http://www.oyez.org/issues/unions/flsa/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Tue, 10 Dec 1996 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Francis Bernard Auer, a St. Louis police sergeant, other St. Louis police sergeants, and a lieutenant sued the respondent police commissioners, including David A. Robbins, for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). The commissioners argued that Auer and the other petitioners were "bona fide executive, administrative, or professional" employees exempted from overtime pay requirements by the FLSA. Under the Secretary of Labor's regulations, that exemption applies to employees paid a specified minimum amount on a "salary basis," which requires that the "compensation...not [be] subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed." Auer claimed that that they did not meet this test because, under the terms of the Police Department Manual, their compensation could theoretically be reduced for a variety of disciplinary infractions related to the "quality or quantity" of their work. The District Court and the Court of Appeals disagreed with Auer's claim. Both courts held that the salary basis test was satisfied.</p> <p>Francis Bernard Auer, a St. Louis police sergeant, other St. Louis police sergeants, and a lieutenant sued the respondent police commissioners, including David A. Robbins, for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). The commissioners argued that Auer and the other petitioners were "bona fide executive, administrative, or professional" employees exempted from overtime pay requirements by the FLSA. Under the Secretary of Labor's regulations, that exemption applies to employees paid a specified minimum amount on a "salary basis," which requires that the "compensation...not [be] subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed." Auer claimed that that they did not meet this test because, under the terms of the Police Department Manual, their compensation could theoretically be reduced for a variety of disciplinary infractions related to the "quality or quantity" of their work. The District Court and the Court of Appeals disagreed with Auer's claim. Both courts held that the salary basis test was satisfied.</p><br/><br/><p>Must sergeants and lieutenants in the St. Louis Police Department be paid for working overtime pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938?</p> 95-897_19961210-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_897/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 23 Feb 2000 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) permits governmental entities to compensate their employees for overtime work by granting them compensatory time in lieu of cash payment. If the employees do not use their accumulated compensatory time, the employer must pay cash compensation under certain circumstances. Harris County, Texas, found that too many of its deputy sheriffs had too many hours of accrued compensatory time. Fearing a budget crisis, the county adopted a policy under which its employees could be ordered to schedule compensatory time at specified times in order to reduce the amount of accrued time that would otherwise require cash payment. Edward Christensen and 128 other deputy sheriffs in Harris County believed they had the right to use their compensatory time when they saw fit. The sheriffs sued, claiming that the FLSA does not permit an employer to compel an employee to use compensatory time in the absence of an agreement permitting the employer to do so. The District Court ruled in favor of the sheriffs, concluding that the policy violated the FLSA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the FLSA did not address the issue in question and thus did not prohibit the county from implementing a compensatory time policy.</p> <p>The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) permits governmental entities to compensate their employees for overtime work by granting them compensatory time in lieu of cash payment. If the employees do not use their accumulated compensatory time, the employer must pay cash compensation under certain circumstances. Harris County, Texas, found that too many of its deputy sheriffs had too many hours of accrued compensatory time. Fearing a budget crisis, the county adopted a policy under which its employees could be ordered to schedule compensatory time at specified times in order to reduce the amount of accrued time that would otherwise require cash payment. Edward Christensen and 128 other deputy sheriffs in Harris County believed they had the right to use their compensatory time when they saw fit. The sheriffs sued, claiming that the FLSA does not permit an employer to compel an employee to use compensatory time in the absence of an agreement permitting the employer to do so. The District Court ruled in favor of the sheriffs, concluding that the policy violated the FLSA. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the FLSA did not address the issue in question and thus did not prohibit the county from implementing a compensatory time policy.</p><br/><br/><p>Does the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 prohibit a public employer from compelling its employees to use their compensatory time without a preexisting agreement?</p> 98-1167_20000223-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_1167/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 20 Apr 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet.<br/><br/>No details yet. 86-88_19870420-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_88/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 03 Oct 2005 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In two separate cases, employees sued Barber Foods and IBP in federal district court. The employees alleged the companies violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by not paying them for time spent walking to the worksite after putting on required equipment. The district court and later the First Circuit ruled against the Barber employees. A separate district court ruled IBP must compensate its employees for the disputed time. The Ninth Circuit agreed. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the cases.</p> <p>In two separate cases, employees sued Barber Foods and IBP in federal district court. The employees alleged the companies violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by not paying them for time spent walking to the worksite after putting on required equipment. The district court and later the First Circuit ruled against the Barber employees. A separate district court ruled IBP must compensate its employees for the disputed time. The Ninth Circuit agreed. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the cases.</p><br/><br/><p>Did the Fair Labor Standards Act require employers to pay employees for time spent walking to and from stations that distributed required safety equipment?</p> 03-1238_20051003-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_03_1238/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 24 Feb 1988 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet.<br/><br/>No details yet. 86-1520_19880224-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_1520/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 01 Mar 1993 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet.<br/><br/>No details yet. 92-1_19930301-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_92_1/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 25 Mar 1985 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet.<br/><br/>No details yet. 83-1935_19850325-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_1935/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist