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  <title>The Oyez Project: 2006 Term Opinions Unsigned</title>
  <link>http://www.oyez.org/tags/2006_term_opinions_unsigned/</link>
  <description>U.S. Supreme Court Cases, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org)</description>
  <language>en-us</language>
  
   <item>
    <title>Burton v. Waddington</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Burton was convicted of burglary, robbery, and rape. Under the standard state sentencing guidelines, the burglary and robbery alone warranted the maximum sentence for a single criminal event. In order to make sure the rape was punished as well, the trial judge added a consecutive sentence for the rape to the standard sentence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Burton filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his sentence in federal court. He argued that under &lt;em&gt;Blakely v. Washington&lt;/em&gt;, handed down after his conviction, the jury rather than the judge should have decided whether to add the extra sentence. The government argued that the holding in &lt;em&gt;Blakely&lt;/em&gt; was a "new rule." Under the Court's decision in &lt;em&gt;Teague v. Lane&lt;/em&gt;, new rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively. Burton countered that the relevant rule was actually established in &lt;em&gt;Apprendi v. New Jersey&lt;/em&gt;, a decision handed down before his conviction became final. Burton also argued that even if &lt;em&gt;Blakely&lt;/em&gt; is a new rule, it is essential for a fair trial. New rules that are essential for the fundamental fairness of trials can apply retroactively.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Burton. The Appeals Court held that &lt;em&gt;Blakely&lt;/em&gt; was a new rule, so it could not be used by Burton in his appeal.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_9222/</link>
   </item>
  
   <item>
    <title>Claiborne v. United States</title>
    <description>Mario Claiborne pleaded guilty to two drug-related charges. A District Court determined that according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the charges should carry a minimum sentence of 37 months in prison. However, the District Court decided to reduce Claiborne's sentence to 15 months based on factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), including the defendant's young age, clean record, and improbability of committing similar crimes in the future. The government appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, claiming that it should be rejected unless "extraordinary circumstances" were found to justify the "extraordinary reduction."  Claiborne argued that because the Supreme Court in &lt;i&gt;U.S. v. Booker&lt;/i&gt; had declared the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be merely advisory, courts could not declare a sentence unreasonable based on variance from the Guidelines. 

The Eighth Circuit ruled that the 15-month sentence was unreasonable because the advised 37-month minimum in the Guidelines already took into account the circumstances that the District Court claimed were extraordinary.</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_06_5618/</link>
   </item>
  
   <item>
    <title>Roper v. Weaver</title>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;William Weaver was convicted of the first degree murder of a prospective witness in a drug trial. During the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor gave a closing statement arguing for a death sentence. In the course of the statement, the prosecutor said: "You've got to think beyond William Weaver [...] This is society's worst nightmare" and "Sometimes killing is not only fair and justified; it's right. Sometimes it's your duty [...] it's right to kill him [Weaver] now." The jury sentenced Weaver to death. Weaver appealed in state court, arguing that the prosecutor's statements had inflamed and prejudiced the jury.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The Missouri state courts denied the appeal, but a federal District Court granted habeas corpus. The District Court overturned the sentence, ruling that the "unfairly inflammatory" closing statement had violated Weaver's right to due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the state cited the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which states that federal courts shall not grant a prisoner's habeas petition unless the state court's decision was "contrary to [...] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." The Eighth Circuit had cited some Supreme Court cases pertaining to prejudicial closing statements in the guilt phase of the trial, but the state argued that the federal courts should not have granted habeas relief, because the Supreme Court had not specifically addressed the issue of closing statements in the penalty phase.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_06_313/</link>
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