The Oyez Project: Judicial Power Issues - Mootness

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater

In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand I)(512 U.S. 200 (1995)), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT) use of race-based measures is subject to strict scrutiny. On remand, the District Court held that the Subcontractor Compensation Clause required by the Small Business Act, which rewards prime contractors for subcontracting with disadvantaged business enterprises, and its race-based presumption, failed strict scrutiny because they were not narrowly tailored (Adarand II). After Adarand II, Colorado altered its disadvantaged business enterprise status certification procedure. Under the new procedures, Adarand Constructors, Inc. requested and received disadvantaged-business status from the Colorado DOT (CDOT). Upon learning that CDOT had given Adarand disadvantaged-business status, the Court of Appeals held that Adarand's cause of action was moot and vacated the District Court's judgment in Adarand II.

Aikens v. California

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American Foreign Service Assn. v. Garfinkel

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Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona

Maria Kelly F. Yniguez, an Arizona state employee, sued the state and various state officials alleging provisions of the state constitution, which declare English "the official language of the State," and allow state residents and businesses to bring suit to enforce the article, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Yniguez used both English and Spanish in her work and feared that the article would require her to face discharge or other discipline if she did not refrain from speaking Spanish while serving the state. The District Court dismissed the case against the state because of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, but held the article on English unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals accepted the case after Yniguez resigned and ultimately affirmed the District Court's ruling that the article violated the Free Speech Clause and announced that Yniguez was entitled to damages from the state.

Black v. Amen

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Bowen v. Kizer

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Brotherhood Of Railroad Trainmen v. O'connell

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Burke v. Barnes

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Cardinal Chemical v. Morton International

Acting upon a belief that Cardinal Chemical ("Cardinal") violated two of its patents on chemical compounds used in polyvinyl chloride, Morton International ("Morton") challenged Cardinal's actions in a South Carolina District Court. Cardinal counterclaimed that Morton's patents were invalid. The District Court ruled that although none of Morton's patents were violated, they were both invalid. Morton appealed to the Federal Circuit Court which sustained the lower courts infringement finding but issued a per se reversal of its determination as to the validity of Morton's patents based on a practice dating back to 1987. Cardinal appealed the per se rejection of its validity counterclaim and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Church Of Scientology Of California v. United States

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City News & Novelty v. Waukesha

The City of Waukesha, Wisconsin requires sellers of sexually explicit materials to obtain and annually renew adult business licenses. City News and Novelty, Inc. (City News), owned and operated an adult-oriented shop in Waukesha. City News had first obtained a license in 1989. In 1995, City News applied for a renewal of its license. Waukesha's Common Council denied the application. The Council found that City News had violated Waukesha ordinances by permitting minors to loiter on the premises, failing to maintain an unobstructed view of booths in the store, and allowing patrons to engage in sexual activity inside the booths. Waukesha's refusal to renew City News's license was upheld in administrative proceedings and on judicial review in the state courts. Among other questions raised in its petition for certiorari, City News asked the Court to "resolve...whether the guarantee of prompt judicial review that must accompany [an adult business] licensing scheme means a prompt judicial determination or simply the right to promptly file for judicial review."

DeFunis v. Odegaard

DeFunis was denied admission to the University of Washington Law School despite test scores that were higher than some of the minorities admitted. DeFunis then successfully asked a trial court to require the school to admit him. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, upholding the school's decision to deny DeFunis admission. The U.S. Supreme Court considered the case as DeFunis was entering his final year of school.

Department Of Treasury v. Galioto

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Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church

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Edwards v. Healy

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Epa v. Brown

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Erie v. Pap's A. M.

"Kandyland," operated by Pap's A. M. in Erie PA, featured totally nude female erotic dancing. The city council enacted an ordinance making it an offense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a "state of nudity," To comply with the ordinance, dancers had to wear, at a minimum, "pasties" and a "G-string." Pap's filed suit against Erie, seeking a permanent injunction against the ordinance's enforcement. The Court of Common Pleas struck down the ordinance as unconstitutional, but the Commonwealth Court reversed. In reversing, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the ordinance's public nudity sections violated Pap's right to freedom of expression as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court explained that, although one purpose of the ordinance was to combat negative secondary effects, there was also an unmentioned purpose to "impact negatively on the erotic message of the dance." Additionally, because the ordinance was not content neutral, the court subjected it to strict scrutiny and found that it failed the narrow tailoring requirement of such a test. After the U.S Supreme Court granted certiorari, Pap's filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot, noting that Kandyland no longer operated as a nude dancing club, and that Pap's did not operate such a club at any other location. The Court denied the motion.

Firefighters v. Boston Chapter, NAACP

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Foley v. Blair & Co.

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Frank v. Minnesota Newspaper Assn., Inc.

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Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services

After Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. bought a wastewater treatment plant, it was granted a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The permit authorized Laidlaw to discharge treated water and limited pollutants. Laidlaw's discharge of mercury into the North Tyger River repeatedly exceeded the limits set by the permit. Ultimately, Friends of the Earth and others (FOE) filed a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act against Laidlaw, alleging noncompliance with the NPDES permit, seeking injunctive relief and an award of civil penalties. Laidlaw moved for summary judgement on the ground that FOE lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. The District Court denied the motion. Ultimately, the District Court found that Laidlaw violated the mercury discharge limitation. In issuing its judgment, the District Court concluded that a civil penalty of $405,800 would be adequate to forestall future violations, given that Laidlaw would have to reimburse the plaintiffs for a significant amount of legal fees and had itself incurred significant legal expenses. The court declined to order injunctive relief because Laidlaw, after the lawsuit began, had achieved substantial compliance with the terms of its permit. FOE appealed to the amount of the District Court's civil penalty judgment, but did not appeal the denial of declaratory or injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals ordered the case to be dismissed. The appellate court held that the case had become moot once Laidlaw complied with the terms of its permit. The court reasoned that the only remedy currently available to FOE, civil penalties payable to the Government, would not redress any injury FOE had suffered.

Indiana Employment Division v. Burney

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Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs

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Johnson v. New York State Education Dept.

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Kremens v. Bartley

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Lake Coal Co., Inc. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co.

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Lane v. Williams

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Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.

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Mechling Barge Lines v. U.S.

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Mosley v. United States

In 1995, Sylvester Mosley was arrested after robbing two banks in eleven days. At the first bank, Mosley displayed a "HOLD UP" sign and asked the teller "Can I have all your money?" At the second bank, Mosley told the teller "This is a holdup, open your bottom draw and give me all your big bills." Because he merely asked for the money, Mosley asked the trial judge to instruct the jury that it could find him guilty of larceny as a lesser-included offense of robbery. Mosley argued that the federal bank robbery statute, 18 USC 2113(a), requires that the robber take the money "by force or violence, or intimidation." The court denied the motion, finding that Mosley had intimated the tellers. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that larceny could not be considered a lesser offense of robbery because an element of larceny is intent and intent is not contained in the robbery definition.

Murphy v. Hunt

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North Carolina v. Rice

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Northeastern Florida Chapter Of The Associated General Contractors Of America v. City Of Jacksonville, Florida

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Noyd v. Bond

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Oil Workers Unions v. Missouri

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Patterson v. Warner

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Preiser v. Newkirk

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Publishers' Assn. v. Mailers' Union

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Sanks v. Georgia

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Scott v. Kentucky Parole Board

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Sears, Roebuck v. Carpet Layers

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SEC v. Medical Committee For Human Rights

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Sibron v. New York

After following Nelson Sibron for several hours, and observing him talking with several narcotics addicts, NYC police officer Anthony Martinez stopped Sibron and questioned him. When Martinez said: "You know what I am after," Sibron began reaching into his pocket. Simultaneously, Martinez thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket and pulled out several heroin envelopes. Following his arrest for drug trafficking, Sibron sought to suppress the heroin evidence as the product of an unconstitutional stop-and-frisk search. When the Criminal Court of New York City denied his motion, Sibron appealed but suffered adverse rulings in the New York State appellate courts. On appeal, the US Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard Sibron's case together with a related case, Peters v. New York. John Peters appealed his arrest and conviction for intent to commit burglary after a stop-and-frisk search of his person revealed burglary tools.

Spencer v. Kemna

In 1990, Randy G. Spencer began serving concurrent three-year sentences for convictions of felony stealing and burglary. In 1992, Spencer was released, but later that year his parole was revoked and he was returned to prison. Seeking to invalidate his parole revocation, Spencer filed unsuccessful habeas petitions in state court. Spencer then filed a federal habeas petition, alleging that he had not received due process in the parole revocation proceedings. In 1993, Spencer was re-released on parole before the District Court addressed the merits of his habeas petition. Subsequently, the court dismissed Spencer's petition as moot. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Spomer v. Littleton

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Super Tire Engineering Co. v. Mccorkle

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Tiverton Bd. Of License Comm'rs v. Pastore

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United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company Of Virginia 516 U.S. 415

To prevent "local media monopolies," Section 533(b) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 barred local phone service providers (local exchange carriers or LECs) from directly providing video programming to their local phone service subscribers. The government claimed that because LEC-controlled phone lines could also transmit video signals, allowing LECs to provide video programming would hurt competing cable companies. First, LECs could deny competitors access to their data lines. Second, LECs could offer lower cable prices than competitors by raising the costs of telephone service and using the extra profits to subsidize the costs of cable service.

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia (Chesapeake) challenged the constitutionality of the statute, pointing out that "video programming" is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. The government argued that the statute's regulation of the cable market had a "content-neutral" objective. The District Court ruled that the statute's restrictions were not "narrowly tailored" to serve the statute's objective. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, adding that the statute did not leave open "ample alternative channels for communication" between LECs and local residents. The Supreme Court consolidated the case with National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp.

United States v. Green

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United States v. Koecher

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United States v. N. J. State Lottery Comm'n

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University Of Texas v. Camenisch

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Vitek v. Jones

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