The Oyez Project: 2006 Term Opinions by Ginsburg

Cunningham v. California (Oral Argument), Part 1 of 3

Wed, 11 Oct 2006 10:00:00 -0500

John Cunningham was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of his young son. Under California's Determinate Sentencing Law, the trial judge can choose between three possible sentences for a given crime: a minimum, medium, and maximum sentence. Judges normally hand down the medium sentence unless there are special circumstances. In Cunningham's case, the judge found six aggravating factors, and sentenced him to the maximum 16-year sentence. However, in determining some of the aggravating factors the judge relied on evidence not considered by the jury.

Cunningham appealed his sentence, arguing that the judge's discretion was a violation of Cunningham's right to a trial by jury. In Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court had ruled that for the right to a jury trial to be effective, any fact which increases a sentence "beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" must be proved before the jury. Cunningham argued that the judge can consider only factors determined by the jury when deciding which sentence to impose.

A California Court of Appeal disagreed and upheld the sentence, ruling that the judge had merely handed down the maximum sentence prescribed by the statute. The California Supreme Court denied Cunningham's appeal, but the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

Cunningham v. California (Oral Argument), Part 2 of 3

Wed, 11 Oct 2006 10:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Cunningham v. California (Oral Argument), Part 3 of 3

Wed, 11 Oct 2006 10:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Microsoft Corporation v. AT&T Corp. (Oral Argument), Part 1 of 4

Wed, 21 Feb 2007 10:00:00 -0500

AT&T owned the patent for certain speech codecs (a type of software code) included in Microsoft's Windows operating system. When Microsoft sent master versions of the software overseas, copied them, and sold the copied software, AT&T sued for patent infringement. A company is guilty of infringement under the Patent Act if it "supplies...from the United States...components of a patented invention...in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components." Microsoft argued that it was not liable because 1) software code is intangible and cannot not be considered a "component" of an invention and 2) no software had been "supplied" from the U.S. because the copies were made overseas.

The District Court rejected both of Microsoft's arguments, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The Federal Circuit ruled that software code could be a component, because the Patent Act was not limited to physical structures. The Circuit Court also held that each overseas copy made of the U.S.-originated software code was "supplied" from the United States.

Microsoft Corporation v. AT&T Corp. (Oral Argument), Part 2 of 4

Wed, 21 Feb 2007 10:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Microsoft Corporation v. AT&T Corp. (Oral Argument), Part 3 of 4

Wed, 21 Feb 2007 10:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Microsoft Corporation v. AT&T Corp. (Oral Argument), Part 4 of 4

Wed, 21 Feb 2007 10:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Osborn v. Haley (Oral Argument), Part 1 of 3

Mon, 30 Oct 2006 12:00:00 -0500

Pat Osborn, an employee of a private contractor for the U.S. Forest Service, sued Barry Haley, an employee of the Forest Service, in state court. Osborn alleged that Haley had influenced her employer to fire her. Under the Westfall Act, federal employees are immune from such lawsuits if the employee acts "within the scope of his employment." If the Attorney General certifies that the employee acted within his scope, the case can be transferred to federal court and the United States can be substituted for the employee as the defendant. The government conceded that if Osborn's version of events were correct, Haley would have been outside his scope. Nevertheless, the government certified that Haley was within his scope, because it denied that Haley had any role in Osborn's firing.

The government brought the case to federal District Court, but the court decided that it lacked the authority to settle the factual dispute at the root of the Attorney General's certification. Instead, the court assumed that Osborn's account was true, ruled that Haley had been outside the scope of his employment by influencing Haley's firing, and sent the case back to state court.

The government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the lower court. The Circuit Court ruled that the Westfall Act gives the courts power to settle factual disputes over the incident at issue in a lawsuit, even if the dispute is over whether or not the incident happened at all. The Sixth Circuit also ruled that the District Court should not have sent the case back to state court, because the Westfall Act gives the federal courts jurisdiction over the case even after the federal District Court finds that the Attorney General was wrong to certify the federal employee.

Osborn appealed to the Supreme Court, which instructed the parties to submit briefs on the additional question of whether the Westfall Act gives a Court of Appeals the authority to review a District Court's order remanding a case back to state court.

Osborn v. Haley (Oral Argument), Part 2 of 3

Mon, 30 Oct 2006 12:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Osborn v. Haley (Oral Argument), Part 3 of 3

Mon, 30 Oct 2006 12:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (Oral Argument), Part 1 of 4

Tue, 09 Jan 2007 12:00:00 -0500

Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (MISC) owned a vessel carrying steel coils for Sinochem International, a Chinese company. Sinochem brought an action in Chinese Admiralty Court, alleging that MISC had backdated documents pertaining to the loading of the cargo, and seeking to have the ship detained in China. MISC filed suit in a Pennsylvania district court, accusing Sinochem of fraudulent misrepresentation. Sinochem argued that the U.S. had no personal jurisdiction over the Chinese company, but the District Court declined to rule on the issue. Instead the court dismissed the suit on grounds of "forum non conveniens," which means that the case could be more conveniently tried in another forum, in this case the Chinese Admiralty Court.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, ruling that the lower court should have first ruled on the jurisdictional issue. The Third Circuit acknowledged the inconvenience of determining jurisdiction before dismissing the case anyway, but nevertheless sent the case back to the District Court.

Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (Oral Argument), Part 2 of 4

Tue, 09 Jan 2007 12:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (Oral Argument), Part 3 of 4

Tue, 09 Jan 2007 12:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (Oral Argument), Part 4 of 4

Tue, 09 Jan 2007 12:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Sole v. Wyner (Oral Argument), Part 1 of 4

Tue, 17 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Florida state park officials prohibited T.A. Wyner and George Simon from forming a peace symbol from nude individuals at a public beach. Wyner and Simon petitioned a district court, which issued a preliminary injunction barring the officials' interference and awarded Wyner and Simon their attorney fees in accordance with 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. Later, the district court reversed the injunction because state laws prohibited nudity at the beach. The officials argued that Wyner and Simon did not qualify as a "prevailing party," and therefore should not have their attorney fees refunded.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Wyner and Simon were the "prevailing party" because the district court had decided to issue the preliminary injunction based on merits of the case. The park officials responded that the preliminary injunction was based on a "mistake of the law," because the case was dismissed upon further review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had previously ruled that a preliminary injunction is not a ruling based on the merits, and therefore does not determine the "prevailing party."

Sole v. Wyner (Oral Argument), Part 2 of 4

Tue, 17 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Sole v. Wyner (Oral Argument), Part 3 of 4

Tue, 17 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Sole v. Wyner (Oral Argument), Part 4 of 4

Tue, 17 Apr 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights (Oral Argument), Part 1 of 4

Wed, 28 Mar 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Several plaintiffs brought a class action securities fraud lawsuit against Tellabs, Inc., a manufacturer of equipment for fiber optic cable networks. The plaintiffs alleged that Tellabs had misrepresented the strength of its products and earnings in order to conceal the declining value of the company's stock. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), plaintiffs bringing securities fraud complaints must allege specific facts that give rise to a "strong inference" that the defendant intended to deceive investors (scienter).

The District Court dismissed the complaints. The court held that the plaintiff's allegations were too vague to establish a "strong inference" of scienter on the part of Tellabs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed one of the lower court's dismissals. The Seventh Circuit ruled that a plaintiff need only allege "acts from which, if true, a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent." The Court of Appeals decided to consider only the plausibility of the inference of a guilty mental state, and not any competing inferences of an innocent mental state. This decision was due in part to the court's concern that weighing competing inferences was more properly the task of a jury. The Seventh Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other Courts of Appeals, which required plaintiffs to show that the inference of scienter supported by the alleged facts was more plausible than any competing inference of innocent intent.

Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights (Oral Argument), Part 2 of 4

Wed, 28 Mar 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights (Oral Argument), Part 3 of 4

Wed, 28 Mar 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights (Oral Argument), Part 4 of 4

Wed, 28 Mar 2007 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Watters v. Wachovia Bank (Oral Argument), Part 1 of 4

Wed, 29 Nov 2006 11:00:00 -0500

Under 12 U.S.C. Section 484(a), states do not have regulatory powers over national banks. In 2001 the federal Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) issued federal regulation 12 C.F.R. 7.4006, which applied 12 U.S.C. Section 484(a) to state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks. Wachovia Mortgage was an operating subsidiary of the national bank Wachovia Bank, and was registered with the state of Michigan.

When Michigan attempted to exercise its regulatory powers over Wachovia Mortgage, Wachovia Bank sued Watters, a Michigan official, seeking a judgment that Michigan's laws on operating subsidies of national banks were superceded by 12 U.S.C Section 484(a). Michigan argued that the OCC had exceeded the authority given it by Congress by extending the definition of "national bank" to cover state-registered operating subsidiaries. Michigan also argued that the extension of federal authority over state entities like Wachovia Mortgage violates the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to states all powers not delegated to the federal government.

The District Court rejected these arguments and ruled for Wachovia, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Circuit Court found that the decision of the OCC to apply rules for national banks to their operating subsidiaries was a reasonable interpretation of Congress's intent, and therefore entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The Sixth Circuit also held that Congress had the power to regulate operating subsidiaries of national banks under the Commerce Clause, so the Tenth Amendment did not reserve that power to the states.

Watters v. Wachovia Bank (Oral Argument), Part 2 of 4

Wed, 29 Nov 2006 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Watters v. Wachovia Bank (Oral Argument), Part 3 of 4

Wed, 29 Nov 2006 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.

Watters v. Wachovia Bank (Oral Argument), Part 4 of 4

Wed, 29 Nov 2006 11:00:00 -0500

Oral Argument, continued.