do post-election court decisions that limit legislators' or executive officials' discretion to certify election results violate the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution or 3 USC Section 5? Did the Florida Supreme Court's decision change the manner in which Florida's electoral votes were chosen, thereby violating Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the US Constitution, which confers plenary power in federal election matters on state legislatures?</p> 00-836_20001201-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_836/argument/ Theodore B. Olson supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Fri, 01 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 00-836_20001201-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_836/argument/ Joseph P. Klock Jr. supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Fri, 01 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 00-836_20001201-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_836/argument/ Paul F. Hancock supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Fri, 01 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 00-836_20001201-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_836/argument/ Laurence H. Tribe supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Fri, 01 Dec 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 00-836_20001201-argument-part05 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_836/argument/ Theodore B. Olson supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Mar 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1996, the Massachusetts Burma Law, which restricted state entities from buying goods or services from companies doing business with Burma, was passed. Afterwards, Congress also imposed mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma. Businesses with ties to Burma landed on Massachusetts' "restricted trade" list. The list came to include 34 members of the National Foreign Trade Council (Council), a non-profit advocate for American companies that do business abroad. The Council filed suit against Stephen Crosby, the Massachusetts Secretary of Administration and Finance, and other state officials in federal court, claiming that the state act unconstitutionally infringes on the federal foreign affairs power, violates the Foreign Commerce Clause, and is preempted by the Federal Burma Law. The District Court permanently enjoined the state act's enforcement, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court also found that the Massachusetts Burma Law violated the Supremacy Clause because the state was acting in an area of unique federal concern, foreign policy, through a balanced, tailored approach.</p> <p>In 1996, the Massachusetts Burma Law, which restricted state entities from buying goods or services from companies doing business with Burma, was passed. Afterwards, Congress also imposed mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma. Businesses with ties to Burma landed on Massachusetts' "restricted trade" list. The list came to include 34 members of the National Foreign Trade Council (Council), a non-profit advocate for American companies that do business abroad. The Council filed suit against Stephen Crosby, the Massachusetts Secretary of Administration and Finance, and other state officials in federal court, claiming that the state act unconstitutionally infringes on the federal foreign affairs power, violates the Foreign Commerce Clause, and is preempted by the Federal Burma Law. The District Court permanently enjoined the state act's enforcement, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court also found that the Massachusetts Burma Law violated the Supremacy Clause because the state was acting in an area of unique federal concern, foreign policy, through a balanced, tailored approach.</p><br/><br/><p>Is the Massachusetts Burma Law, which restricts the authority of its agencies to purchase goods or services from companies doing business with Burma, unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause?</p> 99-474_20000322-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_474/argument/ Thomas A. Barnico supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Mar 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 99-474_20000322-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_474/argument/ Timothy B. Dyk supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Mar 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 99-474_20000322-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_474/argument/ Seth P. Waxman supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 22 Mar 2000 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 99-474_20000322-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_474/argument/ Thomas A. Barnico supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 29 Nov 2004 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court.</p> <p>The medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce and therefore could not be regulated by Congress.</p> <p>In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court.</p> <p>The medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce and therefore could not be regulated by Congress.</p><br/><br/><p>Does the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801) exceed Congress' power under the commerce clause as applied to the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical use?</p> 03-1454_20041129-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1454/argument/ Paul D. Clement supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 29 Nov 2004 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 03-1454_20041129-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1454/argument/ Randy E. Barnett supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 29 Nov 2004 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 03-1454_20041129-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1454/argument/ Paul D. Clement supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 15 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500 <p>William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a "serious health condition" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action "against any employer" that "interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p> <p>William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a "serious health condition" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action "against any employer" that "interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p><br/><br/><p>May an individual sue a State for money damages in federal court for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993?</p> 01-1368_20030115-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1368/argument/ Paul G. Taggart supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 15 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 01-1368_20030115-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1368/argument/ Cornelia T. L. Pillard supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 15 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 01-1368_20030115-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1368/argument/ Viet D. Dinh supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 15 Jan 2003 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 01-1368_20030115-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1368/argument/ Paul G. Taggart supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 30 Mar 1992 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. New York State and Allegany and Courtland counties were frustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New York filed suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management.</p> <p>The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. New York State and Allegany and Courtland counties were frustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New York filed suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management.</p><br/><br/><p>Does the Low-Level Waste Act violate the Tenth Amendment and the "guarantee clause" of Article Four?</p> 91-543_19920330-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_543/argument/ Peter H. Schiff supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 30 Mar 1992 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 91-543_19920330-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_543/argument/ Lawrence G. Wallace supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 30 Mar 1992 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 91-543_19920330-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_543/argument/ William B. Collins supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 30 Mar 1992 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 91-543_19920330-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_543/argument/ Peter H. Schiff supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Dec 1996 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required "local chief law enforcement officers" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal system for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, separately challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf of CLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively. In both cases District Courts found the background-checks unconstitutional, but ruled that since this requirement was severable from the rest of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system could remain. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the interim background-check provisions were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. United States.</p> <p>The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required "local chief law enforcement officers" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal system for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, separately challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf of CLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively. In both cases District Courts found the background-checks unconstitutional, but ruled that since this requirement was severable from the rest of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system could remain. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the interim background-check provisions were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. United States.</p><br/><br/><p>Using the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I as justification, can Congress temporarily require state CLEOs to regulate handgun purchases by performing those duties called for by the Brady Bill's handgun applicant background-checks?</p> 95-1478_19961203-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_1478/argument/ Stephen P. Halbrook supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 03 Dec 1996 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 95-1478_19961203-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_1478/argument/ Walter Dellinger supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Apr 1987 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a state that permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol, challenged the law.</p> <p>In 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a state that permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol, challenged the law.</p><br/><br/><p>Did Congress exceed its spending powers, or violate the Twenty-first Amendment, by passing legislation conditioning the award of federal highway funds on the states' adoption of a uniform minimum drinking age?</p> 86-260_19870428-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_260/argument/ Roger A. Tellinghuisen supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Apr 1987 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 86-260_19870428-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_260/argument/ Louis R. Cohen supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 28 Apr 1987 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 86-260_19870428-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_260/argument/ Roger A. Tellinghuisen supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 13 Jan 2004 12:00:00 -0500 <p>George Lane and Beverly Jones were disabled and could not access upper floors in Tennessee state courthouses. Lane, Jones, and several others sued Tennessee in federal district court, alleging that by denying them public services based on their disabilities, Tennessee was in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990). According to Title II, no person may be denied access to "services, programs, or activities" on the basis of his disability. The act allows alleged victims of discrimination to sue states for damages.</p> <p>Tennessee asked that the case be dismissed, claiming that it was barred by the 11th Amendment's prohibition of suits against states in federal courts (the sovereign immunity doctrine). The state cited <em>Alabama v. Garrett</em> (2001), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Congress had acted unconstitutionally in granting citizens the right to sue states for disability discrimination (such as the denial of employment) under the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause. In that case the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress did not have enough evidence of disability discrimination by states to justify the waiver of sovereign immunity.</p> <p>The district court rejected the state's argument and denied the motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed. The courts reasoned that because Title II of the ADA dealt with the Due process Clause of the 14th Amendment, not the equal protection clause, the ruling in <em>Garrett</em> did not apply. The court found that while Congress may not have had enough evidence of disability discrimination to waive sovereign immunity for equal protection claims, it did have enough evidence of Due Process violations (such as non-handicap-accessible courthouses) to waive the sovereign immunity doctrine for Due Process claims.</p> <p>George Lane and Beverly Jones were disabled and could not access upper floors in Tennessee state courthouses. Lane, Jones, and several others sued Tennessee in federal district court, alleging that by denying them public services based on their disabilities, Tennessee was in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990). According to Title II, no person may be denied access to "services, programs, or activities" on the basis of his disability. The act allows alleged victims of discrimination to sue states for damages.</p> <p>Tennessee asked that the case be dismissed, claiming that it was barred by the 11th Amendment's prohibition of suits against states in federal courts (the sovereign immunity doctrine). The state cited <em>Alabama v. Garrett</em> (2001), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Congress had acted unconstitutionally in granting citizens the right to sue states for disability discrimination (such as the denial of employment) under the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause. In that case the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress did not have enough evidence of disability discrimination by states to justify the waiver of sovereign immunity.</p> <p>The district court rejected the state's argument and denied the motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed. The courts reasoned that because Title II of the ADA dealt with the Due process Clause of the 14th Amendment, not the equal protection clause, the ruling in <em>Garrett</em> did not apply. The court found that while Congress may not have had enough evidence of disability discrimination to waive sovereign immunity for equal protection claims, it did have enough evidence of Due Process violations (such as non-handicap-accessible courthouses) to waive the sovereign immunity doctrine for Due Process claims.</p><br/><br/><p>Did the Americans with Disabilities Act violate the sovereign immunity doctrine of the 11th Amendment when, based on Congress's 14th Amendment enforcement powers of the Due Process clause, it allowed individuals to sue states for denying them services based on their disabilities?</p> 02-1667_20040113-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_1667/argument/ Michael E. Moore supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 13 Jan 2004 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 02-1667_20040113-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_1667/argument/ William J. Brown supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 13 Jan 2004 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 02-1667_20040113-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_1667/argument/ Paul D. Clement supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 13 Jan 2004 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 02-1667_20040113-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_1667/argument/ Michael E. Moore supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 29 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>On November 3, 1992, Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73 to their State Constitution. The "Term Limitation Amendment," in addition to limiting terms of elected officials within the Arkansas state government, also provided that any person who served three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Representative from Arkansas. Similarly, the Amendment provided that any person who served two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Senator from Arkansas.</p> <p>On November 3, 1992, Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73 to their State Constitution. The "Term Limitation Amendment," in addition to limiting terms of elected officials within the Arkansas state government, also provided that any person who served three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Representative from Arkansas. Similarly, the Amendment provided that any person who served two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Senator from Arkansas.</p><br/><br/><p>Can states alter those qualifications for the U.S. Congress that are specifically enumerated in the Constitution?</p> 93-1456_19941129-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1456/argument/ J. Winston Bryant supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 29 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 93-1456_19941129-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1456/argument/ John G. Kester supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 29 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 93-1456_19941129-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1456/argument/ Louis R. Cohen supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 29 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 93-1456_19941129-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1456/argument/ Drew S. Days III supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 29 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 93-1456_19941129-argument-part05 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1456/argument/ J. Winston Bryant supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 08 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.</p> <p>Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.</p><br/><br/><p>Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause?</p> 93-1260_19941108-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1260/argument/ Drew S. Days III supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 08 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 93-1260_19941108-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1260/argument/ John R. Carter supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 08 Nov 1994 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 93-1260_19941108-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_93_1260/argument/ Drew S. Days III supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist