The Oyez Project: Miscellaneous Issues - Miscellaneous Decisions

Addington v. Texas

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Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus

Did the Los Angeles ordinance violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution?

Yes. Using the "First Amendment overbreadth doctrine," which allows an individual to challenge a statute on its face which is potentially threatening to others, the Court found that the ordinance violated the Constitution. Justice O'Connor argued that the rule was vague, overly broad, and would have effectively prohibited activities such as reading, talking, or wearing expressive shirts or political buttons in the LAX terminal. Allowing such an ordinance, which touched "the universe of expressive activity" in its totality, would have caused LAX to become a "First Amendment Free Zone," according to O'Connor.

Airports Auth. v. Citizens For Noise Abatement

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Alabama v. Bozeman

Does the Interstate Agreement on Detainers require the dismissal of criminal charges when a prisoner serving a federal sentence is transferred for a day to be arraigned on state charges and then returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the literal language of Article IV(e) of the Agreement bars any further criminal proceedings when a defendant is returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial. The Court rejected the argument that the one-day breach did not interrupt rehabilitation significantly for two reasons. First, "the language of the Agreement militates against an implicit exception, for it is absolute," wrote Justice Breyer. Second, continued Justice Breyer, "even were we to assume for argument's sake that the Agreement exempts violations that...are de minimis...we could not say that the violation at issue here qualifies as trivial."

Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock

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Alden v. Maine

May Congress use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from private suits in its own courts?

No. A sharply divided court held in a 5-4 decision that Congress may not use its Article I powers to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Both the terms and history of the eleventh amendment suggest that States are immune from suits in their own courts. And more generally, the original understanding of the Constitution's structure and the terms of the tenth amendment confirm that states retained much of their sovereignty despite their agreeing that the national government would be supreme when exercising its enumerated powers.

Aldrich v. Aldrich

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American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan

1) Can the private insurers' decision to withhold payment for disputed medical treatment be considered state action, so as to bring them within the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment? (2) Do workers have a constitutionally protected property interest in continuing payment of disputed medical treatment before such treatment is determined to be reasonable and necessary?

No to both. A finding of state action requires both that the deprivation be caused by actions taken under state law and that the deprivation be fairly attributable to the state. While the alleged deprivation in this case was clearly taken pursuant to state law, the decision of private insurers to withhold medical payments for disputed treatment is not fairly attributable to the state. Mere creation of a new dispute resolution mechanism by the state does not constitute state encouragement or authorization. Nor has Pennsylvania delegated to private insurers powers that were exclusively those of the state, as Pennsylvania has simply authorized insurers to do what they would do in the absence of regulation: dispute payment of unreasonable and unnecessary treatment. Further, under Pennsylvania law no due process protection attaches to payment of disputed medical expenses before the reasonableness and necessity of those expenses is determined. The Act does not entitle an employee to payment of all medical treatment, but only that treatment which is reasonable and necessary. In order to assert a protected property interest a worker must demonstrate not only that his or her employer was liable for a work related injury, but also that the treatment for which payment is sought was reasonable and necessary. In this case the plaintiffs had only established their initial eligibility for treatment, not that treatment was reasonable and necessary.

Apprendi v. New Jersey

Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt?

Yes. In an 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Due Process Clause requires that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that "the New Jersey procedure challenged in this case is an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system." Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Stephen G. Breyer wrote dissenting opinions that were joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.

Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.

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Arizona v. Youngblood

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Arkansas Ed. Television Comm. v. Forbes

Is the exclusion of a ballot-qualified candidate from a debate sponsored by a state-owned public television broadcaster a violation of the candidate's First Amendment right to freedom of speech?

No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that public broadcasters could selectively exclude participants from their sponsored debates, so long as these were not designed as "public forums." The Court found that by reserving participation rights only to candidates for a particular congressional district, rather then hosting an open-microphone format, and selecting among those which were eligible to participate, based on objective indications of their popular support rather then their view points, AETC's debate was a "nonpublic forum." As such, AETC could decide who should and should not participate in its sponsored event.

Arkansas v. Sullivan

Did the Arkansas Supreme Court err by taking into account an officer's subjective motivation in its probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's controlling precedent, Whren v. United States?

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's controlling precedent, which held that police officers' subjective intentions played no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis, and reversed its decision. In addressing the Arkansas court's alternative holding, that it could interpret the U.S. Constitution to provide greater protection than the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court reiterated that while a State may impose greater restrictions, it "may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Stephen G. Breyer.

Armstrong v. Armstrong

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Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon

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Atkins v. Parker

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Baker v. General Motors Corp.

Was a Missouri county court's admission of a witness's testimony, barred by a Michigan county court's injunction, a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV?

No. In unanimous decision, the Court held that GM's injunctive agreement with Elwell did not reach beyond the parties specific controversy to affect Elwell's conduct in other states. Noting Missouri's "public policy," shielding from disclosure only confidential or privileged information, the Court reasoned that since Elwell's testimony in the Baker case was neither confidential nor privileged, its prohibition would not be necessary. Finally, the Court ruled that full faith and credit does not require states to adopt other state's practices regarding time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Such enforcement measures are subject to the "even-handed" control of local state forums.

Bank Of America v. Parnell

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Bank Of Nova Scotia v. United States

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Barnes v. United States

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Bates v. Little Rock

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Beard v. Banks

Does a prison policy that denies newspapers, magazines, and photographs to the worst-behaved prisoners violate the First Amendment?

No. In a 6-2 decision, the Court reversed the Third Circuit and upheld the prison's policy. The plurality opinion by Justice Breyer held that Banks had failed to present sufficient evidence that the prison had acted unreasonably in denying newspapers, magazines, and photographs to its most troublesome inmates. The Court found that the policy met the four-part test established in Turner v. Safley: (1) it was rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of motivating good behavior; (2) though prisoners had no alternate means of exercising their rights, they could potentially graduate to the less-restrictive level 1; (3) accommodating prisoners' rights could result in negative consequences (worse behavior); and (4) there was no alternate means of accomplishing the prison's goals without restricting the prisoners' rights. Justice Thomas concurred separately in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, arguing that "This case reveals the shortcomings of the Turner framework." Justices Stevens and Ginsburg both wrote dissents. Justice Stevens called the policy "perilously close to a state-sponsored effort at mind control," while Justice Ginsburg criticized the high evidentiary burden the plurality placed on the prisoners. Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.

Beck v. Prupis

May a person injured by an action furthering a conspiracy sue under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act even if the action itself was not an act of racketeering?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that an injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering or otherwise wrongful under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not give rise to a cause of action under RICO. Thus, because Prupis' scheme to remove Beck from SIG was not an act of racketeering itself, Beck had no ground to sue him under RICO. Although Prupis did engage in acts of racketeering, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "the alleged overt act (terminating) in the present case was not independently wrongful under any substantive provision of RICO."

Becker v. Montgomery

When a party files a timely notice of appeal in district court, does the failure to sign the notice of appeal require the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that when a party files a timely notice of appeal in district court, the failure to sign the notice does not require the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "if the notice is timely filed and adequate in other respects, jurisdiction will vest in the court of appeals, where the case may proceed so long as the appellant promptly supplies the signature once the omission is called to his attention."

Bell v. New Jersey

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Bennett v. Arkansas

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Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. Of Education

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Bennett v. New Jersey

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Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser

Does the First Amendment prevent a school district from disciplining a high school student for giving a lewd speech at a high school assembly?

No. The Court found that it was appropriate for the school to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive language. Chief Justice Burger distinguished between political speech which the Court previously had protected in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) and the supposed sexual content of Fraser's message at the assembly. Burger concluded that the First Amendment did not prohibit schools from prohibiting vulgar and lewd speech since such discourse was inconsistent with the "fundamental values of public school education."

Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc.

Did a law which required a specific type of rear mudguard on trucks and trailers operated on Illinois's state highways conflict with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution?

Yes. The Court held that the Illinois requirement did place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. While arguing that safety measures "carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged," Justice Douglas nevertheless affirmed that if the effect of such measures are "slight or problematical" then the interests of commerce should prevail. Since the Illinois law was unlike the requirements of almost all of the other states in the nation, the Court found that it did place a great burden on the interstate transport of goods.

Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr

Did the Board's termination of Umbehr's contract, presumably as a result of his criticisms, constitute a violation of his First Amendment freedom of speech?

Yes. In an opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech shielded Umbehr, as a government employee, from termination due to things he might have said about the Board. Umbehr successfully proved that his criticisms of the Board preceded his termination and were the primary motivating factor behind its retaliatory termination of his contract. The Court added that, in balancing an employee's interest in commenting on public concerns against an employer's interest in promoting efficient performance by its employees, it could not find any countervailing county interest justifying its infringement of Umbehr's freedom of speech.

Board Of Ed. v. National Gay Task Force

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Board of Education v. Earls

Is the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy, which requires all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing, consistent with the Fourth Amendment?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, because the policy reasonably serves the School District's important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students, it is constitutional. The Court reasoned that the Board of Education's general regulation of extracurricular activities diminished the expectation of privacy among students and that the Board's method of obtaining urine samples and maintaining test results was minimally intrusive on the students' limited privacy interest. "Within the limits of the Fourth Amendment, local school boards must assess the desirability of drug testing schoolchildren. In upholding the constitutionality of the Policy, we express no opinion as to its wisdom. Rather, we hold only that Tecumseh's Policy is a reasonable means of furthering the School District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren," wrote Justice Thomas.

Board Of Education v. Pico

Did the Board of Education's decision to ban certain books from its junior high and high school libraries, based on their content, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Yes. Although school boards have a vested interest in promoting respect for social, moral, and political community values, their discretionary power is secondary to the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that as centers for voluntary inquiry and the dissemination of information and ideas, school libraries enjoy a special affinity with the rights of free speech and press. Therefore, the Board could not restrict the availability of books in its libraries simply because its members disagreed with their idea content.

Board Of Education v. Vail

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Board of Regents Univ. Wisc. v. Southworth

May public universities and colleges subsidize campus groups by means of a mandatory student activity fee without violating the First Amendment rights of students who find some campus groups objectionable?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the "First Amendment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the program is viewpoint neutral." Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that, "[w]hen a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular speech of other students, all in the interest of open discussion, it may not prefer some viewpoints to others." Justice David H. Souter, in an opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in the judgment only.

Board of Trustees v. Garrett

May an individual sue a state for damages in federal court under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that suits in federal court by state employees to recover money damages by reason of the state's failure to comply with Title I of the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Chief Justice wrote for the majority that "in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation." Rehnquist added that none of these requirements had been met. Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Stephen G. Breyer's dissent.

Bond v. Floyd

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Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona

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Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.

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Bowers v. Hardwick

Does the Constitution confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy, thereby invalidating the laws of many states which make such conduct illegal?

No. The divided Court found that there was no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy, and that states could outlaw those practices. Justice Byron White argued that the Court has acted to protect rights not easily identifiable in the Constitution only when those rights are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" (Palko v. Connecticut, 1937) or when they are "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition" (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). The Court held that the right to commit sodomy did not meet either of these standards. White feared that guaranteeing a right to sodomy would be the product of "judge-made constitutional law" and send the Court down the road of illegitimacy.

Bowsher v. Synar

Did the functions assigned by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985 violate the doctrine of separation of powers?

The Court found that the duties which the Congress delegated to the Comptroller General did violate the doctrine of separation of powers and were unconstitutional. A two step process led Chief Justice Burger to arrive at this conclusion. First, in exploring the statute defining the provisions of the Comptroller General's office relating to the Congress's power of removal, it was clear to Burger that this officer was subservient to the legislative branch. Second, in examining the functions that this officer would carry out under the Deficit Control Act, Burger concluded that the Comptroller General was being asked to execute the laws and, thus, was intruding on the perogatives of the executive branch.

Brandenburg v. Ohio

Did Ohio's criminal syndicalism law, prohibiting public speech that advocates various illegal activities, violate Brandenburg's right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

The Court's Per Curiam opinion held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg's right to free speech. The Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or produce such action." The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.

Branti v. Finkel

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Branzburg v. Hayes

Is the requirement that news reporters appear and testify before state or federal grand juries an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and press as guaranteed by the First Amendment?

No. The Court found that requiring reporters to disclose confidential information to grand juries served a "compelling" and "paramount" state interest and did not violate the First Amendment. Justice White argued that since the case involved no government intervention to impose prior restraint, and no command to publish sources or to disclose them indiscriminately, there was no Constitutional violation. The fact that reporters receive information from sources in confidence does not privilege them to withhold that information during a government investigation; the average citizen is often forced to disclose information received in confidence when summoned to testify in court.

Brentwood Acad. v. TN Sec. School Ath. Assn.

May a statewide association, incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary schools, be regarded as engaging in state action when it enforces a rule against a member school?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the ostensibly private organization, which regulated school sports, and the state education board's acknowledgment of the organization, indicated that the organization is a state actor for civil rights purposes. "The nominally private character of the Association is overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its composition and workings, and there is no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional standards to it," wrote Justice Souter for the majority. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined Justice Clarence Thomas' dissent.

Broadrick v. Oklahoma

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Brown v. Glines

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Brown v. Hartlage

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Brownell v. Chase National Bank

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Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc.

Did the State of Colorado's imposition of name, badge, and financial disclosure requirements, on initiative-petition proponents and their circulators, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court found the name, badge, and disclosure requirements to be unconstitutional. Weighing Colorado's need to protect the integrity of the initiative-petition process against the burdens that its guidelines placed on political expression, the Court found that the latter outweighed the former. Noting that the appellate court upheld a requirement that each circulator submit an affidavit setting out, among several particulars, his or her name and address, the Court explained that the vital information sought by the three additional restrictions at issue was already being secured either directly or indirectly.

Burson v. Freeman

Did Tennessee's 100-foot limit violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech?

No. After subjecting Tennessee's statute to exacting scrutiny, since it constituted a facial content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, the Court held that the statute was narrowly drafted to serve a compelling state interest. By creating a safe zone around polling sites, the statute served the state's interest in protecting its citizen's right to vote freely and effectively. Moreover, the 100-foot zone was acceptable since it was not so large as to completely block out the presence of political messages.

Bus Employees v. Missouri

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Butterworth v. Smith

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California Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt

Does the Nevada Supreme Court's refusal to extend full faith and credit to California's statute immunizing its tax collection agency from suit violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Nevada to give full faith and credit to California's statutes providing its tax agency with immunity from suit. Noting that Nevada did not grant immunity to its agencies for intentional torts, the Court reasoned that Nevada's interest in redressing intentional tortious conduct was sufficient to decline to accord full faith and credit to California's immunity of its tax agency to bar intentional tort claims. Accordingly, the Court refused to adopt a new rule mandating that a state court extend full faith and credit to a sister State's statutorily recaptured sovereign immunity from suit when a refusal to do so would interfere with the State's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities.

California v. Trombetta

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Cameron v. Johnson

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Carmell v. Texas

Does an amended Texas statute that authorizes the conviction of sexual offenses on the victim's testimony alone, whereas the statute previously required the victim's testimony along with corroborating evidence, violate the constitutional prohibition against State "ex post facto" laws when applied in a trial for offenses committed before the amendment's effective date?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the retrospective application of Texas's amended statutory provision allowing alleged sexual offense victim's uncorroborated testimony to support a conviction violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that, "[a] law reducing the quantum of evidence required to convict an offender is as grossly unfair as, say, retrospectively eliminating an element of the offense, increasing the punishment for an existing offense or lowering the burden of proof." For the dissenting minority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the amended statute accords victims of a sexual offense "full testimonial stature," and that "such a witness competency rule validly may be applied to offenses committed before its enactment."

Carroll v. Princess Anne

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Carroll v. United States

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Castle Rock v. Gonzales

Can the holder of a restraining order bring a procedural due process claim against a local government for its failure to actively enforce the order and protect the holder from violence?

No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that Gonzales had no constitutionally-protected property interest in the enforcement of the restraining order, and therefore could not claim that the police had violated her right to due process. In order to have a "property interest" in a benefit as abstract as enforcement of a restraining order, the Court ruled, Gonzales would have needed a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the benefit. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia found that state law did not entitle the holder of a restraining order to any specific mandatory action by the police. Instead, restraining orders only provide grounds for arresting the subject of the order. The specific action to be taken is up to the discretion of the police. The Court stated that "This is not the sort of 'entitlement' out of which a property interest is created." The Court concluded that since "Colorado has not created such an entitlement," Gonzales had no property interest and the Due Process Clause was therefore inapplicable. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented.

Chandler v. Miller

Did Georgia's drug testing statute violate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against illegal search and seizures?

Yes. In an 8-to-1 opinion, the Court noted that while the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits officials from conducting search and seizures without individualized suspicion, there does exist a narrowly defined category of permissible suspicionless searches and seizures. The Court held, however, that Georgia's statute did not fall in this exceptional category, since it failed to show why its desire to avoid drug users in its high political offices should outweigh candidates' privacy interests. In addition to Georgia's failure to provide evidence of a drug problem among its state officials, the Court concluded that even if such a problem did exist, the affected officials would most likely not perform the kind of high-risk, safety sensitive tasks, which might justify the statute's proposed incursion on their individual privacy rights.

Chessman v. Teets

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Chicago v. Morales

Does Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

Yes. In a plurality ruling, Justice John Paul Stevens delivered an opinion for a marjority on several key points. The Court held that Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and provided law enforcement officials too much discretion to decide what activities constitute loitering. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that the ordinance's definition of loitering as "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose" does not give people adequate notice of what is prohibited and what is permitted, even if a person does not violate the law until he refuses to disperse. "'[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits,'" noted Justice Stevens, "[i]f the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty."

Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd.

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City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent

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City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing

Did Lakewood's city ordinance violate freedom of speech rights as protected by the First Amendment?

Yes. The Court held that the licensing ordinance was facially invalid since it gave Lakewood's mayor unbridled discretion to discriminate against permit seekers, based on the content of their publications and viewpoints. This, in turn, promoted self-censorship by publishers and other speakers who sought to curry favor with the mayor's officer in order to secure the approval of their licensing requests. The Court added that while cities may require the periodic licensing of newsracks on public property, even subjecting such procedures to reasonable restrictions, they may not use language which is so open-ended as to give city officials unlimited subjective discretion over permit approvals.

City Of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc.

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Clingman v. Beaver

Do state election laws that restrict the voters a party may invite to vote in its primary election violate the First Amendment rights to freedom of expression and association?

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Oklahoma's semiclosed primary system did not violate the right to freedom of association and that any burden it imposed was minor and justified by legitimate state interests. The Court noted that not every electoral law burdening associational rights was subject to strict scrutiny. Requiring voters to register with a party before participating in its primary minimally burdened voters' associational rights. Moreover, Oklahoma's primary advanced a number of state interests, including the preservation of parties as viable and identifiable interest groups.

Clinton v. City of New York

Did the President's ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills, under the Line Item Veto Act, violate the Presentment Clause of Article I?

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court first established that both the City of New York, and its affiliates, and the farmers' cooperative suffered sufficiently immediate and concrete injuries to sustain their standing to challenge the President's actions. The Court then explained that under the Presentment Clause, legislation that passes both Houses of Congress must either be entirely approved (i.e. signed) or rejected (i.e. vetoed) by the President. The Court held that by canceling only selected portions of the bills at issue, under authority granted him by the Act, the President in effect "amended" the laws before him. Such discretion, the Court concluded, violated the "finely wrought" legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers.

Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.

Does the First Amendment bar a plaintiff from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for a newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Byron White, the Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel suit against the press. The Court first affirmed that such a cause of action, though private, triggered the First Amendment's protection. But the Court went on to rule that the state's promissory estoppel law was generally applicable and did not target the press. The law's enforcement against the press thus did not require stricter scrutiny than would its enforcement against other individuals or institutions.

College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid

Does the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) permit suits against states for alleged misrepresentations of their own products by providing a constitutionally permissible abrogation of state sovereign immunity? Does the TRCA permit suits against states for alleged misrepresentations of their own products by operating as a waiver of sovereign immunity when a state engages in activities regulated by the Lanham Act?

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "the federal courts are without jurisdiction to entertain this suit against an arm of the State of Florida." Justice Scalia concluded that "the sovereign immunity of the State of Florida was neither validly abrogated by the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, nor voluntarily waived by the State's activities in interstate commerce." Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice Stephen G. Breyer expressed the view that Congress possesses the authority to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity where necessary and proper to the exercise of a congressional power under the Constitution's Article I. Justice John Paul Stevens filed his own dissenting opinion and joined that of Justice Breyer.

Colorado Comm'n v. Continental

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Columbia Broadcasting v. Democratic Comm.

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Commissioner v. Estate Of Bosch

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Connick v. Myers

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Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Ser v. Comm'n

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Cooper v. Oklahoma

May state law presume that defendants are competent to stand trial unless they prove their incompetence by clear and convincing evidence without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that because Oklahoma's procedural rule allows the State to try a defendant who is more likely than not incompetent, it violates due process. Justice Stevens wrote for the court that the stringent standard is "incompatible with the dictates of due process," and that criminal defendants must be allowed to avoid trial if they prove incompetence by a "preponderance of the evidence."

Coppedge v. United States

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Corbett v. Stergios

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Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund

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Cousins v. Wigoda

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Crist v. Bretz

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Csc v. Letter Carriers

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Custis v. United States

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Dallas v. Stanglin

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Daniels v. United States

May a federal defendant, who has been sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, challenge his federal sentence through a motion on the ground that his prior convictions were unconstitutionally obtained?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the nonexistent or unsuccessful pursuit of available challenges to the constitutionality of prior state convictions, which were used to enhance a federal sentence, precluded such challenge to collaterally attack a federal sentence. "[Daniels] could have pursued his claims while he was in custody on those convictions," wrote Justice O'Connor for the majority. "As his counsel conceded at oral argument, there is no indication that [Daniels] did so or that he was prevented from doing so by some external force."

Dawson v. Delaware

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Deal v. United States

Does a criminal's second through sixth convictions under section 924(c)(1) in a single proceeding arise "in the case of his second or subsequent conviction" within the meaning of section 924(c)(1)?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Deal's second through sixth convictions in a single proceeding arose "in the case of his second or subsequent conviction" within the meaning of section 924(c)(1), finding that the statute was not ambiguous. The Court rejected that the rule of lenity applied because Deal's "105-year sentence 'is so glaringly unjust.'" Writing for the court, Justice Scalia said the 105 years sentence for the gun offenses was not unjust "simply because [Deal] managed to evade detection, prosecution and conviction for the first five offenses and was ultimately tried for all six in a single proceeding." Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Harry A. Blackmun joined.

Deck v. Missouri

Does shackling a convicted offender during the penalty phase of a capital case violate the due process clauses of the Fifth and 14th Amendment?

Yes. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the Court's 7-2 holding that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during both a capital trial's guilt and penalty phases, unless such shackling is justified by an essential state interest specific to the defendant on trial (such as courtroom security). The majority argued that the law has long forbidden use of visible shackles during a capital trial's guilt phase, and that the reasons underlying this prohibition (like the possibility shackles will bias the jury) extend this rule to the penalty phase.

Demarest v. Manspeaker

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Democratic Party Of U.S. v. Wisconsin

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Denver Area Consortium v. FCC

Do the Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act's empowerments and restrictions violate the petitioner's First Amendment right to freedom of speech?

No and yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, The Court held that the Act's grant of authority to leased channel cable operators under 10(a) - allowing them to restrict the transmission of "patently offensive" or indecent programming - is consistent with the First Amendment. The authority's discretionary nature and ultimate objective of protecting young viewers from offensive programming, is a constitutionally permissible method of restoring editorial authority to cable operators. By contrast, the Court found provision 10(c), permitting cable operators to ban offensive or indecent programming on public access channels, to be unconstitutional. Public access channels are already supervised by both private and public elements and have never been edited by cable operators in the past. Furthermore, a "cable operator's veto" is likely to ban many programs that should have been aired, and the volume of "patently offensive" programming on public access channels has never been so high as to warrant severe restrictions on its content. Finally, with respect to Section 10(b), the Court held that its "segregate and block" requirements for public access channels is also unconstitutional. Section 10(b), by enabling cable operators to take as many as 30 days to respond to a consumer's request to unlock their restricted channel, is overly restrictive. Also, by blocking out an entire channel, 10(b) does not permit viewers or operators to discern between offensive and "patently offensive" programming.

Dept of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives

Is the use of statistical sampling in the execution of the census inconsistent with provisions of the Census Act or in conflict with the Census Clause of the Constitution?

Yes with regard to the Census Act. The Court began by noting that the plaintiffs in the joined cases had good standing to bring their challenges because they stood to suffer a decrease in the number of their congressional representatives and a corresponding dilution of voting strength. The Court then added that the disputed Amendment to the Census Act, authorizing the discretionary use of statistical sampling, did not alter the Act's older statutory prohibition against the use of sampling. Consequently, the Court struck down the sampling provision on statutory grounds and avoided the constitutional question.

Dixon v. United States

When a defendant raises a duress defense, is the burden of proof on the defendant to prove duress by a preponderance of the evidence, or on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that duress is not applicable?

The burden of proof is on the defendant. In a 7-to-2 decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court held that the government meets its evidentiary burden when it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted "knowingly" and "willfully." Dixon had argued that duress would make it impossible for a defendant to act "willfully" (and that the government therefore had to prove she did not act under duress in order to prove she acted willfully). The Court rejected that argument, however, because under Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, acting "willfully" means simply that a defendant "acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful."

Doe v. Chao

Does the federal Privacy Act require that people prove they suffered "actual damage" stemming from the government's violation of their privacy rights in order to win damages in a suit against the government?

Yes. Justice David Hackett Souter delivered the Court's 6-3 opinion that the Privacy Act requires plaintiffs prove actual damages to qualify for the minimum statutory award of $1000. The Court reasoned that "a straightforward textual analysis" of the Privacy Act shows that the statute guarantees the $1000 minimum for victims of willful Privacy Act violations only in relation to "actual damages sustained." Individuals subjected to an adverse effect - like the miners in this case - have "injury enough to open the courthouse door, but without more" have "no cause of action for damages under the Privacy Act."

Dombrowski v. Pfister

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Donovan v. City Of Dallas

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Dowling v. United States

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Drope v. Missouri

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Elrod v. Burns

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Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Comm.

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F. H. A. v. The Darlington, Inc.

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FCC v. League of Women Voters of California

Did the ban on editorializing violate the First Amendment?

Yes. Even though the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate the broadcast medium, "since broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form of communicative activity," Congress must use the First Amendment to "inform and give shape" to its regulation. Justice Brennan argued that no legitimate government interest was served by the law which broadly banned all editorializing, a form of speech which "lies at the heart of First Amendment protection."

FCC v. Pacifica Foundation

Does the First Amendment deny government any power to restrict the public broadcast of indecent language under any circumstances?

No. The Court held that limited civil sanctions could constitutionally be invoked against a radio broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and execration. The words need not be obscene to warrant sanctions. Audience, medium, time of day, and method of transmission are relevant factors in determining whether to invoke sanctions. "[W]hen the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."

FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear

Is a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note insured as a "deposit" under the federal deposit insurance program?

No. In light of the longstanding interpretation of the FDIC, such a letter does not create a deposit. This interpretation is consistent with Congress' intent in creating the FDIC, namely ensuring that a deposit of "hard earnings" entrusted to a bank would not lead to a tangible loss in the event of a bank failure. In this case, the standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note did not entrust any noncontingent assets to the Bank. Therefore, such a letter of credit does not give rise to an insured deposit.

Fiore v. White

Should federal habeas corpus relief be extended to protect a defendant whose conviction was upheld even though his co-defendant's conviction under the same law was invalidated after a state court ruled that he had been prosecuted under the wrong law? Does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause require that the defendant's conviction be set aside?

The questions were left pending. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court certified to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the question whether the court's interpretation of the statute set forth in Scarpone's case stated the correct interpretation of Pennsylvania law on the date which Fiore's conviction became final. The Court also reserved judgment and further proceedings in the case pending a response by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that "the answer to this question will help determine the proper state-law predicate for our determination of the federal constitutional questions raised in this case."

First Nat. Bank v. Walker Bank

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First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio

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Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank

Did nullification of state sovereign immunity, under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, constitute valid legislation?

No. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court began by noting that there was no doubt that the Act intended to abrogate states' immunity from patent infringement. The Court then added that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Patent Clause give Congress the power to curtail state sovereign immunity from patent infringement claims. The Court reasoned that although the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to pass "appropriate legislation" to protect parties from being deprived of property without due process, this in itself does not permit the abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Only a showing of a consistent pattern of state patent violations, and a lack of adequate legal remedies to address such violations, would justify a limited effort to suspend a state's sovereign immunity. Since College made no such showing, and since the Act's language was overly broad in its scope, the Court dismissed College's suit and declared unconstitutional corresponding segments of the Act.

Flower v. United States

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Food Employees v. Logan Plaza

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Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement

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Foucha v. Louisiana

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Franconia Associates v. United States

Does the Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987, which restricted the right of property owners to prepay at any time mortgages under the Housing Act of 1949, constitute a present breach of contract?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that because ELIHPA's enactment qualified as a repudiation of the parties' bargain, not a present breach of the loan agreements, breach would occur, and the six-year limitations period would commence to run, when a borrower tenders prepayment and the Government then dishonors its obligation to accept the tender and release its control over use of the property securing the loan. The Court reasoned that the government's pledged performance was properly comprehended as an obligation to accept prepayment, not an obligation to allow borrowers to have the right to prepay. Therefore, the borrowers' repudiation claims were not time-barred, because the cause of action would not accrue until the government dishonors its obligation to accept the prepayment.

Freedman v. Maryland

Did the the Maryland law violate the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment?

The Court found the Maryland law to be invalid. The Court decision reflected a concern that the statute provides the danger of "unduly suppressing protected expression." The board was allowed overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of statutory provisions for judicial participation in the the procedure to prohibit a film. The Court established three guidelines as adequate safeguards to protect against the "undue inhibition of protected expression." These guidelines are to: (1) place the burden of proving the film is unprotected expression on the censors, (2) require judicial determination to impose a valid determination, and (3) require prompt determination "within a specified time period."

Frew v. Hawkins

Do states forfeit 11th Amendment protection when they enter into a consent decree under federal law in federal court? And must states violate federal law, not just the consent agreement, in order to be subject to suit in federal court?

Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that enforcement of the consent decree does not violate the 11th Amendment. The state officials waived 11th Amendment immunity when they asked the court to approve the consent decree. The Court rejected the argument that a federal court cannot enforce a consent decree unless it finds a violation of federal law. "The decree here is a federal court order that springs from a federal dispute and furthers the objectives of federal law," Justice Kennedy wrote.

Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Does 26 U.S.C. 7443A(a) permit the assignment of particularly complex cases dealing with large amounts of money to "special trial judges" appointed by the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court, provided that the special trial judges do not enter the decision but simply prepare an opinion for review and adoption by a regular Tax Court judge? Under the Appointments Clause of Article II Section 2, may Congress permit the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court to appoint "special trial judges" to "any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate"?

Yes and yes. On the question of whether 7443A permitted the assignment of complex cases to special trial judges, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the statute unambiguously did allow such appointments. Justice Harry Blackmun, in the majority opinion, wrote, "The plain language of 7443A(b)(4) surely authorizes the Chief Judge's assignment of petitioners' cases to a special trial judge. When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry should be complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances."

On the Appointments Clause question, however, the Court was divided 5-to-4. Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority that Article I Courts, like Article III Courts, exercised the judicial power of the United States and were therefore "Courts of Law" for purposes of Article II Section 2. While they may have been more dependent on Congress than the other branches, they were nevertheless independent, and it therefore did not violate the separation of powers to allow them to make appointments.

Frisby v. Schultz

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Fry v. United States

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FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas

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Garcetti v. Ceballos

Should a public employee's purely job-related speech, expressed strictly pursuant to the duties of employment, be protected by the First Amendment simply because it touched on a matter of public concern, or must the speech also be engaged in "as a citizen?"

In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that speech by a public official is only protected if it is engaged in as a private citizen, not if it is expressed as part of the official's public duties. Ceballos's employers were justified in taking action against him based on his testimony and cooperation with the defense, therefore, because it happened as part of his official duties. "The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or write," Justice Kennedy wrote, "does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance." Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented.

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority

Did principles of federalism make the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority immune from the Fair Labor Standards Act?

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the guiding principles of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery were unworkable and that SAMTA was subject to Congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause. The Court found that rules based on the subjective determination of "integral" or "traditional" governmental functions provided little or no guidance in determining the boundaries of federal and state power. The Court argued that the structure of the federal system itself, rather than any "discrete limitations" on federal authority, protected state sovereignty.

Gentile v. State Bar Of Nevada

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Giaccio v. Pennsylvania

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Giglio v. United States

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Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist.

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Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court

Did the Massachusetts law violate the First Amendment's freedom of press guarantee as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?

The Court held that the Massachusetts law violated the First Amendment. Recalling the Court's holding in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia (1980), Justice Brennan reviewed important historical and judicial reasons why access to criminal trials is "properly afforded" First Amendment protection. When the court denies access, argued Brennan, the only justification is to serve a compelling state interest. The Court found no such interest here. First, protecting the psychological well-being of a minor, arguably a compelling interest, conceded Brennan, "does not justify a mandatory closure rule" as circumstances can vary greatly in this type of case. Second, there was no convincing empirical or logical evidence to prove that victims would be more likely to come forward if the press and public were excluded from trials of this nature.

Gomez v. United States

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Gonzaga University v. Doe

May a student sue a private university for damages to enforce provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that such an action is foreclosed because the relevant provisions of FERPA create no personal rights to enforce. The Court reasoned that the creation of individual rights required clear and unambiguous terms, which FERPA's confidentiality provisions did not contain. "FERPA's nondisclosure provisions contain no rights-creating language, they have an aggregate, not individual, focus, and they serve primarily to direct the Secretary of Education's distribution of public funds to educational institutions," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that the Court's opinion "may be read as accepting the proposition that FERPA does indeed create both parental rights of access to student records and student rights of privacy in such records, but that those federal rights are of a lesser value because Congress did not intend them to be enforceable by their owners."

Good News Club v. Milford Central School

Did Milford Central School violate the First Amendment free speech rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the Club from meeting after hours at the school? If a violation occurred, was it justified by Milford's concern that permitting the Club's activities would violate the Establishment Clause?

Yes and no. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "Milford's restriction violates the Club's free speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation." "When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment," wrote Justice Thomas.

Gravel v. United States

Did the subpoena of Senator Gravel's aide violate the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I of the Constitution?

Yes. The Court held that because the work of aides was critical to the performance of legislative tasks and duties, they were nothing less than legislators' "alter egos" and thus immune from subpoenas by the Speech and Debate Clause. Aides were exempted from grand jury questioning so long as Senators invoked the privilege on their behalf. Moreover, the Court held that the protections of the Speech and Debate Clause did not extend beyond the legislative sphere, ruling that Senator Gravel's arrangements with the Beacon Press were not constitutionally protected.

Greene v. United States

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Greenwood v. United States

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Greer v. Spock

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Griffin v. United States

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Groppi v. Leslie

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Hannah v. Larche

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Hartman v. Moore

Are law enforcement agents liable for retaliatory prosecution in violation of a defendant's First Amendment free speech rights when the prosecution was supported by probable cause?

No. In a 5-2 decision, the Court ruled in favor of the postal inspectors, overruling the Court of Appeals. The opinion by Justice David Souter held that plaintiffs alleging retaliatory prosecution must prove that the law enforcement agents lacked probable cause. Probable cause, the Court ruled, is a crucial component of the "chain of causation" needed to evaluate retaliatory prosecution charges. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, which Justice Breyer joined. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito took no part in the decision.

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier

Did the principal's deletion of the articles violate the students' rights under the First Amendment?

No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. The Court held that schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was "inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'" Educators did not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." The actions of principal Reynolds, the Court held, met this test.

Head v. New Mexico Board

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Healy v. James

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Heller, Secretary, Kentucky Cabinet For Human Resources v. Doe, By His Mother And Next Friend, Doe

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Hicks v. Oklahoma

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Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates

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Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB

Does the National Labor Relations Board have the discretion to award backpay to an undocumented alien employee who was not legally authorized to work in the United States?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that such relief is foreclosed by federal immigration policy, as expressed by Congress in the IRCA. The Court reasoned that allowing the Board to award backpay to illegal aliens ran counter to explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy and that however broad the Board's discretion to fashion remedies when dealing only with the NLRA was, it was not so unbounded as to authorize the award. "Congress has expressly made it criminally punishable for an alien to obtain employment with false documents. There is no reason to think that Congress nonetheless intended to permit backpay where but for an employer's unfair labor practices, an alien-employee would have remained in the United States illegally, and continued to work illegally, all the while successfully evading apprehension by immigration authorities," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Holloway v. United States

Does the federal carjacking law apply to crimes committed with the "conditional intent" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands?

Yes. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law applies to carjacking crimes committed with "conditional intent" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands. "The intent requirement...is satisfied when the government proves that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car," wrote Justice Stevens.

Holmes v. South Carolina

Does South Carolina's rule governing the admissibility of evidence of third-party guilt violate a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and compulsory process (the ability to compel witnesses to testify)?

In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court. The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito - his first as a Supreme Court Justice - held that evidence of third-party guilt brought by the defense could not be excluded only on the basis of the strength of the prosecution's case. Although the Constitution is not violated by the exclusion of evidence based on "certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury," the Court held that exclusion of a defendant's evidence based on the strength of the prosecution's evidence denies the defendant his constitutional right to "'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'"

Holt v. Virginia

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Houchins v. KQED Inc.

Did the First Amendment guarantee news media a right of access to jails over and above that of other persons?

No. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that the First Amendment granted no special right of access to the press to government-controlled sources of information. The Court reasoned that the importance of acceptable prison conditions and the media's role of providing information afforded "no basis for reading into the Constitution a right of the public or the media to enter these institutions. . .and take moving and still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes."

Howlett v. Rose

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Hudgens v. NLRB

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Hughey v. United States

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Hynes v. Mayor Of Oradell

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Illinois v. Fisher

Did Illinois police (acting in good faith) violate Fisher's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights by destroying evidence after he filed a motion for discovery?

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the simple fact that Fisher had filed a motion for discovery did not distinguish the case from Youngblood. The Court also rejected Fisher's contention that the substance was "material exculpatory evidence," which would have made the good faith/bad faith distinction irrelevant (whenever the state destroys or refuses to disclose "material exculpatory evidence" it violates Due Process, regardless of its intent). Instead, the Court held that the evidence was at the most "potentially useful evidence" (as it was in Youngblood) because the police had already determined, in good faith, that the material was cocaine. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in this case.

In re Pappas

Did the First Amendment's freedom of the press protect Pappas from appearing and testifying before the grand jury?

No. The Court found that requiring reporters to disclose confidential information to grand juries served a "compelling" and "paramount" state interest and did not violate the First Amendment. Justice White argued that since the cases involved no government intervention to impose prior restraint, and no command to publish sources or to disclose them indiscriminately, there was no constitutional violation. Because reporters receive information from sources in confidence does not privilege them to withhold that information during a government investigation; the average citizen is often forced to disclose information received in confidence when summoned to testify in court. Pappas must appear and give testimony.

In Re Sawyer

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INS v. Chadha

Did the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allowed a one-House veto of executive actions, violate the separation of powers doctrine?

The Court held that the particular section of the Act in question did violate the Constitution. Recounting the debates of the Constitutional Convention over issues of bicameralism and separation of powers, Chief Justice Burger concluded that even though the Act would have enhanced governmental efficiency, it violated the "explicit constitutional standards" regarding lawmaking and congressional authority.

Int. Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee

Does the regulation violate the First Amendment free speech clause?

No. An airport terminal is not a public forum. The regulation banning such activity need only satisfy a reasonableness standard. The regulation is reasonable. Solicitators may slow the path of possible contributors, cause duress or commit fraud. Therefore, the regulation is permissible. In a related case, the Court held invalid the airport authority's ban on literature distribution in airport terminals.

Jackson v. Indiana

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Jones v. Helms

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Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union

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Jones v. United States

Does the federal arson statute apply to the arson of a private residence?

No. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerce-affecting activity, such that arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution under section 844(i). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "[w]ere we to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation of section 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain."

Jones v. United States

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Jones v. United States

Does the federal carjacking law define a single crime with three penalty options dependent on sentencing factors?

No. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice David H. Souter, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law established three separate offenses by the specification of elements, each of which must be charged by indictment, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict.

JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd.

Is a corporation organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands a "citizen or subject of a foreign state" for the purposes of alienage diversity jurisdiction?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a corporation organized under the laws of the BVI is a "citizen or subject of a foreign state" for the purposes of alienage diversity jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that, because of the United Kingdom's retention and exercise of authority over the BVI, statutes permitting incorporation in the BVI are enacted in the exercise of the United Kingdom's political authority. "It is enough to hold that the United Kingdom's retention and exercise of authority over the BVI renders BVI citizens, both natural and juridic, 'citizens or subjects' of the United Kingdom," wrote Justice Souter. Thus, Traffic Stream was a citizen or subject of a foreign state for the purposes of alienage diversity jurisdiction.

Kansas v. Crane

Did the Kansas Supreme Court interpret Kansas v. Hendricks in an overly restrictive manner by ruling that it requires a finding that a sexual offender, who has only an emotional or personality disorder, rather than a volitional impairment, has an inability to control dangerous behavior?

Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Hendricks set forth no requirement of total or complete lack of control, but that the Constitution does not permit commitment of the type of dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination. Such required proof, the Court continued, had to be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjected the offender to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case. The Court concluded that an absolute finding of lack of control since this approach would risk barring the civil commitment of some highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities.

Kansas v. Hendricks

Did the Act's civil commitment provisions, based on its definition of what constitutes a "mental abnormality," violate substantive due process and double jeopardy requirements?

No. Despite Hendricks' claim that a certification of "mental illness" alone was too arbitrary to sustain a civil commitment order, the Court held that the Act met substantive due process standards by requiring considerable evidence of past violent sexual behavior and a present mental inclination to repeat such offenses. Furthermore, the Court held that since it required the release of confined persons who became mentally stable and no longer dangerous, did not speak of scienter, and lacked other procedural safeguards characteristic of criminal trials, the Act did not violate double jeopardy guarantees since it merely authorized "civil" rather than "criminal" commitments

Keller v. State Bar of California

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Kelley v. Johnson

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Kolender v. Lawson

Is the California statute unconstitutionally vague?

The law was unconstitutionally vague because it gave excessive discretion to the police (in the absence of probable cause for an arrest) whether to stop and interrogate a suspect or leave him alone. The majority hinted that the California statute compromised the constitutional right to freedom of movement.

Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss

May a state prisoner use a federal habeas petition to challenge a current sentence on the ground that it was enhanced based on an unconstitutional prior conviction for which the sentence has fully expired?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that "once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. If that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced sentence through a [federal habeas petition] on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained." Justice David H. Souter filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Stephen G. Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion.

Ladue v. Gilleo

Does the Ladue ordinance violate Gilleo's right to free speech as protected by the First Amendment?

Yes. Although acknowledging Ladue's police power to minimize visual clutter associated with signs, the Court ruled that the law "almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important." The Court held a "special respect" for an individual's right to convey messages from her home.

Laird v. Tatum

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Lamont v. Postmaster General

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Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia

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Landon v. Plasencia

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Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia

Does a State's act of removing a lawsuit from state court to federal court waive the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court by citizens of other States?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a State waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it removes a case from state court to federal court. The Court concluded that that the university officials' voluntary removal of the action expressly invoked the jurisdiction of the federal courts and thus constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity with regard to state law claims for which immunity was waived in state court. Under the general principle that a State's voluntary appearance in federal court amounts to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court reasoned that Georgia was brought involuntarily into the case as a defendant in state court, but it then voluntarily removed the case to federal court, thus voluntarily invoking that court's jurisdiction.

Lathrop v. Donohue

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Lawrence and Garner v. Texas

Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?

No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined, filed dissents.

Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist.

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Leathers v. Medlock

Does differential taxation of different media violate the First and 14th Amendments? Does differential taxation of members of the same medium violate the First and 14th Amendments?

No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held 7-2 that without the intent or effect of suppressing expression, the First Amendment allows differential taxation of different media and differential taxation of some members of the same medium. Specifically, the Court held that the GRA was a generally applicable sales tax, and that its burden on cable television, while exempting the print media, was content-neutral, not directed at a select few, and not intended to interfere with expression. The Court went on to rule that the First Amendment allows a differential tax burden on some members of pay television services (that is, a tax on cable but not satellite services), if the tax is not intended to suppress expression. The Court ordered the State Supreme Court to address the 14th Amendment claim on remand. Dissenting, Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, argued that the First Amendment non-discrimination principle prohibits a heavier tax burden on one medium and not other media.

Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation

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Lee v. Int. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness

Does the regulation banning the distribution of literature at airports violate the free speech and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment?

In a short per curiam opinion, the court held 5 to 4 that the ban on literature distribution violated the Free Speech Clause. (A related case, also Int. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, addressed a ban on the solicitation of funds.)

Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez

Does the funding restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, which prevents attorneys from representing clients in an attempt to amend or challenge existing welfare law, violate the First Amendment?

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the funding provision that limited arguments legal services attorneys were allowed to make on behalf of indigent welfare claimants violated the First Amendment by regulating private speech and insulating federal law from legitimate judicial challenge. Justice Kennedy wrote for that Court that, "the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message." Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas, arguing that the Appropriations Act "does not directly regulate speech, and it neither establishes a public forum nor discriminates on the basis of viewpoint."

Lehman v. City Of Shaker Heights

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Lewis v. United States

Does the federal Assimilative Crimes Act make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute applicable on a federal Army base located in Louisiana?

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that, because the ACA does not make Louisiana's first-degree murder statute part of federal law, the federal second-degree murder statute governs Lewis' crime. Because the federal second-degree murder statute does not mandate a life sentence, but rather provides for a sentence of "any term of years or life," Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that Lewis was also entitled to resentencing. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion.

Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner

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Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd

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Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc.

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Louisiana v. N. A. A. C. P.

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Lynch v. Overholser

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Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates

Does the First Amendment permit a State to maintain fraud actions alleging that fundraisers made false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, consistent with the Court's precedent and the First Amendment, States may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used. The Court reasoned that, while bare failure to disclose that information directly to potential donors does not suffice to establish fraud, when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally misleading statements designed to deceive the listener, the First Amendment does not preclude a fraud claim. Because the state's action was on misrepresentations that were not protected by freedom of speech, rather than the high percentage of donations retained, the Court concluded that the allegations against the telemarketers therefore state a claim for relief that can survive a motion to dismiss.

Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n

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Marchioro v. Chaney

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Martin v. Ohio

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McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission

Does the prohibition of the distribution of anonymous campaign literature abridge freedom of speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Yes. The freedom to publish anonymously is protected by the First Amendment and "extends beyond the literary realm to the advocacy of political causes." When a law burdens such anonymous speech, the Court applies "exacting scrutiny," upholding the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.

Mcmillan v. Pennsylvania

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Mcneil v. Director, Patuxent Institution

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Medina v. California

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Meese v. Keene

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Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft

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Meyer v. Grant

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Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo

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Michael H. v. Gerald D.

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Milanovich v. United States

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Miller v. French

Does the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995's "automatic stay" provision preclude courts from exercising their equitable powers to enjoin such a stay? Does the provision violate the constitutional separation-of-powers doctrine?

Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Congress clearly intended to make operation of the PLRA's automatic stay provision mandatory, precluding courts from exercising their equitable power to enjoin the stay and that the PLRA does not violate separation of powers principles. Thus, Congress lawfully imposed deadlines for federal judges to review states officials' motions to discontinue court monitoring and supervision of state prison conditions. Justice O'Connor, in addressing whether the PLRA violated the separation of powers, remarked in a footnote that, "[t]he PLRA does not deprive courts of their adjudicatory role, but merely provides a new legal standard for relief and encourages courts to apply that standard promptly." Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer and John Paul Stevens dissented.

Mills v. Alabama

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Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn.

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Minnesota Bd. For Community Colleges v. Knight

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Mistretta v. United States

Did the Act violate the nondelegation doctrine of the Constitution?

The Court found the Act to be valid because although Congress cannot generally delegate its legislative power to another Branch, the nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from obtaining assistance from coordinate Branches. The test of validity is that an "intelligible principle" must be established by the legislature where the agency of the delegated authority must adhere to specific directives that govern its authority. The delegation to the Commission was sufficiently detailed and specific to meet these requirements. The Commission was given substantial authority and discretion in setting the guidelines; however, Congress established a classification hierarchy for federal crimes that the Commission was to use as an outline for its work.

Montana v. Egelhoff

May a state restrict the elements of a defense in criminal prosecution, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause?

Yes. The Court could not reach a majority on the reasons for its decision. Justice Antonin Scalia, who announced the judgment of the Court, declared that defendants do not have an absolute constitutional right to present all relevant evidence in their defense.

Moore v. Illinois

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Morrison v. Olson

Did the Act violate the constitutional principal of separation of powers?

The Court addressed a number of constitutional issues in this case and upheld the law. The near-unanimous Court held that the means of selecting the independent counsel did not violate the Appointments Clause; the powers allocated to the special court did not violate Article III; and the Act was not offensive to the separation of powers doctrine since it did not impermissibly interfere with the functions of the Executive Branch.

Mt. Healthy City Board Of Ed. v. Doyle

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Mullaney v. Wilbur

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Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipestringing, Inc.

Is the time limit in which a named defendant may remove a state-court action to a federal court, as set forth in 28 U. S. C. ?1446(b), triggered by the mere receipt of a complaint unattended by any formal service?

No. In a 6-3 decision, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a named defendant's time to remove a state-court action to a federal court is triggered by the simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint, "through service or otherwise," after and apart from service of the summons, but not by the mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service. Justice Ginsburg wrote for that Court that, "[i]t would take a clearer statement than Congress has made to read its endeavor to extend removal time...to effect so strange a change_to set removal apart from all other responsive acts, to render removal the sole instance in which one's procedural rights slip away before service of a summons."

NAACP v. Alabama

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NAACP v. Button

Did the law, as applied to the NAACP's activities, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Yes. The unanimous Court held that the activities of the NAACP amounted to "modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit." NAACP initiated litigation was "a form of political expression" and not "a technique of resolving private differences," argued Brennan.

Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm'n

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National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley

Are the statutory funding guidelines requiring the NEA to consider artistic excellence, merit, and general standards of "decency and respect," overly vague and conducive of viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment's freedom of expression guarantees?

No. In an 8-to-1 opinion the Court held that, unlike direct sovereign regulation of speech, Congress enjoys wide latitude when setting spending priorities which may indirectly affect certain forms of expression. The funding of one activity believed to be in the public interest, to the exclusion of another, does not constitute viewpoint discrimination. Moreover, the statutory funding guidelines were not impermissibly vague since they involved selective subsidies rather than criminal or regulatory prohibitions. The Court noted that while the amended regulations may add some measure of imprecision to the existing guidelines, they do so to an already highly subjective selection process, made so by the inevitable nature of the subject matter with which it deals.

National League of Cities v. Usery

May Congress, acting under its commerce power, regulate the labor market of state employees, which the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states?

Congress may not regulate the labor market of state employees. The Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting legislation which operates "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." While the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause is "plenary," that power has constitutional limits. In this case, the exercise of the commerce power ran afoul of the Tenth Amendment which protects the states' traditional activities.

National Socialist Party v. Skokie

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Navarro Savings Assn. v. Lee

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Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart

Did the judge's order violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Yes. The Court agreed with the trial judge that the murder case would generate "intense and pervasive pretrial publicity." However, the unanimous court held that the practical problems associated with implementing a prior restraint on the press in this case would not have served the accused's rights. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that"a whole community cannot be restrained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it."

Neitzke v. Williams

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Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs

May an individual sue a State for money damages in federal court for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that State employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the State's failure to comply with the FMLA's family-care provision. The Court reasoned that Congress both clearly stated its intention to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court under the FMLA and acted within its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting prophylactic, rather than substantively redefining, legislation. "In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic [section] 5 legislation," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy, who was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Scalia, filed dissents.

New York Times v. United States

Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of what it termed "classified information" violate the First Amendment?

Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified.