http://www.oyez.org/issues/judicial-power/personal-injury/ U.S. Supreme Court Oral Arguments, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) en-us http://www.oyez.org/images/oyezfeed.jpg U.S. Supreme Court Audio Recordings, presented by The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) Wed, 29 Feb 1984 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In an effort to curb racially discriminatory practices in private schools, the Internal Revenue Code denies tax-exempt status to schools which promote such practices. The Code also prohibits individuals from making tax-deductible donations to private schools which racially discriminate. Inez Wright and others filed a nationwide class action suit arguing that the IRS had not fulfilled its obligations in enforcing these provisions of the Code, and thus, that government was subsidizing and encouraging the expansion of segregated education in private schools. This case was decided together with Reagan v. Wright.</p> <p>Did the IRS shirk its enforcement duties and encourage private schools to racially discriminate, thus, harming desegregation efforts in the nation's public schools?</p> 81-757_19840229-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_81_757/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 25 Mar 1986 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 84-1777_19860325-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1777/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 05 Oct 1976 12:00:00 -0500 <p>An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of 18 and 21, and a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory.</p> <p>Did an Oklahoma statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by establishing different drinking ages for men and women?</p> 75-628_19761005-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1976/1976_75_628/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 05 Nov 1985 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 84-1379_19851105-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1379/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 17 Nov 1971 12:00:00 -0500 <p>William Baird gave away Emko Vaginal Foam to a woman following his Boston University lecture on birth control and over-population. Massachusetts charged Baird with a felony, to distribute contraceptives to unmarried men or women. Under the law, only married couples could obtain contraceptives; only registered doctors or pharmacists could provide them. Baird was not an authorized distributor of contraceptives.</p> <p>Did the Massachusetts law violate the right to privacy acknowledged in Griswold v. Connecticut and protected from state instrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment?</p> 70-17_19711117-lq-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_17/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 24 Mar 2004 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Michael Newdow's daughter attended public school in the Elk Grove Unified School District in California. Elk Grove teachers began school days by leading students in a voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including the words "under God" added by a 1954 Congressional act. Newdow sued in federal district court in California, arguing that making students listen - even if they choose not to participate - to the words "under God" violates the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment.</p> <p>The district court dismissed Newdow's complaint for lack of standing, because he and the mother of his daughter are divorced and he does not have custody. The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Newdow did have standing "to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct the religious education of his daughter." The Ninth Circuit ruled that Congress's 1954 act adding the words "under God" to the Pledge and the school district policy requiring it be recited both violated the First Amendment's establishment clause.</p> <p>Does Michael Newdow have standing to challenge as unconstitutional a public school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance? Does a public school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes the words "under God," violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?</p> 02-1624_20040324-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_1624/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist <p>Michael Newdow's daughter attended public school in the Elk Grove Unified School District in California. Elk Grove teachers began school days by leading students in a voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including the words "under God" added by a 1954 Congressional act. Newdow sued in federal district court in California, arguing that making students listen - even if they choose not to participate - to the words "under God" violates the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment.</p> <p>The district court dismissed Newdow's complaint for lack of standing, because he and the mother of his daughter are divorced and he does not have custody. The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Newdow did have standing "to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct the religious education of his daughter." The Ninth Circuit ruled that Congress's 1954 act adding the words "under God" to the Pledge and the school district policy requiring it be recited both violated the First Amendment's establishment clause.</p> <p>Does Michael Newdow have standing to challenge as unconstitutional a public school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance? Does a public school district policy that requires teachers to lead willing students in reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes the words "under God," violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?</p> newdow-05-2004 http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_1624/mediafile.2006-09-04.4708353336/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 29 Mar 1965 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Both she and the Medical Director for the League gave information, instruction, and other medical advice to married couples concerning birth control. Griswold and her colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized the provision of counselling, and other medical treatment, to married persons for purposes of preventing conception.</p> <p>Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives?</p> 496_19650329-argument-1 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1964/1964_496/argument-1/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 29 Mar 1965 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Both she and the Medical Director for the League gave information, instruction, and other medical advice to married couples concerning birth control. Griswold and her colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized the provision of counselling, and other medical treatment, to married persons for purposes of preventing conception.</p> <p>Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives?</p> 496_19650330-argument-2 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1964/1964_496/argument-2/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 06 Oct 1987 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 85-1551_19871006-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_85_1551/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 04 Oct 2004 12:00:00 -0500 <p>A 1994 amendment to the Michigan constitution said criminal defendants who pled guilty had no right to appeal and could appeal only with the permission of a state appellate court. Michigan then enacted a law that said in most cases judges could not appoint appellate lawyers for indigent defendants who pled guilty. Two criminal attorneys and three indigent defendants who were denied appointed appellate lawyers filed a single suit alleging the state law violated the 14th Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The district court ruled that the indigents had standing to sue and that the lawyers who sued with them had the right to sue as third-party representatives of the rights of indigents. A federal appellate court agreed the statute was unconstitutional, but based this only on the lawyers' claims. The court said the U.S. Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris required it to abstain from hearing the indigents' claims because the indigents were involved in related proceedings in state court.</p> <p>(1) Does the 14th Amendment guarantee an indigent criminal defendant convicted by a guilty plea the right to an appointed appellate attorney in a discretionary first appeal? (2) Do attorneys have third-party standing on behalf of potential indigent defendants to make a constitutional challenge to a state statute prohibiting appointment of appellate counsel in discretionary first appeals following convictions by guilty pleas?</p> 03-407_20041004-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_407/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 02 Nov 1982 12:00:00 -0500 <p>In 1976, police officers of the City of Los Angeles stopped Adolph Lyons for a traffic code violation. Although Lyons offered no resistance, the officers, without provocation, seized Lyons and applied a chokehold. The hold rendered Lyons unconscious and damaged his larynx. Along with damages against the officers, Lyons sought an injunction against the City barring the use of such control holds.</p> <p>Did Lyons's injunction against the use of police chokeholds meet the threshold requirements imposed by Article III of the Constitution?</p> 81-1064_19821102-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_81_1064/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 16 Apr 1990 12:00:00 -0500 <p>The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) challenged 1,250 land-use designations made by the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM). NWF filed suit under section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming that the actions were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." NWF argued that it had standing to sue because two of its members used public lands "in the vicinity" of lands affected by the BLM's decisions (four other members submitted affidavits claiming that they, too, used lands close to affected areas, but the District Court ruled that the affidavits had been submitted too late).</p> <p>The BLM challenged the NWF's right to sue, and the District Court agreed. It found that the two affidavits filed in a timely manner did not show that the members had been sufficiently affected to have standing to sue. Furthermore, the court ruled that even if they had had standing to challenge those specific BLM decisions, they would not have had standing to challenge all 1,250.</p> <p>On appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the initial two affidavits were enough to give them standing to challenge all 1,250 decisions. Moreover, the Court ruled that the District Court had abused its discretion by refusing to consider the additional four affidavits.</p> <p>Does an organization representing private citizens who use public land "in the vicinity" of areas affected by Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land-use designations have standing to challenge those designations under section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act? Does standing to challenge several individual BLM decision confer standing to challenge those decisions as a whole, even when the organization's members are not affected by the bulk of the decisions?</p> 89-640_19900416-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_89_640/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 28 Feb 1972 12:00:00 -0500 <p>K. Leroy Irvis, a black man who was a guest of a white member of the Moose Lodge No. 107, was refused service at the club's dining room because of his race. The bylaws of the Lodge limited membership to white male Caucasians. Irvis challenged the club's refusal to serve him, arguing that the action of the Pennsylvania liquor board issuing the Lodge a license made the club's discrimination "state action."</p> <p>Did the discriminatory practices violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?</p> 70-75_19720228-lq-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_75/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 15 Jan 1958 12:00:00 -0500 <p>As part of its strategy to enjoin the NAACP from operating, Alabama required it to reveal to the State's Attorney General the names and addresses of all the NAACP's members and agents in the state.</p> <p>Did Alabama's requirement violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?</p> 91_19580115-lq-argument-1 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1957/1957_91/argument-1/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 15 Jan 1958 12:00:00 -0500 <p>As part of its strategy to enjoin the NAACP from operating, Alabama required it to reveal to the State's Attorney General the names and addresses of all the NAACP's members and agents in the state.</p> <p>Did Alabama's requirement violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?</p> 91_19580116-lq-argument-2 http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1957/1957_91/argument-2/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 27 May 1997 12:00:00 -0500 <p>Several individual members of the 104th Congress, who voted against the passage of the Line Item Veto Act (Act) giving the President authority to veto individual tax and spending measures after having signed them into law, sued to challenge the Act's constitutionality. After granting them standing, the District Court ruled in the congressmen's favor as it found the Act unconstitutional. Direct appeal was granted to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Did the congressmen have Article III standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act as a violation of the Presentment Clause in Article I?</p> 96-1671_19970527-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_96_1671/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Tue, 23 Mar 1976 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 74-1393_19760323-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1975/1975_74_1393/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 19 Apr 1995 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 94-558_19950419-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_558/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Wed, 10 Jan 1990 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 88-7146_19900110-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_7146/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist Mon, 04 Nov 1991 12:00:00 -0500 No details yet. No details yet. 112orig_19911104-argument http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_112_orig/argument/ supreme, court, oyez, rehnquist