The Oyez Project: Judicial Power Issues - Justiciable Question Decisions

Anderson, Director, California Department Of Social Services v. Green

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Calderon v. Ashmus

Are state prisoners' challenges of the applicability of Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 to their respective states, separate from a federal habeas corpus petition challenging their state court prosecution, an Article III "case or controversy" to which federal courts are limited?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "this action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief is not a justiciable case within the meaning of Article III." "If the class members file habeas petitions, and the State asserts Chapter 154, the members obviously can litigate California's compliance with Chapter 154 at that time. Any risk associated with resolving the question in habeas, rather than a pre-emptive suit, is no different from risks associated with choices commonly faced by litigants," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice David H. Souter joined.

Davis v. Bandemer

Did Indiana's 1981 state apportionment violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

No. The Court held that while the apportionment law may have had a discriminatory effect on the Democrats, that effect was not "sufficiently adverse" to violate the Equal Protection Clause. The mere lack of proportional representation did not unconstitutionally diminish the Democrats' electoral power. The Court also ruled that political gerrymandering claims were properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, noting that judicially manageable standards could be discerned and applied in such cases.

Gilligan v. Morgan

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Goldwater v. Carter

Did Congress have a constitutional role to play in the termination of the treaty?

Without oral argument ,the divided justices found that the case was not justiciable. Rehnquist led a group of four others who believed that the issue involved a political question, namely, how the President and Congress would conduct the nation's foreign affairs. Justice Powell did not find the case ripe for judicial review. He reasoned that since Congress had not formally challenged Carter's authority, technically there was no conflict for the Court to resolve. The dissenters were prepared to hear the case.

National Park Hospitality Assn. v. Dept. of the Interior

Does the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 apply to contracts between the National Park Service and concessioners in the national parks?

The Court did not answer the question. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the controversy was not yet ripe for judicial resolution. The Court reasoned that, because the NPS has no delegated rulemaking authority under the CDA, 51.3 is nothing more than a general policy statement designed to inform the public of NPS's views on the CDA's proper application and thus the National Park Hospitality Association's challenge was a facial one. Given the absence of a concrete dispute, the Court asked the parties provide supplemental briefing on whether the case was ripe for judicial action. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, dissented.

Nixon v. United States

Is Nixon's claim -- that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause -- justiciable, i.e., appropriate for judicial resolution?

No. A unanimous Court held that the question of whether or not the Senate rule violated the U.S. Constitution was nonjusticiable since the Impeachment clause expressly granted that the "Senate shall have sole Power to try any impeachments." The clause laid out specific regulations that were to be followed and as long as those guidelines were observed the courts would not rule upon the validity of other Senate procedures regarding impeachments. Chief Justice William Rehnquist observed that while the Supreme Court was the "ultimate intrepreter of the Constitution," a matter would be deemed nonjusticiable when there was "a constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department."

Ohio Forestry Association, Inc.v. Sierra Club

Does the United States Forest Service's Land and Resource Management Plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest present a controversy that is justiciable? If so, does the Plan conform to statutory and regulatory requirements for a forest plan?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the controversy is not yet ripe for judicial review. Justice Breyer wore for the Court that "'withhold court consideration' at present will not cause the parties significant 'hardship.'" "[B]efore the Forest Service can permit logging, it must focus upon a particular site, propose a specific harvesting method, prepare an environmental review, permit the public an opportunity to be heard, and (if challenged) justify the proposal in court," continued Justice Breyer, "[t]he Sierra Club thus will have ample opportunity later to bring its legal challenge at a time when harm is more imminent and more certain."

Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc.

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Poe v. Ullman

Did the Connecticut law violate liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment?

The Court chose to dismiss the case because it involved the threatened and not actual application of the Connecticut law. Since the statute had been on the state's books for over three-quarters of a century without ever having been enforced, the Court found no sense of "immediacy which is an indispensable condition of constitutional adjudication."

Powell v. McCormack

May the House of Representatives exclude a duly elected member if the member has satisfied the standing requirements of age, citizenship and residence as articulated in Article I Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution?

No. The Court noted that the proceedings against Powell were intended to exclude and not expel him from the chamber. That is an important distinction to recognize since the House does have the power under Article I, Section 5 to expel members. However, expulsion was not the purpose of the proceedings in this case. After analyzing the Framers' debates on this issue, Chief Justice Warren concluded that since Powell had been lawfully elected by his constituents and since he met the constitutional requirements for membership in the House, that the chamber was powerless to exclude him.

Reynolds v. Sims

Did Alabama's apportionment scheme violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by mandating at least one representative per county and creating as many senatorial districts as there were senators, regardless of population variances?

In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court upheld the challenge to the Alabama system, holding that Equal Protection Clause demanded "no less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens...." Noting that the right to direct representation was "a bedrock of our political system," the Court held that both houses of bicameral state legislatures had to be apportioned on a population basis. States were required to "honest and good faith" efforts to construct districts as nearly of equal population as practicable.

Vieth v. Jubelirer

Can voters affiliated with a political party sue to block implementation of a Congressional redistricting plan by claiming that it was manipulated for purely political reasons? Does a state violate the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment when it disregards neutral redistricting principles (such as trying to avoid splitting municipalities into different Congressional districts) in order to achieve an advantage for one political party? Does a state exceed its power under Article I of the Constitution when it draws Congressional districts to ensure that a minority party will consistently win a super-majority of the state's Congressional seats?

In a split decision that had no majority opinion, the Court decided not to intervene in this case because no appropriate judicial solution could be found. Justice Antonin Scalia, for a four-member plurality, wrote that the Court should declare all claims related to political (but not racial) gerrymandering nonjusticiable, meaning that courts could not hear them. Because no court had been able to find an appropriate remedy to political gerrymandering claims in the 18 years since the Court decided Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, which had held that such a remedy had not been found yet but might exist, Scalia wrote that it was time to recognize that the solution simply did not exist.

Justice Anthony Kennedy, however, wrote in his concurring opinion (which provided the deciding fifth vote for the judgment) that the Court should rule narrowly in this case that no appropriate judicial solution could be found, but not give up on finding one eventually.

Wesberry v. Sanders

Did Georgia's congressional districts violate the Fourteenth Amendment or deprive citizens of the full benefit of their right to vote?

The Court held that Georgia's apportionment scheme grossly discriminated against voters in the Fifth Congressional District. Because a single congressman had to represent two to three times as many people as were represented by congressmen in other districts, the Georgia statute contracted the value of some votes and expanded the value of others. The Court recognized that "no right is more precious" than that of having a voice in elections and held that "[t]o say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected 'by the People. . .'"