The Oyez Project: Privacy Issues - Abortion: Including Contraceptives

Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health

In 1978 the Akron City Council enacted an ordinance which established seventeen provisions to regulate the performance of abortions. Among other things, the ordinance required: all abortions performed after the first trimester to be done in hospitals, parental consent before the procedure could be performed on an unmarried minor, doctors to counsel prospective patients, a twenty-four hour waiting period, and that fetal remains be disposed of in a "humane and sanitary manner." Some of the ordinance's provisions were invalidated by a federal district court.

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England

After New Hampshire's state legislature approved the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act but before the act went into effect, Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenged the law in federal district court. They claimed that the law, which requires that parents be notified before their minor daughter has an abortion, violated the "undue burden" test laid out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a 1992 Supreme Court decision that reformulated the constitutional protections given to abortion in Roe v. Wade. Specifically, they argued that an exemption in the law for abortions necessary to prevent the death of the mother, but not for those abortions necessary to protect merely her health, was unconstitutionally narrow.

The federal district court agreed, rejecting the argument of New Hampshire's Attorney General that the judicial bypass procedure included in the law, in which a judge could approve an abortion without parental notification for a minor who showed she was mature enough to make the decision on her own, could be used to permit abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother. The judge also rejected New Hampshire's argument that the law could not be challenged until it had actually been implemented. A First Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously affirmed the decision.

Beal v. Doe

In the wake of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, abortion opponents turned to state and local legislators in an effort to curb the practice of abortion. This case involved a Pennsylvania law which restricted Medicaid-funded abortions only to indigent women in situations in which a doctor determined the procedure was medically necessary.

Bellotti v. Baird

A Massachusetts law required minors to gain parental consent before having an abortion. However, if either or both of the parents refused, a judge of the superior court could allow a minor to have the procedure "for good cause shown."

Bray v. Alexandria Clinic

Several abortion clinics sued to prevent Jayne Bray and other anti-abortion protesters from conducting demonstrations at clinics in Washington, D.C. The clinics claimed that the protesters had violated 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies to deprive "any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." The protesters had sought to deny women their "right to abortion" and their right to interstate travel, the clinics argued. The District Court agreed, holding that Bray and others, by blocking access to the clinics, had conspired to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. The District Court also ruled for the clinics on state law trespassing and public nuisance claims, ordering the protesters to stop trespassing on or obstructing access to clinics. Finally, the District Court ordered the protesters to pay the clinics' attorney's fees and costs on the 1985(3) claim.

Carey v. Population Services International

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Colautti v. Franklin

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Doe v. Bolton

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H. L. v. Matheson

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Harris v. McRae

In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program, via Title XIX of the Social Security Act, to provide federal financial assistance to states that chose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. Beginning in 1976, Congress passed a number of versions of the "Hyde Amendment" that severely limited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program. Cora McRae, a pregnant Medicaid recipient, challenged the Amendment and took action against Patricia R. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services.

Hartigan v. Zbaraz

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Hill v. Colorado

A Colorado statute makes it unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance to "knowingly approach" within 8 feet of another person, without that person's consent, in order to pass "a leaflet or handbill to, display a sign to, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person...." Leila Hill and others, sidewalk counselors who offer abortion alternatives to women entering abortion clinics, sought to enjoin the statute's enforcement in state court, claiming violations of their First Amendment free speech rights and right to a free press. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the statute imposed content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative channels of communication. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment after holding that a provision creating a speech-free floating buffer zone with a 15-foot radius violated the First Amendment. On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment. In affirming, the Colorado Supreme Court reiterated the lower court's conclusions. The court concluded that the statute struck a proper balance between a person's right to protest and a person's right to medical treatment.

Hodgson v. Minnesota

Under Section 2 of a Minnesota statute regulating a minor's access to abortion, women under 18 were denied access to the procedure until 48 hours after both their parents had been notified. Exceptions were made in the cases of medical emergencies and women who were victims of parental abuse. Section 6 of the law allowed the courts to judicially bypass Section 2 if the young woman could maturely demonstrate that notification would be unwise.

Lambert v. Wicklund

In 1995, Montana enacted the Parental Notice of Abortion Act, which prohibits a physician from performing an abortion on a minor unless the physician has notified one of the minor's parents or legal guardian 48 hours in advance. The Act provides for a waiver, or judicial bypass, of the notification requirement under certain circumstances, including if the notification of a parent or guardian was not in the best interests of the minor. Several physicians challenged the statute's validity. The Federal District Court, asserting that a parental notice requirement must be waived whenever an abortion would be in the minor's best interests, ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. In affirming, the Court of Appeals ruled that a judicial bypass based on the consideration of a minor's best interests only with respect to the possible consequences of parental notification was constitutionally impermissible, in that the bypass did not sufficiently protect the right of minors to have an abortion.

Leavitt v. Jane L.

A Utah district court held that a state statutory provision regulating early-term abortions was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that a similar provision regulating later-term abortions should be invalidated along with the earlier-term provision. The Tenth Circuit held that the Utah Legislature would only have wanted to regulate later-term abortions if it could also regulate earlier-term abortions, and thus concluded that the provisions were not severable (i.e. separable). Utah governor Michael Leavitt appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Utah Legislature intended the two provisions to be severable.

Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.

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Maher v. Roe

In the wake of Roe v. Wade, the Connecticut Welfare Department issued regulations limiting state Medicaid benefits for first-trimester abortions to those that were "medically necessary." An indigent woman ("Susan Roe") challenged the regulations and sued Edward Maher, the Commissioner of Social Services in Connecticut.

Mazurek v. Armstrong

In 1995, the Montana Legislature enacted a statute restricting the performance of abortions to licensed physicians. A group of licensed physicians and one physician-assistant brought suit, challenging that statute under the Constitution. The District Court denied the practitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not established any likelihood of prevailing on their claim that the law imposed an undue burden concerning abortion rights. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the practitioners had shown a fair chance of success on the merits of their claim and thus had met the threshold requirement for preliminary injunctive. On remand, the District Court entered an injunction pending appeal and postponed a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion until the U.S. Supreme Court's disposition of the state attorney general's certiorari petition.

National Organization for Women (NOW) v. Scheidler

The National Organization for Women (NOW) sued a coalition of anti-abortion groups called the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. N.O.W. alleged that Scheidler and other anti-abortion protesters were members in a nationwide conspiracy to obstruct women's access to abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity including the actual or implied threat of violence. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the voluntary contributions are not proceeds of racketeering and that a "racketeering enterprise" must have an economic motive, a fact that NOW could not demonstrate. The Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health

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Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft

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Planned Parenthood Of Missouri v. Danforth

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Planned Parenthood v. Casey

The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement.

Poelker v. Doe

A St. Louis policy prohibited non-therapeutic abortions in the city's two publicly run hospitals.

Roe v. Wade

Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. Texas law prohibited abortions except to save the pregnant woman's life. After granting certiorari, the Court heard arguments twice. The first time, Roe's attorney -- Sarah Weddington -- could not locate the constitutional hook of her argument for Justice Potter Stewart. Her opponent -- Jay Floyd -- misfired from the start. Weddington sharpened her constitutional argument in the second round. Her new opponent -- Robert Flowers -- came under strong questioning from Justices Potter Stewart and Thurgood Marshall.

Rust v. Sullivan

The national government provides funds for family planning services (Title X). The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations limiting the ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities. Title X funds were to be used only to support preventive family planning services.

Scheidler v. National Organization for Women (NOW)

The National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW) filed a class action alleging that certain individuals and organizations that oppose legal abortion violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through "a pattern of racketeering activity" that included acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent nationwide injunction against the abortion opponents. Upholding the injunction, the Court of Appeals held, in part, that the things abortion supporters claimed were extorted from them, such as women's right to seek medical services from the clinics and the clinic doctors' rights to perform their jobs, constituted "property" that was "obtained" for purposes of the Hobbs Act. (Together with No. 01-1119, Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women.)

Scheidler v. National Organization for Women (NOW)

In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that abortion protesters do not commit extortion in violation the Hobbs Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) when they blockade abortion clinics, because they do not "obtain" property, as required by the Act. The Court concluded that "Without an underlying RICO violation, the injunction [on the protesters] issued by the District Court must necessarily be vacated." The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to vacate the injunction, however, finding that the Court had only ruled on the 117 counts of extortion, and not on four additional counts of violence unrelated to extortion. The National Organization for Women (NOW) argued that acts of physical violence are sufficient to establish a violation of the Hobbs Act. Scheidler countered that the four counts of "violence-only" were irrelevant to the Hobbs Act, which he said requires that violence be used for robbery or extortion. Scheidler petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the Circuit Court had acted properly, and the Court granted certiorari. (Consolidated with No. 04-1352, Operation Rescue v. NOW.)

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York

This action was filed by the Pro-Choice Network of Western New York (PCN), on behalf of health care providers, to enjoin Schenck and others from continuously staging blockades and other disruptive illegal activities in front of abortion clinics. After its restraining order proved ineffective, a District Court issued a preliminary injunction creating "fixed buffer zones" which prohibited demonstrations within fifteen feet of entrances to abortion clinics, parking lots, or driveways. The court also created "floating buffer zones" prohibiting demonstrators from coming within fifteen feet of people or vehicles seeking access to the clinics. Following the Appellate Court's decision to uphold the District Court's ruling that the "buffer zones" were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted Schenck certiorari.

Simopoulos v. Virginia

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Stenberg v. Carhart

A Nebraska law prohibited any "partial birth abortion" unless that procedure was necessary to save the mother's life. It defined "partial birth abortion" as a procedure in which the doctor "partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the... child," and defined the latter phrase to mean "intentionally delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure that the [abortionist] knows will kill the... child and does kill the... child." Violation of the law is a felony, and it provides for the automatic revocation of a convicted doctor's state license to practice medicine. Leroy Carhart, a Nebraska physician who performs abortions in a clinical setting, brought suit seeking a declaration that the statute violates the U.S. Constitution, claiming the law was unconstitutionally vague and placed an undue burden on himself and female patients seeking abortions. The District Court held the statute unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

United States v. Vuitch

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Webster v. Reproductive Health Services

In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortions. The statute's preamble indicated that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception," and the law codified the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life; encouragement and counseling to have abortions was prohibited; and physicians were to perform viability tests upon women in their twentieth (or more) week of pregnancy. Lower courts struck down the restrictions.

Williams v. Zbaraz

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