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 <channel>
  <title>The Oyez Project: Miscellaneous Issues - Miscellaneous Arguments</title>
  <link>http://www.oyez.org/issues/miscellaneous/miscellaneous/</link>
  <description>U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org)</description>
  <language>en-us</language>
  <itunes:image>http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg</itunes:image>
  <itunes:category text="Government &amp; Organizations"/>
      <itunes:subtitle>U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org)</itunes:subtitle>
    
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 1987 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;The Board of Airport Commissioners of Los Angeles adopted an ordinance which prohibited all "First Amendment activities" in the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). Alan Snyder, a minister with Jews for Jesus, was instructed by an airport officer to refrain from distributing free religious literature on a walkway in the central terminal of LAX.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the Los Angeles ordinance violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>86-104_19870303-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_104/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_86_104/argument/86-104_19870303-argument.mp3" length="14583158" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Airports Auth. v. Citizens For Noise Abatement - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 1991 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>90-906_19910416-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_906/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_906/argument/90-906_19910416-argument.mp3" length="11392331" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Alabama v. Bozeman - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 17 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;The Interstate Agreement on Detainers creates uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer, a legal order that requires a state to hold a currently imprisoned individual when he has finished serving his sentence so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime. In 1997, Michael Bozeman was serving a federal prison sentence at a federal prison in Florida. In January, the district attorney of Covington County, Alabama sought temporary custody of Bozeman to arraign him on state firearm charges for which an earlier detainer had been filed. The Agreement provides that a state that obtains a prisoner for purposes of trial must try him within 120 days of his arrival, and if it returns him to his "original place of imprisonment" prior to that trial, charges shall be dismissed. After appearing in Alabama court, Bozeman was returned to federal prison in Florida. When Bozeman returned to Alabama court, his local counsel filed a motion to dismiss the state charges on the ground that Bozeman had been "returned to the original place of imprisonment" (the federal prison) "prior to" "trial" on state charges being "had." Ultimately, Bozeman was convicted and an appellate court affirmed. In reversing, the Alabama State Supreme Court held that the literal language of the Agreement required dismissal of the state charges.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does the Interstate Agreement on Detainers require the dismissal of criminal charges when a prisoner serving a federal sentence is transferred for a day to be arraigned on state charges and then returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>00-492_20010417-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_492/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_492/argument/00-492_20010417-argument.mp3" length="13682203" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 01 Dec 1986 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>85-920_19861201-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_920/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1986/1986_85_920/argument/85-920_19861201-argument.mp3" length="14426582" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Alden v. Maine - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 31 Mar 1999 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;A group of probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in 1992 alleging that the state had violated the overtime provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Following the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996)_which held that States are immune from private suits in federal court and that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate that immunity_the probation officers' suit was dismissed in Federal district court. Alden and the other probation officers then sued Maine again for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time in state court. The state trial court and the state supreme court both held that Maine had sovereign immunity and could not be sued by private parties in their own court.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;May Congress use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from private suits in its own courts?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>98-436_19990331-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_436/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_436/argument/98-436_19990331-argument.mp3" length="14390959" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 19 Jan 1999 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act (Act) provides that once an employer's liability for an employee's injury has been established, then either the self-insured employer or insurer (collectively insurers) is responsible for paying for the employee's "reasonable" and "necessary" medical treatment. In 1993, this system was amended to allow insurers to withhold payment for disputed treatments, pending the outcome of an independent utilization review. Ten employees and two organizations representing employees that had received benefits under the Act filed suit against state officials, the self-insured school district of Philadelphia, and a number of private insurance companies. Their complaint alleged that the state and private defendants, acting under color of state law, had deprived them of property in violation of due process.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;1) Can the private insurers' decision to withhold payment for disputed medical treatment be considered state action, so as to bring them within the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment? (2) Do workers have a constitutionally protected property interest in continuing payment of disputed medical treatment before such treatment is determined to be reasonable and necessary?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>97-2000_19990119-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_2000/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_2000/argument/97-2000_19990119-argument.mp3" length="13418200" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Apprendi v. New Jersey - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 28 Mar 2000 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Charles C. Apprendi, Jr. fired several shots into the home of an African-American family. While in custody, Apprendi made a statement, which he later retracted, that he did not want the family in his neighborhood because of their race. Apprendi was charged under New Jersey law with second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, which carries a prison term of 5 to 10 years. The count did not refer to the state's hate crime statute, which provides for an enhanced sentence if a trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the crime with a purpose to intimidate a person or group because of race. After Apprendi pleaded guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to enhance the sentence. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the shooting was racially motivated and sentenced Apprendi to a 12-year term on the firearms count. In upholding the sentence, the appeals court rejected Apprendi's claim that the Due Process Clause requires that a bias finding be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The State Supreme Court affirmed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>99-478_20000328-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_478/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_478/argument/99-478_20000328-argument.mp3" length="14401640" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 29 Apr 1986 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>85-437_19860429-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_85_437/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_85_437/argument/85-437_19860429-argument.mp3" length="10657685" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Arizona v. Youngblood - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 11 Oct 1988 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>86-1904_19881011-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_86_1904/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_86_1904/argument/86-1904_19881011-argument.mp3" length="14022531" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Arkansas Ed. Television Comm. v. Forbes - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;During the 1992 race for Arkansas' Third Congressional District, the Arkansas Educational Television Commission (AETC) -- a state-owned public television broadcaster -- sponsored a debate between the major party candidates. Running as an independent candidate with little popular support, Ralph Forbes sought to participate in the debate but was denied permission. After unsuccessfully challenging AETC's refusal in district court, Forbes appealed and won a reversal. AETC then appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Is the exclusion of a ballot-qualified candidate from a debate sponsored by a state-owned public television broadcaster a violation of the candidate's First Amendment right to freedom of speech?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>96-779_19971008-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_779/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_779/argument/96-779_19971008-argument.mp3" length="4337579" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 25 Mar 1985 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>84-351_19850325-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_84_351/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_84_351/argument/84-351_19850325-argument.mp3" length="11531476" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Atkins v. Parker - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 27 Nov 1984 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>83-1660_19841127-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_1660/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_1660/argument/83-1660_19841127-argument.mp3" length="13567930" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Baker v. General Motors Corp. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 15 Oct 1997 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;After working for General Motors Corporation (GM) for fifteen years as a vehicular fire analyst, Ronald Elwell sued GM for wrongful discharge. In an eventual settlement agreement reached in a Michigan county court, the parties agreed to a permanent injunction barring Elwell from testifying against GM without its consent, unless subpoenaed to do so by another court or tribunal. Thereafter, when Kenneth Lee Baker commenced a product liability action against GM in a Missouri county court, Elwell was subpoenaed to testify on Baker's behalf. When GM argued that Elwell was barred from testifying under the Michigan court injunction, the Missouri court disagreed and permitted his deposition and testimony. After suffering an adverse verdict in the Baker case, GM appealed on the basis that Elwell's testimony was illegally admitted. When a federal appeals court agreed with GM, Baker appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Was a Missouri county court's admission of a witness's testimony, barred by a Michigan county court's injunction, a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>96-653_19971015-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_653/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_653/argument/96-653_19971015-argument.mp3" length="13675174" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Bank Of Nova Scotia v. United States - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 27 Apr 1988 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>87-578_19880427-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_87_578/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_87_578/argument/87-578_19880427-argument.mp3" length="12089172" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Beard v. Banks - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 27 Mar 2006 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Pennsylvania houses "incorrigible, recalcitrant" prisoners in the Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU). Ronald Banks was one of about 40 prisoners in level 2 of the LTSU, which is reserved for the most dangerous, worst-behaved inmates. It is the policy of the LTSU to impose severe restrictions on the privileges of level 2 inmates. In particular, level 2 prisoners are the only ones denied newspapers, magazines, and photographs. Beard, the Secretary of the PA Department of Corrections, argued that this policy was necessary to promote rehabilitation and ensure prison safety. Banks brought a suit challenging the policy as a violation of the First Amendment. On the recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court ruled in favor of Beard. On appeal, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Circuit Court found that the prison's policy failed to meet the test laid down by the Supreme Court in &lt;em&gt;Turner v. Safley&lt;/em&gt;. The Third Circuit held that the First Amendment rights of the prisoners took precedence, because the policy was unrelated to the goal of rehabilitation, and an ineffective method of increasing prison safety.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does a prison policy that denies newspapers, magazines, and photographs to the worst-behaved prisoners violate the First Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>04-1739_20060327-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_04_1739/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_04_1739/argument/04-1739_20060327-argument.mp3" length="14659915" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Beck v. Prupis - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 03 Nov 1999 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Robert A. Beck, II, of Southeastern Insurance Group (SIG), alleged that after he discovered former senior officer and director Ronald M. Prupis' unlawful conduct and contacted regulators, Prupis enacted a scheme to remove him from SIG. Beck sued Prupis under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Beck alleged that his injury, the loss of his employment, served to further Prupis' conspiracy and therefore provided a cause of action under RICO. The District Court dismissed Beck's RICO conspiracy claim. The court agreed with Prupis that employees who are terminated for refusing to participate in RICO activities, or who threaten to report RICO activities, do not have standing to sue under RICO for damages from their loss of employment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the act causing Beck's injury was not an act of racketeering, it could not support a RICO cause of action.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;May a person injured by an action furthering a conspiracy sue under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act even if the action itself was not an act of racketeering?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>98-1480_19991103-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_1480/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_1480/argument/98-1480_19991103-argument.mp3" length="14682240" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Becker v. Montgomery - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 16 Apr 2001 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Dale G. Becker, an Ohio prisoner, instituted a pro se civil rights action to contest the conditions of his confinement. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Becker's complaint. In appealing, Becker, still pro se, filed his notice of appeal using a government-printed form, on which he filled in all of the required information. On the line labeled "Counsel for Appellant" Becker typed, but did not sign, his name. The form contained no indication of a signature requirement. The District Court docketed the notice, sent a copy to the Court of Appeals, and granted Becker leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals, after notifying Becker that the court would not hold him to the same standards it required of attorneys in stating his case, dismissed the appeal on its own motion. The court held that the notice of appeal was fatally defective because it was not signed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;When a party files a timely notice of appeal in district court, does the failure to sign the notice of appeal require the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>00-6374_20010416-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_6374/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_6374/argument/00-6374_20010416-argument.mp3" length="13222041" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Bell v. New Jersey - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 18 Apr 1983 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>81-2125_19830418-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_2125/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_2125/argument/81-2125_19830418-argument.mp3" length="16703400" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Bennett v. Arkansas - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 02 Mar 1988 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>86-6124_19880302-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_6124/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_6124/argument/86-6124_19880302-argument.mp3" length="8269400" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Bennett v. Kentucky Dept. Of Education - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jan 1985 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>83-1798_19850108-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_1798/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_1798/argument/83-1798_19850108-argument.mp3" length="14109568" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Bennett v. New Jersey - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jan 1985 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>83-2064_19850108-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_2064/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_2064/argument/83-2064_19850108-argument.mp3" length="11108630" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 03 Mar 1986 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;At a school assembly of approximately 600 high school students, Matthew Fraser made a speech nominating a fellow student for elective office. In his speech, Fraser used what some observers believed was a graphic sexual metaphor to promote the candidacy of his friend. As part of its disciplinary code, Bethel High School enforced a rule prohibiting conduct which "substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Fraser was suspended from school for two days.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does the First Amendment prevent a school district from disciplining a high school student for giving a lewd speech at a high school assembly?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>84-1667_19860303-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1667/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1667/argument/84-1667_19860303-argument.mp3" length="15162742" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 1959 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;The Illinois legislature adopted a law requiring all trucks and trailers traveling on the state's highways to operate with contour mudguards. The legislators believed that this specific type of mudguard would protect motorists by preventing trucks from throwing debris into the windshields of passing or trailing vehicles.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did a law which required a specific type of rear mudguard on trucks and trailers operated on Illinois's state highways conflict with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>94_19590330-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1958/1958_94/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1958/1958_94/argument/94_19590330-argument.mp3" length="27545136" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 28 Nov 1995 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Umbehr was an independent trash-hauling contractor for Wabaunsee County, Kansas. He frequently criticized the County's Board of Commissioners (the Board). When the Board voted to terminate his contract, supposedly because the Board grew tired of his constant criticisms, Umbehr filed suit against two of the Board's members. Umbehr alleged that his termination resulted from his criticisms of the Board and, therefore, infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. On appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Board, the Tenth Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted Umbehr's petition for certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the Board's termination of Umbehr's contract, presumably as a result of his criticisms, constitute a violation of his First Amendment freedom of speech?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>94-1654_19951128-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_1654/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_94_1654/argument/94-1654_19951128-argument.mp3" length="14024227" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Board Of Ed. v. National Gay Task Force - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 14 Jan 1985 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>83-2030_19850114-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_2030/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_2030/argument/83-2030_19850114-argument.mp3" length="14787991" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Board of Education v. Earls - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy adopted by the Tecumseh, Oklahoma School District (School District) requires all middle and high school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. Two Tecumseh High School students and their parents brought suit, alleging that the policy violates the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted the School District summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court concluded that before imposing a suspicionless drug-testing program a school must demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those tested, such that testing that group will actually redress its drug problem, which the School District had failed to demonstrate.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Is the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy, which requires all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing, consistent with the Fourth Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>01-332_20020319-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_332/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_332/argument/01-332_20020319-argument.mp3" length="14642299" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Board Of Education v. Pico - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 02 Mar 1982 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;The Island Trees Union Free School District's Board of Education (the "Board"), acting contrary to the recommendations of a committee of parents and school staff, ordered that certain books be removed from its district's junior high and high school libraries. In support of its actions, the Board said such books were: "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy." Acting through his friend Francis Pico, and on behalf of several other students, Steven Pico brought suit in federal district court challenging the Board's decision to remove the books. The Board won; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Board petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the Board of Education's decision to ban certain books from its junior high and high school libraries, based on their content, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>80-2043_19820302-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1981/1981_80_2043/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1981/1981_80_2043/argument/80-2043_19820302-lq-argument.mp3" length="16540824" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Board Of Education v. Vail - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 1984 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>83-87_19840228-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_83_87/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_83_87/argument/83-87_19840228-argument.mp3" length="14022188" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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        <title>Board of Regents Univ. Wisc. v. Southworth - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 09 Nov 1999 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;The University of Wisconsin, a public university, requires students to pay an activity fee. The fee supports various campus services and extracurricular student activities including the Future Financial Gurus of America; the International Socialist Organization; the College Democrats and Republicans; and the American Civil Liberties Union Campus Chapter. Scott Harold Southworth filed suit against the University, alleging that the fee violated his rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise under the First Amendment. Southworth argued that the University must grant him the choice not to fund registered student organizations (RSO) that engage in political and ideological expression offensive to his personal beliefs. In granting Southworth judgment, the Federal District Court concluded that the fee program compelled students to support political and ideological activities with which they disagree in violation of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The court declared the fee program invalid and enjoined the University from using the fees to fund any RSO engaging in political or ideological speech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the fee program was "not germane to the University's mission, did not further a vital University policy, and imposed too much of a burden on [Southworth's] free speech rights."&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;May public universities and colleges subsidize campus groups by means of a mandatory student activity fee without violating the First Amendment rights of students who find some campus groups objectionable?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>98-1189_19991109-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_1189/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_1189/argument/98-1189_19991109-argument.mp3" length="15302476" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Board of Trustees v. Garrett - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 11 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;After Patricia Garrett, Director of Nursing for the University of Alabama, was diagnosed with breast cancer, her treatment forced her to take a substantial leave from work. Upon her return, her supervisor informed her she would have to give up her position. Milton Ash, a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services, who suffers from chronic asthma, requested that his employer modify his duties to accommodate him. Ultimately, none of Ash's requested relief was granted and his job performance evaluations fell. Both Garrett and Ash filed discrimination suits against their Alabama state employers, seeking money damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits the States and other employers from "discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of that disability... in regard to... terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." The District Court disposed of both cases by ruling that the ADA exceeds Congress' authority to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;May an individual sue a state for damages in federal court under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>99-1240_20001011-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1240/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_1240/argument/99-1240_20001011-argument.mp3" length="14873609" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 05 Dec 1988 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>87-1346_19881205-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_1346/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_1346/argument/87-1346_19881205-argument.mp3" length="12622948" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Bowers v. Hardwick - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 31 Mar 1986 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Michael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in the act of consensual homosexual sodomy with another adult in the bedroom of his home. After being charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, Hardwick challenged the statute's constitutionality in Federal District Court. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to state a claim, the court dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. Georgia's Attorney General, Michael J. Bowers, appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does the Constitution confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy, thereby invalidating the laws of many states which make such conduct illegal?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>85-140_19860331-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_85_140/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_85_140/argument/85-140_19860331-argument.mp3" length="13322228" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Bowsher v. Synar - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 23 Apr 1986 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Due to rising government budget deficits during the first term of the Reagan Administration, Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985. The act was designed to eliminate the federal budget deficit by restricting spending during fiscal years 1986 through 1991. Under the law, if maximum allowable deficit amounts were exceeded, automatic cuts, as requested by the Comptroller General, would go into effect. This case was decided together with O'Neill v. Synar and United States Senate v. Synar.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the functions assigned by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985 violate the doctrine of separation of powers?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>85-1377_19860423-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_85_1377/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_85_1377/argument/85-1377_19860423-argument.mp3" length="30398965" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Brandenburg v. Ohio - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Thu, 27 Feb 1969 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," as well as assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism."&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did Ohio's criminal syndicalism law, prohibiting public speech that advocates various illegal activities, violate Brandenburg's right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>492_19690227-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1968/1968_492/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1968/1968_492/argument/492_19690227-lq-argument.mp3" length="13610604" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Branzburg v. Hayes - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 23 Feb 1972 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;After observing and interviewing a number of people synthesizing and using drugs in a two-county area in Kentucky, Branzburg, a reporter, wrote a story which appeared in a Louisville newspaper. On two occasions he was called to testify before state grand juries which were investigating drug crimes. Branzburg refused to testify and potentially disclose the identities of his confidential sources. Similarly, in the companion cases of In re Pappas and United States v. Caldwell, two different reporters, each covering activity within the Black Panther organization, were called to testify before grand juries and reveal trusted information. Like Branzburg, both Pappas and Caldwell refused to appear before their respective grand juries.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Is the requirement that news reporters appear and testify before state or federal grand juries an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and press as guaranteed by the First Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>70-85_19720223-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_85/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_85/argument/70-85_19720223-lq-argument.mp3" length="23590936" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Brentwood Acad. v. TN Sec. School Ath. Assn. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 11 Oct 2000 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (Association) is a not-for-profit membership corporation organized to regulate interscholastic sports among its members, a large portion of the public and private high schools in Tennessee. The Association's role in regulating interscholastic competition in public schools has been long acknowledged by the State Board of Education. Brentwood Academy sued the Association after it penalized the academy for placing "undue influence" on football recruits. At the time, all the voting members of the Association were public school administrators. Brentwood claimed that the rule's enforcement was state action that violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court agreed and enjoined the rule's enforcement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no state action.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;May a statewide association, incorporated to regulate interscholastic athletic competition among public and private secondary schools, be regarded as engaging in state action when it enforces a rule against a member school?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>99-901_20001011-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_901/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_901/argument/99-901_20001011-argument.mp3" length="14476649" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 1998 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Colorado practices an initiative-petition process in which citizens can make laws directly through balloting initiatives. Acting on behalf of ballot petitioners, the American Constitutional Law Foundation (Foundation) challenged the constitutionality of six limitations imposed by Colorado on the petitioning process. After mixed rulings in both trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review three of the six original restrictions. The first required petition circulators to be registered voters. The second required them to wear identification badges with their names, status as "volunteer" or "paid," and if the latter then their employer's phone number. The third required initiative proponents to report names, addresses, and registration voting counties for all paid circulators, as well as salary per petition signature, and each circulator's total salary. Proponents also had to report, on a monthly basis, all proponent names, names and addresses of circulators, circulators' monthly salary and debt totals, and the name of each proposed ballot measure.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the State of Colorado's imposition of name, badge, and financial disclosure requirements, on initiative-petition proponents and their circulators, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>97-930_19981014-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_930/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_930/argument/97-930_19981014-argument.mp3" length="14909469" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Burson v. Freeman - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 08 Oct 1991 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Freeman, a Tennessee political campaign treasurer, challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Code forbidding the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling facilities. On appeal from a lower court's dismissal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, finding that the 100-foot ban was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Burson certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did Tennessee's 100-foot limit violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>90-1056_19911008-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_1056/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_1056/argument/90-1056_19911008-argument.mp3" length="10459886" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Butterworth v. Smith - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jan 1990 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>88-1993_19900116-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_1993/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_1993/argument/88-1993_19900116-argument.mp3" length="12163273" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>California Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 24 Feb 2003 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Gilbert Hyatt filed a part-year resident income-tax return in California for 1991, which represented that he had become a Nevada resident in October 1991, shortly before he received substantial licensing fees. The California Franchise Tax Board (CFTB) determined that Hyatt was a California resident until April 1992 and issued notices of proposed assessments and imposed substantial civil fraud penalties. Hyatt filed suit against CFTB in a Nevada state court, alleging that CFTB had committed negligence and intentional torts during the course of its audit. CFTB argued that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because full faith and credit required that the court apply California law immunizing CFTB from suit. Ultimately, the Nevada Supreme Court allowed the intentional tort claims to proceed to trial. The court held that affording CFTB statutory immunity with respect to intentional torts would contravene Nevada's interest in protecting its citizens from injurious intentional torts and bad faith acts committed by sister States' government employees.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does the Nevada Supreme Court's refusal to extend full faith and credit to California's statute immunizing its tax collection agency from suit violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>02-42_20030224-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_42/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_42/argument/02-42_20030224-argument.mp3" length="14193416" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>California v. Trombetta - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 18 Apr 1984 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>83-305_19840418-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_83_305/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_83_305/argument/83-305_19840418-argument.mp3" length="14438121" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Carmell v. Texas - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 30 Nov 1999 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Scott Carmell was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his stepdaughter from 1991 to 1995, when she was 12 to 16 years old. Before September 1, 1993, the relevant Texas statute specified that a victim's testimony alone about a sexual offense could not support a conviction unless corroborated by other evidence or if the victim had informed another person of the offense within six months of its occurrence (outcry). However, the statute provided that if a victim was under 14 at the time of the offense, the victim's testimony alone could support a conviction. A 1993 amendment allowed the victim's testimony alone to support a conviction if the victim was under 18. Carmell argued, before the Texas Court of Appeals, that four of his convictions could not stand under the pre-1993 version of the law, which was in effect at the time of his alleged conduct, because they were based solely on the testimony of the victim, who was not under 14 at the time of four of the offenses and had not made a timely outcry. The court held that applying the 1993 amendment retrospectively did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because the amended statute did not alter the punishment or the elements of the offense that the State must prove. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied review.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does an amended Texas statute that authorizes the conviction of sexual offenses on the victim's testimony alone, whereas the statute previously required the victim's testimony along with corroborating evidence, violate the constitutional prohibition against State "ex post facto" laws when applied in a trial for offenses committed before the amendment's effective date?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>98-7540_19991130-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_7540/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_7540/argument/98-7540_19991130-argument.mp3" length="14590626" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Castle Rock v. Gonzales - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 21 Mar 2005 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Jessica Gonzales requested a restraining order against her estranged husband.  A state trial court issued the order, which prohibited the husband from seeing Gonzales or their three daughters except during pre-arranged visits.  A month later, Gonzales's husband abducted the three children.  Gonzales repeatedly urged the police to search for and arrest her husband, but the police told her to wait until later that evening and see if her husband brought the children back.  During the night Gonzales's husband murdered all three children and then opened fire inside a police station, where police returned fire and killed him.  Gonzales brought a complaint in federal District Court, alleging that the Castle Rock police had violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by willfully or negligently refusing to enforce her restraining order.  The Due Process Clause states: "No state shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..."  The District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that no principle of substantive or procedural due process allowed Gonzales to sue a local government for its failure to enforce a restraining order.  On appeal, however, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Gonzales had a legitimate procedural due process claim.  A rehearing by the full appeals court agreed, ruling that Gonzales had a "protected property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her restraining order," which the police had violated.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Can the holder of a restraining order bring a procedural due process claim against a local government for its failure to actively enforce the order and protect the holder from violence?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>04-278_20050321-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_278/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_278/argument/04-278_20050321-argument.mp3" length="13922056" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Chandler v. Miller - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jan 1997 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Under a Georgia statute, all candidates for elected state office must pass a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to their qualifying for nomination or election. Miller, on behalf of several state office nominees from the Libertarian Party, challenged the statute's constitutionality, naming Georgia's governor and two other regulatory officials as defendants. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did Georgia's drug testing statute violate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against illegal search and seizures?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>96-126_19970114-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_96_126/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_96_126/argument/96-126_19970114-argument.mp3" length="14566333" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Chicago v. Morales - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 09 Dec 1998 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places. If a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member loitering in a public place with one or more persons, he shall order them to disperse. A violation of the ordinance arises when anyone does not promptly obey a dispersal order. An officer's discretion was purportedly limited by confining arrest authority to designated officers, establishing detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein, and providing for designated, but publicly undisclosed, enforcement areas. In 1993, Jesus Morales was arrested and found guilty under the ordinance for loitering in a Chicago neighborhood after he ignored police orders to disperse. Ultimately, after Morales challenged his arrest, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated due process of law in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>97-1121_19981209-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_1121/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_1121/argument/97-1121_19981209-argument.mp3" length="14207016" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 19 Mar 1990 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>88-1260_19900319-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_1260/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_1260/argument/88-1260_19900319-argument.mp3" length="15016139" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 12 Oct 1983 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>82-975_19831012-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_975/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_975/argument/82-975_19831012-argument.mp3" length="15406064" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 1987 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Plain Dealer Publishing challenged the constitutionality of a Lakewood city ordinance that authorized its mayor to grant or deny applications, made by publishers, seeking permission to place newsracks on public property. The ordinance merely required Lakewood's mayor to provide an explanation, in the event of a permit denial, while empowering him to subject all permit approvals to whatever "terms and conditions" which he "deemed necessary and reasonable." On appeal from a district court ruling that found the ordinance constitutional, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted Lakewood's request for certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did Lakewood's city ordinance violate freedom of speech rights as protected by the First Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>86-1042_19871104-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_1042/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_1042/argument/86-1042_19871104-argument.mp3" length="14528639" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Clingman v. Beaver - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 19 Jan 2005 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Oklahoma's election laws created a primary system in which a party could invite only its own members and Independents to vote in its primary. The Libertarian Party and voters registered in other parties argued the laws violated the First Amendment freedoms of expression and association by preventing the Libertarian Party from inviting members of other parties to vote in its primary elections. The district court ruled for Oklahoma. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled Oklahoma's election laws violated the First Amendment.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Do state election laws that restrict the voters a party may invite to vote in its primary election violate the First Amendment rights to freedom of expression and association?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>04-37_20050119-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_37/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_37/argument/04-37_20050119-argument.mp3" length="14363512" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Clinton v. City of New York - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 1998 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;This case consolidates two separate challenges to the constitutionality of two cancellations, made by President William J. Clinton, under the Line Item Veto Act ("Act"). In the first, the City of New York, two hospital associations, a hospital, and two health care unions, challenged the President's cancellation of a provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 which relinquished the Federal Government's ability to recoup nearly $2.6 billion in taxes levied against Medicaid providers by the State of New York. In the second, the Snake River farmer's cooperative and one of its individual members challenged the President's cancellation of a provision of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The provision permitted some food refiners and processors to defer recognition of their capital gains in exchange for selling their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. After a district court held the Act unconstitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on expedited appeal.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the President's ability to selectively cancel individual portions of bills, under the Line Item Veto Act, violate the Presentment Clause of Article I?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>97-1374_19980427-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_1374/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_1374/argument/97-1374_19980427-argument.mp3" length="13878361" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 27 Mar 1991 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Cohen was a campaign associate in the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race. He gave court records concerning another party's candidate for lieutenant governor to the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune. Though he had received a promise of confidentiality from the reporters, the papers identified Cohen in their stories. He was fired as a result. Cohen sued the papers in state court, alleging a breach of contract. At trial, Cohen won compensatory damages and the state appellate court upheld the award. But the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Cohen's claim relied on state "promissory estoppel" law, a law that essentially prevented a promisor from breaking a promise. The court ruled that the First Amendment's free press guarantee prevented promissory estoppel from applying to the newspapers.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does the First Amendment bar a plaintiff from recovering damages, under state promissory estoppel law, for a newspaper's breach of a promise of confidentiality?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>90-634_19910327-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_634/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_634/argument/90-634_19910327-argument.mp3" length="14442011" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 1999 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;This case is the second tier of a patent infringement action. College Savings Bank, a New Jersey chartered bank, markets and sells certificates of deposit designed to finance college costs. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity, administers a tuition prepayment program. In addition to its original patent infringement action, College Savings filed an action alleging that Florida Prepaid violated section 43 of the Lanham Act by making misstatements about its tuition savings plans in its brochures and annual reports. The Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) subjects states to suits brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for false and misleading advertising. The District Court granted Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The court rejected arguments from College Savings and the United States that Florida Prepaid had waived its sovereign immunity by engaging in interstate marketing and administration of its program after the TRCA made clear that such activity would subject it to suit; and that Congress's abrogation of sovereign immunity in the TRCA was effective, since it was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA) permit suits against states for alleged misrepresentations of their own products by providing a constitutionally permissible abrogation of state sovereign immunity? Does the TRCA permit suits against states for alleged misrepresentations of their own products by operating as a waiver of sovereign immunity when a state engages in activities regulated by the Lanham Act?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>98-149_19990420-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_149/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_149/argument/98-149_19990420-argument.mp3" length="14506620" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Connick v. Myers - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 08 Nov 1982 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>81-1251_19821108-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_1251/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_1251/argument/81-1251_19821108-argument.mp3" length="15721860" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Cooper v. Oklahoma - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jan 1996 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Byron Keith Cooper was charged with the murder of an 86-year-old man in the course of a burglary. After an Oklahoma jury found him guilty of first-degree murder and recommended punishment by death, the trial court imposed the death penalty. Cooper's competence was considered on five separate occasions, whether he had the ability to understand the charges against him and to assist defense counsel. Oklahoma law presumes that a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial unless he proves his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. Despite Cooper's bizarre behavior and conflicting expert testimony, he was found competent on separate occasions before and during his trial. In affirming the conviction and sentence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Cooper's argument that the State's presumption of competence, combined with its clear and convincing evidence standard, placed such an onerous burden on him as to violate due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;May state law presume that defendants are competent to stand trial unless they prove their incompetence by clear and convincing evidence without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>95-5207_19960117-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_95_5207/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_95_5207/argument/95-5207_19960117-argument.mp3" length="13066882" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &amp; Ed. Fund - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 19 Feb 1985 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>84-312_19850219-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_84_312/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_84_312/argument/84-312_19850219-argument.mp3" length="14516616" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Crist v. Bretz - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 01 Nov 1977 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>76-1200_19771101-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_1200/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_1200/argument/76-1200_19771101-argument.mp3" length="16236502" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Crist v. Bretz - Oral Reargument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 22 Mar 1978 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>76-1200_19780322-reargument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_1200/reargument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_1200/reargument/76-1200_19780322-reargument.mp3" length="19043315" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Custis v. United States - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 28 Feb 1994 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>93-5209_19940228-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_93_5209/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1993/1993_93_5209/argument/93-5209_19940228-argument.mp3" length="13884841" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Dallas v. Stanglin - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 01 Mar 1989 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>87-1848_19890301-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_1848/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_1848/argument/87-1848_19890301-argument.mp3" length="14113372" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Daniels v. United States - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 08 Jan 2001 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1994, Earthy D. Daniels, Jr., was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), which imposes a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence on anyone convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and who has three previous convictions for a violent felony, Daniels' sentence was enhanced. After an unsuccessful appeal, Daniels filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. Daniels argued that his sentence violated the Constitution because it was based in part on two prior convictions that were themselves unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;May a federal defendant, who has been sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, challenge his federal sentence through a motion on the ground that his prior convictions were unconstitutionally obtained?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>99-9136_20010108-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_9136/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_9136/argument/99-9136_20010108-argument.mp3" length="14462266" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Dawson v. Delaware - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 12 Nov 1991 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>90-6704_19911112-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_6704/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_6704/argument/90-6704_19911112-argument.mp3" length="14160444" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Deal v. United States - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 1993 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Between January and April 1990, Thomas Lee Deal committed six bank robberies. In each robbery, he used a gun. Subsequently, Deal was convicted, in a single proceeding, of six counts of carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Section 924(c)(1) prescribes a 5-year prison term for the first such conviction, in addition to the punishment provided for the crime of violence, and requires a 20-year sentence "in the case of [a] second or subsequent conviction under this subsection." The District Court sentenced Deal to 5 years' imprisonment on the first section 924(c)(1) count and to 20 years on each of the five other counts, the terms to run consecutively. The Court of Appeals affirmed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does a criminal's second through sixth convictions under section 924(c)(1) in a single proceeding arise "in the case of his second or subsequent conviction" within the meaning of section 924(c)(1)?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>91-8199_19930301-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_8199/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_8199/argument/91-8199_19930301-argument.mp3" length="13549136" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Deck v. Missouri - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 01 Mar 2005 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;After the Missouri Supreme Court set aside Carman Deck's death sentence, Deck was presented at his new sentence hearing shackled with leg irons, handcuffs and a belly chain. Deck was again sentenced to death. The state supreme court rejected Deck's claim that his shackling violated the U.S. Constitution.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does shackling a convicted offender during the penalty phase of a capital case violate the due process clauses of the Fifth and 14th Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>04-5293_20050301-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_5293/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_5293/argument/04-5293_20050301-argument.mp3" length="14249342" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Demarest v. Manspeaker - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 06 Nov 1990 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>89-5916_19901106-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_5916/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_5916/argument/89-5916_19901106-argument.mp3" length="14050948" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Democratic Party Of U.S. v. Wisconsin - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 08 Dec 1980 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>79-1631_19801208-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_79_1631/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_79_1631/argument/79-1631_19801208-argument.mp3" length="15384092" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Denver Area Consortium v. FCC - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 21 Feb 1996 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Sections 10(a) and 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act (the Act) empower leased access channel cable operators to control programming that they believe is indecent and obscene. Section 10(b) of the Act requires public access channel cable operators to restrict "patently offensive" programming to a single channel, access to which must be restricted to those subscribers who submit written requests. Petitioners, television access programmers and cable television viewers, filed suit alleging that the Act's empowerments and restrictions violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. This case was consolidated with Alliance for Community Media v. FCC.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Do the Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act's empowerments and restrictions violate the petitioner's First Amendment right to freedom of speech?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>95-124_19960221-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_95_124/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1995/1995_95_124/argument/95-124_19960221-argument.mp3" length="14880342" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Dept of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 30 Nov 1998 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Under the Census Clause (Art. I, Sect. 2, Cl. 3), Congress is authorized to conduct a census of the American public every 10 years. Among other purposes, the census provides a basis for apportionment of congressional districts. Under the Census Act, Congress delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary). When the Census Bureau (Bureau) announced plans to use two new forms of discretionary statistical sampling in the 2000 census, various United States residents, counties, and the House of Representatives challenged the constitutionality of the new sampling methods in two separate suits. On direct appeals from three-judge district courts enjoining the use of the new sampling methods, the Supreme Court consolidated the cases and granted certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Is the use of statistical sampling in the execution of the census inconsistent with provisions of the Census Act or in conflict with the Census Clause of the Constitution?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>98-404_19981130-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_404/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_404/argument/98-404_19981130-argument.mp3" length="21209478" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Dixon v. United States - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 25 Apr 2006 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Keshia Dixon was arrested for illegally purchasing firearms. At her trial, Dixon raised a duress defense, claiming that her boyfriend abused her and that she feared he would harm or kill her or her daughters if she did not buy the firearms. Upon being convicted, Dixon appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that she should not bear the evidentiary burden of proving her duress claim. The Circuit Court rejected Dixon's argument, noting that the circuit's previous cases had clearly established that the duress defense requires the defendant to prove duress by a preponderance of evidence. This ruling conflicted with a ruling on a similar case in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Dixon appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the narrow question of the burden of proof.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;When a defendant raises a duress defense, is the burden of proof on the defendant to prove duress by a preponderance of the evidence, or on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that duress is not applicable?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>05-7053_20060425-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_05_7053/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_05_7053/argument/05-7053_20060425-argument.mp3" length="13635896" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Doe v. Chao - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 03 Dec 2003 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Seven coal miners sued the Department of Labor, claiming that the department had violated the federal Privacy Act and the right to privacy found in the federal Constitution by releasing their social security numbers (SSNs). The Privacy Act stated that any "person entitled to recovery" in a suit against the government for a violation of privacy would be awarded "actual damages sustained by the individual... but in no case... [would the damages awarded be] less than the sum of $1000" and attorney fees.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The miners argued that all they needed to prove in order to receive the $1000 minimum award was that the government had violated their privacy by releasing their SSNs; they did not need to prove that they had suffered actual damages. They maintained that the inclusion of "actual damages" in the act was only intended to limit the size of judgments awarded against the government, not to require proof of actual damage. The government argued that the act required the miners to prove that they had been harmed by the government's violation of their privacy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The district court ruled in favor of the government. A divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does the federal Privacy Act require that people prove they suffered "actual damage" stemming from the government's violation of their privacy rights in order to win damages in a suit against the government?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>02-1377_20031203-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_1377/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_1377/argument/02-1377_20031203-argument.mp3" length="14789178" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Comm. - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 05 Dec 1988 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>87-1269_19881205-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_1269/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_87_1269/argument/87-1269_19881205-argument.mp3" length="12917068" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>FCC v. League of Women Voters of California - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 16 Jan 1984 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 allocated federal funds to noncommercial television and radio stations to support operations and educational programming. The act did not allow stations receiving money under the act to "engage in editorializing."&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the ban on editorializing violate the First Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>82-912_19840116-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_912/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_912/argument/82-912_19840116-argument.mp3" length="15249893" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>FCC v. Pacifica Foundation - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 18 Apr 1978 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;During a mid-afternoon weekly broadcast, a New York radio station aired George Carlin's monologue, "Filthy Words." Carlin spoke of the words that could not be said on the public airwaves. His list included shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. The station warned listeners that the monologue included "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." The FCC received a complaint from a man who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does the First Amendment deny government any power to restrict the public broadcast of indecent language under any circumstances?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>77-528_19780418-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_77_528/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_77_528/argument/77-528_19780418-lq-argument.mp3" length="16513695" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 04 Mar 1986 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Orion Manufacturing Corporation (Orion) was a customer of Philadelphia Gear Corporation (PG). To provide a guarantee of payment to PG, Orion obtained a letter of credit for the benefit of PG from Penn Square Bank, N.A. (Bank). If Orion failed to pay an invoice to PG for at least 15 days, PG could draw upon that line of credit, up to $145,200. This type of credit line, meant to guarantee payment to a seller, is referred to as a standby letter of credit. To back up that line of credit, Orion executed an unsecured promissory note in favor of the Bank. This note is referred to as a backup letter of credit. Nothing was due on the backup letter of credit unless PG presented drafts on the standby letter of credit. Thus the backup letter was a contingent promissory note. The Bank did not credit any account of Orion's in exchange for the note, and did not treat its own assets as increased by its acceptance of the note. In 1982, the Bank was declared insolvent and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed its receiver. PG presented drafts on the standby letter of credit for goods delivered before the Bank's insolvency, but the FDIC returned them unpaid. PG sued the FDIC, claiming that the standby letter of credit was an insured deposit under the definition of "deposit" set forth at 12 U.S.C. Section 1813(l)(1), and that PG was therefore entitled to $100,000 in deposit insurance.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Is a standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note insured as a "deposit" under the federal deposit insurance program?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>84-1972_19860304-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1972/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1972/argument/84-1972_19860304-argument.mp3" length="13984521" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Fiore v. White - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 12 Oct 1999 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;William Fiore and his co-defendant, David Scarpone, were convicted of operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit in violation of Pennsylvania State law after deliberately altering a monitoring pipe. Fiore appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed the conviction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then denied further review of Fiore's case, and his conviction became final. Scarpone appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which noted the existence of a "valid permit" and set aside the conviction. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed and found that Scarpone's conduct did not constitute the operation of the facility without a permit because the law Fiore and Scarpone were convicted under does not apply to those who possess a permit but deviate radically from the permit's terms. Fiore had asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to review his case after it had agreed to review Scarpone's case and twice more after it decided Scarpone. The court denied Fiore's requests. Ultimately, Fiore sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the U.S. Constitution required that his conviction be set aside because his conduct was not criminal under the statutory section charged. The District Court granted his petition. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that state courts have no obligation to apply their decisions retroactively.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Should federal habeas corpus relief be extended to protect a defendant whose conviction was upheld even though his co-defendant's conviction under the same law was invalidated after a state court ruled that he had been prosecuted under the wrong law? Does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause require that the defendant's conviction be set aside?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>98-942_19991012-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_942/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_942/argument/98-942_19991012-argument.mp3" length="14569978" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 28 Mar 1983 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>81-984_19830328-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_984/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_984/argument/81-984_19830328-argument.mp3" length="12869579" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 20 Apr 1999 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Immediately after the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Act) changed patent laws to abrogate state's sovereign immunity, College Savings Bank (College) filed a patent infringement suit against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a Florida state entity. Florida Prepaid asked that College's suit be dismissed and that the Act be declared unconstitutional, based on Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (517 US 44) which upheld state sovereign immunity. The United States joined College looking to uphold the Act's constitutionality. After agreeing with College, the District Court denied Florida Prepaid's dismissal motion. When the Federal Circuit affirmed, Florida Prepaid appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did nullification of state sovereign immunity, under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, constitute valid legislation?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>98-531_19990420-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_531/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_98_531/argument/98-531_19990420-argument.mp3" length="14622561" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 1992 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>91-538_19920331-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_538/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_538/argument/91-538_19920331-argument.mp3" length="13844747" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Foucha v. Louisiana - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 04 Nov 1991 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>90-5844_19911104-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_5844/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_5844/argument/90-5844_19911104-argument.mp3" length="12974468" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Franconia Associates v. United States - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Under the Housing Act of 1949, the Farmers Home Administration makes direct loans to private, nonprofit entities to develop and/or construct rural housing for the elderly and low- or middle-income individuals and families. Franconia Associates is a property owner that entered into such loans before December 21, 1979. The promissory notes Franconia executed authorized "prepaymen[t] of scheduled installments, or any portion thereof...at any time at the option of Borrower." In 1988, Congress enacted the Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 (ELIHPA), which amended the Housing Act of 1949 to impose permanent restrictions upon prepayment of mortgages entered into before December 21, 1979. In 1997, Franconia filed suit, charging that ELIHPA abridged the absolute prepayment right set forth in their promissory notes and thereby effected a repudiation of their contracts. In dismissing Franconia's contract claims as untimely, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that the claims first accrued on the ELIHPA regulations' effective date. In affirming on statute of limitations grounds, the Federal Circuit ruled that, if the Government's continuing duty to allow Franconia to prepay their loans was breached, the breach occurred immediately upon ELIHPA's enactment date.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does the Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987, which restricted the right of property owners to prepay at any time mortgages under the Housing Act of 1949, constitute a present breach of contract?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>01-455_20020415-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_455/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_455/argument/01-455_20020415-argument.mp3" length="14629937" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Freedman v. Maryland - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 1964 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Maryland required that all films be submitted to a board of censors before being exhibited. The board could disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupted morals, or tended to incite crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman challenged the law as unconstitutional due to the procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that prior approval itself was unconstitutional.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the the Maryland law violate the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>69_19641119-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1964/1964_69/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1964/1964_69/argument/69_19641119-lq-argument.mp3" length="15664761" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Frew v. Hawkins - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 07 Oct 2003 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1996, Linda Frew and other citizens settled a class-action lawsuit in federal district court against the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. Settlement was reached through a consent agree, in which the parties make an agreement that is subject to court supervision. As part of this consent decree, Texas was supposed to improve health care for poor children to comply with a federally mandated program called Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment. Two years later, Frew and others remained unsatisfied that Texas was complying with the federal requirements, and asked the court to force Texas to create a plan for how it would improve health care. Texas refused, however, claiming that it was immune from the court order under the 11th Amendment, which provides for state sovereignty. Texas argued that because no federal rights had been violated, suit could not be brought in federal court. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Texas.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Do states forfeit 11th Amendment protection when they enter into a consent decree under federal law in federal court? And must states violate federal law, not just the consent agreement, in order to be subject to suit in federal court?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>02-628_20031007-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_628/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_628/argument/02-628_20031007-argument.mp3" length="14514162" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 1991 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Under 26 U.S.C. 7443A(b), the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court (an Article I Court established by Congress) may appoint special trial judges to certain specified proceedings explicitly laid out in the statute, in which the special trial judges may issue decisions. He may also appoint them to "any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate," but in those unspecified cases the special trial judge may not issue a final decision, only draft an opinion which must be reviewed by a regular judge of the Tax Court.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Freytag and several other defendants were charged with using a tax shelter to avoid paying roughly $1.5 billion in taxes. They consented to have their case heard by a special trial judge. The trial judge eventually drafted an opinion unfavorable to their position, which was reviewed and adopted by the Chief Judge. They then appealed the case, arguing that their case was too complex to assign to a special trial judge under section 7443A. Congress's decision to allow the Chief Judge to make such an assignment, they argued, violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution (Article II Section 2), which provides that Congress may "vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Freytag asserted that the "Courts of Law" referred to there were only Article III courts (Federal District Courts, Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, all of which have judges with lifetime tenure), and that the Chief Judge was part of an Article I court, meaning that Congress could not assign him the power of appointment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, affirming the Tax Court's decisions.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Does 26 U.S.C. 7443A(a) permit the assignment of particularly complex cases dealing with large amounts of money to "special trial judges" appointed by the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court, provided that the special trial judges do not enter the decision but simply prepare an opinion for review and adoption by a regular Tax Court judge? Under the Appointments Clause of Article II Section 2, may Congress permit the Chief Judge of the U.S. Tax Court to appoint "special trial judges" to "any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate"?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>90-762_19910423-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_762/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_90_762/argument/90-762_19910423-argument.mp3" length="14290137" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Frisby v. Schultz - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 20 Apr 1988 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>87-168_19880420-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_87_168/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_87_168/argument/87-168_19880420-argument.mp3" length="15278803" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 04 Oct 1989 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>87-2012_19891004-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_87_2012/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_87_2012/argument/87-2012_19891004-argument.mp3" length="14451786" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Garcetti v. Ceballos - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 12 Oct 2005 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Richard Ceballos, an employee of the Los Angeles District Attorney's office, found that a sheriff misrepresented facts in a search warrant affidavit. Ceballos notified the attorneys prosecuting the case stemming from that arrest and all agreed that the affidavit was questionable, but the D.A.'s office refused to dismiss the case. Ceballos then told the defense he believed the affidavit contained false statements, and defense counsel subpoenaed him to testify. Seeking damages in federal district court, Ceballos alleged that D.A.s in the office retaliated against him for his cooperation with the defense, which he argued was protected by the First Amendment. The district court ruled that the district attorneys were protected by qualified immunity, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled for Ceballos, holding that qualified immunity was not available to the defendants because Ceballos had been engaged in speech that addressed matters of public concern and was thus protected by the First Amendment.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Should a public employee's purely job-related speech, expressed strictly pursuant to the duties of employment, be protected by the First Amendment simply because it touched on a matter of public concern, or must the speech also be engaged in "as a citizen?"&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>04-473_20051012-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_04_473/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_04_473/argument/04-473_20051012-argument.mp3" length="15014373" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Garcetti v. Ceballos - Oral Reargument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 21 Mar 2006 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Richard Ceballos, an employee of the Los Angeles District Attorney's office, found that a sheriff misrepresented facts in a search warrant affidavit. Ceballos notified the attorneys prosecuting the case stemming from that arrest and all agreed that the affidavit was questionable, but the D.A.'s office refused to dismiss the case. Ceballos then told the defense he believed the affidavit contained false statements, and defense counsel subpoenaed him to testify. Seeking damages in federal district court, Ceballos alleged that D.A.s in the office retaliated against him for his cooperation with the defense, which he argued was protected by the First Amendment. The district court ruled that the district attorneys were protected by qualified immunity, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled for Ceballos, holding that qualified immunity was not available to the defendants because Ceballos had been engaged in speech that addressed matters of public concern and was thus protected by the First Amendment.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Should a public employee's purely job-related speech, expressed strictly pursuant to the duties of employment, be protected by the First Amendment simply because it touched on a matter of public concern, or must the speech also be engaged in "as a citizen?"&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>04-473_20060321-reargument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_04_473/reargument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_04_473/reargument/04-473_20060321-reargument.mp3" length="14932867" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 19 Mar 1984 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. SAMTA argued that it was providing a "traditional" governmental function, which exempted it from federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did principles of federalism make the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority immune from the Fair Labor Standards Act?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>82-1913_19840319-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_1913/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_1913/argument/82-1913_19840319-argument.mp3" length="14642706" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority - Oral Reargument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 01 Oct 1984 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. SAMTA argued that it was providing a "traditional" governmental function, which exempted it from federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did principles of federalism make the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority immune from the Fair Labor Standards Act?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>82-1913_19841001-reargument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_1913/reargument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_1913/reargument/82-1913_19841001-reargument.mp3" length="14411118" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Gentile v. State Bar Of Nevada - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 1991 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>89-1836_19910415-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_1836/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1990/1990_89_1836/argument/89-1836_19910415-argument.mp3" length="14256191" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 29 Mar 1982 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;A Massachusetts law required trial courts to exclude members of the press and public from certain cases involving sexual offenses and testimony of victims less than eighteen years old. In a trial involving a male who was accused of raping three minors, the court, acting in reference to the Massachusetts statute, conducted a closed trial.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the Massachusetts law violate the First Amendment's freedom of press guarantee as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>81-611_19820329-lq-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1981/1981_81_611/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1981/1981_81_611/argument/81-611_19820329-lq-argument.mp3" length="14987645" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Gomez v. United States - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 24 Apr 1989 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>88-5014_19890424-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_88_5014/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1988/1988_88_5014/argument/88-5014_19890424-argument.mp3" length="13766570" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Gonzaga University v. Doe - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 24 Apr 2002 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;A student at Gonzaga University planned to become a public elementary school teacher in Washington, which required all new teachers to obtain an affidavit of good moral character from their graduating colleges. Gonzaga's teacher certification specialist overheard one student tell another that the student had engaged in sexual misconduct, contacted the state agency responsible for teacher certification, and discussed the allegations, identifying the student by name. Ultimately, the student was told that he would not receive his certification affidavit. The student sued Gonzaga in state court, alleging a violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), which prohibits the federal funding of schools that have a policy or practice of permitting the release of students' education records without their parents' written consent. A jury awarded the student compensatory and punitive damages. Ultimately, the State Supreme Court acknowledged that FERPA does not give rise to a private cause of action, but reasoned that the nondisclosure provision creates a federal right that is enforceable.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;May a student sue a private university for damages to enforce provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>01-679_20020424-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_679/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_01_679/argument/01-679_20020424-argument.mp3" length="14195177" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
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       <item>
        <title>Good News Club v. Milford Central School - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 28 Feb 2001 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;Under New York law, Milford Central School policy authorizes district residents to use its building after school for certain activities. Stephen and Darleen Fournier were district residents eligible to use the school's facilities. They sought approval of their proposed use and sponsorship of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children. The Fourniers submitted a request to hold the Club's weekly afterschool meetings at the school. Milford denied the request reasoning that the proposed use, including singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture, and praying, was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. The Club filed suit alleging that the denial violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the District Court granted Milford summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that because the subject matter of the Club's was "quintessentially religious", and the activities "fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character development,'" Milford's policy of excluding the Club's meetings was constitutional subject discrimination, not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did Milford Central School violate the First Amendment free speech rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the Club from meeting after hours at the school? If a violation occurred, was it justified by Milford's concern that permitting the Club's activities would violate the Establishment Clause?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>99-2036_20010228-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_2036/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_2036/argument/99-2036_20010228-argument.mp3" length="14462924" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Gravel v. United States - Oral Argument, Part 1</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 19 Apr 1972 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1971, Senator Mike Gravel received a copy of the Pentagon Papers: a set of classified documents concerning U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. Gravel then introduced the study, in its entirety, into the record of a Senate Subcommittee meeting. Gravel also arranged for the private publication of the papers by the Beacon Press. A federal grand jury subpoenaed Leonard Rodberg, one of Gravel's aides, to testify about his role in the acquisition and publication of the papers.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the subpoena of Senator Gravel's aide violate the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I of the Constitution?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>71-1017_19720419-mq-argument-1</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_71_1017/argument-1/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_71_1017/argument-1/71-1017_19720419-mq-argument-1.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Gravel v. United States - Oral Argument, Part 2</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 19 Apr 1972 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>&lt;p&gt;In 1971, Senator Mike Gravel received a copy of the Pentagon Papers: a set of classified documents concerning U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. Gravel then introduced the study, in its entirety, into the record of a Senate Subcommittee meeting. Gravel also arranged for the private publication of the papers by the Beacon Press. A federal grand jury subpoenaed Leonard Rodberg, one of Gravel's aides, to testify about his role in the acquisition and publication of the papers.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
        <itunes:summary>&lt;p&gt;Did the subpoena of Senator Gravel's aide violate the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I of the Constitution?&lt;/p&gt;</itunes:summary>
        <guid>71-1017_19720420-mq-argument-2</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_71_1017/argument-2/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_71_1017/argument-2/71-1017_19720420-mq-argument-2.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Greer v. Spock - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Wed, 05 Nov 1975 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>74-848_19751105-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_848/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_848/argument/74-848_19751105-argument.mp3" length="15389248" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Griffin v. United States - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Mon, 07 Oct 1991 12:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
                <description>No details yet.</description>
        <itunes:summary>No details yet.</itunes:summary>
        <guid>90-6352_19911007-argument</guid>
        <link>http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_6352/argument/</link>
        <enclosure url="http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_90_6352/argument/90-6352_19911007-argument.mp3" length="13036316" type="audio/mpeg"/>
        
        <itunes:keywords>supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist</itunes:keywords>
       </item>
      
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
     
      
       <item>
        <title>Hartman v. Moore - Oral Argument</title>
        <pubDate>Tue, 10 Jan 