The Oyez Project: Privacy Issues - Abortion: Including Contraceptives Decisions

Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health

Did several provisions of the Akron ordinance violate a woman's right to an abortion as guaranteed by the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade and the right-to-privacy doctrine as implied by the Fourteenth Amendment?

The Court affirmed its commitment to protecting a woman's reproductive rights by invalidating the provisions of Akron's ordinance. Generally, Justice Powell's opinion reiterates the Court's findings in Roe and reasons that certain provisions of the ordinance violated the Constitution because they were clearly intended to direct women away from choosing the abortion option. They were not implemented out of medical necessities. The fetal disposal clause was struck down because its language was too vague to determine conduct subject to criminal prosecution.

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England

May Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenge the constitutionality of the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act in federal court before it is put into effect? Does the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act, through the judicial bypass procedure or other safeguards, adequately protect the health of minors seeking abortions?

In a rare unanimous decision regarding abortion, the Supreme Court sidestepped the most contentious questions of the case and focused instead on the proper remedy when a portion of a statute is found unconstitutional. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that the statute would be unconstitutional when applied to the very small percentage of minors for whom an emergency abortion would be necessary to avert serious damage to their health. The lower court's decision to invalidate the entire statute based on its unconstitutional results in this small percentage of cases, however, was unnecessary. Instead, O'Connor wrote, "in this case the lower courts can issue a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting [only] the statute's unconstitutional application."

O'Connor warned, however, that a court should be wary of upholding an act while strike down some of its applications when it was obvious that a legislature would prefer the entire act be declared unconstitutional. Because of some disagreement about which course the legislature would have preferred - wholesale nullification or narrower individual rulings - the Court remanded the case to lower court to determine legislative intent.

Beal v. Doe

Did Title XIX of the Social Security Act require states that participate in the Medicaid program to fund the cost of nontherapeutic abortions?

No. The Court held that states could exclude nontherapeutic abortions from coverage under their Medicaid programs. Justice Powell argued that in its provisions, Title XIX of the Social Security Act made no specific reference to abortion nor did it require states to fund every medical procedure which could possibly fall under its umbrella. Powell made clear however that the federal statute did give states the option to fund therapeutic abortions if they chose to do so.

Bellotti v. Baird

Did the law unconstitutionally restrict the right of a minor to have an abortion?

The Court found the statute unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it allowed judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a minor who is mature and competent enough to make the decision independently. Second, it required parental notification in all cases (parents were required to be notified if their daughter initiated proceedings in superior court) without allowing the minor to seek an independent judicial assessment of her competence to decide the abortion issue.

Bray v. Alexandria Clinic

Did anti-abortion protesters who obstructed access to Washington, D.C. abortion clinics violate 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) by conspiring to deny women their "right to abortion" or right to interstate travel?

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the protesters had not violated section 1985(3) by obstructing access to the abortion clinics. Justice Antonin Scalia, in the majority opinion, wrote that under the Court's decision in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, there must be a "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [underlying] the conspirators' action" for it to violate 1985(3). The clinics' claim that the protesters had demonstrated "animus" toward women as a class was unfounded because the demonstrations were not directed at women but rather were intended to protect the victims of abortion, stop its practice, and reverse its legalization. Opposition to abortion cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect gender-based intent, Justice Scalia wrote, because there are common and respectable reasons for opposing abortion other than a derogatory view of women.

In addition to holding that the protesters did not exercise discriminatory animus, Scalia also addressed the specific rights on which the clinics based their arguments. The right to interstate travel, Scalia pointed out, was not affected here because the protests were carried out entirely within the District of Columbia and were not aimed specifically at interstate travelers. Nor was the "right to abortion" implicated, he wrote, because that right was merely one to be free of governmental interference in the decision. The protesters, acting as private individuals, could not possibly violate that right.

Carey v. Population Services International

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Colautti v. Franklin

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Doe v. Bolton

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H. L. v. Matheson

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Harris v. McRae

Did the Hyde Amendment violate the right to privacy, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment?

No. The Court held that states participating in the Medicaid program were not obligated to fund medically necessary abortions under Title XIX. The Court found that a woman's freedom of choice did not carry with it "a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices." The Court ruled that because the Equal Protection Clause was not a source of substantive rights and because poverty did not qualify as a "suspect classification," the Hyde Amendment did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Finally, the Court held that the coincidence of the funding restrictions of the statute with tenets of the Roman Catholic Church did not constitute an establishment of religion.

Hartigan v. Zbaraz

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Hill v. Colorado

Does Colorado's statutory requirement that speakers obtain consent from people within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance before speaking, displaying signs, or distributing leaflets to such people violate the First Amendment rights of the speaker?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Colorado statute's restrictions on speech-related conduct are constitutional. The Court concluded that the statute "is not a regulation of speech. Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur." "Although the statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from anyone passing by. Nor does it place any restriction on the content of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone else, either inside or outside the regulated areas. It does, however, make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical facilities," Justice Stevens wrote for the Court. "The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases." Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony M. Kennedy dissented.

Hodgson v. Minnesota

Did the Minnesota abortion notification statute unconstitutionally restrict a minor's access to having an abortion?

The Court found Section 2 of the statute unconstitutional because requiring notification of both parents, whether or not both wanted to know or had taken responsibility for raising the child, did not serve a legitimate state interest. The Court favored notification of only one parent and a 48 hour waiting period. The Court upheld Section 6 of the law.

Lambert v. Wicklund

Is a Montana statute authorizing the judicial bypass of parental notification as to a minor's abortion, under conditions including a showing that notification is not in best interests of minor, constitutional?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals's ruling was in direct conflict with the Court's precedents to the effect that the allowance of a judicial bypass if a minor showed that parental notification was not in her best interests met the constitutional requirement that the minor be allowed to show that the desired abortion would be in her best interests. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in the judgment.

Leavitt v. Jane L.

Was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit correct to invalidate a Utah statutory provision regulating later-term abortions after a similar provision regulating earlier-term abortions was ruled unconstitutional?

No. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's ruling. The anonymous Per Curiam opinion held that the Utah Legislature had explicitly stated that each of the two abortion provisions was meant to stand independent of the other. The Court called the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the Utah legislature's intent "questionable when considered in isolation" and "plainly error" when considered in light of the statutory text. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the case should not have been granted, because it dealt with an issue of Utah state law that was better left to the lower courts.

Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.

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Maher v. Roe

Did the Connecticut law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Connecticut law placed no obstacles in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion, and that it did not "impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe." The Court noted that there was a distinction between direct state interference with a protected activity and "state encouragement of alternative activity consonant with legislative policy." Holding that financial need alone did not identify a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court found that the law was "rationally related" to a legitimate state interest and survived scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Mazurek v. Armstrong

Did a Court of Appeals err in holding that the parties seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a Montana statute, which restricted the performance of abortions to licensed physicians, had shown a fair chance of success on the merits of their claim of undue burden concerning abortion rights?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Court of Appeals' finding that the practitioners had shown a fair chance of success on the merits was erroneous. The Court noted that its precedents repeatedly stated that the performance of abortions could be restricted to physicians, where there was no evidence of an unlawful motive on the part of the state legislature. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented.

National Organization for Women (NOW) v. Scheidler

Does RICO require that an organization, to be defined as a racketeering enterprise, must be acting in pursuit of an economic motive?

The unanimous Court held that organizations without an economic motive can detrimentally "affect interstate or foreign commerce," satisfying the RICO definition of a racketeering enterprise. An "enterprise" does not have to be an economic organization or a principally criminal organization to trigger the RICO act. Consequently, the Court reversed the appeals court decision which allowed the original case to proceed.

Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health

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Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft

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Planned Parenthood Of Missouri v. Danforth

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Planned Parenthood v. Casey

Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours, and, if minors, obtain parental consent, without violating their right to abortions as guaranteed by Roe v. Wade?

In a bitter, 5-to-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. The opinion for the Court was unique: It was crafted and authored by three justices.

Poelker v. Doe

Did the policy violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. The Court held that St. Louis could enact a "policy choice" to refuse to provide publicly financed hospitals for nontherapeutic abortions even though it provided facilities for childbirth. Relying on its reasoning in Maher v. Roe (1977), the Court distinguished between a state interfering with a protected activity and simply encouraging an alternative activity. Since the state did not deny women the right to have an abortion, the law was consistent with the Constitution.

Roe v. Wade

Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion?

The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision gave a woman total autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimesters. As a result, the laws of 46 states were affected by the Court's ruling.

Rust v. Sullivan

Do the regulations violate the First and Fifth Amendment rights of clients and health providers?

No. The intent of Congress in the enactment of Title X is ambiguous with regard to abortion counseling. Consequently, the Court will defer to the expertise of the administrative agency. The Court held that the "regulations promulgated by the Secretary [of HHS] do not raise the sort of 'grave and doubtful constitutional questions' that would lead us to assume Congress did not intend to authorize their issuance." Should government subsidize one protected right (family planning), as it does in this case, it does not follow that government must subsidize analogous counterpart rights (abortion services).

Scheidler v. National Organization for Women (NOW)

Do abortion opponents, who protest at abortion clinics, commit extortion within the meaning of the Hobbs Act? May abortion supporters obtain injunctive relief in a civil action pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?

In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that abortion opponents did not commit extortion because they did not "obtain" property from the abortion supporters as required by the Hobbs Act. The Court further held that is first holding renders insufficient the other bases or predicate acts of racketeering supporting the jury's conclusion that the abortion opponents violated RICO. While the opponents' conduct constituted the separate offense of coercion, reasoned Chief Justice Rehnquist, the opponents neither pursued nor received something of value from the supporters that the opponents could exercise, transfer, or sell, and thus did not commit extortion. Without an underlying RICO violation, the Court vacated the District Court's injunction and did not reach the second question. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.

Scheidler v. National Organization for Women (NOW)

Does the Hobbs Act prohibit violence unrelated to extortion or robbery?

No. In an 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court ruled that "physical violence unrelated to robbery or extortion falls outside the scope of the Hobbs Act." Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Stephen Breyer cited statutory language, legislative history, and case law in support of the decision. He wrote, "The language of the statute makes the more restrictive reading the more natural one." Although Congress had revised the Act in 1948, making it less clear, the Court ruled that Congress did not intend for the revisions to "create a freestanding physical violence offense in the Hobbs Act."

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York

Did either or both types of "buffer zones" violate Schenck's First Amendment right to freedom of speech.

The Court held that while the "fixed buffer zones" were constitutional, the "floating buffer zones" were not. It distinguished between the two types of "buffer zones." The Court supported the "fixed buffer zones" because they protected the government's interest in public safety, by preventing protesters from engaging in unlawful conduct (i.e. spitting on and shouting in clinic users' faces, blocking doorways), while still allowing them to be heard from a short distance. "Floating buffer zones," by contrast, were struck down by the Court since they imposed a greater burden on free speech than was required to protect the government's interest in public safety and free traffic flow. The Court found that forcing demonstrators to remain at least 15 feet away from the people they wished to communicate with would create an inordinate amount of dangerous confusion and congestion.

Simopoulos v. Virginia

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Stenberg v. Carhart

Does the Nebraska statute, which makes the performance of a "partial birth abortions" a crime, violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment in the U.S. Constitution?

Yes. In a complicated 5-4 decision delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that "Nebraska's statute criminalizing the performance of "partial birth abortion[s]" violates the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted in Casey and Roe." The sharply divided Court struck down the statute because it placed an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion and did not allow for exception in cases of threatened health. "All those who perform abortion procedures using that method must fear prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment," that results in "an undue burden upon a woman's right to make an abortion decision," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court. Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent concluded that "[t]he notion that the Constitution of the United States... prohibits the States from simply banning this visibly brutal means of eliminating our half-born posterity is quite simply absurd."

United States v. Vuitch

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Webster v. Reproductive Health Services

Did the Missouri restrictions unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to privacy or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

In a controversial and highly fractured decision, the Court held that none of the challenged provisions of the Missouri legislation were unconstitutional. First, the Court held that the preamble had not been applied in any concrete manner for the purposes of restricting abortions, and thus did not present a constitutional question. Second, the Court held that the Due Process Clause did not require states to enter into the business of abortion, and did not create an affirmative right to governmental aid in the pursuit of constitutional rights. Third, the Court found that no case or controversy existed in relation to the counseling provisionsof the law. Finally, the Court upheld the viability testing requirements, arguing that the State's interest in protecting potential life could come into existence before the point of viability. The Court emphasized that it was not revisiting the essential portions of the holding in Roe v. Wade.

Williams v. Zbaraz

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