http://www.oyez.org/issues/judicial-power/venue/ U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_1481/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_779/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1977/1977_76_398/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1959/1959_229/ <p>Do the venue provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act limit motions to confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitration award to the district where the award was made?</p><p>No. In an unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the "FAA's venue provisions are permissive, allowing a motion to confirm, vacate, or modify to be brought either in the district where the award was made or in any district proper under the general venue statute." Writing for the Court, Justice Souter reasoned that because both the history and function of the FAA's venue provisions dictate that they were meant to expand, not limit, venue choice, it was appropriate for Cortez Byrd to seek to vacate the arbitrator's award in federal court in Mississippi.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_1960/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1966/1966_794/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_386/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_1512/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1956/1956_310/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1961/1961_101/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1959/1959_25/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1978/1978_78_759/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1961/1961_14_2/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_32/ <p>Does the possibility of an unfavorable change in law bar dismissal under <i>forum non conveniens</i>?</p><p>Yes. In a 7-3 majority opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that the District Court properly weighed private and public interests using the <i>Gulf Oil v. Gilbert</i> test to determine that the trial should be held in Scotland. The possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry. Justices Lewis Powell and Sandra Day o"Connor did not participate.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1981/1981_80_848/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_113/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1965/1965_692/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_75_268/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_219/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1962/1962_46/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1978/1978_77_1546/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_1908/ <p>May a defendant in a federal money-laundering case in which all the transactions occurred in one state be prosecuted in a second state?</p><p>No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Missouri is not a place of proper venue for the money-laundering offenses with which Cabrales is charged. Rejecting the Government's "continuing offense" argument, under which Cabrales would have been triable in more than one place, the Court noted that the laundering transactions occurred only in Florida, making venue in Missouri improper. The Court also reasoned that if the Government could link Cabrales to the drug-trafficking activity, then she could be prosecuted for those violations in Missouri with her money laundering in Florida shown as overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_643/ <p>Is the venue for prosecuting a violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1), which proscribes using or carrying a firearm "during and in relation to any crime of violence," proper only in the district were the firearm was used or carried?</p><p>No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "[v]enue in a prosecution for using or carrying a firearm 'during and in relation to any crime of violence' in violation of section 924(c)(1) is proper in any district where the crime of violence was committed." Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "A kidnapping...does not end until the victim is free. It does not make sense...to speak of it in discrete geographic fragments....[I]t does not matter that respondent used the revolver...only in Maryland because he did so 'during and in relation to' a kidnaping that was begun in Texas and continued in New York, New Jersey, and Maryland." Justice Antonin Scalia, with joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, dissented, expressing the view that the crime defined in 924(c)(1) could be "committed only where the defendant both engages in the acts making up the predicate offense and uses or carries the gun." Moreover, Justice Scalia argued, because the accused's use of the gun occurred only in Maryland, venue was proper only there.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1998/1998_97_1139/ <p>No details yet.</p> http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1963/1963_56/