http://www.oyez.org/tags/2006_term_opinions_by_stevens/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Wed, 17 Jan 2007 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Jalil Abdul-Kabir was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. At his sentencing, Abdul-Kabir presented mitigating evidence of his destructive family background and neurological defects. The jury was instructed to give effect to all mitigating evidence by making yes-or-no determinations on Texas's two "special issues" for capital sentencing: the deliberateness of the crime and the future dangerousness of the criminal. After his sentencing, Abdul-Kabir filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, arguing that the special issues had not allowed the jury to give full consideration and effect to his mitigating evidence as required by the Supreme Court in <i>Penry v. Johnson</i>. The District Court denied Abdul-Kabir habeas relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p><p>The Fifth Circuit held that the mitigating evidence was not "constitutionally relevant," and that in any case the jury could have given it consideration as part of the "deliberateness" and "dangerousness" determinations. After the Supreme Court rejected the "constitutional relevance" test, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its decision that Abdul-Kabir's mitigating evidence had been given full consideration and effect under the Texas special issues. The case was consolidated with <i>Brewer v. Quarterman</i> No. 05-11287.</p> <p>Jalil Abdul-Kabir was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. At his sentencing, Abdul-Kabir presented mitigating evidence of his destructive family background and neurological defects. The jury was instructed to give effect to all mitigating evidence by making yes-or-no determinations on Texas's two "special issues" for capital sentencing: the deliberateness of the crime and the future dangerousness of the criminal. After his sentencing, Abdul-Kabir filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court, arguing that the special issues had not allowed the jury to give full consideration and effect to his mitigating evidence as required by the Supreme Court in <i>Penry v. Johnson</i>. The District Court denied Abdul-Kabir habeas relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p><p>The Fifth Circuit held that the mitigating evidence was not "constitutionally relevant," and that in any case the jury could have given it consideration as part of the "deliberateness" and "dangerousness" determinations. After the Supreme Court rejected the "constitutional relevance" test, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its decision that Abdul-Kabir's mitigating evidence had been given full consideration and effect under the Texas special issues. The case was consolidated with <i>Brewer v. Quarterman</i> No. 05-11287.</p><br/><br/><p>Do Texas's "special issue" jury instructions for capital sentencing allow jurors to give full consideration and effect to mitigating evidence about a defendant's destructive family background and mental defects, as required by the Eighth Amendment?</p> 05-11284_20070117-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_11284/argument/ Robert C. Owen supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 17 Jan 2007 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 05-11284_20070117-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_11284/argument/ Edward L. Marshall supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 17 Jan 2007 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 05-11284_20070117-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_11284/argument/ Robert C. Owen supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 24 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500 <p>Brad Hanson worked as State Office Manager for U.S. Senator Mark Dayton. Shortly after Hanson took medical leave for a heart problem, Dayton fired him. Hanson sued under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, claiming that Dayton had discriminated against him based on a perceived disability. Dayton filed a motion to have the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He argued that he was immunized from the suit by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution ("for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.") Dayton claimed that because Hanson's duties were directly related to Dayton's legislative functions, the decision to fire him could not be challenged. The District Court denied the motion.</p><p>Overturning its own precedent, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that the Speech or Debate Clause does not bar the suit. The clause can be invoked to exclude evidence that would involve legislative acts, but the D.C. Circuit ruled that it is not a blanket ban on suits involving legislative employees. The employee would simply have to make his case without questioning legislative acts or motivations for legislative acts. Senator Dayton appealed directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Accountability Act requires the Court to hear the appeal. He also argued that Hanson's suit should be dismissed because the case had become moot after Dayton retired from the Senate.</p> <p>Brad Hanson worked as State Office Manager for U.S. Senator Mark Dayton. Shortly after Hanson took medical leave for a heart problem, Dayton fired him. Hanson sued under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, claiming that Dayton had discriminated against him based on a perceived disability. Dayton filed a motion to have the case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He argued that he was immunized from the suit by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution ("for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.") Dayton claimed that because Hanson's duties were directly related to Dayton's legislative functions, the decision to fire him could not be challenged. The District Court denied the motion.</p><p>Overturning its own precedent, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that the Speech or Debate Clause does not bar the suit. The clause can be invoked to exclude evidence that would involve legislative acts, but the D.C. Circuit ruled that it is not a blanket ban on suits involving legislative employees. The employee would simply have to make his case without questioning legislative acts or motivations for legislative acts. Senator Dayton appealed directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Accountability Act requires the Court to hear the appeal. He also argued that Hanson's suit should be dismissed because the case had become moot after Dayton retired from the Senate.</p><br/><br/><p>1) Does the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution bar federal court jurisdiction of suits under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 by congressional employees whose job duties are part of the due functioning of the legislative process?</p><p>2) Was the Office of Senator Mark Dayton entitled to appeal the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit directly to the Supreme Court?</p><p>3) Was the case rendered moot by the expiration of Senator Dayton's term of office?</p> 06-618_20070424-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_06_618/argument/ Jean M. Manning supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 24 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 06-618_20070424-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_06_618/argument/ Richard A. Salzman supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 24 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 06-618_20070424-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_06_618/argument/ Thomas E. Caballero supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 24 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 06-618_20070424-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_06_618/argument/ Jean M. Manning supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 06 Nov 2006 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Robert Marrama filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and agreed to turn over all of his non-exempt assets to a trustee for payment of his creditors. Trustees later accused Marrama of acting in bad faith by attempting to conceal two assets: a tax refund and some real estate. Marrama then moved to convert his bankruptcy petition from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, which would allow him to keep more of his assets. Citizens Bank, one of Marrama's creditors, opposed the conversion. Citizens Bank argued that Marrama should not be able to convert to Chapter 13 due to his initial bad faith Chapter 7 petition. The bankruptcy court agreed and denied the conversion.</p> <p>The bankruptcy appeals panel affirmed the court's ruling. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Marrama argued that the plain language of Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code supported his right to convert to Chapter 13, regardless of the circumstances. Section 706(a) states, "The debtor may convert a case under [Chapter 7] to a case under Chapter 11, 12 or 13 of this title at any time [...]" Citizens Bank countered that the word "may" indicates a privilege rather than a right. It also argued that the bankruptcy system could be abused if debtors were able to convert to Chapter 13 after filing bad faith Chapter 7 petitions. The First Circuit upheld the panel's ruling, denying Marrama his conversion.</p> <p>Robert Marrama filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and agreed to turn over all of his non-exempt assets to a trustee for payment of his creditors. Trustees later accused Marrama of acting in bad faith by attempting to conceal two assets: a tax refund and some real estate. Marrama then moved to convert his bankruptcy petition from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, which would allow him to keep more of his assets. Citizens Bank, one of Marrama's creditors, opposed the conversion. Citizens Bank argued that Marrama should not be able to convert to Chapter 13 due to his initial bad faith Chapter 7 petition. The bankruptcy court agreed and denied the conversion.</p> <p>The bankruptcy appeals panel affirmed the court's ruling. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Marrama argued that the plain language of Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code supported his right to convert to Chapter 13, regardless of the circumstances. Section 706(a) states, "The debtor may convert a case under [Chapter 7] to a case under Chapter 11, 12 or 13 of this title at any time [...]" Citizens Bank countered that the word "may" indicates a privilege rather than a right. It also argued that the bankruptcy system could be abused if debtors were able to convert to Chapter 13 after filing bad faith Chapter 7 petitions. The First Circuit upheld the panel's ruling, denying Marrama his conversion.</p><br/><br/><p>Can the right in Section 706(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to convert a Chapter 7 bankruptcy to another chapter be denied because of bad faith?</p> 05-996_20061106-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_996/argument/ David G. Baker supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 06 Nov 2006 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 05-996_20061106-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_996/argument/ G. Eric Brunstad Jr. supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 06 Nov 2006 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 05-996_20061106-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_996/argument/ Lisa Schiavo Blatt supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 06 Nov 2006 12:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 05-996_20061106-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_996/argument/ David G. Baker supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 29 Nov 2006 10:00:00 -0500 <p>Massachusetts and several other states petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), asking EPA to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide and other gases that contribute to global warming from new motor vehicles. Massachusetts argued that EPA was required to regulate these "greenhouse gases" by the Clean Air Act - which states that Congress must regulate "any air pollutant" that can "reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."</p> <p>EPA denied the petition, claiming that the Clean Air Act does not authorize the Agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Even if it did, EPA argued, the Agency had discretion to defer a decision until more research could be done on "the causes, extent and significance of climate change and the potential options for addressing it." Massachusetts appealed the denial of the petition to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and a divided panel ruled in favor of EPA.</p> <p>Massachusetts and several other states petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), asking EPA to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide and other gases that contribute to global warming from new motor vehicles. Massachusetts argued that EPA was required to regulate these "greenhouse gases" by the Clean Air Act - which states that Congress must regulate "any air pollutant" that can "reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."</p> <p>EPA denied the petition, claiming that the Clean Air Act does not authorize the Agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Even if it did, EPA argued, the Agency had discretion to defer a decision until more research could be done on "the causes, extent and significance of climate change and the potential options for addressing it." Massachusetts appealed the denial of the petition to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and a divided panel ruled in favor of EPA.</p><br/><br/><p>1) May the EPA decline to issue emission standards for motor vehicles based on policy considerations not enumerated in the Clean Air Act?</p> <p>2) Does the Clean Air Act give the EPA authority to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases?</p> 05-1120_20061129-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_1120/argument/ James R. Milkey supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 29 Nov 2006 10:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 05-1120_20061129-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_1120/argument/ Gregory G. Garre supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 29 Nov 2006 10:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 05-1120_20061129-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_1120/argument/ James R. Milkey supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 18 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500 <p>Brentwood Academy, a private school, was a voluntary member of the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA). After Brentwood's football coach violated TSSAA recruiting rules by contacting some prospective players at other schools, the TSSAA imposed various penalties on Brentwood. Brentwood sued the TSSAA, claiming that its First Amendment and Due Process rights were being violated. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that because the TSSAA was composed primarily of public schools, it was a state actor subject to the limitations of the Constitution (see <i>Brentwood Acad. v. TN Sec. School Ath. Assn.</i> No. 99-901). Accordingly, the District Court faulted the TSSAA for violations of Brentwood's constitutional rights and threw out the TSSAA's penalties.</p><p>On appeal, the TSSAA argued that it had not exercised the "police power" of the State, but merely enforced a voluntary contractual agreement with Brentwood. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth circuit rejected this argument, characterizing the TSSAA's actions as those of a "government regulator." The Sixth Circuit held that the state interest in regulating athletic competition was not substantial enough to counter-balance Brentwood's First Amendment rights, and it affirmed the lower court's ruling for Brentwood.</p> <p>Brentwood Academy, a private school, was a voluntary member of the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA). After Brentwood's football coach violated TSSAA recruiting rules by contacting some prospective players at other schools, the TSSAA imposed various penalties on Brentwood. Brentwood sued the TSSAA, claiming that its First Amendment and Due Process rights were being violated. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that because the TSSAA was composed primarily of public schools, it was a state actor subject to the limitations of the Constitution (see <i>Brentwood Acad. v. TN Sec. School Ath. Assn.</i> No. 99-901). Accordingly, the District Court faulted the TSSAA for violations of Brentwood's constitutional rights and threw out the TSSAA's penalties.</p><p>On appeal, the TSSAA argued that it had not exercised the "police power" of the State, but merely enforced a voluntary contractual agreement with Brentwood. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth circuit rejected this argument, characterizing the TSSAA's actions as those of a "government regulator." The Sixth Circuit held that the state interest in regulating athletic competition was not substantial enough to counter-balance Brentwood's First Amendment rights, and it affirmed the lower court's ruling for Brentwood.</p><br/><br/><p>Does a voluntary association composed primarily of public schools violate the First Amendment's protection of free speech when the association punishes a member school for violating athletic recruiting rules that the school agreed to follow?</p> 06-427_20070418-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_06_427/argument/ Maureen Mahoney supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 18 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 06-427_20070418-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_06_427/argument/ Dan Himmelfarb supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 18 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 06-427_20070418-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_06_427/argument/ James F. Blumstein supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 18 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 06-427_20070418-argument-part04 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_06_427/argument/ Maureen Mahoney supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 10 Oct 2006 10:00:00 -0500 <p>Juan Resendiz-Ponce, a Mexican national, was convicted of kidnapping and deported. When Resendiz-Ponce tried to reenter the U.S. using false identification, he was arrested and indicted for attempting to reenter the country after being deported. Resendiz-Ponce moved to dismiss his indictment because it failed to allege that he had "committed an overt act that was a substantial step toward reentering" - an essential element of the criminal offense. The trial judge denied the motion and the jury convicted Resendiz-Ponce.</p> <p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial judge's decision to deny the motion. The Ninth Circuit ruled that because the indictment failed to explicitly mention that Resendiz-Ponce had physically crossed the border and presented false identification, it was insufficient and should be dismissed. The government argued that the omission was "harmless error," a minor mistake that would not invalidate the indictment, but the Circuit Court ruled that the omission was instead a "fatal flaw."</p> <p>Juan Resendiz-Ponce, a Mexican national, was convicted of kidnapping and deported. When Resendiz-Ponce tried to reenter the U.S. using false identification, he was arrested and indicted for attempting to reenter the country after being deported. Resendiz-Ponce moved to dismiss his indictment because it failed to allege that he had "committed an overt act that was a substantial step toward reentering" - an essential element of the criminal offense. The trial judge denied the motion and the jury convicted Resendiz-Ponce.</p> <p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial judge's decision to deny the motion. The Ninth Circuit ruled that because the indictment failed to explicitly mention that Resendiz-Ponce had physically crossed the border and presented false identification, it was insufficient and should be dismissed. The government argued that the omission was "harmless error," a minor mistake that would not invalidate the indictment, but the Circuit Court ruled that the omission was instead a "fatal flaw."</p><br/><br/><p>Can the omission of an element of a criminal offense from a federal indictment constitute harmless error?</p> 05-998_20061010-argument-part01 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_998/argument/ Michael R. Dreeben supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 10 Oct 2006 10:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 05-998_20061010-argument-part02 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_998/argument/ Atmore Baggot supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 10 Oct 2006 10:00:00 -0500 Oral Argument, continued. Oral Argument, continued.<br/><br/>Oral Argument, continued. 05-998_20061010-argument-part03 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_998/argument/ Michael R. Dreeben supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist