The Oyez Project: 2006 Term Opinions by Roberts

Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (Oral Argument), Part 1 of 6

Wed, 25 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), a nonprofit political advocacy corporation, ran three advertisements encouraging viewers to contact two U.S. Senators and tell them to oppose filibusters of judicial nominees. WRTL intended to keep running the ads through the 2004 election, but the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate funds from being used for certain political advertisements in the 60-day period prior to an election. WRTL sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC), claiming that the BCRA was unconstitutional as applied to the advertisements. In 2006, the Supreme Court let the "as applied" challenge proceed (see Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission, 04-1581). In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the Court had upheld Congress's power to regulate "express advocacy" ads that support or oppose political candidates, but WRTL claimed that its ads were "issue ads" rather than express advocacy. WRTL also argued that the government lacked a compelling interest sufficient to override the corporation's First Amendment free speech interest. The FEC countered that WRTL's ads were "sham issue ads," which refrain from explicitly endorsing or opposing a candidate but are intended to affect an election.

A three-judge District Court agreed with WRTL's arguments and ruled the BCRA unconstitutional as applied to the ads. The court refused the FEC's request that it inquire into the intent and likely effect of the ads, because those determinations would be impractical and would have a chilling effect on protected speech. Analyzing only the explicit content of the ads, the court found them to be legitimate issue ads and not express advocacy or sham issue ads. The court also held that the government's justification for banning express advocacy ads by corporations - the need to reduce political corruption and public cynicism - did not apply to ads that do not endorse or oppose a candidate. Therefore, the court ruled that the government lacked a compelling interest to justify the burden on WRTL's First Amendment rights.

Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (Oral Argument), Part 2 of 6

Wed, 25 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (Oral Argument), Part 3 of 6

Wed, 25 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (Oral Argument), Part 4 of 6

Wed, 25 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (Oral Argument), Part 5 of 6

Wed, 25 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (Oral Argument), Part 6 of 6

Wed, 25 Apr 2007 00:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Hinck v. United States (Oral Argument), Part 1 of 3

Mon, 23 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed over $20,000 in interest fees for outstanding taxes against John and Pamela Hinck. The Hincks claimed that the interest accrued because of IRS delays and errors. Section 6404(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the abatement of interest fees that are caused by IRS delays. The IRS rejected the Hincks' interest abatement claim in 2000. In 2003, the United States Court of Federal Claims determined that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case because Section 6404(h) of the Internal Revenue Code granted the United States Tax Court jurisdiction over interest abatement disputes.

The Hincks appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Tucker Act granted subject matter jurisdiction to the Federal Claims Court. The Federal Circuit held that Section 6404(h) grants the Tax Court exclusive jurisdiction over interest abatement disputes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had previously ruled to the contrary.

Hinck v. United States (Oral Argument), Part 2 of 3

Mon, 23 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Hinck v. United States (Oral Argument), Part 3 of 3

Mon, 23 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Jones v. Bock (Oral Argument), Part 1 of 5

Mon, 30 Oct 2006 12:00:00 -0500

Congress passed the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in 1995 in an effort to cut down on frivolous lawsuits by prisoners. Under the PLRA, before bringing a federal civil rights suit a prisoner must go through his prison's internal complaint process. Only after exhausting all of these "administrative remedies" can the prisoner bring the complaint to federal court.

Lorenzo Jones sustained serious injuries in a car accident while in custody. He sued prison officials in federal court, claiming that they were violating his Eighth Amendment rights by making him do arduous work despite his injuries. The officials moved to dismiss the suit, because Jones had not provided any evidence or description of the administrative remedies he claimed to have pursued. The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the suit.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Circuit Court ruled that in order for Jones to sue, he would have had to provide the court with copies of his grievance forms or at least describe the administrative processes he had exhausted. The Circuit Court further ruled that the PLRA requires "total exhaustion," which means that if a prisoner's suit has multiple claims, administrative remedies must have been exhausted for each and every claim.

The Supreme Court accepted review in order to resolve the conflict between Circuit Courts over which side bears the burden of proving exhaustion of administrative remedies.

In Williams v. Overton, Timothy Williams suffered from a medical condition which caused tumor growth and disfigurement in his arm. He claimed that prison officials were violating his rights by ignoring his medical needs. Williams's complaint had two claims: he needed additional surgery on his arm and a single-occupancy, handicapped-accessible cell. Williams went through the administrative remedial process on both grievances and both claims were denied. Williams then sued in federal court.

The District Court dismissed the suit, because Williams had neglected to name any prison officials as defendants in his medical complaint. Therefore, the court ruled, the administrative remedies for that claim could not be considered to have been exhausted.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, ruling that "The prisoner must demonstrate that he has exhausted the administrative remedies with respect to each individual he intends to sue." The Circuit Court also ruled that the PLRA requires "total exhaustion," which meant that Williams's entire suit was dismissed because of his unexhausted medical claim, even though the administrative remedies for his request for a new cell had been exhausted.

Jones v. Bock (Oral Argument), Part 2 of 5

Mon, 30 Oct 2006 12:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Jones v. Bock (Oral Argument), Part 3 of 5

Mon, 30 Oct 2006 12:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Jones v. Bock (Oral Argument), Part 4 of 5

Mon, 30 Oct 2006 12:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Jones v. Bock (Oral Argument), Part 5 of 5

Mon, 30 Oct 2006 12:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Morse v. Frederick (Oral Argument), Part 1 of 6

Mon, 19 Mar 2007 11:00:00 -0500

At a school-supervised event, Joseph Frederick held up a banner with the message "Bong Hits 4 Jesus," a slang reference to marijuana smoking. Principal Deborah Morse took away the banner and suspended Frederick for ten days. She justified her actions by citing the school's policy against the display of material that promotes the use of illegal drugs. Frederick sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the federal civil rights statute, alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found no constitutional violation and ruled in favor of Morse. The court held that even if there were a violation, the principal had qualified immunity from lawsuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, which extended First Amendment protection to student speech except where the speech would cause a disturbance. Because Frederick was punished for his message rather than for any disturbance, the Circuit Court ruled, the punishment was unconstitutional. Furthermore, the principal had no qualified immunity, because any reasonable principal would have known that Morse's actions were unlawful.

Morse v. Frederick (Oral Argument), Part 2 of 6

Mon, 19 Mar 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Morse v. Frederick (Oral Argument), Part 3 of 6

Mon, 19 Mar 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Morse v. Frederick (Oral Argument), Part 4 of 6

Mon, 19 Mar 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Morse v. Frederick (Oral Argument), Part 5 of 6

Mon, 19 Mar 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Morse v. Frederick (Oral Argument), Part 6 of 6

Mon, 19 Mar 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Sorrell (Oral Argument), Part 1 of 3

Tue, 10 Oct 2006 13:00:00 -0500

Sorrell, an employee of Norfolk Southern Railway, crashed his company truck while swerving to avoid another company truck. Sorrell suffered injuries and sued Norfolk Southern for damages under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). Both Sorrell and the railroad had been negligent in the incident to some extent. Norfolk Southern argued that under the FELA, the "causation standard" - the standard for assigning the blame for an incident - was the same for both the employee and the railroad. According to Norfolk Southern, any damages awarded to Sorrell for the railroad's negligence had to be reduced by the amount of the damages that was attributable to Sorrell's own negligence. (If Sorrell was 60% responsible for the accident, for example, the damages would be reduced by 60%.)

The trial ruled instead that the causation standards were different: the railroad was responsible for any negligence that contributed to the accident, but the employee was only responsible for negligence that directly caused damage. Under this more lenient standard for employee negligence, the trial court awarded Sorrell $1.5 million.

The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. The Missouri Supreme Court declined to hear the case, but the U.S. Supreme Court granted review.

Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Sorrell (Oral Argument), Part 2 of 3

Tue, 10 Oct 2006 13:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Sorrell (Oral Argument), Part 3 of 3

Tue, 10 Oct 2006 13:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (Oral Argument), Part 1 of 6