The Oyez Project: Judicial Power Issues - Judicial Review Decisions

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner

No details yet.

ABF Freight System, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

Can the National Labor Relations Board grant reinstatement with backpay to an employee who lied under oath during his administrative hearing?

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that the National Labor Relations Act gave the Board broad authority to adopt laws regarding the reinstatement of employees. The Court called perjury "intolerable in a formal proceeding," but ruled that the National Labor Relations Board was under no obligation to adopt a blanket rule against reinstating employees who have perjured themselves. Reducing the Board's discretion in making rules for employee reinstatement "might force the Board to divert its attention from its primary mission and devote unnecessary time and energy to resolving collateral disputes about credibility."

All States Frgt. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co.

No details yet.

Aluminum Co. v. Central Lincoln Util. Dist.

No details yet.

American Airlines v. North American

No details yet.

American Trucking v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co.

No details yet.

Atlantic Rfg. Co. v. Ftc.

No details yet.

Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Could the Tax Court exclude from the record on appeal Rule 183(b) reports submitted by special trial judges?

No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that no statute authorized, and Rule 183's text did not warrant, the concealment of the special report. Rule 183 did not allow the "novel practice" of treating the trial judge's opinion as an "in-house draft to be worked over collaboratively by the regular Tax Court judge and the special trial judge." The rules allowed only one trial judge opinion to be issued and before a separate Tax Court ruling, Ginsburg wrote. It would be impossible for a Tax Court judge to give deference to an opinion he himself collaborated in producing. Moreover, the Tax Court's refusal to disclose the trial judge's original report did not allow fully informed appellate review of the court's decision.

Bethesda Hospital Assn. v. Bowen

No details yet.

Block v. Community Nutrition Institute

No details yet.

Board Of Governors, Frs v. Dimension Financial

No details yet.

Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital

No details yet.

Bowen v. Mich. Academy Of Family Physicians

No details yet.

Bowsher v. Merck & Co.

No details yet.

Brock v. Pierce County

No details yet.

Burlington Northern Inc. v. United States

No details yet.

Burlington Truck Lines v. U.S.

No details yet.

Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co.

No details yet.

Califano v. Sanders

No details yet.

Canada Packers v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co.

No details yet.

Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co.

No details yet.

City Of Chicago v. United States

No details yet.

Civil Aeronautics Board v. Hermann

No details yet.

Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor

No details yet.

Conley v. Gibson

No details yet.

Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n

No details yet.

Dalton, Secretary Of The Navy v. Specter

No details yet.

Dickinson v. Zurko

Must the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit use the framework set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act when reviewing the Patent and Trademark Office's findings of fact?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit must use the framework set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act when reviewing PTO findings of fact. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that, "[A] close examination of the...cases reviewing PTO decisions do not reflect a well-established court/court standard." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, dissented, noting that at the time of the enactment of the APA judicial review of fact-finding by the PTO under the "clearly erroneous" standard was an "additional requiremen[t]...recognized by law."

Dole v. United Steel Workers of America

No details yet.

Dunlop v. Bachowski

No details yet.

Etsi Pipeline Project v. Missouri

No details yet.

FCC v. Schreiber

No details yet.

Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exch.

No details yet.

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion

No details yet.

Fmc v. Svenska Amerika Linien

No details yet.

FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.

No details yet.

Franklin v. Massachusetts

Did the Secretary of Commerce's decision to apportion overseas personnel of the Department of Defense to their "homes of record" for census purposes meet the constitutional requirement of a census counting the number of people "in each State," or was the procedure "arbitrary and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act?

The Secretary's decision was not reviewable under the APA because it was not a "final agency action." Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in the majority opinion, wrote that only agency decisions that complete the decision-making process and directly affect the party bring suit may be challenged under the APA. In this case the Secretary's decision resulted merely in a set of findings reported to the President that he could ask to have revised using a different formula. Also, the recommendation (and therefore the procedure used to arrive at it) did not directly affect Massachusetts; the President had to take action before the findings would affect the number of Representatives apportioned to the State. The procedure and the findings that resulted from it, therefore, was not a "final agency action" challengeable under the APA, and the actions of the President are also not challengeable under the APA.

Evaluating the Secretary's chosen procedure under Article I Section 2 of the Constitution, however, Justice O'Connor ruled that the decision to include overseas personnel of the Department of Defense was a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution's intent. "The Secretary's judgment does not hamper the underlying constitutional goal of equal representation, but, assuming that employees temporarily stationed abroad have indeed retained their ties to their home states, actually promotes equality," wrote Justice O'Connor.

Frozen Food Exp. v. United States

No details yet.

Ftc v. Flotill Products

No details yet.

Ftc v. Mary Carter Paint Co.

No details yet.

Ftc v. Standard Oil Co. Of Cal.

No details yet.

Ftc v. Universal-Rundle Corp.

No details yet.

Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn.

No details yet.

Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services

No details yet.

Gunther v. San Diego & A. E. R. Co.

No details yet.

Gutierrez De Martinez v. Lamagno

No details yet.

Heckler v. Chaney

Are decisions made by the FDA not to exercise enforcement authority over the use of drugs precluded from judicial review by Section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 501 et seq. (APA)?

Yes, they are presumptively unreviewable. Refusals of administrative agencies to exercise enforcement authority involve a complicated balancing of factors, including agency allocation of scarce resources, which are not suitable for judicial review. Thus, they are presumptively "committed to agency discretion by law" under Section 701(a)(2). This presumption may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers. In the instant case, the presumption of unreviewability was not overcome by the enforcement provisions of the FDCA. The FDCA's prohibition on "misbranding" of drugs and introduction of "new drugs," absent agency approval, does not supply relevant guidelines. Neither does the FDA's "policy statement" indicating that the agency considered itself "obligated" to take certain investigative actions nor the FDCA's provision that the Secretary need not report for prosecution minor violations of the Act supply relevant guidelines.

Hotel Employees v. Leedom

No details yet.

Icc v. Locomotive Engineers

No details yet.

Illinois C. R. Co. v. Norfolk & W. R. Co.

No details yet.

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Transcon Lines

No details yet.

Kleppe v. Delta Mining, Inc.

No details yet.

Labor Board v. Duval Jewelry Co.

No details yet.

Labor Board v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp.

No details yet.

Leedom v. International Union

No details yet.

Leedom v. Kyne

No details yet.

Lehigh Valley Coop. v. United States

No details yet.

Lewis v. Labor Board

No details yet.

Lincoln, Acting Director, Indian Health Service v. Vigil

No details yet.

Lindahl v. Opm

No details yet.

Maislin Industries, US, Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc.

No details yet.

Marine Terminal v. Rederi. Transatlantic

No details yet.

Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild

Can collective bargaining contracts require membership for employment without articulating what it means to be "in good standing?"

Yes. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled collective bargaining contracts do not have to spell out what it means to be "in good standing." Justice O'Conner noted that requiring membership to be specified in a contract would force all terms to be specified. There would be no limit.

Mcnary v. Haitian Refugee Center., Inc.

No details yet.

Meat Cutters v. Labor Board

No details yet.

Mobil Oil Exploration v. United Distribution

No details yet.

Moog Industries, Inc., v. F. T. C.

No details yet.

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut.

No details yet.

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines

No details yet.

National Assn. Of Greeting Card Pubs. v. Usps

No details yet.

National Cable and Telecom. Assoc. v. Gulf Power

Does the Pole Attachments Act cover attachments that provide both cable television and high-speed Internet service? Does the Act cover attachments by wireless telecommunications providers?

Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held 6-2 that the Act covers attachments that provide high-speed Internet access at the same time as cable television and 8-0 that the Act applies to wireless attachments by providers of wireless telecommunications services. The Court reasoned that the FCC's assertion of jurisdiction under the Act to regulate rates charged for attachments that provided commingled cable television and high-speed Internet access and for attachments by wireless telecommunications providers was reasonable and, therefore, entitled to deference. Joined by Justice David H. Souter, Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that the FCC had failed to clearly explain the specific statutory basis on which the FCC was regulating rates for attachments that provided commingled cable television service and high-speed Internet access. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.

National Cable and Telecomm. Assn v. Brand X Internet Services

Did the FCC lawfully interpret the Communications Act of 1934 by deciding that broadband cable companies did not provide a "telecommunications service?"

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the FCC lawfully construed the Communications Act to not define cable broadband providers as "telecommunications services." The Court held that the Ninth Circuit should have followed the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. That decision required federal courts to defer to an agency's construction of a statute, if that statute was within the agency's jurisdiction to administer and the agency's interpretation was reasonable, even if it differed from the court's own interpretation. In this case, the Court held that the FCC's construction was reasonable.

National Cable Television Assn. v. U.S.

No details yet.

National Coal Operators' Assn. v. Kleppe

No details yet.

Nationsbank Of North Carolina, N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.

No details yet.

Nelson, Inc., v. United States

No details yet.

New Haven Inclusion Cases

No details yet.

New York v. FERC

May the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission require a public utility to transmit competitors' electricity over its lines on the same terms that the utility applies to its own energy transmissions, if the utility unbundles, or separates, the cost of transmission from the cost of electrical energy when billing its retail customers? Must FERC impose that requirement on utilities that continue to offer only bundled retail sales?

Yes and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that FERC properly construed its statutory authority. The Court's 9-0 decision affirmed that FERC had the jurisdiction to require nondiscriminatory access to electrical transmission by utilities, which unbundled their costs, regardless of state regulation of retail sales, and, by a 6-3 vote, was not required to impose requirements on bundled retail sales. "Because the FPA authorizes FERC's jurisdiction over interstate transmissions, without regard to whether the transmissions are sold to a reseller or directly to a consumer, FERC's exercise of this power is valid," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.

NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers

No details yet.

NLRB v. Food Store Employees

No details yet.

NLRB v. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co.

No details yet.

NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.

No details yet.

NRPC v. Boston & Maine Corp.

Was the Interstate Commerce Commission's decision to permit Amtrak to seize the property of B & M Railroad under the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 reasonable?

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the ICC was entitled to deference and that its decision had been reasonable. In the majority opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that by interpreting the statute's use of "required" to mean that the track must be useful but not absolutely indispensable to Amtrak's operation, the ICC had better accommodated the underlying intention of the RPSA than the appeals court. That finding was reinforced by Congress's amendment to the act, which would only be effective under the ICC's interpretation.

Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines

No details yet.

Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States

No details yet.

Public Service Comm'n v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co.

No details yet.

Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide

Does Labor Department regulation 29 CFR section 825.700(a) require employers to grant an employee additional leave after granting more than 12 weeks of leave, if the employer failed to notify the employee that the original leave counted against the employee's Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 entitlement?

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the regulation is contrary to the FMLA and beyond the Secretary of Labor's authority. Among other findings, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the regulation amended the FMLA's most fundamental substantive guarantee, the 12-week leave entitlement, and thus undermined Congress's balance of the needs of families and the interests of employers. Arguing that the regulation was incompatible with the regulation, Justice Kennedy wrote that, it "imposes a high price for a good-faith but erroneous characterization of an absence as non-FMLA leave, and employers like Wolverine might well conclude that the simpler, less generous route is the preferable one." Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.

Railway Clerks v. Employees Assn.

No details yet.

Red Lion Broadcasting Co.v. FCC

Do the FCC's fairness doctrine regulations, concerning personal attacks made in the context of public issue debates and political editorializing, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantees?

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the fairness doctrine was consistent with the First Amendment. Writing for the Court, Justice White argued that spectrum scarcity made it "idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." The Court held that the FCC's fairness doctrine regulations enhanced rather than infringed the freedoms of speech protected under the First Amendment. With respect to the regulation of personal attacks made in the context of public issue debates, the FCC's requirement that the subject of the attack be provided with a tape, transcript, or broadcast summary, as well as an opportunity to respond without having to prove an inability to pay for the "air-time," insured a balanced and open discussion of contested issues. The requirement that political editorializing be presented for and against both sides of the debated issues also contributed to the balanced discussion of public concerns.

Regions Hospital v. Shalala

Is the Secretary of Health and Human Services' "reaudit" rule a reasonable interpretation of the GME Amendment of the Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985?

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the reaudit rule is a reasonable interpretation of the GME Amendment and that it is not impermissibly retroactive. Given that the timing of the "recognized as reasonable" determination is silent and thus ambiguous, the Court concluded that, because it reflects a reasonable interpretation of the law, the reaudit rule merits the Court's approbation. "The Secretary's reaudit rule brings the base-year calculation in line with Congress' pervasive instruction for reasonable cost reimbursement," wrote Justice Ginsburg. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas joined.

Reiter v. Cooper, Trustee For Carolina Motor Express, Inc.

No details yet.

S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States

No details yet.

Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co

No details yet.

Secretary Of Agriculture v. U.S.

No details yet.

Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital

No details yet.

Shuttle Corp. v. Transit Comm'n

No details yet.

Sims v. Apfel

Is a Social Security claimant barred from federal judicial review of issues he or she failed to raise during the administrative process?

No. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held, 5 to 4, that Social Security claimants who exhaust administrative remedies need not also exhaust issues administratively in order to preserve judicial review of those issues. Justice Thomas wrote that the issue-exhaustion requirement, usually required even in the absence of a statute or regulation, does not apply in a non-adversarial proceeding, as in Social Security cases. Justice O'Connor filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy.

Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota)

Does the National Bank Act of 1864 authorize a national bank to charge late-payment fees that are lawful in the bank's home State but prohibited in the States where the cardholders reside?

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the National Bank Act of 1864 authorizes such charges because a regulation adopted by the Comptroller of the Currency, which defined interest to include late-payment fees, was a reasonable interpretation of the act and entitled to deference. The Court rejected arguments that late-payment fees do not constitute interest because they do not vary based on the payment owed or the time period of delay and because they are penalties.

Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina

No details yet.

Southern R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp.

No details yet.

Texas Gas Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.

No details yet.

Thomas Jefferson University, Dba Thomas Jefferson University Hospital v. Shalala, Secretary Of Health And Human Services

No details yet.

Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner

No details yet.

Tooahnippah v. Hickel

No details yet.

Transportation Union v. U. P. R. Co.

No details yet.

Udall v. FPC

No details yet.

Udall v. Tallman

No details yet.

United Gas Co. v. Continental Oil Co.

No details yet.

United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mccombs

No details yet.

United States National Bank Of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents Of America, Inc.

No details yet.

United States v. Bean

Does a federal district court, despite appropriation provisions barring the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms from acting on applications for relief from firearms disabilities from persons convicted of a felony, have the authority to grant such relief?

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the absence of an actual denial of Bean's petition by ATF precludes judicial review. Because Bean's application for relief from the firearms disabilities was not considered due to appropriation provisions, Justice Thomas reasoned that the court could not grant relief since the statute only permitted judicial review of an affirmative denial of an application. "The text of [section 925(c)] and the procedure it lays out for seeking relief make clear that an actual decision by ATF on an application is a prerequisite for judicial review, and that mere inaction by ATF does not invest a district court with independent jurisdiction to act on an application," wrote Justice Thomas.

United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co.

No details yet.

United States v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co.

No details yet.

United States v. City of Fulton

Can the Secretary of Energy or his delegates impose new hydro-electricity prices on an interim basis under Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944?

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Secretary of Energy could impose rate hikes on an interim basis without violating the Act. The Court found that the language of the Act and its legislative history did not conclusively show whether Congress intended the Secretary to impose rate hikes on an interim basis. The Secretary's decision, therefore, only needed to be a reasonable attempt to balance the competing interests in the act: preventing unnecessarily high charges to customers while still allowing the dams to be self-sufficient (and therefore not a burden on government resources). Justice Marshall wrote "Interim ratesetting appears well suited to accommodating that dual goal... [and therefore] the procedures established by the Secretary to exercise his powers under the Flood Control Act both are within his delegated authority and constitute a reasonable accommodation of the policies underlying that Act." The Court further found that the rate increases were consistent with the cities' electricity contracts, which were based largely on the language of the Act.

United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co.

No details yet.

United States v. Grace & Sons

No details yet.

United States v. Haggar Apparel Company

Is the United States Customs Service's regulation regarding permapressing entitled to judicial deference?

The Court did not expressly answer the question. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court vacated and remanded the case. The Court concluded that the regulation in question was subject to further analysis. Additionally, the Court held that if the regulation was a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision, then it required judicial deference in the Court of International Trade.

United States v. Mead Corp.

Does a tariff classification ruling by the United States Customs Service deserve judicial deference?

No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the "administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for [the greatest level of deference accorded under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council] when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority." Justice Souter wrote that "a tariff classification has no claim to judicial deference under Chevron, there being no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law, but we hold that under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the ruling is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness."

United States v. Utah Constr. Co.

No details yet.

United States v. Western Pac. R. Co.

No details yet.

USPS v. Gregory

Must the Merit Systems Protection Board adopt the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruling that, when assessing a penalty's reasonableness, the Board may not consider prior disciplinary actions that are pending in collectively bargained grievance proceedings?

No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that that the Federal Circuit's ruling was vacated because the Board has broad discretion in determining how to review prior disciplinary actions and need not adopt the Federal Circuit's rule. The Court reasoned that the Board had broad discretion under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of 5 USC section 7703(c) to review prior disciplinary actions and that the role of the judiciary was only to ascertain whether the Board had met this minimum standard. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC

No details yet.

Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank

No details yet.

Young v. Community Nutrition Institute

No details yet.

Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala

Can Medicare-reimbursed health care providers appeal a fiscal intermediary's refusal to reopen previous reimbursement decisions?

No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the Board does not have jurisdiction to review a fiscal intermediary's refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination. Moreover, the Court held that the federal-question statute and mandamus statute do not entitle Your Home Visiting Nurse to judicial review of the intermediary's reopening decision.