The Oyez Project: Judicial Power Issues - Judicial Review

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner

No details yet.

ABF Freight System, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

After employee Michael Manson gave a false excuse for being late to work, ABF Freight System, Inc. (ABF) fired him for tardiness. Manson repeated his false excuse while under oath at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, during which he argued that ABF had fired him in retaliation for his previous union activities. The National Labor Relations Board reversed the judge, ruling that ABF had used Manson's tardiness as a pretext to fire him. The Board reinstated him with backpay.

ABF appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, claiming that the Board could not reinstate an employee who lied under oath. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the Board could determine whether or not to pardon Manson for giving a false excuse.

All States Frgt. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co.

No details yet.

Aluminum Co. v. Central Lincoln Util. Dist.

No details yet.

American Airlines v. North American

No details yet.

American Trucking v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co.

No details yet.

Atlantic Rfg. Co. v. Ftc.

No details yet.

Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Under federal law, the Tax Court could appoint special trial judges to hear certain cases and to make recommendations to the Tax Court. The Tax Court judge, under Tax Rule 183(b), had to presume the special judge's fact findings to be correct, but could make the ultimate decision in the case. The special trail judge reports were made public and included in the record on appeal. Only after a rule revision in 1983 did the Tax Court stop making such reports public and exclude them from the appellate record. Whether the final Tax Court's decision deviated from the special judge's recommendations was kept secret. Tax Court Judge Howard Dawson ruled that Kanter was guilty of tax fraud and of illegally diverting money to Claude Ballard, a business associate. In his opinion, Dawson claimed to have adopted the opinion of the special trial judge. Ballard and Kanter separately appealed, objecting to the absence of the special trial judge's report from the appellate record. Two federal appellate courts ruled against Kanter and Ballard.

Bethesda Hospital Assn. v. Bowen

No details yet.

Block v. Community Nutrition Institute

No details yet.

Board Of Governors, Frs v. Dimension Financial

No details yet.

Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital

No details yet.

Bowen v. Mich. Academy Of Family Physicians

No details yet.

Bowsher v. Merck & Co.

No details yet.

Brock v. Pierce County

No details yet.

Burlington Northern Inc. v. United States

No details yet.

Burlington Truck Lines v. U.S.

No details yet.

Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co.

No details yet.

Califano v. Sanders

No details yet.

Canada Packers v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co.

No details yet.

Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co.

No details yet.

City Of Chicago v. United States

No details yet.

Civil Aeronautics Board v. Hermann

No details yet.

Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor

No details yet.

Conley v. Gibson

No details yet.

Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n

No details yet.

Dalton, Secretary Of The Navy v. Specter

No details yet.

Dickinson v. Zurko

Mary E. Zurko, and others, applied for a patent upon a method for increasing computer security. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) patent examiner concluded that Zurko's method was obvious in light of prior art and, therefore, denied the application. The PTO's review board, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, upheld the examiner's decision. Zurko sought review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In reviewing PTO's decision to deny Zurko's patent application, the Federal Circuit analyzed the PTO's factual finding using a "clearly erroneous" standard of review, which generally governs appellate review of district court findings of fact (court/court review), rather than the less stringent standards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which permit a court to set aside agency findings of fact found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence. The court found the PTO's factual finding to be clearly erroneous. The Federal Circuit then heard the matter en banc. After examining relevant precedents, the en banc court concluded that its use of the stricter court/court standard was legally proper. The Solicitor General, representing the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Q. Todd Dickinson, sought certiorari.

Dole v. United Steel Workers of America

No details yet.

Dunlop v. Bachowski

No details yet.

Etsi Pipeline Project v. Missouri

No details yet.

FCC v. Schreiber

No details yet.

Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exch.

No details yet.

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion

No details yet.

Fmc v. Svenska Amerika Linien

No details yet.

FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.

No details yet.

Franklin v. Massachusetts

Under Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution, a census must be conducted every ten years and the distribution of Representatives in Congress adjusted to provide proportional representation. The census is designed and carried out by the Secretary of Commerce before the results are forwarded to the President, who determines the number of Representatives each state will receive. In 1990, for only the second time since 1900, the census allocated employees of the Department of Defense who were stationed oversees to the states designated their "homes of record." Massachusetts claimed that this adjustment of the census shifted one Representative from Massachusetts to Washington state. They brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Constitution, arguing that the allocation of overseas personnel to their "homes of record" was arbitrary and capricious under the APA standards and did not meet the constitutional requirement of counting the number of people "in each State."

Frozen Food Exp. v. United States

No details yet.

Ftc v. Flotill Products

No details yet.

Ftc v. Mary Carter Paint Co.

No details yet.

Ftc v. Standard Oil Co. Of Cal.

No details yet.

Ftc v. Universal-Rundle Corp.

No details yet.

Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn.

No details yet.

Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services

No details yet.

Gunther v. San Diego & A. E. R. Co.

No details yet.

Gutierrez De Martinez v. Lamagno

No details yet.

Heckler v. Chaney

Several prison inmates convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death by lethal injection petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) alleging that the drugs to be used for their executions were not approved for use in human executions and therefore violated the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). When the FDA denied enforcement, the inmates brought suit claiming violations of the FDCA and requesting that the FDA be required to take enforcement actions. The district court granted summary judgment to the FDA holding that decisions declining to initiate enforcement proceedings were not judicially reviewable. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that the decision not to begin an enforcement action was judicially reviewable under 5 U.S.C. Section 701(a)(2) and an abuse of discretion.

Hotel Employees v. Leedom

No details yet.

Icc v. Locomotive Engineers

No details yet.

Illinois C. R. Co. v. Norfolk & W. R. Co.

No details yet.

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Transcon Lines

No details yet.

Kleppe v. Delta Mining, Inc.

No details yet.

Labor Board v. Duval Jewelry Co.

No details yet.

Labor Board v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp.

No details yet.

Leedom v. International Union

No details yet.

Leedom v. Kyne

No details yet.

Lehigh Valley Coop. v. United States

No details yet.

Lewis v. Labor Board

No details yet.

Lincoln, Acting Director, Indian Health Service v. Vigil

No details yet.

Lindahl v. Opm

No details yet.

Maislin Industries, US, Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc.

No details yet.

Marine Terminal v. Rederi. Transatlantic

No details yet.

Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild

Naomi Marquez, part-time actress, auditioned successfully for a role in a television series produced by Lakeside Pictures. Pursuant to their collective bargaining agreement, Lakeside contacted the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) to confirm that Marquez met the "union security clause" of the agreement that requires union "membership" as a condition for employment. The clause stated one must be a member "in good standing." Subsequently, Marquez was denied the part because she had not paid her dues. Marquez filed suit alleging SAG breached its duty of fair representation with its union security clause. First, Marquez argued she should have been made aware of her established legal right not to join the union, but only to pay for its representational activities. Second, Marquez claimed that the clause required repetitious thirty-day previous work periods every time motion picture employment ceased. The District Court summarily ruled against Marquez because the clause followed the National Labor Relations Act; therefore, it did not breach its duty of fair representation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on the first claim, but held the second claim was in the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.

Mcnary v. Haitian Refugee Center., Inc.

No details yet.

Meat Cutters v. Labor Board

No details yet.

Mobil Oil Exploration v. United Distribution

No details yet.

Moog Industries, Inc., v. F. T. C.

No details yet.

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut.

No details yet.

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines

No details yet.

National Assn. Of Greeting Card Pubs. v. Usps

No details yet.

National Cable and Telecom. Assoc. v. Gulf Power

The Pole Attachments Act requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to set reasonable rates, terms, and conditions for certain attachments to telephone and electric poles. A pole attachment includes "any attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service to a [utility's] pole, conduit, or right-of-way." After the FCC issued an order that interpreted the Act to cover pole attachments for commingled high-speed Internet and traditional cable television services and attachments by wireless telecommunications providers, pole-owning utilities challenged the order. Reversing both of the FCC's positions, the Court of Appeals held that commingled services are not covered by either of the Act's two specific rate formulas and, thus, were not covered by the Act. Additionally, the appellate court held that the Act does not give the FCC authority to regulate wireless communications.

National Cable and Telecomm. Assn v. Brand X Internet Services

Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, which was amended in 1996, subjected providers of "telecommunications service" to mandatory common-carrier regulation. The FCC concluded that this did not include broadband cable companies. The Ninth Circuit reversed and cited its own previous opinion that had held that cable modem service was a "telecommunications service."

National Cable Television Assn. v. U.S.

No details yet.

National Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe

No details yet.

Nationsbank Of North Carolina, N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.

No details yet.

Nelson, Inc., v. United States

No details yet.

New Haven Inclusion Cases

No details yet.

New York v. FERC

In 1935, when the Federal Power Act (FPA) became law, most electric utilities operated as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local regulation and their sales were bundled, meaning that consumers paid a single charge for both the cost of the electricity and the cost of its delivery. Section 201(b) of the FPA provides the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with jurisdiction over "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce" and section 205 prohibits unreasonable rates and undue discrimination "with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the [Commission's] jurisdiction." Currently, public utilities still retain ownership of the transmission lines that their competitors must use to deliver electricity to wholesale and retail customers and thus can refuse to deliver their competitors' energy or deliver that power on terms and conditions less favorable than those they apply to their own transmissions. In Order No. 888, FERC found such practices discriminatory under section 205. FERC then ordered the unbundling of wholesale generation and transmission services, which means that each utility must state separate rates for its wholesale generation, transmission, and ancillary services; imposed a similar open access requirement on unbundled retail transmissions in interstate commerce; and declined to extend the open access requirement to the transmission component of bundled retail sales. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals upheld the order.

NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers

No details yet.

NLRB v. Food Store Employees

No details yet.

NLRB v. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co.

No details yet.

NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.

No details yet.

NRPC v. Boston & Maine Corp.

Under the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA), the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) may enter into "trackage rights" agreements to use tracks owned and used by freight railroads. Section 562(d) of the act also states that Amtrak may buy tracks from private railroads, and may ask the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to condemn tracks owned by those railroads if they cannot agree on sale terms, provided that the tracks in question are "required for intercity rail passenger service." Amtrak's need for the tracks is established unless the private railroad can show either that its ability to carry out its obligations as a common carrier (that is, a transporter of public goods) will be seriously hampered or that Amtrak's needs can be met by the purchase of alternative property.

Amtrak had a "trackage rights" agreement with Boston and Maine Railroad (B & M). Amtrak claimed that it was forced to discontinue this agreement because B & M did not properly maintain its tracks. Amtrak then entered into an agreement with the Central Vermont Railroad (CV), under which it would acquire the B & M track and sell it to CV, which would take over maintenance of the track but grant "trackage rights" to Amtrak and usage rights to B & M. When B & M declined Amtrak's offer to purchase the track, Amtrak asked the ICC to condemn the track (thus allowing Amtrak to seize it). The ICC granted Amtrak's request. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, sent the case back to the ICC for reconsideration, because Amtrak had not demonstrated the need for ownership, just for use (demonstrated by its intent to convey the property to CV). Amtrak petitioned the appeals court to rehear the case, and while the petition was pending Congress amended the RPSA to explicitly allow Amtrak to seize property with the ICC's permission and then convey it to another party if that would further its mission. The appeals court denied rehearing, however, holding that the condemnation had been invalid because it was not "required for intercity rail passenger service."

Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines

No details yet.

Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States

No details yet.

Public Service Comm'n v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co.

No details yet.

Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide

The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) guarantees qualifying employees 12 weeks of unpaid leave each year and encourages businesses to adopt more generous policies. In 1996, Wolverine World Wide, Inc. granted Tracy Ragsdale 30 weeks of medical leave after she was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease. Wolverine did not notify Ragsdale that 12 weeks of the absence would count as her FMLA leave. After Ragsdale sought another 30-day extension, Wolverine refused her request and terminated her when she did not return to work. Ragsdale filed suit, alleging under Labor Department regulation 29 CFR section 825.700(a), which provides that if an employee takes medical leave "and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee's FMLA entitlement," that Wolverine was required to grant her 12 additional weeks of leave. The District Court granted Wolverine summary judgment, finding that the regulation was in conflict with the statute and invalid because it required Wolverine to grant Ragsdale more than 12 weeks of FMLA-compliant leave in one year. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Railway Clerks v. Employees Assn.

No details yet.

Red Lion Broadcasting Co.v. FCC

The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) fairness doctrine requires radio and television broadcasters to present a balanced and fair discussion of public issues on the airwaves. The doctrine is composed of two primary requirements concerning personal attacks in the context of public issue debates and political editorializing. The FCC conditioned its renewal of broadcast licenses on compliance with its regulations. Red Lion Broadcasting challenged the application of the fairness doctrine with respect to a particular broadcast. In a companion case (United States v. Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA)), the fairness doctrine's requirements concerning any broadcast were challenged.

Regions Hospital v. Shalala

Under the Medicare Act a hospital may obtain a reimbursement for certain graduate medical education (GME) programs for interns and residents by preparing certain reports. The GME Amendment, section 9202(a), of the Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985 directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to determine, for a hospital's cost reporting period starting during fiscal year 1984, the amount "recognized as reasonable" for GME costs. The Amendment then directs the Secretary to use the 1984 amount, adjusted for inflation, to calculate a hospital's GME reimbursement for subsequent years. The Secretary's "reaudit" regulation permits a second audit of the 1984 GME costs to ensure accurate reimbursements in future years. A reaudit of Regions Hospital significantly lowered the Hospital's allowable 1984 GME costs. Subsequently, the Hospital challenged the validity of the reaudit rule. Ultimately, the District Court granted the Secretary summary judgment, concluding that the rule reasonably interpreted Congress' prescription and that the reauditing did not impose an impermissible "retroactive rule." The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Reiter v. Cooper, Trustee For Carolina Motor Express, Inc.

No details yet.

S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States

No details yet.

Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co

No details yet.

Secretary Of Agriculture v. U.S.

No details yet.

Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital

No details yet.

Shuttle Corp. v. Transit Comm'n

No details yet.

Sims v. Apfel

After a state agency denied Juatassa Sims' application for Social Security disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits, she obtained a hearing before a Social Security Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ also denied Sims' claims, concluding that, although she did have some medical impairments, she had not been and was not under a "disability." Sims then sought review by the Social Security Appeals Council, which denied review. She next filed suit in the Federal District Court, contending that the ALJ erred in three ways by making selective use of the record, by posing defective questions to a vocational expert, and by failing to order a consultative examination. The District Court rejected her contentions. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over two of the contentions because they were not included in Sims' request for review by the Appeals Council.

Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota)

Barbara Smiley, a resident of California, possessed credits cards issued by Citibank, a national bank located in South Dakota. Under certain circumstances, Citibank will issue late-payment fees. In 1992, Smiley brought a class action against Citibank on behalf of herself and other California holders of Citibank's credit cards, alleging that the late-payment fees charged by Citibank, although legal under South Dakota law, violated California law. In response, Citibank argued that a provision of the National Bank Act of 1864, which permits a national bank to charge its loan customers "interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State... where the bank is located," pre-empted Smiley's state law claims. After accepting Citibank's argument that late-payment fees constituted "interest," the California Superior Court ruled in its favor. The California Superior Court Supreme Court affirmed.

Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina

No details yet.

Southern R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp.

No details yet.

Texas Gas Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.

No details yet.

Thomas Jefferson University, Dba Thomas Jefferson University Hospital v. Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services

No details yet.

Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner

No details yet.

Tooahnippah v. Hickel

No details yet.

Transportation Union v. U. P. R. Co.

No details yet.

Udall v. FPC

No details yet.

Udall v. Tallman

No details yet.

United Gas Co. v. Continental Oil Co.

No details yet.

United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mccombs

No details yet.

United States National Bank Of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents Of America, Inc.

No details yet.

United States v. Bean

After attending a gun show in Texas, Thomas Bean drove to Mexico. When Mexican officials stopped his vehicle at the border, they found ammunition, and Bean was subsequently convicted in a Mexican court of importing ammunition. Because of his felony conviction, 18 USC section 922(g)(1) prohibited Bean from possessing, distributing, or receiving firearms or ammunition. Bean applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) for relief from his firearms disabilities, but the ATF returned the application unprocessed, explaining that its annual appropriations law forbade it from expending any funds to investigate or act upon applications such as Bean's. Bean then filed suit, asking the District Court to conduct its own inquiry into his fitness to possess a gun and grant relief from his inability to possess, distribute, or receive firearms or ammunition. The court granted the requested relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co.

No details yet.

United States v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co.

No details yet.

United States v. City of Fulton

In 1979, the Southwestern Power Administration, a federal regulatory body acting on behalf of the Secretary of Energy, increased the cost of electricity generated by federally owned dams under its control. The price hike was initially implemented on an interim basis, and three years later, after furher review, the new rates were made permanent. A group of cities that purchased power from the dams filed suit to recover the extra fees it had paid before the interim rates were made final, claiming that Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 prohibited the imposition of interim fees. The Act stated that new rates would "become effective upon confirmation and approval by the Secretary (of Energy)." The cities asserted that the rates, while in their interim phase, had not yet received "confirmation and approval" from the Secretary and could therefore not be legally implemented.

The Court of Claims sided with the cities, holding that the new rates could only be charged once they received final approval from the Secretary. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.

United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co.

No details yet.

United States v. Grace & Sons

No details yet.

United States v. Haggar Apparel Company

The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States provides importers a partial exemption from duties otherwise imposed for articles which were assembled abroad, but that were not enhanced abroad, except by operations incidental to the assembly process. A regulation issued by the United States Customs Service deems permapressing operations to be an additional step in manufacture, not part of or incidental to the assembly process. The Haggar Apparel Company sought a refund for duties imposed on a collection of its men's trousers that it had shipped to the U.S. from an assembly plant in Mexico. The trousers' pre-treated fabric had been cut in the U.S. and then shipped to Mexico, along with the thread, buttons, and zippers necessary to complete the garments. Under the HTSUS, had the trousers only been sewn and reshipped they would have been eligible for the duty exemption that Haggar sought. However, Haggar also permapressed the trousers by baking them in an oven at the Mexican facility before shipping them to the U.S. The Customs Service claimed that the baking was a process in addition to assembly and denied the duty exemption. Haggar contended that the baking was simply part of the assembly process. Subsequently, Haggar filed suit, seeking the refund, in the Court of International Trade. The court declined to treat the Customs Service's regulation as controlling and ruled in Haggar's favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

United States v. Mead Corp.

Under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, the United States Customs Service is authorized to classify and fix the rate of duty on imports under rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury. Under the Secretary's regulations, any port-of-entry Customs office and the Customs Headquarters Office may issue "ruling letters" setting tariff classifications for particular imports. The Mead Corporation's imported "day planners," were classified as duty-free until the Customs Headquarters issued a ruling letter classifying them as bound diaries subject to tariff. Subsequently, Mead filed suit in the Court of International Trade. The court granted the Government summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that ruling letters should not be treated like Customs regulations, which receive the highest level of deference, because they are not preceded by notice and comment as under the Administrative Procedure Act, do not carry the force of law, and are not intended to clarify importers's rights and obligations beyond the specific case. The court gave no deference at all to the ruling letter at issue.

United States v. Utah Constr. Co.

No details yet.

United States v. Western Pac. R. Co.

No details yet.

USPS v. Gregory

Maria Gregory worked for the United States Postal Service as a letter technician with responsibility for overseeing letter carriers on five mail routes and serving as a replacement carrier on those routes. In 1997, while three disciplinary actions that the Postal Service took against Gregory were pending in grievance proceedings pursuant to the Postal Service's collective bargaining agreement with her union, the Postal Service terminated Gregory's employment after a fourth violation. Gregory then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, where an agency must prove its charge by a preponderance of the evidence, proving not only that the misconduct occurred, but also that the penalty assessed is reasonable in relation to it. Analyzing her three prior disciplinary actions independently, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that Gregory's termination was reasonable in light of her four violations. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that prior disciplinary actions subject to ongoing proceedings may not be used to support a penalty's reasonableness.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC

No details yet.

Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank

No details yet.

Young v. Community Nutrition Institute

No details yet.

Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala

Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. provides home health care services to Medicare beneficiaries. Under the Medicare Act, providers seeking reimbursement for covered health services submit a yearly cost report to a fiscal intermediary, usually a private insurance company. The intermediary then issues a Notice of Program Reimbursement (NPR) determining the provider's reimbursement. The Act allows the provider up to 180 days to appeal a reimbursement determination to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board. The provider also has up to three years to ask the intermediary to reopen a determination of the Board. Your Home Visiting Nurse submitted cost reports for 1989 to its intermediary and did not appeal the reimbursement decision. However, within three years Your Home Visiting Nurse asked its intermediary to reopen its 1989 reimbursement determination on the ground that "new and material" evidence demonstrated entitlement to additional compensation. The intermediary denied the request. Your Home Visiting Nurse appealed the denial to the Board, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that lacked it jurisdiction to review an intermediary's refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination. Your Home Visiting Nurse then brought action in Federal District Court, seeking review of the Board's dismissal and of the intermediary's refusal to reopen. The District Court agreed that the Board lacked jurisdiction to review the refusal to reopen. Moreover, it rejected Your Home Visiting Nurse's contention that the federal-question statute or the mandamus statute gave the District Court jurisdiction to review the intermediary's refusal directly. Subsequently, the court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed.